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Abstract 
 
This research is to evaluate soft law as a method to regulate public procurement from a trade 
perspective. The value of soft law is studied under this thesis according to a four-fold approach – 
bindingness, precision, discretion and delegation. An international legal instrument can be 
considered soft along one or more of the above four dimensions. 
Based on the reviews of the current procurement regimes, the thesis outlines the values of soft law 
in regulating procurement. Soft law may serve as a second-best to hard law where the latter can not 
be achieved. It is explained that public procurement is a sensitive subject in the sense that many 
states are often unwilling to give up their regulatory freedom for protectionism purposes. Soft law in 
terms of all the four dimensions is argued as an effective device for breaking deadlock and fostering 
compromises in negotiating a procurement agreement. Also, it can serve as an ‘intermediate step’ 
towards the formation of hard law even though this is not necessarily the case.  
Soft law can also be regarded as a better alternative to hard law even where the latter is attainable. 
Possible advantages of soft law are identified including its reduced negotiating costs; reduced 
implementing costs; reserved states’ regulatory autonomy for national legitimate objectives and 
better adaptation to changes. Meanwhile, its possible disadvantages are mentioned and possible 
ways of addressing these disadvantages are also suggested. 
Special features of procurement are identified including intrusiveness, sensitivity, complexity and 
constant evolution, which might be relevant for soft law’s influence in that particular area. At the end, 
the thesis sets out both s short-term and a long-term proposal for developing a multilateral 
agreement on government by use of soft law. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The Significance of Regulating Public Procurement with a Trade Objective and the Current 
Difficulties. 
This thesis provides an evaluation of soft law as a method of regulating public procurement from a trade 
perspective. Before elaborating the precise research questions it is necessary to provide an introduction 
to both the significance of regulating public procurement internationally to promote trade and the 
current difficulty in opening up markets, and to the concept of soft law. 
Government procurement1accounts for a substantial value of commercial activities in most countries, 
and the size of public procurement market represents considerable opportunities for international trade.2 
Public procurement, however, tends to favour domestic suppliers. Traditionally, procurement was 
utilised as a policy tool to achieve industrial, social and environmental objectives3 . Also, public 
procurement constitutes a barrier to trade in many countries for illegitimate reasons like corruption, 
nepotism and political patronage. Moreover, even if there exists no deliberate discrimination, foreign 
suppliers are often disproportionately affected compared to domestic ones owing to structural 
inefficiencies of certain national systems.4 The empirical research indicates that government purchases 
are home-biased by the evidence found that governments exhibit consistently lower import share than 
the private economy.5  
                                                        
1
 There is no agreed definition of government procurement, however the term ‘government procurement’ or ‘public 
procurement’ (these two terms are interchangeable) in this thesis refers to ‘the acquisition by public bodies, such as 
government departments and municipalities, of various goods and services that they need for their activities. see 
Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Jr, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspective (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International Ltd, 2000) at p.1 
2
 According to the recent statistics provided by OECD, in 1998, for OECD countries as a whole, the share of total public 
procurement (consumption and investment expenditures) for all levels of government is an estimated 19.96% of GDP, 
while for non-OECD countries it is 14.48% of GDP; the value of the worldwide potentially contestable part of the 
government procurement markets in 1998 is estimated to be equivalent to 7.1% of world GDP or 30.1% of the global 
merchandise and commercial services export. See OECD(2002),‘The Size of Government Procurement Markets’ available 
at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/14/1845927.pdf> 
3
 Such objectives are often referred to as ‘secondary’ or ‘collateral’ objectives, by way of contrast with the ‘primary’ 
concern of a procurement of obtaining goods or services on the best possible terms. 
4
 Such structural inefficiencies include opaque procurement procedures, inexperienced purchasing officers, badly drafted 
specifications. 
5
 See Trionfetti, ‘Home-biased Government Procurement and International Trade: Descriptive Statistics, Theory and 
Empirical Evidence’ In Arrowsmith and Tybus (ed), Public Procurement: the Continuing Revolution (Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) at p. 232 
 1
In recognition of the value of free trade which leads to more efficient use of world resources and 
maximum total economic welfare6, a lot of efforts have been made towards the liberalisation of public 
procurement markets. The last decade of the twentieth century has witnessed the start of a ‘global 
revolution’ in the regulation of public procurement, involving many ambitious programmes of domestic 
procurement reform as well as the growth of international trade agreements on procurement.7 As regards 
such international instruments, they are different in terms of their objectives, approaches as well as other 
key features.  
In the contemporary legal system, international agreements on nearly all subjects have increasingly 
come to use various approaches to regulation. Many scholars distinguish soft law approaches from hard 
law ones, but the term ‘soft law’ is defined differently. This thesis defines ‘soft law’ in comparison with 
‘hard law’. ‘Hard law’ is defined as legally binding rules that create definitive rights or obligations, and 
enforceable through violation deterrence measures, dispute settlement procedures etc. Accordingly, ‘Soft 
law’ refers to rules of conduct that are formulated in instruments which lack certain core elements of 
hard law, namely, bindingness, precision, discretion and delegation, but nevertheless not devoid of all 
the legal effects of hard law, and that are aimed at and may have practical effects comparable to hard law. 
This definition will be elaborated in chapter 2. 
Most international or regional procurement regimes, which seek to open up procurement markets, 
operate through formal negotiation and consequential binding agreements. For example, the Agreement 
on Government Procurement (‘GPA’) under the WTO system, the European Community (‘EC’) 
procurement directives, the North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’) show one or more key 
dimensions of hard law notably bindingness. However, those liberalising efforts met with limited 
success in the sense that only a limited number of countries have accepted comprehensive multilateral 
disciplines on government procurement, leaving the procurement markets of the majority of developing 
countries unaddressed in the world trading system.  
                                                        
6
 For general information as to the value of free trade, please refer to the literature on the economics of international trade, 
such as Krugman and Obstfeld, International economics: theory and policy (Addison-Wesley, 2004) 
7
 Arrowsmith, ‘National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: Harmony or Conflict’, In 
Arrowsmith and Tybus (ed), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998) at p.3 
 2
On the other hand, certain international instruments regulating procurement can be also found 
operating on the basis of soft law commitments. The Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (‘APEC’) 
provides a remarkable example for such an approach. The Government Procurement Expert Group 
(‘GPEG’) within APEC was established in 1995 to consider ways to increase transparency of, and 
liberalise, government procurement market throughout the Asia-Pacific region.8 Pursuant to its 1996 
Osaka Action Agenda, the GPEG developed a set of non-binding principles on public procurement 
(NBPs)9, which were endorsed by APEC member economies in 1999 and later revised in 2005. Like the 
usual APEC approach, there is notable state discretion in implementing these NBPs, and thus states’ 
regulatory autonomy on procurement has largely been preserved. Such NBPs are of a non-binding 
nature, worded in an imprecise and discretional way and without any delegation to a third party in 
enforcement. Member economies may decide which ones to apply and how to translate these elements 
into practical measures, taking into account the specific characteristics of their economy.10    
It is hardly surprising that such an approach has made it much easier for members to agree on what 
should be included in the NBPs compared with hard law agreements, and it is also not necessary to set 
out detailed rules concerning scope, derogation etc, as is the case with most hard law agreements such as 
the GPA.11 Similar soft law international instruments aiming at opening up procurement markets include 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (‘COMESA’).  
Despite the above benefits that such soft law arrangements can possibly offer, the central question is 
how they can generate incentives for member governments to comply with their principles or rules since 
they are entirely voluntary. In contrast, two features of binding hard law agreements such as the GPA 
make government officials refrain from taking measures contrary to the agreements12: one is the 
                                                        
8
 See APEC website www.apec.org 
9
 The APEC GPEG NBPs are Value for Money; Open and Effective Competition; Fair Dealing; Accountability and Due 
Process; an Non-discrimination. Originally, the Principle of Transparency was also included in the NBPs, but it has now 
been subsumed into the area-specific APEC Transparency Standards on Government Procurement. Ibid. 
10
 Transparency Principal, see APEC website 
<http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/documents_reports/government_procurement_experts_group/2003.html#I> 
11
 Arrowsmith, ‘The APEC Document on Principles of Transparency in Government Procurement’, (1998) P.P.L.R. CS38 
at p.CS40 
12 Evenett, S and B. Hoekman, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: What can We Expect from International Trade 
Agreement’, In Arrowsmith and Trybus (ed), note 5, at p.279-281 , 
 3
expectation of future trade negotiations and the market access benefits that they can bring to a nation’s 
exporters; the other is that disputes can be brought before an independent body, and sanctions may be 
authorised against nations that break the provisions of an agreement. However, these features are 
obviously absent in the non-binding soft law international law regime due to its optional nature. Rather, 
‘peer’ pressure and mutual verification are frequently pointed in order to explain the efficiency of 
APEC-like soft law regimes. 
 
1.2 The Research Question for the Thesis 
From the international law perspective, a variety of forms of international commitment have been 
adopted in the international legal system owing to an ever-growing number of transnational problems, 
among which soft law is playing increasingly important and varied roles.13  
There exists a considerable scholarship that addresses the phenomenon of the increasing use of 
international soft law approach to tackle transnational problems across many subject areas especially the 
areas of human rights law, environmental law, arms control, and trade and finance. In the particular area 
of public procurement, a lot of research has been done in order to find ways to subject procurement to 
international competition, for example, how to expand the membership of the GPA especially to make it 
more attractive to developing countries.  
However, little attention has been paid to the existing use of soft law in international public 
procurement instruments.14 No one has really analysed various soft law elements as well as different 
approaches utilised in the context of public procurement and the value of soft law in procurement 
remains a subject that has not been seriously addressed. 
                                                        
13
 Shelton, ‘Introduction: Law, Non-law and the Problem of ‘soft law’’, In Shelton (eds) Commitment and Compliance: the 
Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System ’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at p.17 
14
 There are several remarks made by scholars. For instance, Arrowsmith was of opinion that there are grounds to believe 
that the APEC approach may produce considerable results despite many criticisms on its non-binding and optional nature. 
In particular, she believed that the flexibility of the APEC transparency agreement eliminates the need for detailed rules on 
both award procedures and scope of the agreement. See Arrowsmith, ‘Public Procurement within the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-operation Forum’ (1996) PPLR CS71 at p.SC72 and Arrowsmith, note 11, at p.CS40 
 
 4
This thesis will mainly focus on the value of soft law as a method for regulating procurement form the 
trade perspective. Based on the analyse of the use of soft/hard law in various procurement instruments, it 
attempts to outline the possible advantages and disadvantages that soft law could have in the context of 
public procurement. For example, the use of soft law eliminates the need for detailed definition of 
coverage, which avoids certain problems involved in GPA-type binding agreements such as the 
complexity of rules that might be needed, the difficulties of achieving uniform coverage due to 
economic and political difference among member states and so on. However, the choice of soft law in a 
procurement agreement might affect the credibility of its rules by increasing the chance for opportunistic 
states to shirk from their obligations or failing to provide an effective deterrent to non-compliance. 
The chapter also seeks identify factors specific to procurement that might be relevant for soft law's 
influence in that particular context. For example, public procurement is a sensitive area especially in 
some developing countries with high-level corruption and patronage. Is this a factor that might make 
soft law easier to be agreed upon but more difficult to be observed by such countries? Or could the 
intrusive nature of international procurement law on state sovereignty make certain soft law a better 
alternative to hard law in terms of preserving states’ regulatory freedom in pursuing their legitimate 
procurement objectives? The thesis seeks to answer these questions.  
However, it should be noted that the thesis is not aimed at providing any factual conclusion on the 
market opening effects of soft law approaches because of the absence of empirical work.  
At the end, based on the conclusions on the value of soft law and the specific features of 
procurement, the thesis will set out both short-term and long-term proposals for developing a 
multilateral procurement agreement by use of soft law. Instead of proposing any substantive rules for 
a future multilateral procurement agreement, the short term proposal explores ways in which soft 
law can be used to achieve a multilateral procurement agreement by mitigating the current political 
oppositions especially from developing countries, whilst the long-term proposal intends to design 
hard/soft law elements for a future multilateral agreement taking into account the particular features 
of procurement. Again due to the lack of empirical evidence, the value of these two proposals is only 
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limited to providing some theoretical hypotheses to be verified by further empirical research. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
The method employed by the thesis is essentially that of legal analysis. Since the research question of 
the thesis aims at evaluating the use of soft law as a method for regulating procurement from a trade 
perspective, the research will generally involve two different areas of law, namely, public procurement 
law and public international law. The primary focus is the application of general soft law arguments 
raised in the field of public international law scholarship to a particular area of law – public procurement 
law. It seeks to consider the value of soft law to regulate procurement in contrast to that of hard law  
A theoretical literature review concerning soft law from the public international law perspective is 
important not only for defining the scope of the subject matter, but also for setting out a framework to 
study the value of soft law in later chapters. After examining a vast amount of existing literatures on soft 
law, the thesis develops a framework of types of soft law largely based on Abbott et al’s legalization 
framework15 but with slight adaptations. The framework makes it clear that what types of soft law 
elements utilised in the area of public procurement will be examined in relation to its value for 
regulating this area. 
The analysis of a variety of current international procurement instruments and initiatives, focusing on 
techniques, is expected to illustrate how soft/hard law functions in implementation as well as how the 
choice of soft/hard law during negotiations influences the conclusion of a procurement agreement. The 
choice of legal analysis is justified by the theoretical nature of the work and the classic doctrine of the 
sources of law. The analysis concerns both international procurement law in force and the failed 
initiative to negotiate international procurement agreements.  
To do this will involve a contrast between soft law approaches and hard law approaches within the 
current international procurement instruments to see what soft law can better offer over hard law, and 
                                                        
15
 See Abbott, K., R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000), 3 
International Organization 401-419 
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also to compare different techniques employed by different soft law regimes in the context of 
international procurement law. It aims to show the benefits and pitfalls of using different soft law 
elements in existing procurement regimes, which largely contributes to final conclusions on the value of 
soft law in regulating procurement. 
The analysis will cover all major international and regional procurement instruments that have the 
English version of their relevant documents available, including both trade and non-trade instruments. 
Although the final analysis will focus on trade instruments, the study on non-trade instruments is meant 
to establish possible options for the vaule of soft law in regulating procurement.  
Besides existing procurement instruments in force, the failed initiatives to negotiate procurement 
agreements are also examined to show the situations or obstacles we currently face in finding a way to 
subject public procurement to international competition. This helps to explore the possible value of soft 
law to tackle the current obstacles and to facilitate the successful conclusion of a procurement 
agreement. 
The thesis approaches the value of soft law in international procurement law exclusively from a legal 
perspective instead of an economic or political one. The political situation in international trade 
negotiations and the political attitude toward compliance with international procurement law will be 
analysed. However it is only relevant to the extent that international procurement rules will or should be 
shaped according to the current political background. 
Moreover, compliance with soft law is considered a central factor as far as the value of soft law is 
concerned. Various incentives and disincentives to compliance may be identified but little can be done 
to quantify these factors because the decisions of states and non-state actors to comply or not to comply 
involve complex and holistic determinations, not always based on rational preferences.16  
The limited time and resources available also leads to a methodology that confines the research work 
to drawing out relevant factors purely based on legal analysis and certain secondary data sources rather 
than relevant empirical study. As a result, the research work is limited owing to the absence of 
                                                        
16
 See Shelton, note 13, at p.17 
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quantifying the relative value, from the trade perspective, of the various different types of soft law 
approaches in the context of procurement.  
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
Besides the introduction (Chapter 1) and conclusion (Chapter 12), the thesis will be divided into four 
parts and ten chapters. 
The first part is Chapter 2, which mainly involves a theoretical analysis of soft law form the public 
international law perspective. This part includes not only a definition of the term ‘soft law’ and an 
analysis of the concept of soft law, but also sets out a four-fold framework for studying the value of soft 
law for the rest of thesis. It generally evaluates the role of soft law in the contemporary international 
legal system by comparison with hard law, and the possible advantages and disadvantages of four 
different types of soft law are identified and explained in this chapter. The important issue of compliance 
is also addressed, and reasons for compliance with soft law instruments, sources of non-compliance, and 
measures for inducing compliance are generally discussed. 
The second part of the thesis comprises Chapters 3-6. This part examines the current international 
procurement instruments and initiatives including those with trade-related objectives as well as 
non-trade objectives, focusing on their objectives, general approach, coverage, secondary policies and 
soft law and hard law issues. 
Chapter 3 examines the public procurement instruments and initiatives within the WTO framework 
including Agreement on Government Procurement (‘the GPA’); the initiative to negotiate the proposed 
Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement (‘the proposed transparency agreement’) and 
the Negotiating Mandate Pursuant to GATS Article XIII:2. 
Chapter 4 deals with the major procurement instruments with trade objectives at regional level: the 
EC procurement rules; the NAFTA Chapter 10; Chapter XVIII of the third draft of FTAA agreement; 
and the COMESA directives. 
Chapter 5 reviewes other procurement instruments, which also have the trade objective but can hardly 
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be classified in either of the above categories. They are the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services (‘the Model Law’) and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (‘the OECD Convention’). 
Chapter 6 provides an overview of a number of other international instruments regulating 
procurement with non-trade objectives including the World Bank’s rules governing its aid-funded 
procurement and the OECD’s Recommendation on Untying Aid  
After having evaluated the role of soft law in the international legal system and examined the current 
international procurement instruments, the third part of the thesis looks at whether or how the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of soft law identified earlier can apply in the context of public 
procurement law. This part provides a detailed analysis of current soft law procurement instruments, 
focusing on techniques. Finally it attempts to provide conclusions on the value of soft law for trade 
instruments in procurement, based on the above analysis and highlights the factors specific to 
procurement that might be relevant for soft law's influence in that particular context. The third part 
consists of Chapter 7-10, dealing with the analysis of the value of soft law in terms of bindingness, in 
terms of precision, in term of discretion and in terms of delegation respectively. 
The final part of the thesis raises both short-term and long-term proposals for developing a 
multilateral agreement on government procurement by means of soft law. The short-term proposal seeks 
to employ soft law to tackle the ‘illegitimate' concerns of many states and achieve a multilateral 
agreement by mitigating the political opposition from domestic vested interests, whilst the long-term 
proposal uses the combination of both hard and soft law elements to address states’ legitimate concerns 
and the particular features of public procurement.
  Chapter 2 Soft Law: A Theoretical Analysis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Soft law instruments can be found in many systems, and the phenomenon seems to be increasing in 
the contemporary international legal system.1 The focus of this thesis is to evaluate soft law as a 
means to regulate public procurement from a trade perspective. However, before looking at the use 
of soft law in procurement, it may be helpful to discuss the emergence and influence of this 
phenomenon as whole. Firstly, this chapter attempts to provide for a definition of ‘soft law’ to set out 
the scope of the subject matter for the purpose of the thesis.  
Soft law has generated vast amounts of doctrinal debate but not produced any universally agreed 
definition. The term ‘soft law’ was first formulated by McNair, who designated it as a ‘transitional 
stage in the development of norms where their content is vague and their scope imprecise’.2 The 
‘essential ingredient’ of soft law, in Gold’s analysis, is ‘an expectation that the states accepting these 
instruments will take their content seriously and will give them some measure of respect’.3 There are 
two elements which could contribute to the ‘legal’ quality of soft law norms: states’ consent to the 
norm, which gives it an authoritative basis, and an expectation that states will take it seriously, which 
communicates an intention that states will respect behavioural values expressed in the norm.4  
Some jurists restrict the term ‘soft law’ to norms in legally binding form, usually created by treaty 
but with vague content or weak requirements of the obligation and termed these as ‘legal soft law’, 
while many concentrate on instruments in non-legal form, such as declarations5, resolutions6, codes 
                                                        
1
 There are various reasons to explain the growing use of soft law in contemporary international relations, see Wellens K. 
C. & G. M, Borchardt, 'Soft Law in European Community Law' (1989), E.L.R. 14; Handl, G.F., W. M. Reisman, B. Simma, 
P. M. Duputy, C. Chinkin and R. D. L. Vega, ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’ (1988) 82 Amer.Soc.Int’l. L. Proc. 371 at pp.376, 
379-340 
2 See G.J.H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law, (1983: Netherlands) at pp187. Moreover various other 
terms were proposed by individual jurists, such as ‘non-binding agreements’; ‘de facto agreement’; ‘non-legal norms’; 
‘weak law’; ‘para-legal’; ‘imperfect law’. For critiques on these terms, see Bierzanek, R. ‘Some Remarks on ‘Soft’ 
International Law’ (1988) P.Y.I.L. Vol 17 at pp.21-22 
3
 See Gold, ‘Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements’, (1983) 77 AM. J. INT’L L. at 443 
4
 See Carlson, J. ‘Hunger, Agriculture Trade Liberalization, and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal Dimensions 
of a Political Problem’ (1985) 70 Iowa L.Rev. at p.1194 
5
 Declaration is often issued by states to express their will, their intent or their opinion regarding certain international issue, 
which can be made through a conference, or through an international organisation. Not all declarations are legally binding 
and whether a declaration is binding very much depends on its wording and the circumstances under which the declaration 
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of conduct 7 , decisions of international organizations, and even unilateral statements, named 
‘non-legal soft law’. Some other authors include both categories in the definition. 8‘Legal soft law’ 
refers to treaty norms with vague content or weak requirements, while ‘non-legal soft law’ describes 
norms embodied in non-binding instruments.  
The distinction between soft law and hard law only applies to international agreements. In the 
areas of customary international law and general principles of law, a norm is either international law 
or not, and the result is binary9 depending on whether the norm meets the relevant requirements.  
In order to work out a definition for soft law, it is important to specify the meaning of ‘hard law’ 
in advance as the concept ‘soft law’ owes its existence to the comparison with the term ‘hard law’. 
‘Hard law’ in this thesis refers to legally binding rules that create definitive rights or obligations, and 
enforceable through violation deterrence measures, dispute settlement procedures etc. Accordingly, 
‘Soft law’ is defined as rules of conduct that are formulated in instruments which lack certain core 
elements of hard law, but nevertheless not devoid of all the legal effects of hard law, and that are 
aimed at and may have practical effects comparable to hard law.  
Furthermore, ‘law’ in the context of soft law implies that it must establish rules of a normative 
nature, prescribing or inviting its participants to adopt or abstain from certain behaviours, which is 
very different from political statements only expressing a certain view or instruments merely 
providing information.10 However, soft law is distinguished from hard law because of the lack of 
certain legal features of the latter such as legally binding force and precision. Soft law is ‘soft’ in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is made. International organisations as well as individual states have been increasingly enunciating important principles by 
means of declarations. Examples can be found in numerous UN declarations, which are generally regarded as legally 
non-binding but have significant legal effect in practice.  
6
 The term ‘resolution’ referred originally to a binding decision by an international organisation or an international 
conference. A resolution could be regarded as a simplified form of international agreements between states when it was 
reached unanimously. However, the original meaning has been gradually changed. Nowadays, the term ‘resolutions’ often 
refers to non-binding decisions adopted by international organisations which normally have no power to take binding 
decisions.    
7
 Codes of Conduct refer to written sets of rules which are intended to be followed in multinational business activities. It 
can be set up not only be states and international organisations but also by private parties and organizations, and be agreed 
upon in either binding or non-binding form. 
8
 On the different meanings of the term ‘soft law’, see Gruchalla-Wesierski, T. ‘A Framework for Understanding ‘Soft 
Law’’ (1984) 30 McGill. L. J. 37 at pp. 44-45 
9
 Binary basically means characterized or consisting of two parts or components, and here refers specifically to the only 
two options of either being international law or not.  
10
 See L. Senden, ‘Soft Law in European Community Law’ (Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2004) at p.112 
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sense that it either adopts a non-binding form, or contains vague and ambiguous provisions 
embodying merely hortatory, aspirational, or promotional obligations.  
Many international obligations couched in a legally binding form lack significant levels of 
precision or delegation in enforcement and are thereby soft law under the above definition. 
Nevertheless, in many cases, soft law performs legal functions comparable to hard law. This 
definition seems to include both legal and non-legal soft law and thus embrace a wide range of 
international instruments including agreements, declarations, communications, recommendations, 
resolutions, guidelines, and codes of conduct. 
In so defining soft law, it has been made clear that what types of soft law instruments utilised in 
the area of procurement will be examined in relation to its value for regulating this area. In addition 
to this definition, this chapter will explain the scope of soft law in further detail. By doing so, a 
framework of types of soft law will be set up, which classifies soft law instruments according to a 
fourfold approach: an international legal instrument can be made soft along one or more of the 
dimensions of bindingness, precision, discretion and delegation. This approach will be employed 
when analysing soft instruments regulating public procurement in later chapters.  
Secondly, this chapter will evaluate the role of soft law in international legal system by 
comparison with hard law. Such an evaluation will be based on the four-fold framework as 
previously developed, and thus distinguish different purposes the four types of soft law fulfil in the 
contemporary legal order. Legal functions of different types of soft law will be identified and 
explained in this chapter, and the later chapters is to look at whether or how these functions of soft 
law apply in public procurement law. 
Lastly, the important issue of compliance will also be addressed. Soft law can only be effective if 
states comply, and therefore the issue of states’ compliance with soft law instruments deserves 
special attention in view of the lack of certain legal features of hard law. In this regard, reasons for 
compliance with soft law instruments, sources of non-compliance, and measures for inducing 
compliance will be generally discussed in this chapter, and their application in the area of 
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procurement will be examined in the later chapters in order to answer the question concerning the 
value of soft law in public procurement. 
 
2.2 The concept of soft law 
Soft law appears in an ‘infinite variety’ of forms.11 Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and 
Snidal developed a new approach to illustrate the wide variety of international legal arrangements. 
They distinguished three dimensions along which variations in the degree of legalisation of 
international instruments are to be observed12: ‘obligation’ (the degree to which states are legally 
bound by rules or commitments); ‘precision’ (the degree of ambiguity of the rules put in place); and 
‘delegation’ (the degree to which third parties, independent or not, have been granted the authority to 
implement rules, issue detailing rules and/or resolve disputes).  
The legalisation acknowledges the binary world, i.e. the extreme states of complete legalisation or 
complete anarchy, but asserted that most of international regimes are somewhere between the 
‘high/hard’ and ‘low/soft’ pole on each of these dimensions, which is a matter of degree and 
graduation, not a rigid dichotomy.13  
Moreover, this framework emphasises the functional value of particular combinations of each 
triplet referring to the level of obligation, precision, and delegation.14  States can opt for an 
arrangement that is highly legalised on all three dimensions when appropriate and feasible, and 
thereby constitutes hard law, or vice versa. Alternatively, states can make any combination of 
different degrees of these three parameters to produce an arrangement exactly suited to their specific 
needs.15 
This approach is very useful for analysing the various degrees of legality of international 
                                                        
11
 See Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ (1989) 38 I.C.L.Q. 850 at 
p.851 
12
 See Abbott, K., R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000), 3 I.O. 
401-419 
13
 Ibid  
14
 See Abbott, K. and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, (2000) In Goldstein, J., M. Kahler, R 
Keohane, A-M. Slaughter (eds) Legalization and World Politics (The MIT Press, 2000) at pp. 39-40 
15
 Ibid 
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instruments as it can indicate the continuous gradations of softness and hardness of an international 
instrument in the most important aspects, but it analyses the bindingness of obligation in the similar 
way it does the other two dimensions. While it is true that the dimensions of ‘vagueness’ and 
‘delegation’ could be considered as a matter of graduation, the issue of bindingness is quite different 
in this regard because an international obligation can only be binding or not in terms of its form and 
there is nothing in between.  
In Jan Klabbers’ words, an international agreement cannot be ‘more or less binding’.16 According 
to the fundamental principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’17embodied in Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (‘the Vienna Convention’), every treaty is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.18 Technical rules for the formation of legally binding treaty 
obligations can be found on such matters as capability to conclude treaties; subsequent confirmation; 
adoption/authorisation of the text; means of express consent to be bound by a treaty and etc. 
Although it is not necessarily easy, as shown in the Qatar-Bahrain Maritime Delimitation Case19, to 
determine whether an agreement is a binding treaty, the international legal system contains criteria 
for distinguishing binding instruments from non-binding ones in international law. 
Furthermore, it is recognised by the Abbot et al’s framework that the content of an obligation can 
also affect its legal character, but this framework seems to solely address the dimension of vagueness 
without mentioning the issue of discretion. In the author’s viewpoint, ‘vagueness’ and ‘discretion’ 
are closely-related, but not interchangeable concepts.  
The level of precision in treaty provisions is very relevant to states’ discretion in implementation. 
In the absence of authorised interpretation by a third party, the more ambiguously the obligations are 
defined, the more discretion states may have in implementing them. Nevertheless, issues of precision 
and discretion remain conceptually distinct, and it is possible for an obligation to be very precise but 
still allow considerable discretion in its implementation. For example, it may set out a precise result 
                                                        
16
 See J. Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law, (The Hague, 1996) 
17
 Latin for ‘pacts must be respected’ 
18
 See Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, available at < http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm> 
19
 See Qatar v. Bahr., 1994 I.C.J. 112, Available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqb/iqbframe.htm> 
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while leaving open the means by which the result is to be achieved, or only requiring states to use 
‘best endeavours’ to attain the result. As a result, the issue of discretion should also be considered 
when discussing the concept of soft law.  
Largely based on Abbott et al’s legalization framework but with slight adaptations, this chapter 
will examine the concept of soft law in the following four dimensions: 
1. bindingness, referring to whether states are legally bound by obligations; 
2. precision, referring to the degree of ambiguity of the language defining parties’ obligations 
in legislative text; 
3. discretion, referring to the degree of discretion states have in negotiating and  
implementing their obligations; 
4. delegation, referring to the degree to which states have delegated the power to a third party 
to implement rules. 
States make choices of varying degrees in each dimension and different combinations across these 
four dimensions in response to their interests, needs as well as different characteristics of subject 
matters. Accordingly, the realm of soft law begins once legal instruments are weakened along one or 
more of the dimensions of bindingness, precision, discretion and delegation, and comes in many 
varieties. Again, it is emphasised that it involves a matter of degree and graduation with regard to the 
dimensions of precision, discretion and delegation, but it is not the case for the dimension of 
bindingness. The choice is binary in terms of the dimension of bindingness. 
The distinction between hard law and soft law is neither purely a matter of being legally binding 
or not, nor is there such a specified point somewhere between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ pole on each of 
the other three dimensions, from which hard law ends and soft law begins. The line between hard 
and soft law becomes increasingly blurred. As Baxter stated, ‘provisions of treaties may create little 
or no obligation, although inserted in a form of instrument which presumptively creates rights and 
duties, while on the other hand, instruments of lesser dignity may influence or control the conduct of 
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States or individuals to a certain degree, even though their norm are not technically binding’.20 In 
treaties, thousands of ‘empty formulae’ can be found while such agreements in a non-legal form as 
the Final Helsinki Act ‘create something less than strict legal obligations but are not lacking in legal 
influence or impact’.21 
 
2.2.1 Binding force of obligations 
According to this quadripartite approach, soft law can be soft in four ways: in terms of its form, in 
terms of its content (precision and discretion respectively), in terms of its compliance mechanism. 
First of all, hard obligation is characterised by the predominance of legally binding rules in an 
international regime.22 Although a treaty form does not always guarantee hard law obligation, the 
non-binding form of an agreement can by itself categorise it into soft law group.  
  In other words, if international agreements are of a non-binding form, like political declarations, 
codes of conduct, guidelines, it is safe to call them soft law instruments. There are many instruments 
that explicitly negate any intent to create legally binding obligations. The frequently-mentioned 
example is the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, under which the parties signified that it was not an 
‘agreement…governed by international law’.23  
However, the non-binding character of soft law could possibly be lost or altered once it begins to 
interact with binding agreements. For example, norms contained in a non-legal soft law could be 
incorporated into a legally binding treaty by parties and therefore the origin of the norms contained 
therein may be overlooked due to the legal nature of a subsequent binding agreement. 
An example of the incorporation of soft norm into a binding agreement can be found in the 
Aarhus Convention24. The Preamble of the Convention makes explicit reference to Principle 10 of 
                                                        
20
 Baxter, ‘International Law in ‘Her Infinite Variety’’ (1980) 29 I.C.L.Q. at p. 565 
21
 Ibid. at p. 559 
22
 Abbot, K., R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, note 12 
23
 See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Helsinki 1August 1975, available at 
<http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html > 
24
 Available at < http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/aarhus/ > 
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the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development25. Accordingly, Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration, a soft law instrument, has become legally binding by being incorporated into a binding 
convention. 
 
2.2.2 Vagueness of rules 
As Baxter pointed out, even treaties with a binding form can be soft in the sense that they are so 
ambiguous or vaguely stated that they do little or nothing to control the conduct of states, unless they 
are fleshed out by the decisions of courts or other agencies.26 Precise sets of rules in international 
instruments will specify clearly and unambiguously what is expected of a state or other actors, 
detailing conditions of application, spelling out required or proscribed behaviours in numerous 
situations etc.27  
  Much of binding international law is formulated as quite precise, elaborated and dense rules and 
precision seems to be increasing over time, as exemplified by the WTO trade agreements.28  
However, ambiguousness or vagueness can be associated with both binding and non-binding 
instruments. The Vienna Convention does not require any precise or identifiable obligations within a 
treaty.29 Ambiguous provisions in a treaty may be deprived of the character of hard law despite their 
legally binding form.  
The Framework Convention on Climate Change adopted at 1992 Rio Conference furnishes a good 
example. The core articles of this convention are so cautiously and obscurely worded that it is 
uncertain whether any real obligations are created. The U.S. interpretation of these articles was that 
‘there is nothing in any of the language which constitutes a commitment to any specific level of 
emissions at any time…’30  
The low level of precision in international legal provisions implies a necessity for interpretation in 
                                                        
25
 Available at <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?ArticleID=1163&DocumentID=78&l=en> 
26
 See Baxter, note 20, at p. 560 
27
 See Abbot, K., R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, note 12.  
28
 Ibid. 
29
 See I. Brownlie, Principle of Public International Law, 3rd ed. (1979) at p.6; A.A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in 
International Law (1971) at 47-56 
30
 Available at <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php> 
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determining compliance. However, unlike the position under domestic legal systems with 
well-established courts or agencies to interpret and apply imprecise norms, imprecise norms in 
international agreements are, in practice, most often interpreted and applied by the very actors whose 
conduct they are intended to govern.31  
Indeed, each state is entitled to interpret the law, that is, the right of auto-interpretation in the 
absence of delegated interpreting authority, but this interpretation, is neither final nor binding upon 
other parties.32 If all the parties agree on a uniform interpretation, no problem will arise; and if, as 
what frequently happened in practice, divergent views are held by different parties, and then dispute 
settlement procedures can take place, but if these procedures do not produce a result accepted by the 
parties concerned, the divergent interpretations will persist and the controversy may remain unsettled 
for a long time.  
Nevertheless, in some international regimes, institutional bodies are set up and entrusted with 
functions such as implementing agreed rules, thus elaborating vague norms. Again, the 
ambiguousness of treaty provisions is generally a deliberate choice on the part of parties rather a 
failure of legal drafting.  
 
2.2.3 Discretion 
International instruments may vary in terms of the degree of discretion states possess in 
implementing their obligation. Even for the choice of binding treaty form and precise content, it may 
present a different degree of states’ discretion in their application of rules to agreements. On the one 
hand, there are instruments imposing unconditional obligations, for instance, Article 24 of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations specifies that ‘the archives and documents of the 
mission shall be inviolable at any time and wherever they may be’.33 On the other hand, binding 
instruments can be found with only hortatory, best-endeavour weak legal obligations, which are soft 
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 See Abbot, K., R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A-M. Slaughter, D. Snidal, note 12  
32
 L. Gross ‘States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation’, In L. Gross (ed) Selected 
Essays on International Law and Organisation (1993) at p.186 
33
 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, available at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/diplomat.htm> 
 18
in terms of a very broad states’ discretion in their implementations.  
These soft law rules can be adopted as a legally binding obligation to make best-endeavour to 
achieve a certain result, or only to carry out certain conduct without setting a concrete result to be 
achieved. Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement, for example, requires each party only to 
‘endeavour’ to adopt specified domestic economic policies, ‘with due regard to its circumstances’, 
and to ‘seek to promote’ economic stability.34 Meanwhile, best-endeavour provisions can also be 
adopted in a non-binding form. Therefore best-endeavour obligations, which grant a significant 
states’ discretion, can be of either binding or non-binding nature depending on the relevant intention 
of member states. 
Furthermore, significant discretion may also be given to states through the presence of many 
mechanisms, such as reservations, escape clauses or remedies for breach. By virtue of these 
mechanisms, the ‘hard’ form of the intent to be bound and its effects can be ‘softened’. Taking 
escape clauses as an example, they are widely used devices to limit the binding force of treaties, 
under which states are exempted from fulfilling the treaty obligations upon the occurrence of 
particular events and/or upon the judgment of the party.  
The use of such clauses can be exemplified by Article XIX of the GATT, which permits WTO 
members to apply temporary ‘safeguard measures’ to protect domestic industries injured or 
threatened with injury caused by unexpected surges in imports.35 The rationale underlying such a 
escape clause is that states would be more likely to agree to trade concessions if there were a way to 
temporarily ‘escape’ from their obligations in the case of emergency.36 
However, it is evident that the GATT escape clause had serious problems resulting from the 
ambiguity of its wording. For instance, the definition given by Article XIX for the circumstances 
under which it should be used is very ambiguous. A number of terms such as ‘unforeseen 
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developments’, ‘serious injury’, ‘like or directly competitive products’ were left undefined, giving 
states leeway in applying safeguards measures.37  
The various GATT rounds attempted to address this issue but ended in failure until the Uruguay 
Round, in which the Agreement on Safeguards was concluded in response to many of the 
inadequacies of GATT Article XIX. Many areas of ambiguity have been cleared up by this 
agreement, and the Safeguards Committee has been set up to oversee the operation of the agreement 
and be responsible for the surveillance of members’ commitments.  
Similar exemptions clauses can be found in other multilateral binding agreements. The example 
here demonstrates that such escape rules can be exposed to very broad, self-serving interpretations. 
As Baxter argued, many treaties are particularly exposed to the operation of rebus sic stantibus 
clause38 and are ‘legally fragile’.39  
In many cases, states’ discretion can be largely controlled if a secondary obligation has to be 
fulfilled as a pre-condition for relying on the escape clause. For example, a procedural OECD 
Council Decision obliges member countries to notify their exceptions to the provision of national 
treatment, and establishes follow-up procedures to deal with such exceptions. 40  Thus, the 
subjectivity of an escape clause has been made more objective. Notification obligations must be 
fulfilled before invoking the escape clause and failure to notify is by itself a breach of an obligation, 
which has a more objective element and of which non-compliance can be more easily determined.  
 
2.2.4 Delegation  
Another way of identifying soft law is to focus not on issues of form or content of an agreement but 
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on the extent to which parties delegate authority to designated third parties, including courts, 
arbitrators and administrative organisations, to implement it.  
  As with the sliding scales of discretion and precision, the ‘hard’ pole is characterised by the 
presence of developed bureaucracies, entrusted with functions such as interpreting agreed norms, 
inducing compliance and resolving disputes in cases of non-compliance, while at the softened pole 
one finds regimes which are no more than fora for negotiation and consultation.41  
Regarding the function of interpretation, many international instruments delegate third parties 
with the power to interpret the agreed rules. As will be discussed in Section 3.2.4.2, precise and 
detailed obligations can be developed from vague wording of treaty provisions by means of third 
parties’ interpretation. As a result, it remains possible that vague soft law provisions harden up to 
imply hard law obligations through judicial development.  
The general rule of interpretation can be found in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, saying a 
‘treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’.42 However, the 
imprecision of certain treaty provisions can leave designated third parties considerable discretion in 
the process of interpretation, and in practice, the degree of power third parties possess in interpreting 
the rules varies and methods of interpretation they employ are very different.  
There are international counts or tribunals in the habit of interpreting a treaty provision text in an 
extensive way with a view to achieve the goals for which this treaty was created or those goals as 
perceived by those courts and tribunals themselves. The most distinct example of teleological 
interpretation can be found in much of the case law of the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’). The 
ECJ has been playing a very creative role in interpreting the EC law (see Section 4.1.4.4a). In 
contrast, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) seems to be more cautious and put emphasis on 
the exact wording of the WTO treaty texts. It is required to take seriously the wording of the treaty 
text, and especially must neither add to nor diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
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covered agreements (see Section 3.2.4.4a). 
As regards dispute settlement, the sequence of methods recognised by international law is found 
in Article 33 of the UN Charter: ‘negotiation, enquiry, meditation, conciliation, arbitration, (and) 
judicial settlement’43. ‘Soft’ means of dispute settlement mechanism (‘DSM’) range from traditional 
political means of dispute settlement including negotiation and consultation44; and ones in which 
disputes are referred to non-binding mediation or conciliation45. Meanwhile, there are ‘hard’ DSMs 
including arbitration and international courts or tribunals such as the International Court of Justice46; 
the European Court of Justice47 and the European Court of Human rights48. 
 However, it should be noted that most international regimes incorporate more than one of these 
means of dispute settlement and are usually a mix of soft and hard approaches. The WTO DSM, for 
example, consists of three possible stages. The first stage is for parties in dispute to resolve the 
dispute by themselves and if that fails, they can ask the WTO director-general to mediate and the 
director-general may assist at its sole discretion49. Failing the first stage, the complaining country 
can ask for a panel to be appointed to consider the case, and the panel recommendation will become 
binding when adopted by the DSB - the General Council in another guise, which consists of all 
WTO Members.  
The third stage is the appeal process starting when there is an objection to the finding by either side 
to the dispute. The dispute is referred to the Appellate Body, a standing body established by the DSB, 
which may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel. The ruling 
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made by the Appellate Body when adopted by the DSB will be binding and final. 
In the case of soft dispute settlement there is an attempt to find an agreed solution rather than to 
engage in adversarial adjudication or claims for reparation. Such soft dispute settlement is well 
exemplified by Article 13 Settlement of Disputes under the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Disputes regarding the implementation of the Convention will be resolved by a ‘multilateral 
consultative process’, conducted by a panel of experts empowered to recommend measures to 
facilitate co-operation and implementation. No suspension of rights and privileges can be imposed, 
let alone any kind of sanctions; and the process relies on negotiation and persuasion rather than 
formal findings of breach of convention or state responsibility.  
However, in the absence of institutional machinery or other means of reviewing states compliance 
with their obligations, a state’s refusal to fulfil its treaty obligations cannot be met with any 
measures of compulsion. Such soft dispute settlement has been criticised by Koskenniemi for 
undermining the binding character of the treaties concerned and setting them apart from ‘normal’ 
treaties.50 By contrast, Chinkin asserted that formal adjudication is inherently unsuited to soft law 
instruments with subjective and discretionary content.51Instead, she believes that soft law with an 
informative and educative role is well suited to non-judicial means of dispute settlement and to 
self-regulation between interested parties.  
Clearly, opinions are divided between jurists who press for a process of formal adjudication and 
those who believe that disputes will be settled better through a more flexible process. It is hard to 
say whether a more judicialised DSM is desirable or not without a given context of a concrete legal 
instrument, but for sure, an appropriate degree of dispute settlement design improves the likelihood 
of states’ decision to comply. 
 
2.3 The role of soft law  
There has been much debate over whether soft law plays a positive role in the contemporary 
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international system. Soft law has been criticised and even dismissed as a factor in international 
relations. Klabbers, for example, is of the opinion that soft law is a redundant concept and fulfils no 
useful function at all, but instead contributes to the crumbling of the entire international legal 
system.52 However, many scholars contend that soft law should not be viewed as a ‘normative 
sickness’ but rather as a symbol of contemporary times and a product of necessity.53 
 
2.3.1 As a second best to hard law 
States do not just happen to arrive in soft law instruments, instead soft law approaches are 
deliberately chosen. It is especially true when hard law instruments have been expressly rejected or 
proven to be unachievable, but the subject matter still demands at least a degree of international 
regulation. In many cases, there is a sufficient community of interest among states for them to wish 
to formulate some sort of restraint on their actions, which inspires the formulation of certain 
instruments, but at the same time will be counterbalanced by the divergent interests of different 
states.54 Consequently, a soft law instrument is often reached as a compromise between some states 
which wish to have a hard law instrument and others which would probably prefer to have no 
instrument at all, but will accept it in soft law form.55  
  Schafer has viewed the main value of soft law to resolve deadlock during negotiations.56 In the 
case of a deep disagreement among negotiating parties, cooperation does not necessarily end and 
soft law can be used as techniques to avoid the failure of international negotiations. It could be much 
easier even for opposing parties to accept it if an agreement is non-binding, or defines only general 
goals leaving the exact meaning unspecified, or leaves a broad discretion in implementation, or 
involves no delegation in enforcement. These techniques may involve any or all of the four aspects 
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of soft law discussed in the thesis.   
Furthermore, soft law can be regarded as ‘intermediate step’ towards the formation of hard law. 
Non-binding rules have the potential to harden into binding rules by providing a basis for later treaty 
negotiations. Some authors attribute the significance of non-binding instruments exclusively to their 
later transformation into hard law and assert that this transformation is a major goal of the 
formulation of non-binding rules.57  
However it could be argued that non-binding instruments do not play merely a preliminary role 
and assume functions that go well beyond that of being an intermediate step to the formation of later 
treaties. Not all non-binding instruments necessarily become legally binding; not all of them are 
intended to do so. Even if soft law does not harden, it still performs important legal functions and 
plays an indispensable role given the structure of the international system.58 Similar to non-binding 
soft law, soft law in terms of precision, in terms of discretion or in terms of delegation also have the 
potential to develop into the relevant hard law though this is not necessary the case.  
Lastly, soft law has the effect of internationalising an issue by taking the subject matter covered 
by such norms out of the exclusive domain of states.59 As a result of agreeing to any of the four 
kinds of soft law regulating a particular subject, a state will be deprived of the right to complain of 
intervention in its internal affairs if another state accuses it of non-compliance or demands 
compliance with soft law regulating activities wholly within the territory of the former state.60 The 
mere fact there is an international agreement on the subject matter whether binding or not makes the 
subject matter a proper object of international concern. A prominent example is the Declaration of 
the United Nations Conference on Human Environment of 1972 which, for the first time, raised the 
issue of the environment protection to a global level and paved the way for the later development of 
international environment law.  
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2.3.2 As a better alternative to hard law 
Klabbers has claimed that soft law is frequently used in many international organisations because 
they have no other options.61 Chinkin has further argued that soft law can be presented ‘as the only 
alternative to anarchy’ in situations where some states are resisting international legal regulation but 
there is a political awareness, perhaps engendered by civil society, that ‘something must be done’.62  
However, it is worth emphasising that the unachievability of hard law should not be regarded as 
the only reason for choosing soft law, because it does not explain why states would prefer soft law to 
hard law even if the latter could be achieved in many cases. For example, there seems to be an 
increasing use of soft law even in organisations such as the EU with the power to enact hard law. 
Abbott and Snidal hold the view that states often deliberately choose softer forms of legalisation as 
superior institutional arrangements.63  
Soft law can be preferable on its own terms as it offers many of the advantages of hard law, but 
avoids some of the costs of hard law. Also it has many independent advantages of its own. It is 
believed that soft law measures is a better alternative to hard law rules when there is a concern about 
the possibility of non-compliance and when there is a need for flexibility and rapid reactions64, and 
soft law measures are preferable when dealing with complex and diverse problems characterized by 
uncertainty.65 Therefore states may opt for different types of soft law in order to serve different 
purposes. 
Firstly, the drafters may intentionally select a soft formula in order to lower the possibly high 
costs associated with a hard law instrument including negotiating costs, implementing costs and 
sovereignty costs. As with negotiating costs, every agreement entails some negotiating costs – 
delegates from different countries sitting together, exchanging ideas on the subject matter, restricting 
                                                        
61
 J. Klabbers, ‘Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organizations in International Law’ (2001), N.J.I.L. 70, 403-421 
62
 Chinkin, ‘Normative Development in the International Legal System’, In Shelton (eds) Commitment and Compliance: 
the Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System ’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at pp.41-42 
63
 See, Abbott, K. and D. Snidal, note 14, at p.423 
64
 See, Abbott, K. and D. Snidal, note 14, at pp.421-456; also, D Shelton, ‘Introduction: Law, Non-law and the Problem of 
‘Soft Law’, in D. Shelton (ed), note 62, at pp.1-42 
65
 See A, Héritier, ‘New Modes of Governance in Europe – Increasing Political Efficiency and Policy Effectiveness’, in 
Tanja Boerzel and Rachel A. Cichowski (eds), State of the European Union, Vol.6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003),   
 26
the scope of negotiation, bargaining for different interests, drafting the legislative text and debates 
and preparation work back home etc.  
In many cases, obligations defined too ‘hardly’ would entail significant negotiating costs, 
especially where subject matters are sensitive or complex. Generally speaking, the negotiating costs 
of international treaties may probably be higher than those of non-binding soft law agreements, as 
states are normally more cautious in negotiating and drafting legally binding agreements owing to its 
higher costs of violation. Moreover, the ratification process of treaties, which typically involves 
legislative authorisation, is often more complex and costly for that of non-binding agreement. 
In a similar way, soft law in terms of precision, in terms of discretion or in terms of delegation can 
also reduce negotiating costs. Vague soft law may avoid the difficulty in formulating detailed rules, 
while soft law with a high level of discretion in implementation or with a low level of delegation in 
enforcement may make it easier for negotiating states to agree especially for controversial issues. 
Consequently, a legal instrument would arguably involve less negotiating costs if it could be made 
soft in the sense that it has a non-binding form, a less precise content, a higher degree of states’ 
discretion, a lower level of delegation, singularly or in combination. In other words, all the four 
dimensions of soft law discussed in this thesis can be helpful in terms of mitigating negotiating 
costs.  
As far as implementing costs are concerned, states entering into an international agreement are 
required to implement their obligations. Some international obligations call for states’ abstention 
from action (e.g. not resort to war), while others demand positive actions (e.g. ensuring that vessels 
flying its flag comply with applicable international pollution rules and standards). The 
implementation of international obligations demanding positive action can be costly for participating 
states, as states have to enact domestic implementing legislation and sometimes to establish 
particular implementing institutions.  
However, the use of soft law can arguably significantly reduce implementing costs of an 
international agreement. By resorting to non-binding soft law that entails no adverse legal 
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consequences in the case of incompliance, states are provided with a learning process of adapting 
national policies to the requirements of the agreement. Meanwhile, under an international regime 
that does not involve a high level of delegation of interpreting power to a third party, the preference 
for vague soft law which grants states a significant discretion in implementation may also help 
reduce implementing costs, as states obtain more freedom to formulate their own appropriate 
national implementing rules.   
Soft law can also mitigate sovereignty costs of an international agreement. Having recognised the 
fierce debate over the concept of sovereignty66, sovereignty costs is defined for the purpose of this 
thesis as the distance between the policy that a state would implement if it were not a party to an 
international agreement and the one it actually adopts once it has joined. 
Consequently, every international agreement imposes certain sovereignty costs on its participating 
states, because states are required to change its national laws and practices as a consequence of 
joining the agreement. The sovereignty costs of international agreements vary according to different 
subject areas. For example, sovereignty costs are especially high in areas related to national security, 
while technical issues such as international standardisation involves lower sovereignty costs. Even 
for a given subject, sovereignty costs may vary across states. In general, the further a country’s 
practices are divergent from the requirements of a treaty, the higher the sovereignty costs the 
ratification of treaty entails. 
More importantly, the soft/hard elements of an international agreement are also relevant to 
sovereignty cost it entails for participating states. A legally binding hard law agreement that involves 
delegating the authority to a third party in enforcement is often costly to its participating states. 
Conversely, the choice of soft law can arguably protect states from excessive sovereignty costs as a 
result of participating in an international agreement.  
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Firstly, soft law in terms of non-bindingness can preserve states’ freedom to depart from their 
obligations under unexpected adverse circumstances as non-compliance with nonbinding 
international rules does not incur formal legal consequences. Secondly, soft law in terms of 
vagueness may avoid trying to accommodate divergent national conditions within a single detailed 
text and thus reduce sovereignty costs by allowing states to implement international rules to their 
particular national conditions.  
Next, soft law in terms of discretion can significantly mitigate the infringement of international 
rules on states sovereignty by providing states with discretion in negotiating and implementing their 
obligations. Moreover, soft law in terms of discretion can reduce sovereignty costs by serving as a 
softening device to circumscribe the obligatory force of hard law rules. Soft devices such as escape 
clause67 can protect participating states from being locked into unfavourable situations where they 
find the implementation of their obligations is detrimental to their essential national interests.  
Lastly, hard law with a high level of delegation in enforcement provides the greatest source of 
unanticipated sovereignty costs. As pointed out by Lindblom, a grant of ‘authority always becomes 
to a degree of uncontrollable’.68 For example, as will be examined in 4.1.4.2 & 4.1.4.3, the ECJ has 
been exerting its delegated interpreting authority in ways that go beyond the initial intentions or 
anticipations of the EC states, which increasingly restricts states’ regulatory freedom in many 
respects. In contrast, soft law with a low level of delegation can avoid such unanticipated 
sovereignty costs. 
Except for the consideration of reduced negotiating, implementing and sovereignty costs, soft law 
has increasingly been employed to accommodate states’ diversified needs and to facilitate states 
compliance in the case of varied domestic systems. The international system has undergone dramatic 
changes since World War II. Many newly independent countries have emerged with weak economies, 
while developed countries have lost assured access to raw material from their ex-colonised countries. 
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An international instrument may include diversified member states whose national legal and 
financial systems, economic circumstances and other characteristics vary widely in type and 
sophistication.  
Soft law provisions making vague or discretional assertions rather than creating definitive legal 
obligations, or the use of non-binding form instead of binding one can make an instrument 
acceptable to more countries. Moreover, these soft law approaches allow governments to participate 
in a cooperative arrangement based on their ability to do so. The atmosphere of mutual trust can be 
established over time through regular meetings between national experts from various countries, 
which assists in achieving the purposes desired. The striking success of the soft law approach in 
setting international financial standards is illustrative of this point.  
Taking the particular area of ‘money laundering’ as an example, the earlier effort to address the 
problem of money laundering has been severely hampered by many disagreements among states as 
to the fundamental issues like whether money laundering itself should be illegal. The Financial 
Action Task Force (the ‘FATF’)69resorted to recommended principles for action rather than binding 
legal accords towards harmonising national rules to fight money laundering. 70  These FATF 
recommendations have provided a substantial core for developing international rules in the field of 
anti-money laundering. Despite their non-binding nature, the degree of compliance with its 
recommendations has been fairly high at least among the most industrialised countries.71 
Apart from those soft law arrangements that apply equally to all participating states, the general 
principle that ‘one size does not fit all’ has been widely acknowledged, asserting that a set of 
uniform multilateral rights and obligations among a deep diverse set of nations could not serve the 
best interests of all parties.72 In consideration of significant differences in economic power and 
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benefits gained by developed and developing countries, obligations may be formulated with different 
level of hardness for different categories of member states within the same international instrument.  
For example, in the field of international environmental regulation, the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ (‘CDR’) has become a normative standard. The meaning of CDR was 
elaborated in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Given the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. Developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the pursuit of 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and 
of the technologies and financial resources they command’.73 
The notion of CDR contained in the Rio Declaration has become one of guiding principles in the 
development of international environmental law. Many international environmental instruments, if 
not all, have special provisions for developing countries including the application of different 
standards, delayed compliance timetable and less stringent commitments.  
Similarly, in the area of international trade law, Special & Differential Treatment (‘S&DT’) 
provisions have frequently been utilised as a tool to ensure the proportionality of trade agreements, 
commensurate with the levels of development of developing countries and their capability to 
manage the burdens of the adjustment process.74 Under the GATT/WTO system, for example, the 
formal inclusion of S&D provisions as an element of the trading system could be traced in 1979 
through the so-called ‘Enabling Clause’75.  
Since then, the S&D provisions have evolved over time but remained as a political demand by 
developing countries during trade negotiations. The inclusion of longer transitional periods, reduced 
levels of commitments and special derogations or exceptions etc for developing countries in these 
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S&DT provisions grant developing countries more discretion in implementing their trade 
obligations. 
Thirdly, soft law is more capable of adapting to changes in comparison with hard law. As with the 
non-binding rules, they can be amended more quickly and relatively easily. States can refine and 
experiment with new notions in a non-binding situation, thus providing a learning process for 
regulating a new or sensitive area as changes continually arise.  
Similarly, the more ambiguous international rules are or the more discretion states possess in 
implementing them, the stronger capability they will have in the face of rapidly changing 
environment. As a result, to respond more quickly and flexibly to changing information makes soft 
law particularly appropriate for many areas of regulation, including environment protection, arms 
control and telecommunications 
Next, states sometimes prefer soft law to hard law for technical reasons. It is well-know that the 
ratification or termination of treaties by states is usually subject to complex formalities pursuant to 
national law. It takes a considerable period of time for multilateral treaties to be concluded and to 
come into force. Many countries require that treaty ratification be submitted for parliamentary 
approval, and federal states often require the approval of their constituent parts.76 For example, the 
US Constitution specifies that the President’s ability to make treaties is subject to a two-thirds 
majority vote of the Senate.77 
In contrast, the conclusion of non-binding instruments is less time-consuming as the simpler 
procedures facilitate more rapid finalisation. Also, non-binding instruments are more easily 
extinguished, thus avoiding the difficulties presented in terminating treaty obligations.78 Obviously, 
this technical reason only applies to soft law being soft in the sense of non-binding form, but not in 
the sense of the other three dimensions.   
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Lastly, there may be a matter of comprise among the four aspects of bindingness, precision, 
discretion and delegation with respect to a particular instrument. For instance, it is normally easier 
for clear and ambitious commitments to be adopted if they are put in a non-binding form. States 
might only bind themselves to modest or ambiguous commitments should a binding instrument be 
chosen, especially in cases where there is a high degree of diversity of interests or where the future 
development of the subject matter cannot be foretold. 
By contrastˈnon-binding agreements can benefit from a high degree of clarity and are often 
drafted by specialists with technical knowledge. States are often more willing to be innovative when 
an agreement is not explicitly legally binding. On the other hand, a comparatively less precise or 
ambitious content may raise the chances for states to agree on a binding form. 
Therefore designing an international instrument can be considered as a process for prioritising 
these four aspects depending on its specific needs and circumstances. In many cases, balancing 
between the different types of soft law options rather than strictly sticking to the hard law approach 
enhances the effectiveness of legal rules. 
 
2.4 Compliance with Soft Law 
Meanwhile, many jurists point out negative phenomena associated with the development of soft 
international law. Some observers criticised the very concept of soft law claiming that it was a 
pathological phenomenon of international law introducing a graduated scale of normativity and also 
a practice that lends itself to legal pretension. Certain commentators fully denied the desirability of 
soft law that it has nothing to contribute to the solution of the political problems but instead 
contribute to the crumbling of the entire legal system.79 The law could only be made through the 
procedures that themselves have been created to regulate the creation of law, which protects us from 
arbitrariness on the part of the powers.80 
Even for jurists who do not deny the concept of soft law as a whole, it is criticised that soft law 
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may have the potential to inappropriately relieve policy pressure for more aggressive action or 
weaken already thin notions of international law.81 Bothe expresses fears that the executive braches 
of government might be interested in evading the requirement of obtaining parliament’s approval to 
ratify the agreement by concluding it in the form of non-binding norms.82  
Most importantly, the use of soft law may arguably affect the credibility of international law. 
Despite advantages soft law can better offer over hard law, the rule of law requires compliance for 
law to be effective, and likewise soft law can only be effective if states comply. Obviously, as with 
soft law instruments, the issue of their implementation by states is crucial. If any such instruments 
are adopted but ultimately not implemented, their mere existence could not produce any practical 
legal consequence but only lead to a false sense of security.  
By using the term ‘compliance’, this chapter follows Jacobson and Weiss’ definition: ‘compliance 
refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provision of the accord and to the implementing 
measures that they have instituted’.83 Doubts have been cast on states’ compliance with their soft 
law obligations in view of its absence of certain core legal features of hard law. 
 
2.4.1 A choice to comply? 
Compliance is a matter of state choice. Famously, Henkin asserted that ‘almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time’.84 
More recently, broad empirical works regarding the conditions under which compliance with 
international obligations occurs have been conducted85, which seem largely to confirm Henkin’s 
assertion. Chayes also claims that as a general rule, states acknowledge an obligation to comply with 
the agreements they have signed and although the violation of obligations does occur occasionally, it 
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cannot be seen as a normal practice of states.86 
If there is a general propensity for states to comply with their international obligations, the 
questions here will naturally be why states comply with international law, and whether and how each 
different type of soft law within the meaning of this thesis affects states’ choice to comply? 
‘Interests’ is the most frequently mentioned reason for states’ choice to comply with international 
rules. International agreements are concluded on the basis of states’ consent, which represents, to a 
certain extent, an accommodation of the interests of participating states. A state will not commit 
itself to an international legal instrument, no matter how hard or soft obligations such an instrument 
may contain, unless it believes that signing this instrument furthers its interests and it complies for 
the same reason. International rule making, like democratic legislation, can be considered as a 
creative process through which the parties weigh the benefit and burdens of commitment and 
redefine or sometimes even discover their interests.87  
In general, states are motivated to respect international rules by virtue of their own interests. In 
this sense, there is little difference between soft or hard law obligations and states will comply with 
both for the sake of their own interests.  
Admittedly, international rule making process is not absolutely consensual, but is heavily affected 
by uneven bargaining power of different states. It is not a secret that powerful states are more 
influential in formulating international law. However, many regimes allow small or weak states to 
form coalitions and organise blocking positions and therefore, to a certain extent, the international 
rule-making process leaves room for accommodating divergent interests.88  
Furthermore, states’ interest is not a static concept. Often economic and technological changes can 
cause governments to change their minds about which rules should be reinforced and observed and 
which should be disregarded and changed.89 Also, it is decision-makers who will have a say in 
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defining state interests with respect to the conclusion of an international agreement and state interest 
will normally be decided according to the ruling party’s own value preferences.  
However, elections or other large social or political events often change the bargaining power of 
domestic bureaucratic and political groups, which will inevitably alter how a state assesses its 
interests in compliance. Most international instruments can be adapted to inevitable changes by 
incorporating amendment procedures, delegating to relevant organs the power of interpretation. In 
the case of unforeseeable changes for a few individual states, those states may still choose to comply 
owing to the cost involved with non-compliance.  
In this regard, the binding form of international instruments, the first dimension of soft law, makes 
a difference in legal consequences of non-compliance. A failure to comply with binding international 
obligations involves legal consequences as set out in the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001 ( ‘ILC Articles on 
States’ Responsibility’).90 A breach of a legally binding obligation by a state entails international 
responsibility of the state and that responsible state is obliged to cease the wrongful conduct and to 
make full reparation for the injury caused by the breach91. Full reparation for the injury shall take the 
form of restitution92, compensation93 and satisfaction94, either singly or in combination.95  
The legal consequences of non-compliance can therefore serve as an important deterrent to those 
states which might have violated their international obligations in the absent of such consequences. 
However, there are no similar legal consequences in the case of violating non-binding soft 
obligations. An act of a state does not constitute a breach of an international obligation and lead to 
the above legal consequences if the state is not legally bound by the obligation in question at the 
time the act occurs.96  Consequently, the question arises whether the binding form of a legal 
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instrument is crucial to secure comply.  
While the legal consequences flowing from binding obligations induce conforming behaviours by 
making the choice of non-compliance more costly, states are still demonstrating concerns about 
compliance with legally non-binding obligations for other reasons. States may fear the unknown and 
unwanted side effects of their current non-compliance on the future of their relationship with other 
countries as states especially small and medium ones view the maintenance of the stability and 
effectiveness of the international legal system as one of their boarder and long-term interests. Or 
states may fear the lost of their trustworthy reputation and the bad name of violator, domestically or 
internationally.  
Clearly, appropriate institutional design would also largely improve the likelihood of states’ 
decision to comply (to be discussed in section 2.4.3). Coercive enforcement measures such as 
sanctions may help deter violations. Traditionally, supervisory mechanisms were more likely 
associated with formal treaties, but recently, delegated supervisory bodies have increasingly been 
created to oversee compliance with soft law norms.97 It is possible for soft law instruments equipped 
with an efficient follow-up mechanism to be equally, or even more troublesome or threatening to 
states violating obligations undertaken than treaties.98 
 Despite states’ calculation of benefits and costs, states may still comply with international rules 
they have agreed to even if it is at times costly to do so. It has been argued that states may comply 
out of a sense of obligation.99 It is often said that the fundamental norms of international law is 
pacta sunt servanda – treaties are to be obeyed, and compliance arises from a basic normative sense 
of obligation. Scholars such as Ostrom100 and Ellickson101 show how relatively small communities 
in contained circumstances generate and secure compliance with norms in the absence of the 
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intervention of an implementing authority. Others, like Schauer102and Kratochwil103, have reached 
the conclusion that the norm by itself is a ‘reason for action’ and therefore becomes an independent 
reason for explaining states’ choice of compliance.  
  This ‘norm’ argument applied to compliance seems to suggest that there should be a fundamental 
distinction between the uses of binding hard law form and non-binding soft law form since the 
choice of instrument reflects and represents a prior expectation of the degree of compliance.104 The 
use of treaty form appears to impose more normative expectations than the resort to non-binding soft 
law on the part of states.  
  No study has concluded, however, whether the rate of compliance with binding international 
norms is greater than that of non-legally binding international rules. On the contrary, empirical 
studies of compliance find great variation over time for different subject matters without any 
indication of higher rate of compliance with hard law.105 Although legally binding obligations bring 
about greater expectation of conforming behaviour and more serious consequences for 
non-compliance, it can and frequently it does happen that parties to a non-binding agreement comply 
with their obligations under it.106  
Factors that influence compliance with binding instruments and those that influence compliance 
of nonbinding ones overlap to a large extent.107 This thesis presumes that there is no distinct 
variation in compliance depending upon the nature of international obligations. The key issue to be 
discussed will be the factors which influence states choice to comply with international obligations 
of any nature. 
 
2.4.2 Sources of non-compliance 
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Although there are reasons for states to comply with their international obligations, states from time 
to time do violate them. There must be factors leading to such noncompliance. If a state’s decision 
whether to comply is purely the result of calculation of costs and benefits, states would sometimes 
find it preferable to violate international law.  
  Werksman and Roderick summarise three types of cases of non-compliance which takes such 
form108: the first case is that a state may be a classic free-rider which values the compliance by 
others but seeks to avoid of the costs of its own compliance; second, a state may prefer devoting the 
compliance-related resources to more pressing problems even if it values compliance by itself and 
by others; third, a state may view compliance as having no real benefit compared to its costs. It 
would therefore imply that noncompliance is a premeditated and deliberate action.  
  However, it has been argued that violations of international agreements infrequently fall into the 
category of wilful flouting of legal obligations and that premeditated violations are the exception 
rather than the rule.109 If violations of international rules are not always deliberate, what explains 
this behaviour? The following are factors which may possibly affect states’ choice to comply except 
states’ consideration of benefits and costs. 
 
Incapability to comply 
The first point here is that states may be willing to comply with their international obligations, but 
incapable of doing so. As explained in Section 2.3.1, some international obligations call for states’ 
abstention from action, while others demand positive action. The requirement of inaction could be 
easily met should states so desire.  
  However, with regard to international obligations demanding positive action, even when states 
wish to comply, not all are capable of doing so. Compliance entails committing national resources 
either in terms of staff time, political energy and attention or money of a state.110 Violations may 
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result from financial, administrative or technological incapacities rather than unwillingness to 
comply. Once a state has formally subscribed to an international agreement, it will need to develop, 
adopt or modify the relevant national legislation to give effect to it. A state may lack technical 
capacity to fulfil its obligations, which is especially true for developing countries with fewer 
financial resources and less developed administrative systems.  
  In this case, it is irrelevant whether an international legal obligation is soft in terms of its 
bindingness, vagueness and delegation, as states do not comply because they face no choices. 
However, soft law granting states a high level of discretion in negotiating and implementing their 
obligations may help reduce the occurrence of such kind of non-compliance, as it allows states to 
devise their own way of complying based on particular national circumstances.  
 
Ambiguity of the rule 
The wordings of many international rules, as discussed above, are so vague that they can not provide 
determinate answers to disputes as to their interpretation. These international rules fall into one of 
the four categories of soft law defined earlier. In many cases, provisions were deliberately drafted in 
a vague manner to serve particular purposes.  
  Furthermore, the ambiguous nature of treaty obligations may result from the drafter’s lack of 
foresight of many possible applications at the time of negotiation. Also, the legal form often inhibits 
states from agreeing to very specific obligations taking into account that political, economic, 
technological and scientific conditions may change over time. All the above factors could lead to a 
zone of ambiguity in international obligations within which it is hard to say exactly what is 
permitted and what forbidden.  
Consequently, there can be a considerable ambit within which states can interpret the meaning of 
relevant provisions as they want it to. Some states may even take advantage of the indeterminacy of 
treaty language to justify indulging their preferred course of action or to design the desired activity 
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as complying with the letter of the obligation.111 Therefore, differing interpretations as to the 
meaning or requirements of vague soft law rules could possibly be another factors leading to 
non-compliance. 
 
2.4.3 Measures for inducing compliance 
It has been widely acknowledged that agreements made by consensus are the best hope for ensuring 
compliance and there must be political will behind such agreements in order for them to be 
effective.112 Meanwhile, different techniques/mechanisms can be employed by international regimes 
to induce compliance. 
 
Sanctions 
The traditional remedy for non-compliance involves deterrence through the threat or use of sanctions. 
If the choice of compliance lies in states’ benefit-costs calculation, the availability of sanction may 
encourage compliance in the sense that reluctant states would probably be convinced that the 
likelihood that a violation will be detected and sanctioned makes the expected costs of violation 
exceed those of compliance. There are mainly three types of sanctions113:  
” Treaty-based Sanctions (military or economic action authorised by treaty instrument to punish 
violation of the norms established by it); 
” Membership Sanctions (expulsion or suspension of rights and privileges of a violating party to 
the treaty); and  
” Unilateral Sanctions (coercive action not expressly authorised by the treaty but applied 
unilaterally or by several states in concert to bring a party into compliance) 
  As with the first two types of sanctions, hard law rules in terms of delegation in enforcement may 
involve the delegation of power to a third party to authorise such sanctions, which is normally 
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unavailable under soft law rules. Regarding unilateral sanctions, there is no difference between hard 
and soft law as states take actions unilaterally.  
  In practice, sanctioning is rarely used and often proves ineffective when used. The imposition of 
sanctions involves costs for the sanctioner as well as the sanctionee. It might not fundamentally 
solve the problem but instead serve only to exacerbate tensions. As argued by Chayes’, states obey 
international law not because they are threatened with sanctions, but because they are motivated to 
comply by the dynamic created by the international agreements of which they are parties.114  
 
Capacity Building 
It is submitted that lack of technical and administrative capability and financial resources have 
become a major deterrence to compliance. Many international agreements include technical and 
financial assistance provisions, but most take the form of ‘best endeavour’ efforts instead of firm 
obligations, or have tacit conditions. Such provisions are often too soft to have any practical 
significance because aiding states are left with excessive discretion over whether or how technical or 
financial assistance will be provided.  
The difficulties of imposing hard law obligations on technical and financial assistance provisions 
may arguably result from the very nature of such obligations. Financial aids or the funds needed for 
technical assistance constitute part of a government’s budget, which must go through parliamentary 
approval procedures annually in many developed countries. Therefore it is very difficult for the 
governments of developed economies to legally commit themselves in a precise way by stating what 
kind of or how much technical assistance is to be given. 
However, the Montreal Protocol, for the first time, expressly provides that the parties are obliged 
to provide significant financial assistance to defray the incremental costs of compliance for 
developing countries and the obligations of developing countries are explicitly conditioned on the 
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provision of financial resources by developed member states.115 These financial and technology 
transfers may help states who want, but are unable, to comply, to fulfil their international 
obligations. 
Moreover, the fear that the provision of technical and financial assistance will be withheld from 
non-compliance states may, to a certain extent, elicit greater compliance. States may re-examine the 
costs of non-compliance and probably be encouraged to comply. 
 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
It is essential for an international regime to have certain dispute settlement machinery available 
when a dispute arises. Many treaty regimes make it possible to submit disputes before delegated 
adjudication bodies, either by external bodies like International Court of Justice or by 
internally-established tribunals or panels for this purpose. However many regimes especially soft 
law regimes, resort to a variety of relatively informal processes if the parties to a dispute are unable 
to resolve the issues among themselves. As previously discussed in Section 2.2.4, international rules 
can be soft in the sense that a low level of authority or even no authority at all has been delegated to 
a third party to interpret the rules and to adjudicate disputes. 
Although formal international adjudication, like its domestic counterpart, is often costly, slow and 
cumbersome, it has been argued that compliance would be better fostered if allegations of 
non-compliance could be submitted to a sort of ‘hard’ dispute settlement such as judicial or 
quasi-judicial rulings.116 A recent disposition in some regimes is to revert to compulsory and binding 
forms of hard law dispute settlement.117 The most important example is the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism, which is to be discussed in Section 3.2.4.4a. 
 
Violation Preventive Measures 
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Besides dispute settlement and remedies after violation have occurred, some international regimes, 
especially soft law regimes with a low level of delegation such as the OECD118, mainly rely on 
efforts to raise obstacles to non-compliance in the first place.  
Such a strategy focus on ‘preventive’ control measures, i.e. efforts to inspect and survey behaviour 
before violations occur, rather than to detect and investigate violations afterwards.119 For instance, 
the availability of and access to information operates to enhance compliance with international law. 
The probability that conduct departing from international rules will be discovered may deter parties 
contemplating violation.  
More significantly, self-reporting by participating states can be an early warning system for 
identifying compliance problem, for example, whether a particular non-compliance is the result of 
deficits in domestic capacity or ambiguity of the rules or anything else. Therefore the publication 
and dissemination of self-reported and independently-collected information improves transparency 
and provides a ‘basis for wider critique and evaluation of a party’s performance and policies’.120 
Furthermore, policy review and assessment can arguably exert significant pressure on states to make 
changes and meet standards.   
  While effective dispute settlement mechanisms and remedies for aggrieved parties could deter 
violations from occurring in the future, the demands for dispute settlement would be dramatically 
reduced if violation preventive rules had been effectively established. Also, a prevention-oriented 
approach can largely avoid the problems of detecting violations that violators intend to keep hidden, 
collecting legally legitimate proof of violations, as well as restoring deprived benefits of other 
parties due to violations in the process of dispute settlement. 
 
Denial of Benefits 
Some international organisations especially international financial institutions can induce 
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compliance through their power to confer or deny benefits. The World Bank, for example, makes its 
detailed policies on various matters legally binding by means of incorporating them in loan 
agreements as a precondition for the grant of loans.121 Similarly, the International Monetary Fund 
can enforce its economic policies by denying further assistance for failure to comply with conditions 
of its assistance.  
  Such deprivation of benefits, as pointed by Bothe, is perhaps the most potent sanction that any 
international organisation can use against a state in the case of non-compliance. The constitution of 
most international organisations does not provide them with sufficient resources or power for similar 
sanctions, but still many international organisations can deny technical assistance or rights of 
participation to violator.  
  
2.5 Conclusion 
Although there is no universally agreed definition of the term ‘soft law’, soft law has been defined 
for the purpose of this thesis as rules of conduct that are formulated in instruments which lack 
certain core elements of hard law, but nevertheless not devoid of all the legal effects of hard law. It is 
also recognised that there is no black and white distinction between ‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’, but 
rather a graduation.  
This chapter has examined the concept of soft law in four dimensions, i.e. bindingness; precision; 
discretion and delegation. International law can be ‘soft’ in terms of its non-binding form; in terms 
of the vagueness of its rules; in terms of a wide margin of discretion states possess in negotiating and 
fulfilling their obligations and in terms of its low level of delegation in enforcement.  
States can resort to any or all of these four parameters at the soft end of spectrum to produce a soft 
law instrument as circumstances demands. Except for the issue of bindingness, it is possible for 
states to choose varying degree of softness along each of the other three dimensions. An 
international agreement can, however, only be either binding or non-binding and the non-binding 
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form of an agreement by itself leads to soft law obligations. 
Next, the role of soft law has been examined in comparison with hard law. It is recognised that 
soft law instruments are often adopted as a deliberate choice by states. Different types of softness 
based on the fourfold approach serve different purposes. States would opt for soft law instruments 
when hard law instruments had proven unachievable but there was still a pressing need for 
regulation. In the absence of hard law, soft law can act as a second-best in terms of overcoming 
deadlock and promoting agreement during negotiation, in terms of its possible transformation to 
hard law and in terms of its internationalisation effect of subject matters. 
More importantly, in many case, states might still prefer soft law to hard law even if the latter 
could be achieved. Soft law can sometime be regarded as a better alternative than hard law. Different 
types of soft law may produce similar effects of hard law but with reduced costs. Soft law in terms 
of bindingness, precision, discretion or delegation has been argued to entail less negotiating costs, 
implementing costs and sovereignty costs associated with the relevant had law. Different types of 
soft law have their own advantages. Soft law in terms of bindingness, precision or discretion has 
been argued to have better ability to adapt to changes, whilst soft law in term of bindingness can 
avoid technical problems with the ratification and termination of binding hard law.  
Meanwhile, possible disadvantages of soft law have also been pointed out. Most importantly, it 
has been emphasised that soft law can only be effective if states comply. The important issue of 
compliance with soft law has been discussed and it has been examined how different types of soft 
law can affect states’ compliance in view of various factors influencing compliance.  
It is a normal practice for states to comply with international agreements they subscribed to. 
Several reasons have been presented to explain the general propensity for states to comply with their 
soft or hard international obligations including self-interests; violation costs and a sense of norm. 
Generally speaking, states are motivated by their own interests to respect their international 
obligations, and in this sense, it does not make any difference that the obligation is hard or not.  
While it is true that the legal consequences flowing from binding obligations may deter 
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non-compliance by making the choice of non-compliance more costly, states are still reluctant to 
violate their non-binding soft law obligations for other reasons such as the maintenance of the 
stability of international legal system and the fear of the bad name of violator.  
Although a sense of norm has been presented as an independent reason for explaining states’ 
choice of compliance as the use of binding form appears to impose more normative expectations 
than the resort to non-binding soft law, no study has concluded that the rate of compliance with 
binding international norms is greater than that of non-legally binding international rules. As a 
matter of fact, factors that affect states’ compliance with binding instruments and those that affect 
compliance with nonbinding ones overlap to a large extent. 
Then, the factors such as incapability to comply and ambiguity of the rule have been pointed out 
as sources for states non-compliance. In this regard, soft law in terms of discretion may induce 
compliance by leaving states with more freedom in choosing their own way of implementing 
international obligations, while soft law being soft in terms of its ambiguous content may negatively 
affect states’ compliance as the indeterminacy of legislative language creates opportunities for states 
to shirk their obligations.  
Furthermore, appropriate institutional design would arguably improve the likelihood of states’ 
compliance with international law. Measures frequently employed by international regimes to induce 
compliance have also been discussed including sanction; capacity building; dispute settlement 
mechanisms; violation preventive measures and denial of benefit.  
In conclusion, it has been argued that soft law plays a positive role in contemporary international 
system despite the possibility of abused use of it.
Chapter 3 An Overview of International Instruments Regulating 
Procurement towards Market Liberalisation  
 
It is widely believed that domestic discriminatory procurement practice could constitute a significant 
barrier to trade. Traditionally, governments employed procurement as a policy tool to promote 
industry development or support social, political, environmental objectives. The evidence shows that 
governments are unlikely to liberalise their procurement markets unilaterally even if the economic 
benefits of liberalisation outweigh the costs.1 In order to open up international procurement market, 
various arrangements have been concluded at both international and regional levels, under which 
states promise to accord effective market access in procurement to other Parties.  
These international and regional trade instruments share similarities as well as have differences in 
terms of objectives, approaches, memberships and etc. This chapter provides an overview of current 
international procurement instruments with a trade objective, mainly, the procurement instruments 
within the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) framework. 
 
3.1 Background 
The WTO, formally established in 1995 during the Uruguay Round negotiations, is the successor to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) which had functioned since its inception in 
the wake of World War II as the most important international framework for promoting trade 
between nations. The primary goal of the WTO is to improve the welfare of the people of its 
                                                        
1
 This is a general phenomenon in the procession of trade liberalisation not only in the area of public procurement but also 
in other areas. This is mainly because political lobbying tends to push governments towards protectionism. The principle of 
reciprocity can solve this problem by confronting the protectionists with another lobby that may be equally powerful: the 
set of firms that gain from greater access to foreign market. However in this case, restrictions on market access could also 
be utilised as a tool for negotiating reciprocal access with trading partners. The sensitive nature of procurement 
exacerbated this problem. Procurement could be employed to support non-economic secondary policies especially when 
other measures like subsidies have been largely ruled out under current international trading system. For detailed 
discussion, See Trebilcock and Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (Routlege,1999) at pp. 7-17; Jackson, The 
World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (The MIT Press, 1997) at pp.19-25; Hoekman 
and Kosteck, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: from GATT to WTO (Oxford University Press,1995) at 
pp.21-23; Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 2002) at pp.11-19 
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Member countries by liberalising trade across the globe.2  
The past 50 years have seen a significant success achieved by the WTO in terms of promoting 
trade. A series of WTO agreements, as the result of negotiations between its Members, have been 
reached to eliminate or lower most trade barriers such as import bans, quotas, and tariff etc. 
Nevertheless, the area of procurement remains largely neglected at the WTO multilateral level. 
Within the WTO framework, the major multilateral agreement dealing with trade in goods is the 
GATT 19943, which includes general obligations of national treatment and a Most Favoured Nation 
(‘MFN’)4. However, the national treatment provision in the GATT includes an explicit exception 
regarding procurement.5 Meanwhile, it is widely believed that the GATT MFN obligation is also not 
applicable to procurement despite the fact that no similar exception can be found6. Similarly, 
procurement are also exempted from main commitments of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)7, which regulates trade in service under the auspices of the WTO.  
Although the key obligations of MFN as well as national treatment have been excluded, certain 
general transparency obligations found in both GATT (Article X) and GATS (Article III) do apply to 
public procurement practice. Under these rules on transparency, states are mainly required to publish 
their general measures on trade which concern procurements, such as laws and regulations, rather 
than relevant information on specific contracts, either in terms of ex ante publication of invitations to 
bid or ex post announcement of decisions.8  
The GATT Article XVII is the only other possibility for a general obligation for procurement at 
                                                        
2
 See Pre-amble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO, available at <www.wto.org> 
3
 The GATT was originally negotiated in 1947, and the GATT 1994 is mainly made up of the text of the GATT 1947, 
certain other pre-Uruguay Round measures relating to GATT and some new agreement reached in the Uruguay round.  
4
 National treatment obligation and the Most Favoured Nation obligation are contained in Article III and Article I of the 
GATT respectively, which are also regarded as the key principles for the whole WTO system. 
5
 See the GATT Article III:8(a) of GATT 
6
 Favoured by most scholars, for example, Arrowsmith, note 1 at pp. 61-63; Dischendorfer, ‘The Existence and 
Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO’ (2000) 9 P.P.L.R 1 at 
pp. 15-17; Footer, ‘International Developments: GATT: Development in Public Procurement Procedures and Practices’ 
(1993) 6 P.P.L.R. 1 at pp. CS193-204. However, some other commentators hold a different standpoint that there should be a 
limited and special application of MFN obligation in the GATT to procurement policies, for instance, Reich, ‘The New 
GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity’, (1997) 31 J.W.T.1 at 
pp.125-151   
7
 See GATS Article XIII(2) 
8
 See Arrowsmith, note 1, at pp. 75-76; Low, Mattoo and Subramanian ‘Government Procurement in Services’ (1996) 20 
W.C. 5 at pp. 8-10 
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the WTO multilateral level. The field of state trading9 is specifically regulated under this provision 
in which an exception echoing the procurement exclusion of Article III:8 can also be found10. That is 
to say, the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT Article XVII do not apply to the concept of 
public procurement in this provision as well, i.e. procurement of goods or services for their own use 
or for use by other government bodies.  
The GATT Article XVII.2, however, imposes another obligation to give imports of other WTO 
Members ‘fair and equitable treatment’11. This obligation applies only to state trading enterprises 
with regard to ‘imports of products for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use’. 
But there is no equivalent provision regulating procurement of other government bodies which are 
not state trading enterprises. Also, it is difficult to define the exact meaning of ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ in this provision since it has never been interpreted. Some commentators argued that it 
might amount to a ‘weak’ MFN rule on procurement, while others viewed it as a requirement for 
WTO Members to afford to other Members reciprocal treatment.12 
Consequently, public procurement was largely neglected from the scope of the multilateral trade 
rules under the WTO system, in the areas of both goods and services. Nevertheless, currently there 
are three avenues through which the WTO seeks to subject procurement to international competition. 
” Reviewing the plurilateral Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), seeking to simplify 
and improve its text to attract new members as well as expand coverage; 
” Initiatives towards negotiations on a transparency agreement in procurement at the 
multilateral level. 
” Multilateral negotiations on government procurement in services pursuant to the GATS 
Article XIII:2; 
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 The definition of state trading enterprise given by Article XVII.1 of GATT is not very precise. See Davey, ‘Article XVII 
GATT: an Overview’ in Cottier and Mavroids (ed) State Trading in the Twenty-First Century (the University of Michigan 
Press, 1998) 
10
 The wording in GATT Article XVII: 2 is slightly different from that in the GATT Article III:8(a), however it is 
suggested that these two exclusions should be interpreted, so far as possible, to have the same meaning. See Arrowsmith, 
note 1, at p.72. 
11
 See GATT Article XVII: 2 
12
 See Arrowsmith, note 1, at pp.73, 74 
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 3.2 Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
3.2.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
In recognition of trade barriers created by discriminatory procurement policies and of the existing 
‘loophole’ relating to procurement under the WTO system, the first Agreement on Government 
Procurement13 was originally signed in 1979 and entered into force in 1981, which was amended in 
1987. In 1994, the current version of GPA was signed. 
In contrast with the old agreement, the GPA 1994 significantly expanded its scope and coverage in 
the sense of the extension of rules to cover procurement of services as well as goods and to cover 
sub-central entities and a number of utilities as well.14 It is estimated that the value of procurement 
open to international competition has increased by ten times by virtue of this extension.15 Also, 
enforcement provisions have been strengthened by introducing challenge procedures under the new 
agreement.  
Moreover, a ‘built-in’ commitment can be found in the current GPA to further negotiations.16 
Accordingly, the GPA has been currently undergoing a formal review since 1997. In 2006, a revised 
draft text was provisionally agreed supersede the current GPA text, which is subject to a legal check 
and a satisfactory outcome from negotiations on the expansion of coverage.17 In essence, the 
agreement, however, remains a plurilaterial agreement, in that its disciplines apply only to those 
WTO members that have signed it. Therefore the GPA is left outside of ‘the single undertaking’, 
which all states are obliged to assume as a condition for WTO membership.18 
As declared in its Preamble, the official objectives of the GPA are ‘to contribute greater 
liberalisation and expansion of world trade; eliminate discrimination among foreign products, 
                                                        
13
 It is often referred to as the GATT Government Procurement Agreement/Code although it never formed strictly part of 
GATT. The agreement did not bind all GATT Parties, but only those countries which chose to sign it. 
14
 The old GATT Government Procurement Agreement was very limited in scope, covering only supplies contracts (not 
services or constructions), and only central or federal government entities (not sub-central or local entities).    
15
 See Overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement available at <www.wto.org> 
16
 See GPA Article XXIV.7(b) 
17
 The provisionally agreed revised GPA text can be found at 
<www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/negotiations_e.htm> 
18
 See Article II:2 of Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
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services or suppliers; and enhance the transparency of relevant laws and practices’. In other words, 
the main objective of the GPA is to open up procurement to international competition by ensuring 
effective market access to foreign bidders.  
The principle objective of GPA is connected with that of WTO, the focus of which is fairly 
different from domestic objectives for regulating procurement such as ‘value for money’19, the 
maintenance of ‘probity’, the implementation of secondary policies and so on.20 It is submitted that 
those domestic goals are clearly outside the scope of the GPA’s mandate and also are not appropriate 
for the WTO to address. Such a difference in objectives can be reflected in the provisions under the 
GPA. For instance, procurements that are of a value below specified financial thresholds21, which 
are normally not of foreign interests, are not subject to any requirements under the GPA. Further, the 
implementation of social, environmental policies in procurement is largely restricted by the GPA for 
covered procurement.  
However, there exist close connections among some of these objectives.22 For example, the 
objective of ‘value for money’ will be more likely to be achieved should the goals of integrity and 
international competition be fulfilled. It can be argued that the similarity between GPA and domestic 
regulations lies in the fact that the tool of transparency is used in both contexts instead of sharing 
common objectives. 23  Obviously, transparent procedures can contribute to all of the above 
mentioned objectives by making it more difficult not only to conceal discrimination but also to 
conceal corruption, and at the same time achieving better value for money. 
In order to achieve its objectives, the GPA lays down two basic principals prohibiting 
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 That is, ensuring effective delivery on the best possible term and an efficient procurement process. See Arrowsmith, 
note 1 at p. 17 
20
 For detailed information regarding domestic regulatory objectives of procurement, See Arrowsmith, Linarelli and 
Wallace, Jr, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspective (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 
2000) , Ch. 2 
21
 The GPA applies only to procurements of value not less than relevant thresholds specified in Appendix I to the 
agreement, which are different depending on the level of government and type of procurement concerned.  
22
 For detailed discussion of the relations between international and national objectives, see Arrowsmith, ‘National and 
International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: Harmony or conflict’, in Arrowsmith and Davies (ed), 
Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 1998) 
23
 Arrowsmith, ‘Reviewing the GPA: the Role and Development of the Plurilateral Agreement After Doha’ (2002) J.I.E.L. 
at p. 766 
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discrimination in procurement, namely national treatment obligation and MFN 24 , which are 
supported by detailed transparency procedural requirements governing the award of contract. These 
transparency procedures are mainly aimed at making it difficult to conceal discrimination and at 
facilitating participation by suppliers unfamiliar with the system.25 Under the GPA, the Parties are 
required to have domestic rules governing contract award procedures in place so as to give effect to 
their obligations under the GPA.  
 
3.2.2 Coverage 
Regarding the coverage of current GPA, whether a procurement contract is regulated depends on 
three basic parameters: the procuring entity, the type of contract and the contract value. The precise 
entity covered, contracts covered and the thresholds at which the GPA applies are specified in each 
Parties’ own coverage annexes, which vary from state to state.26 This is because states are only 
willing to subject certain types of procurement to international competition, which are quite different 
according to their own particular considerations.  
Furthermore, the differences in coverage for different Parties lead to the problem of ‘reciprocity’27. 
Not surprisingly, states would probably hope to give market access concessions to other states only 
if comparable access is accorded to their own industry by those states in order to exclude ‘free 
riders’ benefiting from other Parties’ bilateral bargains for free. 
Consequently, the agreement covering central government entities was reached on the basis of 
MFN treatment, while at sub-central government level and in the utilities sectors, Parties departed 
from MFN treatment and agreed coverage on the basis of strict reciprocity.28 That is to say, most 
Parties have inserted specific derogations to exempt them from applying parts of the agreement to 
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 It should be noted that the national treatment obligation and MFN under the GPA is subject to any trade- restrictive rules 
to a member’s market as a whole. See GPA Article III (3) 
25
 Arrowsmith, note 23 at p.765 
26
 The precise coverage for each party is set out in Appendix I to the GPA, which contains a series of separate annexes on 
coverage for each party.  
27
 The major problem of the reciprocity is asymmetry in the size of countries so that small countries have little to offer to 
large ones in terms of export potential, see, Hoekman and Kosteck, note 1 at pp. 27-30. This reciprocity approach could 
arguably be an important reason for limited participation to the GPA by developing countries. 
28
 Graaf, G..D.and M. King, ‘Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: the Expansion of the GATT 
Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round’, I.L. 29 (1995) , at p. 446 
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other Parties not offering reciprocal coverage. Under the principle of reciprocity, Parties are, in 
effect, invited to work out bilaterally the economic equivalence of concessions between themselves; 
the GPA thus only serving as a suggested framework within which such bilateral deals are 
concluded.29  
As Graaf and King pointed out 30 , reciprocity-based derogations to MFN obligations are 
instrumental in helping to expand the coverage of GPA since offers would have been scaled down to 
the level of the lowest common denominator in order to achieve balance on the basis of MFN 
treatment. However, Reich held different standpoint that there are immense problems connected with 
this tit-for-tat approach based on the idea of ‘fair trade’ instead of ‘free trade’. Also, he proposed ‘the 
common objective approach’ as a better way to succeed in reaching a broad coverage without 
compromising on the MFN principle.31  
While the MFN approach has been proved to be successful in achieving extensive tariff cut under 
the GATT negotiations, it might be questionable to what extent such a common objective could be 
achieved and whether a mechanism of determining how each party’s offer could meet such a 
common objective could be agreed given the fact that procurement is much more complicated and 
sensitive than the issue of tariff cut to most states.  
As pointed out by Arrowsmith, a precise assessment of whether the beneficial effects of reciprocal 
derogations from MFN under the GPA outweigh their detrimental effects is difficult in the absence 
of empirical evidence on trade diversion and trade creation effects.32 
 
3.2.3 Secondary Policies 
Many GPA Parties have traditionally used procurement as an instrument to promote industrial, social, 
environmental policies, and the GPA also provides its Members with some scope to pursue such 
secondary policies. It seeks to strike an appropriate balance between free trade goals and the 
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 Reich, note 6 at p.137 
30
 ibid 
31
 Reich, note 6 
32
 Arrowsmith, note 1, at pp.111-112 
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legitimate domestic policies concerns.  
Due to its flexible approach to coverage, states may exclude particular entities or type of contracts 
from the coverage of the agreement if they wish to utilise the procurement of those entities or 
contracts to promote secondary policies. It is also possible for states to negotiate specific derogations 
to cover certain programmes using procurement as a policy tool though it is envisaged that such 
derogations are temporary. Many Members such as the U.S., Canada and Japan have derogations for 
specific existing programmes. For instance, the agreement does not apply for the U.S. to set asides 
for small and minority businesses for all covered entities.33  
However, the GPA rules can restrict the implementation of secondary policies for covered 
procurement practices of its Members. Firstly, such secondary use of procurement will be caught by 
the national treatment rule in Article III if it has a discriminatory effect. Apparently, measures to 
support non-competitive domestic industries are prima facie prohibited for covered procurement.  
Furthermore, even if there is no discrimination involved, the rules on contract award procedures 
may affect a procuring authority’s ability to employ procurement as a policy tool. Taking 
qualification conditions as an example, Article VIII(b) expressly requires that conditions of 
qualification are limited to those ‘essential to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfil the contract’, and 
thus procuring entities would probably not be able to disqualify a firm which does not meet certain 
social or environmental criteria such as providing equal opportunity for women or having a good 
environmental record.34  
Additionally, the GPA also expressly prohibits the use of offsets35subject to special provisions for 
developing countries. However, it is not always clear in terms of the compatibility of certain 
secondary use of procurement with the GPA. For example, it is unclear whether social or 
environmental considerations can be used as contract award criteria. Article XIII4 allows a contract 
to be awarded to the tender which is the ‘most advantageous’ provided that the specific criteria for 
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 The GPA, U.S. Appendix 1, General Notes 
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 See Article VIII.   
35
 For the meaning of offset under the GPA, see the GPA Article XVI footnote 7. 
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evaluation are set forth in advance, but there is no further indication on what kind of criteria may be 
used in this context.36 Such uncertainties in the law create practical problems for purchasers and 
governments.  
   
3.2.4 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
3.2.4.1 Bindingness 
The first dimension of soft law discussed in Chapter 2 was the non-binding nature of an agreement. 
In this regard, the overall context of the GPA and its negotiating history reflect the intent of the 
Parties to create legally binding obligations governed by international law. In the early 1960s, the 
issue of government procurement was initially addressed at the Organisation on European Economic 
Cooperation, the predecessor of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(‘OECD’).  
Later the negotiations for international procurement rules were transferred to the GATT, which 
was remarkable for its rule-making focus, legally-binding nature and dispute settlement system with 
trade sanctions. The transfer of the work on procurement from the OECD forum to the GATT may 
indicate negotiating parties’ intention to produce binding obligations. In the words of Blank and 
Marceau, ‘in bringing the work on government procurement from the OECD to the GATT, 
Governments made a choice to opt for enforceable and multilateral disciplines on government 
procurement, rather than anything weaker’37 
Moreover, the legislative language of the GPA text also implies that the instrument creates legally 
binding obligations. The National Treatment and Non-discrimination clause is illustrative of this 
point: it provides ‘each Party shall provide immediately and unconditionally to the products, services 
and suppliers of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less 
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 As a result, it can be argued that secondary criteria can be considered, however the EC and Japan are arguing that this 
provision is limited to economic criteria. See Massachusetts-Myanmar case, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/disput_e.htm> 
37
 See Blank and Marceau, ‘the History of the Government Procurement Negotiations since 1945’ (1996) 4 P.P.L.R. 77 at 
pp. 86-91 & 108 
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favourable than…’(Article III (1), emphasis added).  
As for legal procedures on the ratification of treaties, the agreement has undergone the traditional 
legal formalities of signature, accession, and entry into force38, and has been deposited with the 
Director-General of the WTO and registered with the United Nations39. Undoubtedly, a legally 
binding obligation is imposed on Member governments to abide by the rules for covered 
procurement.  
However, as previously argued in Chapter 2, some treaty rules may create little or no obligations 
owing to their lack of precision or award of too much discretion, which consequently negate the 
general presumption of being binding treaty rules. Under the GPA, it can be argued that its four 
general principles governing national challenge procedures are not legally binding by themselves 
due to their lack of precision.40 The wordings of these principles are too vague to ascertain their 
precise content, and it remains unclear if any violation claim can solely based on them without 
further resorting to more specific rules (See Section 3.2.4.2). 
 Another possible example is the GPA’s provisions on Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) 
for developing countries. As will be examined in 3.2.4.3, the rules requiring developed countries to 
negotiate concessions for the interests of developing countries confer a very broad discretion for 
developed countries over whether or how to implement them. Therefore the bindingness of these 
S&DT provisions might be largely negated by their discretional feature. 
 
3.2.4.2 Precision  
The second dimension of soft law is precision, referring to the degree of ambiguity of language 
defining parties’ obligations. In this respect, detailed rules have been laid down in the GPA to govern 
the conduct of the contract award procedures, which mainly focus on the pre-contractual stage from 
invitation to participate to award of contracts.  
                                                        
38
 GPA Article XXIV (1) 
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 GPA Article XXIV (14) (15) 
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 See Arrowsmith, note 1 at pp.388-391 
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Procuring entities are required to award contracts mainly through competitive tendering 
procedures, i.e. either ‘open tendering procedures’ or ‘selective tendering procedures’41, with the 
exception of ‘limited tendering procedures’42permitted under exceptional circumstances. Minimum 
standards for the conduct of the competitive award procedures are fairly elaborated including 
minimum time-limits for different stages of the procedures (Art. XI); minimum information required 
in tender documentation (Art. XII); rules on qualification of suppliers (Art. VIII); and rules on award 
criteria and the evaluation of bids (Art. XIII). 
The GPA contains rules on minimum time-limits for tendering and for other phases of the 
procedure. As a general principle, it requires that suppliers must be granted a sufficient period of 
time to prepare and submit their tenders, with an illustrative list of factors procuring entities shall 
take into account in setting time-limits such as the complexity of the intended procurement and the 
extent of subcontracting anticipated. 
 In addition to this general principle, the GPA also lays down precise rules on certain minimum 
deadlines that must be allowed for the preparation, submission and receipt of tenders. For example, 
Article XI.2(a) provides that generally in open procedures the period for the receipt of tender shall 
not be less than 40 days from the date of publication of invitation to participate. Also, Article XI.3 
specifies the circumstances in which the standard time-limit may be reduced. The first case, for 
example, is when a separate advance notice of the procurement has been published within a 
specified time and the notice contains the information required, the 40-day period can be reduced so 
long as the period chosen is sufficiently long to enable responsive tendering, which in general shall 
not be less than 24 days, but in any case not less than 10 days.  
It can be seen that the GPA provisions on time-limits are formulated as general principles and 
precise rules rather than general standards alone. In contrast, the issue of time-limits could 
potentially be dealt with in a less precise way. For example, vague terms like ‘sufficient 
time-periods’ or ‘a reasonable period’ without further elaborations have been suggested for the 
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. For the meaning of open tendering procedures under the GPA, see the GPA Article VII(3) 
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 For the meaning of limited tendering procedures under the GPA, see the GPA Article VII (3)  
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time-limits provisions of the proposed transparency agreement (see Section 3.3.5.2). 
However, it is not necessarily true that all the GPA obligations are highly precise and dense. The 
degree of precision varies widely among its provisions, and some provisions are found pretty vague 
and general. For example, the GPA rules governing qualification criteria are quite general, merely 
requiring that ‘any conditions for participation shall be limited to those which are essential to ensure 
the firm’s capability to fulfil the contract in question’.43 Apart from this general standard, there is no 
further elaboration or illustration on exactly what kind of criteria can be regarded as ones ‘essential 
to ensure the firm’s capability to fulfil the contract’.  
Compared with the GPA’s general approach in this respect, more precise provisions are included 
in other regimes. For instance, the EC public sector directive contains a highly detailed list of criteria 
which can be considered at the qualification stage (see Section 3.1.4.2).  
There are also the GPA rules which are too vague to ascertain their content. The four general 
principles governing national challenge procedures can furnish a good example. The GPA Article 
XX.2 provides that ‘Each Party shall provide non-discriminatory, timely, transparent and effective 
procedures enabling suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement arising in the context 
of procurements in which they have, or have had, an interest’. Judging from the vague wording, it is 
difficult to find out any concrete obligation this provision alone entails. In contrast, as will be 
discussed in Section 4.1.4.2, the EC principle of effectiveness on remedies is also couched in 
similarly vague language, but precise obligations have been developed from this principle by the 
European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) through judicial interpretation.  
However, in the case of the GPA’s general principles on remedies, a lack of relevant disputes 
brought under the WTO prevents its Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) from making any 
interpretations of the vague principles. Nevertheless, even if there were plenty disputes, it is still 
unlikely that the DSB would approach the issue in a similar way as the ECJ did taking into account 
their different interpretation methods (see Section 3.2.4.4a and Section 4.1.4.4a below). 
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Consequently, it has been argued that these GPA principles themselves are only enforceable to the 
extent that they are given effect through other more specific provisions.44 
Despite its varied level of precision among provisions, the GPA possesses a fairly high level of 
details in general. Although this generally detailed approach can clarify the precise requirement of 
obligation and promote certainty, many problems can be found in the detailed text of the GPA 
including textual errors, omission, lack of coherence, and need for updating.45  
It is proposed by Arrowsmith that the current text of the GPA should be radically simplified and 
reformulated in terms of general principles rather than detailed requirements.46 In essence, this 
proposal opts for a lower degree of precision to resolve many difficulties with the current GPA. By 
reducing its current level of detail, the agreement would be softened along the dimension of 
precision. However, it is still possible, as pointed out by Arrowsmith, to retain many of the 
advantages of detailed rules in other ways, notably by issuing guidance.47   
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the GPA has been undergoing a formal review and a revised 
legislative text was provisionally agreed. The first phase of review is exactly aimed at simplifying 
and improving the non-market-related provisions in the GPA text.48 
 
3.2.4.3 Discretion 
The third dimension of soft law is the discretion, referring to the degree of discretion states have in 
negotiating and implementing their obligations. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.2.1, the GPA 
remains a plurilaterial agreement, that is to say, states in theory have absolute discretion in deciding 
whether to sign the GPA when acceding to the WTO. However the role of the GPA has been 
changing gradually: a commitment to GPA accession now is often requested for prospective new 
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WTO members as a condition of WTO accession.49 
Although the GPA membership is theoretically not a precondition for accession to the WTO, 
certain existing WTO members mainly parties to the GPA such as the U.S. and the E.C. insist that 
prospective new WTO members should be committed to join the GPA upon accession to the WTO. 
As a result, 18 out of 21 new WTO members since 1995 have provisions in their respective 
Protocols regarding their commitments to accede to the GPA.50 For example, China, upon its 
accession to the WTO, has undertaken an obligation to become an observer to the GPA and to 
initiate negotiations for the GPA membership as soon as possible51, and more recently it had further 
committed to commence formal negotiations by tabling an Appendix I offer of coverage no later 
than December 2007.52  
Saudi Arabia could serve as another example: it was obliged to initiate negotiations for the GPA 
membership upon its accession to the GPA, and also confirmed that it would complete the 
negotiations within a year of accession.53 Currently, there are eight WTO members in the process of 
negotiating accession to the GPA, all of which are these new WTO members with a commitment for 
the GPA membership upon their accession to the WTO.54 
  Moreover, other measures have also been taken by the existing Members to speed up accession. 
For example, ‘punitive measures’ are even taken by the U.S. against non-members to the GPA by 
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essentially baring them from all U.S. federal procurement.55 Consequently, state’s discretion over 
whether to join the GPA has been significantly curtailed. 
  So far as coverage of the GPA is concerned, there is no uniform coverage for states under the GPA, 
and they thus enjoy a broad discretion in negotiating their coverage lists. Each state is allowed to 
freely decide which entities should be covered, the types of contracts covered and the precise 
thresholds above which the contracts are covered, provided its offer is acceptable to other 
negotiating parties. In contrast, under the EC procurement rules, as will be discussed in Section 
4.2.1.2, states’ discretion in negotiation is substantially restricted by the uniform coverage applied 
equally to all EC Members. 
The difference in coverage under the GPA may arguably result from the great difference in the 
extent to which different signatories were prepared to subject their procurement to international 
regulation. The GPA would probably be an agreement very narrow in scope had it followed the EC’s 
approach to adopt a uniform coverage for all signatories, as was the case with old GATT 
Government Procurement Agreement.56 
  Regarding states’ discretion in the implementation stage, the GPA does not attempt to regulate the 
contract award process in an exhaustive manner, and instead, it merely lays down minimum 
procedural standards under which states have a significant discretion to tailor their own procurement 
rules to the needs of specific domestic objectives.  
As with the issue of procurement methods, the GPA requires covered contracts to be awarded by 
using either ‘open tendering procedures’ or ‘selective tendering procedures’, which are essentially a 
kind of competitive tendering procedures; however, in certain clearly defined exceptional 
circumstances the GPA also allows procuring entities to use more informal procurement method 
without a competition, namely ‘limited tendering’. Nevertheless, Parties are free to apply more 
stringent rules than the GPA rules, for example, states can require the use of open tendering as the 
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sole procurement method, even where selective tendering or limited tendering is permitted under the 
GPA.  
Taking the issue of award criteria as another example, Article XIII (4) states that contracts shall be 
awarded to ‘either the lowest tender or the tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria 
set forth in the notices or tender documentation is determined to be the most advantageous’. 
However it does not provide clear guidance on the scope of the acceptable non-price criteria, nor 
provide any examples to illustrate what types of criteria are allowed to be considered. A wide range 
of award criteria can surely be included by procuring entities such as technical features, delivery 
conditions and after-sale services, however the range is interpreted.  
Moreover, unlike the EC directives (see Section 4.1.4.3), the GPA doesn’t expressly require the 
criteria linked to the subject-matter of the contract, and then states can arguably include award 
criteria unrelated to the subject-matter. Apparently, a broad discretion is given to states here by 
allowing them to choose different sets of award criteria for different contracts. 
Apart from a fairly high degree of discretion accorded to all Members, it seems that developing 
countries are granted with an even higher degree of discretion in negotiating and implementing their 
obligations. S&DT provisions for developing countries are included in the GPA to accommodate 
states with different level of development.  
First of all, developed countries are required to give developing countries concessions in the 
process of negotiations or in the later modification of their coverage lists after their accession to the 
agreement. Such provisions, however, deliberately leave a very broad discretion for developed 
countries, which are arguably no more than a set of ‘best-endeavour’ undertakings. The essentially 
soft nature of these obligations is apparent from the language in which they are couched. For 
example, Article V.3 provides that ‘developed countries, in the preparation of their coverage list 
under the provisions of this agreement, shall endeavour to include entities procuring products and 
services of export interest to developing countries’ (emphasis added). 
Although the presence of word ‘shall’ in treaty provisions may theoretically imply binding 
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obligations, or mandatory formulations in the classifications made by the WTO Secretariat57 , 
considerable discretion can still be allowed in their implementation. As for this provision, soft law 
obligations are disguised in a hard law form: it may still impose a legally binding obligation but only 
to the extent that states make ‘best-endeavour’ to include entities of export interests to developing 
countries.  
Consequently, the effectiveness of these provisions largely depends on the willingness of 
developed countries. As criticised by Davies, all these special provisions failed to establish any firm 
guarantees for the treatment of developing countries because they only amount to a vague 
commitment of good faith to the developing countries and any benefit derived from them depends 
very much on the negotiating attitude taken by the developed countries.58 As a result, the GPA 
S&DT obligations are very soft in the sense that developed country parties possess a remarkably 
high degree of discretion over whether or how to implement them. 
Secondly, developing countries, with lower levels of motivation and readiness for international 
regulation on procurement, are supposed to be granted with more discretion by these GPA S&DT 
provisions. For instance, these provisions seek to impose less stringent obligations on developing 
countries by allowing them to negotiate derogations from the rules on national treatment for certain 
entities, products or services included in their coverage lists.59 Therefore developing countries might 
be allowed to employ preferential procurement policies in sectors where continued maintenance of 
such preferences is vital.  
Similarly, the GPA generally prohibits offsets, but Article XVI.2 allows developing countries to 
negotiate for the use of offsets at the time of accession to the GPA. However, it only states a kind of 
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possibility rather than an automatic right for developing countries to obtain such a higher level of 
discretion.  
The provisionally agreed GPA text goes a step further by clearly specifying certain transitional 
measures developing countries can negotiate for when acceding to the agreement, including price 
preference, offset, phased-in addition of specific entities and a higher threshold; and/or an 
implementation period to delay the application of any specific obligation.60  
However, it can be argued that such measures still fail to guarantee a higher degree of discretion 
for developing countries because whether or to what extent a developing country can enjoy such a 
transitional period is subject to the consent of other parties during negotiations. 
In the negotiating process, developing countries have to conduct hard bargaining in order to 
benefit from such soft law provisions, and whether a higher degree of discretion can be obtained 
solely relies on the attitude of developed countries. In fact, the higher discretion given to developing 
countries in negotiation is largely restricted by their limited bargain power, simply because they have 
less to offer under the principle of reciprocity. In practice, most developing countries may find it 
difficult to insist on leaving out certain entities or obtaining derogations from the annexes given their 
limited bargaining power.  
It is impossible for applicant states to accede to the GPA without the admission of the existing 
Parties. Ironically, the schedule offers of new entrants now receive a great deal of more scrutiny than 
the schedules of existing members, which makes it more difficult for new entrants especially 
developing countries to join in the GPA. One member of the old GATT Government Procurement 
Agreement, reflecting a majority view, stated that it was not willing to accept ‘purely symbolic 
offers’.61 
Later, in the Uruguay Round, the demands for extensive coverage in relation to developing 
countries were further stiffened, making them not much different from their developed 
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counterparts.62 Consequently, terms for accession set by applicant states and those expected by the 
existing parties were too wide and in the end discouraged them from making additional offers.63 
Taking India as an example, India initially put on record its intention to join the old GATT 
Government Procurement Agreement but ended up with its trading partners finding its offer 
unsatisfactory,64 and more recently India explicitly showed its position that it was not ready to 
negotiate any agreement beyond transparency.65  
The issue of technical assistance is also included in the GPA S&DT provisions. The GPA Article 
V.8 requires ‘each developed country party shall, upon request, provide all technical assistance 
which it may deem appropriate to developing country parties’ (emphasis added). Again, it is the case 
that soft obligations are dressed up as hard law by using the word ‘shall’. The mandatory nature of 
these ‘shall’ formulations is nearly diminished by the use of subjective language like ‘deem 
appropriate’, which makes whether or how to provide technical assistance to developing countries at 
the sole discretion of developed countries. 
 
3.2.4.4 Delegation 
3.2.4.4a Inter-governmental Mechanism 
The final dimension of soft law is delegation referring to the degree to which states have delegated 
the power to a third party to implement rules. As with the GPA, the WTO’s general Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (‘DSM’) is applicable if not superseded by certain special provisions 
contained in GPA Article XXII, which responds more closely to the specific nature of procurement 
disputes.  
The preferred objective of the WTO DSM is to secure a positive solution mutually acceptable to 
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the parties concerned and consistent with covered agreements.66 Accordingly, the process for setting 
disputes starts with consultations between the Parties to the dispute in order to find a satisfactory 
solution without resorting to litigation.  
Apart from mandatory consultation67, good offices, conciliation and mediation may be undertaken 
voluntarily should the Parties so agree. The non-judicial or diplomatic nature of such consultations is, 
however, shadowed by the availability of formal adjudications. The WTO DSB, consisting of all 
Members, is delegated with the power to adjudicate disputes and to authorise coercive measures.68 
If consultations have failed to settle the dispute, the complaining party may request adjudication 
by a panel, and then appellate review in the case of appeal. The request for establishment of a panel 
initiates the phase of adjudication. By virtue of the rules of negative consensus, the complainant has 
a firm guarantee that the panel will be established if it so wishes.69 Panels are a sort of quasi-judicial 
bodies in charge of adjudicating disputes between members in the first instance. 
Rules and procedures governing the selection of panelists are laid down to insulate the panel from 
political or governmental influence. For example, Art.8 of the DSU provides that panelist 
nominations will be proposed by the Secretariat with a view to ensuring the independence of 
members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience, and the parties to 
the dispute may only oppose the nomination for ‘compelling reasons’.70  
The Uruguay Round Agreement introduced a more judicialised or ‘harder’ DSM. A number of 
reforms were adopted towards the ‘hard’ end of the enforcement spectrum. Arguably, the most 
important innovation is that the DSU removed the right of individual states, especially the one 
whose measure is being challenged, to block the establishment of panels and the adoption of a 
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ruling.71 Under the previous GATT DSM, it was difficult for the DSB to deliberate and reach legal 
judgments independently of governmental influence. Now, the DSB is empowered to automatically 
establish panels and to adopt panel rulings unless there is consensus not to do so. 
Another important reform of the Uruguay Round Agreement is the introduction of an appeal 
system. Unlike panels, the Appellate Body is a permanent body delegated with the task of reviewing 
the legal aspects of the reports issued by panels. Like the panel report, the appellate report can only 
be rejected by a negative consensus of the DSB.72 The establishment of the Appellate Body reflects a 
judicialised character of the WTO DSM – the separation of the judicial power from other organs.  
Regarding the discretion possessed by the DSB in interpreting the WTO rules, the DSU provides 
that the DSB serves ‘to preserve the rights and obligations of members under the covered 
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions’ and its recommendations and rulings ‘cannot add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’.73 The DSU also states 
that all solutions to matters formally raised shall be consistent with those agreements and shall not 
nullify or impair benefits under those agreements or impede the attainment of their objectives.74 By 
adhering the DSB rulings to treaty texts, states choose to delegate the task of disputes settlement to 
third-party tribunals with applying the agreed rules instead of resolving disputes through 
institutionalised bargaining. This can arguably provide predictability and certainty for the WTO 
system. 
The recommendations or rulings adopted by DSB are binding upon the parties concerned. The use 
of the term ‘recommendation’ by no means implies that the party is given discretion to decide 
whether to follow the recommendation. As argued by Jackson, the general effect of an adopted 
dispute settlement report has ‘by practice the effect of providing an international legal obligation for 
disputants to obey’.75 The DSB monitors the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings, 
                                                        
71
 See the DSU Art.16.4 and Art.17.14 
72
 See the DSU Art.17.2&3 
73
 See the DSU Art. 3.2 
74
 See the DSU Art. 3.5 
75
 See J. H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on treaty law and economic relations (2000: 
Cambridge University Press) at p.127. Most of scholars agree with Jackson that the rulings of an adopted DSB report has 
 68
with the delegated power to authorise retaliation in the case of non-compliance with a ruling. 76 A 
state that does not comply with the DSB recommendations or rulings risks serious consequences - it 
either has to provide compensation acceptable to the complainant or otherwise face retaliatory 
countermeasures.  
However, departing from the general provisions under the DSU, no cross-retaliation is allowed in 
relation to the GPA, that is to say, a dispute under the GPA cannot result in the suspension of 
concessions under any other WTO agreement, and nor can a dispute under any other WTO 
agreement lead to the suspension of concessions under the GPA.77  
Also, due to its inter-governmental nature, the parties in proceedings under the WTO DSM are its 
Member State governments. Private individuals or companies and other international organisations 
do not have direct access to the WTO DSM. In practice, individuals and groups may still exert 
influence on a state government with respect to the triggering of a dispute, but they must do so by 
convincing the government to support their claim as a state claim against another government. Also, 
the GPA Article XXII.3 makes it clear that only governments that are parties to the GPA may invoke 
the DSM in relation to the GPA. 
 
3.2.4.4b National Challenge Procedures 
The most distinctive feature of the GPA in contrast with the majority of other WTO agreements is 
that a novel concept of challenge procedure78was introduced to allow private bidders to challenge 
decisions taken in award procedures covered by the agreement before domestic review bodies and to 
seek redress for the infringement of rights.  
Under the GPA Article XX, each signatory is required to provide in its domestic legislation for 
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procedures before a national court or an independent review body to allow the aggrieved supplier to 
challenge the tender procedure or its award. This provision is new in that it marks a ‘hard law’ 
feature of the GPA in terms of delegation. It is a rare example in the WTO system where private 
parties can invoke WTO rules before domestic courts.79 By providing direct access for aggrieved 
suppliers to domestic legal adjudication, the GPA takes advantages of well-established national 
judicial systems to enforce its rules.  
Historically, the issue of DSM was one of the most controversial issues during the GPA 
negotiations.80 The fact that consensus was finally reached on a relatively stringent approach could 
be mainly attributed to the specific features of procurement, which have been described as being 
‘often a single event, costly to reverse, and where modifications to national rules of general 
application would not necessarily provide adequate guarantees of non-recurrence’81.  
Another important reason for including such a different approach from ‘normal’ WTO DSM is 
probably explained by the GPA’s plurilateral character and limited membership, especially the fact 
that most of the GPA’s founding members such as the EC member states and Norway were already 
obliged to provide challenge procedures under regional agreements.82  
It is required that such national challenge procedures must be ‘non-discriminatory, timely, 
transparent and effective’.83 It might be interesting to mention the time/efficiency requirement of 
procedures. It provides that the challenge procedure shall normally be completed in a timely fashion 
so as to preserve the commercial and other interests involved.84 Unless speedy action can be taken, 
inconsistencies with the agreement would probably be tolerated as firms will not have an interest in 
bringing cases.  
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This concern is also reflected in the available remedies85under the GPA, among which rapid 
interim measures aimed at correcting breaches and at preserving commercial opportunities would be 
provided. Review bodies have certain discretion in deciding whether such measures should be 
granted on a case by case basis, and may normally refuse to grant an interim measure in the case of 
overriding adverse consequence for the interests concerned including public interest.86 Furthermore, 
the award of interim measures and expedition in completing procedures are closely connected for the 
reason that the longer it takes to complete the procedures, the more serious the adverse consequences 
for those affected by a delay.87  
Although such a private challenge mechanism is deemed to give more teeth to the agreement, 
some criticisms have been made. For instance, Reich claimed that it was very regrettable that 
compensation awarded is limited to costs for tender preparation or protest only but not lost profits 
because aggrieved firms might be very reluctant to complain against violations of the agreement and 
thus the objective to provide ‘effective’ challenge procedures would not be achieved.88 Another 
concern is the possibly divergent interpretations of the GPA rule. All Parties have been put in a 
position to interpret the agreement under such a private challenge system and consequently much 
depends on the diligence and the good faith of Parties.89  
Lastly, it is important to note that any remedies under national challenge procedures will only be 
available to aggrieved suppliers if the relevant state has incorporated the GPA rules into national law. 
In most national systems that do not themselves give an international agreement direct effect, the 
agreement cannot be enforced unless the relevant national legislation has been adopted to implement 
it.  
Consequently, aggrieved suppliers would get no remedies by bringing GPA-inconsistent 
procurement practices before their national review body unless such practices are prohibited under 
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national law. For example, if a state maintains in its national legislation discriminatory measures 
inconsistent with the GPA and has no general recognition of the overriding effect of treaty rules over 
national rules there will be no remedies. This represents a big difference between the GPA rules and 
the EC rules, which will be discussed in Section 4.1.4.4b.   
 
3.3 Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Although it does not seem possible to simply multilateralise the current GPA in the short term, major 
developed countries continue to make enormous efforts to gain market access for their industries to 
international procurement market, especially to the multi-billion dollar government procurement 
business in developing countries.90  
  The view of negotiating an interim agreement in procurement at the multilateral level was raised 
during the preparation for the first ministerial meeting of the WTO. At the 1996 Singapore 
Ministerial Conference, the areas of possible future negotiations including procurement were 
agreed91, and a Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement (‘the WGTGP’) was 
also set up with the mandate to ‘conduct a study on transparency in government procurement 
practices, taking into account national policies, and, based on this study, to develop elements for 
inclusion in an appropriate agreement’.92  
  After conducting a study of transparency-related provisions of international instruments as well as 
drawing elements from regional initiatives, the WGTGP identified twelve issues93that could form 
the contents of a possible transparency agreement.94 However there was a wide division between the 
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WTO members almost over each of these twelve issues95.  
  The 2000 Doha Ministerial Declaration took the issue of transparency agreement a step further, 
stating that negotiations regarding a multilateral transparency agreement in procurement would start 
after the fifth Ministerial Conference.96 According to the Declaration, participants’ development 
priorities, especially those of least-developed countries should be taken into consideration and more 
importantly, negotiations shall be limited to the transparency aspects explicitly excluding the issue of 
market access.97  
However, there are marked disagreements among the WTO members over the interpretation of the 
mandate on procurement in this Declaration, over the role and purpose of the WGTGP, as well as 
over the specific elements of a potential multilateral transparency agreement in procurement.98   
In 2003, the Cancun Ministerial Conference ended in deadlock by failing to produce a consensus 
as to whether negotiations should be started over the Singapore issues within the context of the Doha 
Work Programme. In the end, the General Council Decision of 1 August 2004 finally concluded that 
the issue of transparency in government procurement would not be taken forward in the Doha Work 
Programme and therefore no work towards negotiations on this issue would take place within the 
WTO during the Doha Round.99  
The main reason for the failure of including the issue of transparency in government procurement 
inside the Doha Work Programme is the fear shared by many developing countries that a multilateral 
transparency agreement would only be a first and tactical measure to be taken to eventually address 
the question of market access, which only serves the export interests of the developed industries.100  
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Admittedly, non-discrimination and market access commitments are clearly delinked from the 
proposed transparency agreement in view of the Doha Mandate, but it has been made clear that the 
ultimate goal of developed countries is to upgrade the proposed transparency agreement into a 
full-blown agreement granting full access and national treatment for their companies to the 
government procurement business, especially of developing countries.101 
 
3.3.2 Possible objectives  
Some commentators viewed that the decision not to launch negotiations on a multilateral 
procurement agreement on transparency in the Doha Round is regrettable and hopefully this issue 
will be reignited in future negotiating rounds since it has only been excluded from the Doha Work 
Programme. 102  However, the first question one should consider is the objectives of such a 
multilateral transparency agreement in procurement at the WTO. 
The E.C. and the U.S. submitted to the WGTGP their draft texts for a transparency agreement in 
procurement respectively. Ensuring transparency in procurement was identified as the very objective 
of transparency agreement under both of their draft texts. However, as argued by Arrowsmith, 
‘transparency is merely a means to an end rather than an end in itself’.103 Transparency can serve 
different objectives in procurement such as value for money, integrity, and trade etc. Although the 
benefits of transparency could not be denied by any states, the targeted objectives regarding the 
proposed transparency agreement had not been clarified before states went further to discuss 
elements for inclusion in such an agreement.104 
The possible benefits associated with a future multilateral agreement on transparency in 
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procurement identified by the WGTGP include enhanced efficiency and increased innovation; better 
value-for-money; encouragement of domestic and foreign investment and partnership between local 
and foreign suppliers; the effect of reducing corruption; good governance; the establishment of a 
minimum set of applicable rule.105 
Possible benefits of such an agreement were, on the whole, not a controversial matter and none 
had put forward a view against the value of transparency in the procurement process; however many 
did raise the question how a transparency agreement would enhance the relation among states or 
how a state apply enhanced transparency rules would affect and benefit its trading partners.106  
Among the possible benefits flowing from a future transparency agreement, the role of 
transparency in implementing domestic objectives such as value for money and the reduction of 
corruption can only be regarded as a side effect rather than the underlying rationales for negotiating 
such an agreement given the existing ‘trade’ remit of the WTO.107 It is the primary role of the WTO 
to enhance market access conditions so that any agreement that have little or no implications for 
market access does not belong in the WTO.108  
Put simply, it cannot be justified to negotiate a WTO transparency agreement solely with the aim 
of promoting better value-for-money or reducing corruption.109 If the objective of the agreement is 
limited to addressing the issue of non-transparency as an independent trade barrier, it need to be so 
stated, or if there are other objectives, they have to be precisely defined, because the possible 
contents of the transparency agreement will largely depend on the objectives.  
 
3.3.3 Possible coverage 
                                                        
105
 The WGTGP, Report (2003) of the WGTGP to the General Council, WT/WGTGP/7, 15 July 2003. available at < 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gptran_e.htm > 
106
 This is the view stated by the representatives of Brazil and Philippine etc, See the WGTGP, Report on the Meeting of 7 
February 2003-Note by the Secretariat, 15 April 2003, WT/WGTGP/M/17 para.10; WGTGP (December 2000) note 104, 
para.8. 
107
 See Arrowsmith, note 103 at p.297 
108
 Evenett and Hoekman, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: What can We Expect from International Trade 
Agreements’, In Arrowsmith and Tybus (ed), Public Procurement: the Continuing Revolution (Kluwer Law International, 
2003) at p.271 
109
 However, corruption can pose a significant problem for trade in the sense that market access commitments may have 
little impact in practice whilst corrupt practices continue. See Evenett and Hoekman, note 108. This issue is going to be 
discussed later in Section 5.2. 
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The first issue debated was whether the proposed transparency agreement should only apply to 
procurement open to foreign suppliers, which would largely depend on the objectives of the 
agreement. An agreement limited to transparency can only ‘facilitate international competition to the 
extent that there is procurement open to foreign industry on which the agreement can ‘bite’, and the 
significance of the agreement will thus depend on the extent and nature of discriminatory policies 
maintained by Parties’.110  
  If the objectives of the agreement are limited to promoting trade, such an agreement will not have 
any direct effect on closed procurement markets and thus there is no justification for its application 
to closed markets. Nevertheless, it was suggested by some states that the proposed transparency 
agreement should apply even where a tender was not open to foreign bidders.111 
  There was a wide divergence on the definition and coverage of the proposed transparency 
agreement. Some states maintained that the agreement should have a broad coverage extending to 
goods, services and construction services, to central entities as well as sub-central entities since it 
would not include market access obligations. Also, this broad approach to coverage could arguably 
avoid the difficulty in distinguishing where transparency rules should apply. However, most of 
developing countries argued for a narrow coverage. The Indian representative, for example, said that 
the coverage should only reflect the common minimum standards of national procurement systems 
and be limited to goods and to central government entities.112 
  A comparatively less contentious issue was about the use of thresholds. Most states agreed that the 
concept of a threshold should be incorporated into the scope of the agreement given that otherwise 
the agreement would become too onerous and apply even to the smallest procurements.113 Some 
developed countries such as the EC agreed that different thresholds might be given to developing 
                                                        
110
 Arrowsmith, ‘Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement’ (1998) I.C.L.Q. 47 
793-816 at p. 804 
111
 See the WGTGP (April 2003), note 106, para.10 & para.7 
112
 See the WGTGP (August 2002), note 98, para.25,26 
113
 This view was supported by India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the E.C., and Switzerland etc. See the WGTGP (August 2002), 
note 98, para.28,29 
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countries, or at least, for least-developed countries.114 
 
3.3.4 Secondary policies 
A future transparency agreement would not necessarily affect or reduce states’ ability to implement 
secondary policies in procurement since the Doha mandate limits negotiations to the transparency 
aspects.115 In this regard, its participating states could freely utilise procurement to support their 
industry, social, or environmental objectives. However, there was still a debate over whether the 
transparency rules would apply to procurement reserved for domestic suppliers or procurement 
utilised to pursue policies of economic, social and regional development.116 
  The implementation of secondary policies in a transparent way might make a big difference for 
foreign suppliers because even where there is certain domestic preference involved, foreign suppliers 
with adequate information could still choose to participate if their bid is lower than the comparable 
domestic bid by more than the differential preference and they could still win the contract.117 
 
3.3.5 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
3.3.5.1 Bindingness 
The possible binding nature of the proposed transparency agreement was one of the most 
contentious issues among the WTO States. Many countries especially developed countries insisted 
on the binding nature of the agreement. Reservations, however, were expressed by a number of 
developing countries, that obligations under the transparency agreement should be of a non-binding 
nature given difficulties and complexities faced by many developing countries in this area.118  
                                                        
114
 See the WGTGP, Report on the Meeting of 18 June 2003-Note by the Secretariat , 7 July 2003, WT/WGTGP/M/18, 
para.8 
115
 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para.26, available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm> 
116
 See the WGTGP (August 2002), note 98, para.33 
117In very rare cases when one foreign supplier enjoys a significant comparative advantage over all other bidders, a 
preferential margin scheme may have a positive effect similar to that of the ‘optimal tariff’, under which a foreign supplier 
is forced to lower than it would in the absence of this scheme, resulting in all lower profit margin for that supplier and 
savings for the government. See Deltas and Evenett, ‘Quantitative Estimates of the Effects of Preference Policies’, in 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (ed), note 61, at p.84 
118
 This view was shared by Pakistan, India, Egypt and Malaysia. See the WGTGP, Report on the Meeting of 25 September 
2000-Note by the Secretariat, 19 December 2000, WT/WGTGP/M/11 para.33 
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 3.3.5.2 Precision  
There was no agreed general approach for the proposed transparency agreement. The draft texts for 
such an agreement submitted by both the E.C. and the U.S. include certain prescriptive transparency 
rules. However some others maintained that a simple and flexible framework without seeking to 
define in any detail the content of national procurement procedures should be negotiated.119 Later, 
the E.C. revised its original draft to favour a more ‘principles-oriented approach’, taking into 
account observations made by other delegations.120 
Regarding the issue of time-limits, there was a disagreement over whether this issue was an 
element of transparency. 121  Negotiating states, however, generally agreed that the proposed 
transparency agreement should not include provisions setting out specific time-limits for each 
procurement period. 122 This is different from many procurement agreements such as the GPA and 
the EC directives which contain prescriptive rules on minimum time-limits for different phases of 
the tendering procedure (see Section 3.2.4.2 and Section 4.1.4.2).  
When discussing the issue of qualification criteria, most agreed that national authorities or 
procuring entities should have sufficient discretion in developing qualification criteria suited to 
different types of procurement, sectors and circumstances, and the prescription of any harmonised 
qualification criteria or even an illustrative listing should be avoided for a transparency 
ag
                                                       
reement.123  
Taking into account difficulties for developing countries to implement a future transparency 
 
119
 Japan, for example, stated that the provisions of a transparency agreement should be flexible enough so that all WTO 
Members could accept them and the framework of such an agreement should be simple, focusing on core principles such as 
transparency in procurement opportunities. See the WGTGP, Japan’s View on Transparency in Government Procurement- 
Communication from Japan, 14 October 2002, WT/WGTGP/W/37 
120
 See Transparency in Government Procurement: Communication from the EC: Elements for an agreement on 
transparency in government procurement 5 November 1999, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/gov_proc/wto_nego/transpa5.htm> 
121
 The representative of India said that time-limits per se were not a matter of transparency and thus should be deleted 
from the topics for discussion, while many states such as the US and Malaysia held the view that it was relevant to 
transparency, in the sense that transparency would be affected if sufficient time was not provided or if sufficient time was 
provided to one party and not to others. See the WGTGP (August 2002), note 98, para.56 & 57 
122
 Ibid. 
123
 See the WGTGP, Work of the Working Group on the Matters Related to the Items VI-XII of the List of the Issues Raised 
and Points Made 2002-Note by the Secretariat, 3 October 2002, WT/WGTGP/W/33, para.15 
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agreement, it was generally agreed that a robust principles-based approach should be employed both 
with respect to transparency and due process aspects.124 
ch as ‘sufficient time’ or ‘reasonable information’ imply a clear intention to confer 
scretion, as many general 
pr
ision in legislative text 
                                                       
 
3.3.5.3 Discretion 
The proposed non-binding nature or principled approach of such a transparency agreement may 
grant states a broad discretion in their implementation. It is natural to expect that states would have 
more discretion over whether or how to implement the relevant rules should their obligations be 
made non-binding. As regards the possible choice for general principles over precise rules, it seems 
that terms su
discretion.  
  For example, in response to the concern about the use of ambiguous term ‘sufficient’ in the 
relevant time-limits clause of the EC’s proposal, it was clarified that the term should be interpreted 
as procuring entities retained considerable discretion to determine time-limits for individual 
procurements.125 However, the possibility remains open that these general principles could be 
interpreted in a way to impose precise obligations or largely constrain di
inciples have been under the EC regime (see Section 4.1.4.2 & 4.1.4.3). 
A transparency agreement might be formulated in a principled way as an agreement with detailed 
obligations would be politically unachievable during the time of negotiation. However, by means of 
judicial interpretation, soft law provisions in terms of their low level of prec
still have a potential to harden up at a later stage when circumstances permit. 
  Apart from a significant discretion states might possibly possess owing to the proposed 
non-binding nature or principled feature of the transparency agreement, it was widely recognised 
that states should be granted with a considerable discretion in implementation in light of their varied 
domestic circumstances. For example, any discussion on the use of procurement methods was based 
on a general consensus that states should retain discretion in using different procurement procedures, 
 
124
 The WGTGP, note 105, para.11 
125
 See the WGTGP (May 2002), note 98, para.59 
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and any obligation imposed on states should focus on ensuring transparency in choice and use of 
methods in question rather than on attempting to be prescriptive about the conditions governing the 
 transitional periods, the application of high level threshold values and exemptions 
isions for the proposed transparency 
g countries were unable 
 implement their commitments due to the lack of technical assistance.129  
                                                       
use of different methods.126 
  Regarding S&DT for developing countries, it was generally agreed that developing countries 
should enjoy more discretion in negotiating and implementing their obligations. As for the types of 
S&DT to be included in the proposed transparency agreement, most of suggestions made related to 
the provision of
from coverage. 
  However, many developing countries pointed out that these traditional S&DT provisions had 
proven to be ineffective in solving problems of substance.127  The GPA S&DT provisions, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.4.3, serves an example of this point - they are very soft in the sense that 
developed countries are only under a legally binding obligation to make best-endeavour to 
implement these S&DT provisions, and thereby whether developing countries could have a higher 
level of discretion in negotiating and implementing their obligations solely relies on the goodwill of 
developed countries. It was suggested that the S&DT prov
agreement should not remain a best-endeavours clause.128   
  Technical assistance was another important issue for many developing countries. As the 
representative of Brazil argued, transitional periods or other types of discretion awarded to 
developing countries had proven to be inadequate as a number of developin
to
 
3.3.5.4 Delegation  
Whether to include any DSM has always been a contentious issue during negotiations towards a 
procurement agreement. As for the proposed transparency agreement, the situation was exacerbated 
 
126
 See the WGTGP, note 123, para.23  
127
 See the WGTGP (April 2003), note 106, para.79-83 
128
 See the WGTGP, note 118, para.41 
129
 See the WGTGP (April 2003), note 106, para.79 
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by the fact that it would only include rules on transparency without having rules on market access. 
The issue of dispute settlement, namely the linkage to the WTO DSU as well as the availability of 
domestic review procedures, was thus extremely contentious and became a big factor in opposition 
to the transparency agreement by some countries. It seemed more difficult for negotiating parties to 
reach an agreement on matters like dispute settlement without agreed objectives, coverage, content 
r other elements of the agreement.  
nd if without clear provisions on dispute settlement, the 
ag
 
w
ested as an alternative to the WTO DSM to ensure the implementation of the transparency 
les.133 
                                                       
o
 
3.3.5.4a Inter-governmental Mechanism 
A number of countries, such as the U.S., the E.C. members, Canada, Japan and Australia etc, agued 
that obligations under the transparency agreement should be subject to the WTO DSM. It was said 
that the application of inter-governmental DSM in the transparency agreement should reflect the 
general approach adopted in the WTO, a
reement would not have any merit.130  
However, many other countries especially developing countries were strongly against any 
application of the WTO DSU to a future transparency agreement. Brazil, for example, challenged
hether the DSU was the best way to ensure the enforcement of an agreement on transparency.131  
In addition, the view was expressed that whether the DSU should apply would depend on the 
nature of obligations under the transparency agreement and the DSU would not be necessary should 
the agreement be made of a non-binding nature.132 In this regard, a ‘peer review mechanism’ was 
also sugg
ru
 
3.3.5.4b National Challenge Procedures 
Many States including all the GPA Members have procedures allowing aggrieved suppliers to file 
 
130
 See the WGTGP, note 123, para.99  
131
 See the WGTGP (April 2003), note 106, para.16 
132
 See the WGTGP, note 123, para.101  
133
 Ibid. para.103 
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complaints against any alleged breaches of the applicable rules and to seek review of the 
procurement proceedings of a public entity.134 It was advocated by developed members, particularly 
the U.S.135and the E.C.136, that the proposed transparency agreement should contain provisions 
requiring states to make available certain domestic review procedures for both domestic and foreign 
su
rden on many countries since they appeared to have domestic review systems in place 
al
 be left with 
dividual states provided the review system itself was transparent and independent.139 
cess rules), it requires multilateral negotiations to be 
                                                       
ppliers.  
Proponents for the inclusion of domestic review procedures referred to the important roles they 
played in ensuring the overall transparency and enforcement of underlying rules. The view was 
expressed by the E.C. representative that complying with such a requirement would not entail any 
additional bu
ready.137  
However, even for states which have already had their own domestic review systems in place, 
many of them such as China and Malaysia objected to any provision on domestic review 
mechanisms in the proposed transparency agreement for the reason that the issue of domestic review 
procedures would eventually go beyond transparency-related issues into the realm of market 
access.138 A further suggestion was made that the choice of review procedure should
in
 
3.4 Negotiating Mandate Pursuant to the GATS Article XIII:2 
Another WTO initiative to multilateralise procurement can be found in the existing negotiating 
mandate on procurement within the GATS framework. While Article XIII of the GATS exempts 
public procurement from the disciplines contained in Article II (MFN treatment), Article XVII 
(national treatment), and Article XVI (market ac
 
134
 Ibid. para.59 
135
 See the WGTGP, Considerations Related to Enforcement of an Agreement on Transparency in Government 
Procurement-Communication from the U.S., WT/WGTGP/W/38 
136
 See the WGTGP, Domestic Review Mechanisms related to Transparency in Government Procurement-Communication 
from the European Communities, WT/WGTGP/W/39 
137
 See the WGTGP (January 3003), note 98, para.41 
138
 See the WGTGP (April 2003), note 106, para.45,47 
139
 See the WGTGP, note 123, para.56 
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 83
he
y since there is more support for opening up procurement 
m
ving the issue of transparency to the WGTGP.142 However, limited progress 
ha
nclude the 
ne
ent in this 
forum would be one of the most cumbersome ongoing activities under the WTO regime.
                                                       
ld on procurement in services under GATS.  
Consequently, the Working Party on GATS Rules (‘the WPGR’) was established, among other 
purposes, to provide a forum for negotiations on procurement of services.140 Although there is no 
corresponding provision in the GATT, any multilateral rules agreed for services will certainly be 
applied to goods in practice, especiall
arket in goods than that in service.141 
The issue of procurement was first put on the agenda of the WPGR in 1995 and to date, the work 
of the WPGR has mainly focused on the other issues. Since the WTO’s broader transparency 
launched at Singapore, the WPGR has concentrated on defining procurement and facilitating market 
access negotiations, lea
s been made so far.  
According to a note on progress in the negotiations circulated by the Chairperson of the WPGR in 
June 2003, the issue of procurement had been ‘dormant for some time’ as a result of other 
priorities.143  Not surprisingly, its Member States failed to meet the deadline to co
gotiations on procurement prior to the conclusion of the Doha round negotiations.144  
The main reason why the negotiations have remained ‘dormant’ is because of continuing 
disagreement over the scope of the negotiating mandate. The latest annual report of the WPGR still 
shows that no common understanding has been reached on the scope of the negotiating mandate 
under Article XIII.145 It seems that the negotiations towards multilateralising procurem
 
140
 Another two mandated issue are the establishment of an emergency safeguard mechanism for services and disciplines 
on subsidies. Ibid. 
141
 Arrowsmith, note 110 at p.804 footnote 26 
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 See Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 26 November 1997 S/WPGR/M/14, available at < 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpserv_e.htm > 
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 The WPGR, ‘Negotiations on Government Procurement’, reported by the Chairperson of the WPGR (2003) 
S/WPGR/11 available at < http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/stsd/Resources/Docs/WPGR_Report_on_GovProc.pdf>  
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 Kunkel, ‘Trade Negotiations on Government Procurement of Services’ (2003)ˈavailable at 
<http://apseg.anu.edu.au/pdf/kunkel.pdf>. at p. 2 
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 Chapter 4 An Overview of Regional Instruments Regulating Procurement 
towards Market Liberalisation 
 
In view of the drop of public procurement issue from the Doha Work Programme and the little 
progress pursuant to the GATS Article XIII:2, the GPA currently remain the most important 
instrument regulating procurement under the WTO despite its limited membership. Besides the 
WTO initiatives, the opening up of procurement markets has increasingly been a target of regional 
trade arrangements (RTAs). This chapter will examine the major RTAs on procurement, namely, the 
EC procurement rules; the NAFTA Chapter 10; Chapter XVIII of the third draft of FTAA agreement; 
the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs. 
 
4.1. The European Community (‘EC’) 1 Procurement Regime 
4.1.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
The EC procurement regime is the most developed regime, which has to a large extent served as a 
model for subsequent procurement regimes, and has had a significant influence on the development 
of the current GPA.2  
  General prohibitions on discriminatory procurement within the EC can date back to the execution 
of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 when the EC was set up, under which theoretically no EC Member 
State should discriminate against any firm or individual from outside that country but from within 
the EC wishing to sell goods or services to any public or private body in its own country.3 Such 
                                                        
1
 The European Community (EC) is the main economic organisation of the European Union (EU). The other two EU 
Communities are European Atomic Energy Community (Euraton) and European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The 
EU is made up of the above three European Communities and certain inter-governmental activities outside the scope of the 
Communities, under other Treaties. The current EU Members include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, United Kingdom. 
2
 Gordon, Rimmer and Arrowsmith, ‘The Economic Impact of the European Union Regime on Public Procurement: 
Lessons for the WTO’, in Arrowsmith and Davies (ed), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer Law International 
Ltd, 1998) at p. 28 
3
 Cox, ‘The Single Market Rules and the Enforcement Regime After 1992’ (Hull: Earlsgate Press, 1993) at pp.29-30 
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initial liberalising efforts, however, had little influence on the area of procurement due to both 
economic and political reasons.4  
  In addition, the EC adopted a series of directives regulating award procedures in detail for major 
contracts, the first of which were adopted in 1970s, but these early rules were largely ignored in 
practice.5 Despite its uncelebrated origin, the EC’s procurement policy has undergone a remarkable 
evolution.6 More and more detailed and stringent measures on procurement have been developed 
within the EC.  
The main EC legal rules on procurement derive from two sources. The first one is the general free 
movement principles of the EC Treaty which forms a basis of European procurement framework. 
Certain general provisions of the EC Treaty prohibit Member States from discriminating against 
firms or products originating from other member states, notably, Art.28 (ex Art.30) on free 
movement of goods; Art.43 (ex Art.52) on freedom of establishment; and Art.49 (ex Art. 59) on 
freedom to provide services.7 These provisions are aimed at establishing an integrated market of the 
Member States, in which goods, services and capital can freely move across the internal borders, but 
do not contain any express reference to public procurement. 
  Another source of legal rules on procurement in the EC consists of a series of directives, 
regulating award procedures for major contacts. Recognising the insufficiency of the EC Treaty 
alone to open procurement markets, directives had been adopted to regulate award procedures for 
major contracts where cross-border trade is more likely to happen since 1971. Originally these 
procurement directives were widely disregarded and little attempt was made to enforce the rules.8 
Nevertheless, from 1987 onwards the Community has been taking measures to improve the efficacy 
                                                        
4
 Ibid 
5
 Directive 71/305/EEC, [1971] O.J. (L185) 1 was adopted in 1971 dealing with public works contracts at the same time as 
Directive 71/304/EEC, and a similar directive on suppliers, Directive 77/62/EEC, [1977] O.J. (L13) 1, was adopted six 
years later. See Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd Edition 2005) at 
p.53   
6
 Fernández-Martín, ‘The EC Procurement Rules: a Critical Analysis’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at p.4 
7
 For detailed information on the application of the EC Treaty to procurement, see Arrowsmith, ‘The Application of the 
E.C. Treaty Rules to Public and Utilities Procurement’ (1995) P.P.L.R. 6, 255-280 
8
 Arrowsmith, note 5, at p.54 
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of its procurement rules, as part of the drive to achieve the single market by 1992.9  
  The EC directives can be divided into two categories apart from the remedies directives10: the 
public sector directives and the utilities directives. Previously the public sector directives included 
three key directives applicable to the procurement of goods, services and construction works.11 As 
regards the utilities directives, Council Directive 93/38/EEC12 regulated so-called public utility 
bodies engaged in certain activities in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors13. 
In March 2004, the Community adopted two new directives and made significant changes in order to 
simplify, consolidate, and increase flexibility of the previous framework.14 
  Consequently, a single new directive15 for the public sector was set up to replace the previous 
three directives, while a new directive16 for utilities to replace the old one. The new directives 
entered into force on the day of its publication, 1 May 2004.17 Member States are required to 
transpose the new directives into their national legislation no later than 31 January 2006.18 
  The main aim of the EC procurement rules is to eliminate restrictive procurement practices so far 
as they affect trade between Member States and thus to realise the full benefits of a single market in 
those sectors affected by public procurement.19 Similar to the GPA regime, national objectives such 
as value for money, integrity, and the implementation of secondary policies are not by themselves 
the objectives of the EC directives, albeit the similar tools of transparency have been employed for 
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 Ibid. 
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 For discussion, see Section 4.1.4.4b 
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 They are Council Directive 93/36/EEC, 1993 O.J.(L 199); Council Directive 92/50/EEC, 1992 O.J.(L 209); Council 
Directive 93/37EEC, 1993 O.J.(L 199) respectively. All the three directives were amended by Council Directive 97/52 EEC, 
1997 O.J. (L 328) 1. This directive introduced changes to harmonise the EC rules with the GPA, of which the EC is a 
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 Like the public sector directives, Council Directive 93/38/EEC, 1993 O.J.(L 199)84 was also modified by Council 
Directive 98/4 EEC, 1998 O.J.(L 101)1 for the reason mentioned above 
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 Telecommunication sectors are excluded from regulation by the new utilities directive of 2004, and postal services are 
newly covered instead. 
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 Arrowsmith, ‘An Assessment of the New Legislative Package on Public Procurement’ (2004) 41C.M.L.R. at p.1277 
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 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, 2004 O.J.(L 
134)114 
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 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services, 2004 O.J.(L 134)1 
17
 Directive 2004/18/EC Art.83; Directive 2004/17/EC Art.74  
18
 Directive 2004/18/EC, Art.80 (1); Directive 2004/17/EC, Art.71(1). Except for the new rules on postal service which are 
currently regulated by the public sector rules, will be covered by the new utilities directive instead, with a later date, 1 
January 2009.  
19
 Arrowsmith, note 5, at p.48 
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implementing both supranational and national objectives. 
The EC directives, like the GPA, seek to ensure non-discrimination in award procedures by 
mainly requiring procuring entities to follow detailed transparency procedures so that it is more 
difficult to hide discrimination. There are two fundamental general principles underlying the 
directives, namely, the principle of equal treatment and the principle of transparency.20 These 
principles have been used to assist in interpreting the express provisions of the directives as well as 
imposing additional obligations which are not expressly set out in the directives.  
  
4.1.2 Coverage 
Different from the GPA’s flexible approach to coverage, the coverage of the EC rules is the same for 
all Member States, ruling out any possibility of derogations for particular entities or sectors. The EC 
Treaty applies in principle to all contracts awarded by public bodies including small contracts 
without cross-border interests.  
As regards the bodies covered by the public sector directive, the entities falling within the scope 
of the directives are called ‘contracting authorities’, which is defined in Art.1 of the directive.21 Also, 
the directive applies only to ‘contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing’22, and the value 
of which above certain financial thresholds23. Certain contracts are expressly excluded from the 
scope of the directive.24 
  The sectors covered by the utilities directive, were not regulated until 1991.25 The alleged reason 
                                                        
20
 These two fundamental principles were originally articulated in the judgment of the ECJ, for interpreting the explicit 
rules in the directives as well as supplementing additional obligations to the directives’ explicit requirements. See Case 
Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark [1993] E.C.R. 1-3353; Case C-87/94 Commission of 
the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [1996] E.C.R. I-2043; Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services 
v European Parliament [1998] E.C.R. II-4239; Case C-16/98 Commission of the European Communities v French 
Republic,[2000] E.C.R. I-8315; Case T-203/96 Embassy Limousines & Services v European Parliament [1998] E.C.R. 
II-4239. Furthermore, the new directives now expressly incorporate these principles into their texts. See Directive 
2004/18/EC Art.2; Directive 2004/17/EC Art.10. 
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 See Directive 2004/18/EC Art 1 (9) 
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 Directive 2004/18/EC Art.2(a) 
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 Directive 2004/18/EC Art.7 specifies the different value thresholds for various kinds of public sector contracts. 
Moreover, Art 9(3) expressly prohibits purchasers from splitting up purchases in order to bring the value of each contract 
below the specified threshold and thus circumvent the application of the directives. Art. 9 (4) also lay down ‘aggregation 
rules’ which makes it difficult to avoid the rules by contract splitting.  
24
 Directive 2004/18/EC S.3 excluded contracts Art.12-18 
25
 Utilities sectors of water, energy, transport and telecommunication were firstly addressed in 1990 by Directive 90/531 
[1990] O.J.(297)1, having the procurement of suppliers and works regulated, and three years later services were also 
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for this delayed regulation is that these activities were carried out in some Member States by public 
bodies, while in others by private entities and it would be unfair to regulate these activities only in 
those states in which they were carried out by public bodies since it was not previously considered 
acceptable to regulate private entities.26 
The idea behind regulation, however, lays in the fact that these entities even if in the private sector 
were still susceptible to pubic influence because of their dependence on government.27 Activities 
covered, as contained in Article 3-9 of the new utilities directive28, are those in which there involves 
limited competition and state influence plays an important part. 
As for entity coverage, a broad approach was adopted that most entities operating in the relevant 
sectors are subject, prima facie, to the directive.29 Three groups of entities are covered pursuant to 
Article 2(1) of the new utilities directive30: ‘contracting authorities’31; ‘public undertakings’ and 
entities carrying out the covered activities on the basis of ‘special or exclusive rights’. Like the 
public sector directive, the utility directive applies only to the contracts above certain thresholds32 
and a number of exemptions are included from its coverage33. 
In view of the privatisation and liberalisation of these utilities sectors since the mid to late 1980s, 
the Community’s recent reform in 2004 made some significant changes to limit the scope of the 
utilities rules and to exempt certain activities carried out in competitive markets. In particular, 
purchasers in telecommunications sector are no longer covered; the narrow definition of ‘special and 
exclusive rights’ is given to exclude certain entities that were covered, or arguable covered, by the 
previous rules and exemption for utilities in competitive markets is introduced on the basis that 
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competition is sufficient to ensure commercial purchasing.34  
Again, all the contracts awarded by public bodies which are not regulated by the directives for 
various reasons are nevertheless governed by the EC treaty.35 
 
4.1.3 Secondary policies 
Under the EC procurement rules, many secondary uses of procurement are prohibited by the 
non-discrimination principle derived from the Treaty. Most procurement policies to promote national 
industry or regional development would inevitably involve discrimination against foreign suppliers 
and thus be prohibited by the EC Treaty. For example, in Du Pont de Nemours case,36 the European 
Court of Justice (‘the ECJ’) ruled that Italian legislation reserving to undertakings established in a 
particular region proportion of public supply contracts was incompatible with Article 28 (ex Article 
30) since such a preferential system constitutes discrimination against products originating from 
other Member States.  
Meanwhile, the use of procurement for secondary objectives is also largely restricted by the 
detailed rules on award procedures contained in the directives. The EC directives generally adopt a 
restrictive approach in terms of utilising procurement to promote secondary policies.37 For example, 
it is not generally permitted to consider social or environmental criteria in awarding contacts, unless 
such criteria ‘linked to the subject-matter of the contract in question’ (see Section 3.2.4.3). 
Although most rules are the same between the public sector directive and the utilities directive, 
there is an arguably greater scope for the secondary use of procurement under the utilities directive 
in qualifying and shortlisting stage.38 For example, the public sector directive allows firms to be 
excluded mainly for lack of financial standing or technical capacity to deliver the goods or services 
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contracted39, while the utilities directive only requires the objective rules and criteria to be used for 
selection.40  
Given the EC’s restrictive approach to its Members’ use of procurement to support national 
secondary policies, it is interesting to note that a different approach is applied as with the use of 
procurement to promote the EC’s policies. For example, the new directives require states to exclude 
firms convicted of participation in criminal organisation, corruption, fraud, money laundering, as 
defined in relevant EC instruments, to support the European criminal policy.41 
 
4.1.4 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
4.1.4.1 Bindingness 
Regarding the EC Treaty and directives, the EC Treaty obligations are legally binding on Member 
States and enforceable without the need for national implementing measures, while the directives 
define a legal framework within which each Member State are under a legally binding obligation to 
transpose the rules into national legislation in a specified period of time. 
According to the EC Article 249 (ex Article 189), the directives are ‘binding as to the result 
achieved’ but ‘leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’. As previously noted, 
the binding nature of certain treaty rules may be negated by virtue of their vagueness. However, 
many ambiguous provisions of the EC procurement rules are still binding and enforceable, and 
impose precise obligations as a result of judicial interpretation. 
Taking the principle of effectiveness in the Remedies Directives as an example, it is couched in 
general and vague terms like the GPA’s general principles on remedies. But different from the 
possible non-binding nature of the GPA principle of effectiveness on remedies, the EC principle of 
effectiveness is legally binding and enforceable, in that this has been developed by the court 
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imposing additional obligations to the explicit requirement of the Remedies Directives.42  
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that all the EC procurement rules are of a binding 
nature no matter how ambiguous they are. Article 23 (1) of the new public sector directive on 
accessibility may furnish a rare example for being non-binding rules owing to its vague content. It 
only generally provides that ‘whenever possible technical specifications should be defined so as to 
take into account accessibility criteria for people with disabilities or design for all users’. The 
vagueness of this provision may fail to create any legally binding obligations. As Arrowsmith 
pointed out, this provision arguably does not intend to impose any legally binding obligation taking 
into account the use of the words ‘whenever possible’ and the nature of the decisions to be made on 
these matters, which mainly involves balancing costs and social benefits.43 
 
4.1.4.2 Precision  
In the same way as the GPA sets minimum standards rather than a complete set of rules, the EC 
procurement regime was originally intended to be a broad framework, within which states still have 
significant freedom to tailor their own procurement rules to the needs of specific domestic 
objectives.  
The EC Treaty forms a basis of European public procurement framework by setting out general 
principles, while the directives lay down detailed transparency rules in support of the Treaty’s 
principles. Similar to the GPA’s approach, the EC directives set out detailed rules governing the 
conduct of the contract award from invitation to participate to award of contracts, with a higher 
degree of precision compared with the GPA rules though.  
In recognition of the complexity of the previous directives and the rigidity of their procedures, the 
two new directives were adopted with the aim to simplify the complex rules as well as increase the 
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flexibility of previous legal framework. 44  The new legislative package has introduced many 
important changes. For example, a single consolidated directive has been adopted for all the public 
sector contracts, which eliminates unnecessary differences between the treatment of works, supplies 
and services contracts.  
However, as argued by Arrowsmith45, the new directives remain excessively detailed and complex 
and for the most part, even more complex than the previous ones despite the original intention of 
simplification. Indeed, the precision of the procurement rules has been increasing with the deeper 
integration of the EC and consequential legislative reforms, in spite of their intended framework 
nature at the outset. 
Taking the rules on time-limits as an example, Art.38(1) of the public sector directive generally 
requires that procuring entities shall take account the complexity of the contract and the time 
required for drawing up tenders in determining the time-limits for the receipt of tenders and requests 
to participate. Apart from this general principle, different minimum time-limits are also included for 
different procurement methods. For example, in the case of open procedures, it provides that the 
minimum time-limit for receipt of tenders should generally be 52 days from the date of dispatch of 
the contract notice (Art.38(2)); and if a prior information notice has been published within a 
specified period of time this minimum time-limit may be shortened to 36 days as a general rule but 
under no circumstances to less than 22 days (Art.38(4)).  
The EC directives lay down a general principle followed by precise minimum time-limits to 
ensure that non-domestic firms will not be disadvantaged by unreasonably short tendering periods, 
which closely resembles the GPA’s approach. In contrast, as for the proposed WTO transparency 
agreement, it was agreed that no similar provisions should be included, and general principles 
requiring ‘sufficient’ or ‘reasonable’ time alone could suffice (see Section 3.3.5.2). 
The rules on qualification criteria may serve as one of the most striking examples to illustrate the 
detailed nature of the EC directives. Different from the GPA’s general approach, the EC public sector 
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directive requires that suppliers can only be excluded from participation on certain explicitly stated 
grounds, including a highly elaborated list stating grounds for exclusion as well as relevant 
evidences which procuring entities may demand as means of proof of standing (Art.48).  
This list possesses a very high degree of precision, which includes grounds ranging from financial 
position to technical capacity; from enrolment on a professional or trade register to other 
miscellaneous grounds.46 The grounds on technical capacity, for example, also have an exhaustive 
list of specific evidence that procuring entities may demand from suppliers, stating not only the 
information that the entities may demand from suppliers but also the substantive evidences they may 
require. For example, according to the public sector directive Article 48(2), suppliers’ previous work 
experiences over the past five years may be considered in assessing technical capability. Further, it 
prescribes the details of the evidence that may be required from suppliers – certificates of 
satisfactory execution for the most import works which ‘shall indicate the value, date and site of the 
work and shall specify whether they were carried out according to the rules of the trade and properly 
completed’(Art. 48(2)(a)(i)). 
Moreover, much more detailed obligations than those written out in the legal provisions have been 
developed by the ECJ’s generous interpretation.47 With the development of judicial interpretation, 
there is now in fact a huge difference between the GPA and the EC rules in the degree of detail and 
strictness though provisions of the two regimes still look superficially similar with a bit more detail 
in the latter.  
The EC Treaty principles are couched in general and imprecise terms in a similar way as the GPA 
general principles; however the former clearly impose more detailed obligations than the latter. 
Compared with the WTO DSB we discussed in Section 3.2.4, the ECJ plays a much more active role 
in applying the Treaty principles, and pays more attention to the spirit behind the language of the 
Treaty provisions rather than to the language itself. The abstract nature of the EC Treaty, together 
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with a great amount of cases brought before the ECJ have allowed the ECJ to exercise judicial 
creativity in many areas. The Treaty principles consequently imply detailed obligations even though 
their legislative language remains imprecise.  
One of the most significant judicial developments in interpreting the Treaty can be found in the 
ECJ judgment in Telaustria48. In this case the ECJ held that the non-discrimination principle of the 
Treaty implied an obligation of transparency entailing ‘a degree of advertising sufficient to enable 
the services market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures 
to be reviewed’.49 
In the later case of Coname, the Court stated that the transparency requirement does not 
necessarily imply ‘an obligation to hold an invitation to tender’50, but did not clarify whether this 
obligation might be imposed under certain circumstances and if so, the conditions that trigger such 
an obligation. The precise requirements of such a transparency obligation remain unclear from the 
current case law.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the ECJ ruling in Telaustria developed the concept that the EC Treaty 
itself imposes positive obligations of transparency, which overturned the traditionally submitted 
view that the Treaty only imposed ‘negative’ obligations on Member Sates to refrain from certain 
positive measures that restrict access to contracts. As argued by Arrowsmith, ‘the Telaustria rulings 
imposes important obligations for all public contracts in the EC and creates the potential for 
significant judicial control over the precise detail of all procedures’.51  
Certain types of contracts were deliberately excluded from detailed procedural requirements when 
the directives were adopted. The Telaustria rulings, however, indicate the possibility for the ECJ to 
impose procedural rules in a similar way as the directives do but for the contracts excluded by the 
coverage of directives. It can be argued that the ECJ’s attempt to impose procedural requirements on 
contracts outside the directives may risk undermining the carefully achieved regulatory balance 
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between the free trade goal and other domestic concerns.  
The ECJ’s general tendency in expansive interpretation can also be reflected in its interpretation 
of the directives. The general principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination 
were held by the ECJ to underlie the directives52, which now have been expressly written into the 
new directives.53 The ECJ has employed these general principles not only to interpret the explicit 
rules in the directives but also to imply additional obligations alongside the detailed and precise 
rules of the directives.  
For example, Article 1 of each Remedies Directive provides that procurement decisions shall be 
‘viewed effectively and, in particularly, as rapidly as possible’. Despite its vague wording, the 
principle of effectiveness entails precise binding obligations, which dramatically different from those 
general principles governing remedies under the GPA (see 3.2.4.2).  
Member States are required to comply not only with the specific requirements of the directives but 
also the principle that the remedies system as a whole is effective. This principle has been 
interpreted to impose precise obligations in addition to the minimum requirements of other more 
specific provisions of the directives. For instance, in Alcatel54, the ECJ stated that the principle of 
effectiveness requires Member States to make available the set-aside remedy against any disputable 
award decision. This requirement, the Court further indicated, would not be satisfied if a national 
system which prohibits the setting aside a concluded contract could not give aggrieved suppliers a 
practical opportunity to challenge the award decision before the contract is concluded.  
The judgment of Alcatel seems to suggest that a period of reasonable delay between the award 
decision and the conclusion of the contract should be provided to allow time for suppliers to make a 
challenge if states choose to prohibit the setting aside of a concluded contract, which has been 
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expressly written into the new Remedy Directives as a ‘standstill period’ requirement.55 
In later case of Universale-Bau56, the vague term ‘reasonable’ used in the judgment of Alcatel has 
been further clarified and very short time periods has been accepted as ‘reasonable’ including a 
two-week period from publication of an award notice, or six months after the award of the contract 
where the notice is not published. 
 
4.1.4.3 Discretion 
Different from the plurilateral nature of GPA, the procurement rules are an integral part of the EC 
agreement and thus mandatory for all EC Member States. Furthermore, states have little discretion in 
negotiation in the sense that there is a uniform coverage for all Member States without any 
possibility of derogation for particular entities or sectors.  
Previously, it was possible for Member States to gradually abolish discriminatory measures in 
light of politically difficulties for removing these measures overnight. When the European Economic 
Community was first formed, members were provided with a transitional period only on expiry of 
which the rules on free movement of goods57 became fully operational.58.   
As mentioned above, the EC procurement regime was designed as a form of legal framework, 
within which states enjoy discretion in adopting their own national procurement legislation. States 
may choose to include stricter or more detailed rules in their national legislation than what are 
required in the directives.  
The rules of the pubic sector directive and the utilities directive are quite similar, but the latter 
seem to grant more state discretion in implementation. For instance, under the public sector directive, 
formal tendering procedures, i.e. the open procedures59and restricted procedures60, have to be used 
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in most cases with the availability of negotiated procedures61only in exceptional cases.62 However, 
the utilities directive allows procuring authorities a free choice between the open procedures, the 
restricted procedures and the negotiated procedures provided that a call for competition has been 
made.63 
Generally speaking, the EC directives represent a much harder approach than the GPA in terms of 
states’ discretion in implementation. As discussed in the previous section, the EC procurement rules 
possess a higher degree of precision than the GPA. In particular, the ECJ’s broad judicial 
interpretation of the rules results in more detailed obligations.  
On the one hand, a higher level of precision may not necessarily of itself imply greater constraints 
but just greater clarity of treatment. For example, the new explicit provisions on framework, 
auctions and electronic communications in the EC directives serve to remove legal uncertainties 
rather than to limit states’ discretion in using them.  
On the other hand, the more detailed feature of the EC rules together with the ECJ’s broad 
interpretations does restrict states’ discretion in many respects. The rules governing award criteria 
can serve as an example. Although the previous directives only listed certain criteria for determining 
the most economically advantageous tender as illustrative examples64, the ECJ went a step further to 
held in Concordia Buses that all the criteria for awarding the contract must be ‘linked to the 
subject-matter of the contract’ on the ground that all illustrative criteria are of this type, which has 
been expressly written into the current directives now.65 By contrast, under the GPA, it is still 
possible to argue that criteria unrelated to the subject matter could also be considered (see Section 
3.2.4.3).  
In addition to the detail in explicit provisions, the ECJ’s expansive interpretations on the general 
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principles of transparency, equal treatment and non-discrimination further restrict states’ discretion. 
Taking the principle of equal treatment as an example, this principle was first articulated by the 
Court in Storebaelt66. In this case, Storebaelt, the contracting authority, conducted negotiations with 
a tender which did not comply with the tender conditions. It was held by the Court that Storebaelt 
infringed the principle of equal treatment by accepting a tender that did not comply with a 
fundamental requirement of the tender conditions.  
The Court also made it clear that the duty to observe the principle of equal treatment ‘lies at the 
very heart the directive’67, although it was yet written into the explicit provisions. Since then, the 
Court applied this principle to several cases without clarifying its precise meaning.68  
However, in the case of Fabricom, the Court stated that ‘the equal treatment principle requires 
that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be 
treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified’69. In so defining the principle, 
the Court is left with a broad discretion in determining the meaning of ‘comparable’ or ‘different’ 
situations and the justifications for departing from this requirement.70  
Arrowsmith, in her recent article71, demonstrates how states’ discretion has increasingly been 
reduced by the ECJ’s case law in deciding under what circumstances the procuring entity may treat 
two suppliers in a different way. In Fabricom, the Court held that the Belgian law prohibiting all 
persons involved in preparatory work from tendering contravened the directives because it was not 
proportionate. As explained by the Court, the rules went ‘beyond what is necessary to attain the 
objective of equal treatment for all tenderers’, and the principle of equal treatment could be achieved 
by a less restrictive measure – to only exclude those who were unable to prove that their 
participation entailed no risk for competition.72  As a result, the proportionality test stated in 
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Fabricom further constrains states’ discretion in implementing the principle of equal opportunity. 
Furthermore, even in the absence of explicit legislation and case law, states’ discretion could also 
be affected by the vagueness of these widely-interpreted principles. For instance, there are neither 
legislative provisions nor judicial interpretations expressly dealing with the issue of later tender 
under the EC regime. The rules on time-limit, as discussed above, is to ensure suppliers sufficient 
time to prepare and submit their tenders, which should by no means restrict states’ discretion to 
accept later tenders as the deadline is set by the procuring entity only for its own convenience.  
However, whether the procuring entity is allowed to freely accept late tenders still depends on 
how the Court is going to apply the principle of equal treatment here. It can be interpreted to allow 
the procuring entity to accept late tenders so long as it gives other suppliers equal opportunities to 
improve their tenders during the extension period it gives to a particular supplier; but the principle of 
equal treatment can, however, alternatively be interpreted to require that the procuring entity adheres 
to any rules set by itself – failing to apply them to one supplier involves unequal treatment of others, 
which thus generally precludes the procuring entity from accepting later tenders.73 Because of the 
unclear implication of this principle, states’ discretion in deciding whether to accept late tenders can 
be constrained for the fear of being caught by this principle, especially taking into account the ECJ’s 
previously restrictive approach in its interpretation. 
Recently, many interpretations given by the ECJ have been incorporated into the new directives, 
for example, the requirement that the criteria for awarding the contracts must be ‘linked to the 
subject-matter of the contract in question’ has now been explicitly included in the directives.74 
Consequently, states’ discretion in implementing the EC procurement rules has been increasingly 
curtailed by the unnecessarily detailed rules of the directives and the restrictive interpretation of 
them by the ECJ. 
 
4.1.4.4 Delegation 
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4.1.4.4a Inter-governmental Mechanism  
The EC’s inter-governmental enforcement system is an advanced centralised enforcement regime, 
under which the ECJ is delegated with the power to adjudicate disputes, elaborate the agreed rules 
and to authorise coercive measures. 
The ECJ is comprised of 25 judges at present, who shall be ‘appointed by common accord of the 
governments of the Member States for a term of six years’.75 Unlike the composition rule for the EC 
Commission and Council, there is no explicit nationality requirement and judges are chosen 
depending solely on their independence and legal qualifications or competence. Its structural and 
procedural elements form a barrier against potential attempts by national governments to exert an 
influence over the ECJ decisions. For instance, the Statue of the ECJ requires that the deliberations 
of judges shall remain secret,76 which makes it difficult for national governments to discern how 
their proposed judge actually behaves in reaching the final decisions of the ECJ.  
The prominent place occupied by the ECJ in the EC regime finds no parallel in other international 
arrangements where judicial organs are generally confined to a relatively modest role. The powers of 
the ECJ within the framework of the EC are closer to those of national rather than international 
jurisdictions.  
Like all other international dispute settlement bodies, the main function of the ECJ is to deal with 
disputes between Member States as well as cases concerning interpretation and application of the EC 
law. However, unlike most of legalised dispute settlement bodies which adhere closely to treaty texts 
such as the WTO DSB (see Section 3.2.4.4a), the ECJ has been deriving its judgment from the 
objectives of the Treaty without explicit grounding in the Treaty text or the intent of national 
governments.77   
The ECJ rulings are binding upon parties to the dispute. If the ECJ finds a breach of rules by an 
institution for which the relevant Member State is hold responsible, the state is obliged to take 
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‘necessary measures’ to comply with the judgment.78 If the state fails to do so, the Commission may 
bring it before the ECJ again for failure to redress breach, and then penalty payment can be 
imposed.79 During the process of proceedings before the ECJ, interim measures are available to 
suspend a concluded contract.   
Although the ECJ is not rigidly bound by their own previous decisions, it usually follows its own 
precedents in the interests of legal certainty and the consistent development of the case law. As 
argued in Section 4.1.4.2, the ECJ has actually been acting as a law-maker by its expansive 
interpretation of the fundamental principles under the Treaty and the directives rules. Apart from its 
own case law the ECJ usually applies, many interpretations given by the ECJ have been clearly 
incorporated in the secondary regulations such as the directives. 
The proceedings before the ECJ can be brought either by the European Commission80or by other 
Member States81. Like most of other inter-governmental DSM, there is no right for private parties to 
bring a proceeding against governments directly. The only avenue of legal redress open to private 
parties is to present their complaints to the Commission in the hope that it will initiate legal 
proceedings. The Commission may consider breaches brought to its attention by private parties but 
there is no guarantee that it will do so. 
In practice, the institution of proceedings has been largely left to the Commission as the guardian 
of the European rules.82 The Commission can refuse or take up a case with its sole discretion.83 The 
Commission used to take up and pursue all valid complaints brought to it, but now it concentrates on 
cases having a community-wide impact or raising major questions of interpretation.84 The vast 
majority of disputes which are not of general importance will be expected to be dealt with through 
relevant national challenge procedures.  
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The essential role that the Commission plays in pursuing breaches of EC law can be regarded as 
one of most novel features of the EC enforcement system. As for other procurement regimes 
involving the delegation of formal adjudication power such as the GPA, the task of detecting and 
correcting non-compliance is largely relied upon the institution of challenge proceedings by one 
government against another, which may probably be motivated by their own political interests rather 
than appreciations of the value of the whole system. In contrast, the Commission, an institution 
largely independent from Member governments, is in a better position to act in the general interest of 
the Community.  
 
4.1.4.4b National Challenge Procedures    
However, the enforcement by suppliers at national level is considered the primary enforcement 
mechanism. The EC States are required to make the EC procurement rules enforceable by affected 
parties in their national courts and to ensure the relevant remedies fair and effective. In particular, 
the specific legislation on remedies was adopted: Directives 89/665/EEC [1989] O.J. (L395)33 for 
the public sector, and Directives 92/13/EEC [1992] O.J. (L76)14 for the utilities sector, which has 
recently been amended by the new directive, the Directive 2007/66/EC.85 
Like the GPA approach, Member States enjoy the freedom to design their own precise remedies 
system provided that certain minimum standards set by the directives are met. Also, the vital aspect 
of the form of remedy under both of the GPA and the EC regimes is that rapid interim measures 
should be provided to correct breaches of the agreement and to preserve commercial opportunities, 
but in the case of EC directives the anticipated measure is more precise on what forms of procedures 
must be made available.86  
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The EC directives are more detailed and further provide that the review bodies shall have the 
power to set aside or ensure the setting aside of decisions taken unlawfully,87and different from the 
GPA rules, both set aside of unlawful decisions and damages must be made available in the case of 
breach.88 The newly adopted EC directive further introduces a ‘standstill’ period requirement under 
which the procuring entity should wait a certain number of days before concluding a public contract. 
If this standstill period has not been respected, the new directive requires national courts under 
certain conditions to set aside a concluded contract.89 
By contrast with the position under the GPA, national review bodies may independently seek a 
preliminary ruling of the ECJ on interpretation of the EC rules if they do not feel competent to 
resolve on their own. The ECJ answers specific questions concerning the rules and then sends the 
case back to national review bodies for deposition of the merits of the dispute. Such a link between 
the ECJ and national review bodies helps to ensure consistent interpretation of the EC rules.  
Lastly, the concept of direct effect represents one of most remarkable features of the EC rules, 
referring to the capacity of EC rules to confer rights on individuals which can be enforced by 
national courts.90 The doctrine of direct effect was firstly established by the ECJ in Van Gend en 
Loos,91 which may have the effect to put the enforcement of the EC law on dual levels: at the 
inter-governmental level, the Commission is delegated with the power to take a non-complying state 
before the ECJ; meanwhile, it also gives private individuals, at national level, rights to enforce the 
EC law before their national courts.  
However, the Court also made it clear in Van Gend en Loos that not every treaty provision has 
direct effect and laid dawn a test for Treaty provisions to be held to have direct effect.92 Regarding 
the EC directives, they were not initially considered to have direct effective. The ECJ, however, 
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decided otherwise. In the case of Van Duyn, the Court held that the directives could be directly 
effective as the criteria for direct effect are satisfied.93  
In particular, as for the procurement directives, it has been ruled by the Court that most of 
substantive rules of the directives governing contract award procedures have direct effect.94 That is 
to say, if a state fails to take the implementing measures or adopts measures which do not conform 
to such a directive with direct effect, affected parties will have the right to rely on the directive rules 
against the defaulting state. This direct link between the directives and domestic laws found in the 
EC is unique among international organisations. As discussed in Section 3.2.4.4b, most of 
international agreements including the GPA, international norms can only take effect in domestic 
legal system through legal incorporation or statutory recognition.  
Nevertheless, the direct effect of the EC directives does not absolve Member States from the 
obligation to take measures to implement them.95 Member States are legally obliged to properly 
transpose the directives into national law in due time. If a state fails to transpose the directives into 
national legislation, a creative interpretation made by its national court to meet the requirement of 
the directives will not suffice in itself to make that state comply with its obligation to implement the 
rules, as judicial interpretation in the absence of legislation is not sufficiently clear to confer the 
rights provided for by the directives.96  
A Member State which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directives in 
the prescribed period cannot rely on its own failure to perform the obligations against individuals,97 
and continues being subject to a legally binding obligation to take steps to transpose them. Also, it 
may risk being brought before the ECJ, which may ultimately result in the Court imposing a 
financial penalty. Meanwhile, state liability may also be incurred for the non-implementation of 
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directives: individuals who have suffered loss as a result of the failure of a national government to 
implement the directives may bring proceedings in tort before national courts against the 
government.98 
 
4.2 Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the EC Member States Participating in the 
European Defence Agency (‘the Code’) 
4.2.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
As have been examined at the previous section, public procurement of goods, services and 
constructions is highly regulated by the EC Treaty and directives, which are hard law rules in nature 
and with the effect of de factor harmonisation. Although procurement of military equipments is, by 
law, still covered by these hard law rules, in practice it is largely left unregulated owing to Member 
States’ extensive use of derogations.  
Derogations concerning public security can be found in the EC procurement rules. Most famously, 
Art.296 of the Treaty provides a general exemption from the procurement rules in cases where states 
consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of their security in connection with 
‘the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war materials’.99 Under this provision, states 
currently have very broad discretion over the application of the EC rules on their defence 
procurement. It has been recognised that the majority of defence contracts are exempted from the EC 
procurement rules and awarded on the basis of national procurement rules, and the European defence 
sector remains fragmented, with relatively small and closed national markets and divergent national 
regulatory frameworks.100 
In view of the economic and military benefits which could be achieved through a more liberalised 
defence procurement market, the European Commission has issued a series of Communications with 
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an attempt to improve the situation and two major initiatives have been announced. One is to adopt a 
restrictive interpretation of Art.296 to confine states’ discretion in excessive use of the derogation; 
the other is to agree on a new and more flexible directive on the defence procurement to which 
derogation in Art.296 does not apply.101  
Recently, the Commission issued a Communication clarifying that the derogation under Art.296 
should be construed narrowly and is subject to strict conditions.102 Although the Communications is 
not a legally binding instrument solely with the effect of confirming existing law, it would oblige the 
Commission to abide by this interpretation when deciding whether to take actions before the ECJ,103 
which presumably has a persuasive force to convince Member States to comply. As with the possible 
new directive on defence procurement, Member States are yet to agree on anything so far. 
In addition to the above initiatives taken by the European Community, a number of efforts have 
been made outside the EC framework. An early effort was made by the Western European Union 
(‘the WEU’), which is a partially dormant European defence and security organisation established on 
the Treaty of Brussels of 1948.104 In 1991 the defence ministers of the WEU Member States agreed 
to the Maastricht Declaration with the objective of creating a European Armaments Agency, which 
led to the creation of the Western European Armament Group (‘the WEAG’) a year later.105  
The basis for WEAG-wide armaments activities was a set of principles laid down in the Coherent 
Policy Document aimed at liberalising defence procurement market of Member States.106 Given the 
non-binding nature of the Coherent Policy Document, its application depended on the political 
willingness of WEAG Members, and in practice was largely ignored from the outset.107 The WEAG 
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was closed in 2005 and most of its workings have now been transferred to the European Defence 
Agency (to be discussed below). Accordingly, the WEAG Coherent Policy has also been replaced by 
the new European Defence Agency initiatives. 
The second initiative is the establishment of a management agency of collaborative defence 
projects. In 1996 the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (‘the OCCAR’) was established 
by the defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the UK to provide more effective and 
efficient management of certain existing and future collaborative armament programmes.108 The 
success of the OCCAR was limited as small states considered it as an attempt of larger ones to 
dictate the way of European defence procurement integration, and the latter soon also realised that it 
is impossible to sustain European armaments co-operation without the participation of the majority 
of European states.109 
The most recent initiative is a Joint Action of the Council of European Union established the 
European Defence Agency (‘the EDA’) in 2004.110 The participation of the EDA is not automatic for 
all EU Members though open to all of them. The EU Members can freely decide to participate 
immediately or at a later stage after the adoption of the Joint Action or to withdraw from the EDA at 
any time provided they notify their intention accordingly.  
In 2005, the EDA adopted a non-binding Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the EU 
Member States Participating in the European Defence Agency (‘the Code’).111 In consistent with the 
flexibility of participation for the EDA, states may subscribe to it or not; they may cancel their 
participation at any time; and no sanctions would apply if a subscribing state does not observe the 
rules.112 Currently, out of the 24 EDA participating Member States, that is, all EU members except 
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Denmark, 22 have committed to follow the Code principles and rules.113 
The objective of the Code is to encourage application of competition in the segment of defence 
procurement derogated from the EC procurement rules.114 To this end, a set of general principles 
have been laid down including the principles of fair and equal treatment of suppliers, mutual 
transparency and accountability, mutual support and mutual benefit. Under each of these principles, 
comparatively more precise rules are provided, explaining what the principle entails and indicating 
any concrete measure needed to implement it.  
Taking the principle of fair and equal treatment of suppliers as an example, transparency and 
equality of information is pointed out as an important element of the principle. Further, concrete 
measures are also required to substantiate this element. First of all, participating states may make 
arrangements to publish all new defence procurement opportunities covered by the Code on one 
single portal. Secondly, all participating states are encouraged to provide suppliers with a ‘vade 
mecum’ to familiarise foreign suppliers with their national procurement procedures. Thirdly, a 
standard-format announcement on contract awards will also be posted to the public; and lastly, 
certain transparency and equal treatment rules are also included governing the conduct of the 
procurement proceedings itself including the rules on selection criteria, specifications and statement 
of requirement, award criteria and debriefing. 
Additionally, the Code recognises, as part of its principle of mutual benefit, that the regime shall 
expand procurement opportunities for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from across Europe to 
sell into a continental scale market.115 Consequently, a Code of Best Practice in Supply Chain was 
also adopted in 2006, as an integral part of the Code, to ensure that fair competition and the benefits 
of the regime are driven down the supply chain.116 
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4.2.2 Coverage 
The Code covers all defence procurement contracts whose value exceeds 1 million and which meets 
the condition for application of Art.296, excluding certain clearly specified contracts.  
Art.296 allows Member States to derogate from the Treaty and directives rules, in those cases 
where an exception from those hard law rules is required for the protection of their essential security 
interests. The application of the Code attempts to subject massive defence procurements derogating 
from the hard law rules to a certain degree of soft law regulation.  
Like the EC directives, a value threshold above which the rules apply is set to ensure 
cross-boarder interests. Moreover, the Code excludes certain highly sensitive defence procurements 
such as nuclear weapons procurement, which seem inappropriate for any international regulation 
from a free trade perspective. 
The way how Art.296 is interpreted is very important to determine the application of the Code for 
participating states, which provides a dividing line between the application of the EC procurement 
rules and that of the Code. For example, the Commission’s restrictive interpretation on Art.296 
might make more defence-related contracts fall under the EC procurement rules, and thus outside the 
application scope of the Code.  
The Commission explicitly clarifies the relationship between the EC procurement rules and the 
Code as pursuing the same objective in a different segment of defence market.117 The Code and the 
proposed new directive on defence procurement can also work as complementary instruments, as the 
former applies in cases where the conditions for the use of Art.296 are met and the latter applies 
where are not. 
 
4.2.3 Secondary policies 
Defence procurement has extensively been utilised as a policy tool to promote secondary objectives. 
States may directly award domestic firms the contracts to develop or support their own national 
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defence industries to guarantee the security of supply in time of emergency; or allow foreign 
participation with the requirement of transferring the relevant technological know-how to enhance 
their national defence capabilities. Alternatively, states may use defence procurement as an 
investment vehicle in a particular industry which is located in a distressed region or of strategic 
interest.                                                                                       
After subscribing to the Code, Member States’ secondary use of covered defence procurement 
would be ruled out by its principle of fair and equal treatment if it has a discriminatory effect. For 
example, measures favouring non-competitive national defence industries will be prohibited by this 
principle. However, if there is no discrimination involved, the Code does not explicitly prevent states 
from using defence procurement to promote secondary objectives.  
More importantly, unlike other procurement regimes such as the GPA and the EC (see Section 
3.2.3 & 4.1.3), the Code does not prohibit the use of offset, and on the contrary, it expressly 
mentions the consideration of offset as one of possible criteria when evaluating ‘the most 
economically advantageous solution’.118 Consequently, states are left with considerable freedom to 
pursue secondary objectives at the evaluation stages. 
 
4.2.4 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
4.2.4.1 Bindingness 
The Code is a voluntary non-binding instrument. It is expressly stated in the Code that ‘no legal 
commitment is involved or implied’, and ‘the regime or operate on the basis of sovereign Member 
State voluntarily choosing to align their policies and practices…those who elect to join the regime, 
and follow this code, will be free to cancel their participation in the regime at any time’.119 The 
non-binding nature of the Code echoes that of the context in which the Code was concluded, namely, 
the EDA, which is essentially a voluntary inter-governmental forum. 
Defence procurement, because of the very nature of the procured products, are often very 
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politically sensitive in the sense of its being closely connected with national sovereignty and security. 
Derogations are therefore often included in international procurement regimes to protect states’ 
essential security interests.  
Besides the EC rules, the GPA, for example, also contains a general exemption for action and 
non-disclosure of information by any state that ‘considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests relating to the procurement of arms, ammunition or war materials, or to 
procurement indispensable for national security for national defence purpose’.120 Indeed, national 
security interests are widely considered a legitimate reason to exempt certain defence procurements 
from international regulation.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the non-binding nature of the Code is largely owing to 
the very area it attempts to address: an extremely sensitive area excluded from the application of 
binding hard law rules. Legally binding rules such as the EC treaty or directives are theoretically 
inappropriate or politically infeasible to regulate certain defence procurements closely related to 
states’ essential security interests. However, it is also undesirable to leave them completely 
unregulated, especially in consideration of the EC states’ extensive use of derogations from the hard 
law rules. In this regard, the non-binding Code was brought in to fill the gap, providing a certain 
degree of soft law regulation. 
 
4.2.4.2 Precision  
In general, the Code possesses a very low degree of precision, laying down general principles rather 
than prescriptive rules. It does not include a complete set of detailed procedural rules, which can be 
found in many other procurement regimes such as the GPA, the EC directives, the NAFTA and the 
FTAA (see Section 3.2.4.2, Section 4.1.4.2, Section 4.3.4.2 and Section 4.4.4.2 respectively). Instead, 
it resembles the COMESA’s or the APEC’s principled approach (see Section 4.5.4.2 & 4.6.4.2), and 
sets out general principles such as fair and equal treatment of suppliers, mutual transparency and 
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accountability, mutual support and mutual benefit.  
In comparison with the COMESA directives or the APEC NBPs, the Code generally shares a 
similar degree of precision with them, and in some respects, it seems even more general and 
ambiguous. Regarding the issue of qualification criteria, the Code only generally states that all 
companies will be selected ‘on the basis of transparent and objective standards, such as possession 
of security clearance, required know-how and previous experience’. Moreover, the Code contains no 
specific rules governing the issues of minimum time-limits for the receipt of tenders etc 
Despite the similarly imprecise feature, different reasons can be raised to explain their imprecision. 
Regarding the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs, the principled approach is mainly used to 
accommodate the diversity of their Member States, whilst in the case of the Code consisting of more 
economically and politically homogenous states, again, the reason for its vagueness is because of the 
particular area it intends to address – certain defence procurement contracts exempted from the EC 
hard law procurement rules for the protection of Member States’ essential security interests. 
Soft law rules in terms of its vague content are believed to be better suited to their highly 
sensitive nature. Further, in the case of the Code, all its Member States have taken hard law 
obligations in procurement of civil goods, services and constructions as well as of defence goods and 
services not closely relating to national security under the EC rules. However, regarding the 
procurement of military products and services concerning essential security, it has been proven 
politically impossible for Member States to accept any hard law regulation. These types of defence 
procurement are expressly excluded, even for limited soft law regulation in regimes such as the 
COMESA and the APEC.121 
 
4.2.4.3 Discretion 
The EDA membership does not predetermine the participation in the Code. The EDA Member States 
may, in their absolute discretion, choose to participant in the regime or not. It is explicitly stated in 
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the Code that the Member States may freely subscribe to it or not; and ‘those who elect to join the 
regime, and follow this Code, will be free to cancel their participation in the regime at any time’.122  
Furthermore, a considerable wide discretion is left with subscribing Member States over how to 
transpose the Code principles into their national legislation. It does not contain a series of detailed 
procedural rules restricting states’ discretion in implementation. For example, there are no rules 
governing the choice of procurement methods. 
As have been examined in Section 3.2.4.3, Section 4.1.4.3, Section 4.3.4.3 and Section 4.4.4.3, 
regimes such as the GPA, the EC, the NAFTA and the FTAA confine states’ discretion over the 
choice of procurement methods by indicating certain formal competitive tendering as ‘standard’ 
procedures with the possibility of using other procedures under prescribed conditions, while others 
like the COMESA and the APEC leave states with more discretion by only recommending the 
generally preferred procurement methods for normal contracts, but allowing states to define their 
own particular conditions for the use of alternative methods (see Section 4.5.4.3 & 4.6.4.3).  
In the absence of any rules on the use of procurement methods, the Code Member States may, in 
their sole discretion, allow the general use of more informal procurement procedures to facilitate 
communications between the procuring entity and suppliers. Apparently, extensive negotiations with 
suppliers at all stage of the procurement process are normally indispensable given the highly 
technical and complex feature of the defence contracts covered by the Code.  
So far as the issue of award criteria is concerned, the Code suggests that the fundamental award 
criteria should be ‘the most economically advantageous solution for the particular requirement, 
taking into account inter alia consideration of costs, compliance, quality and security of supply and 
offset’. 123  Although the Code emphasises value-for-money concern by referring to ‘the most 
economically advantageous solution’, it also expressly points out other factors for consideration 
such as security of supply. 
The special features of covered defence procurement distinguish it from other types of 
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procurement, which are not only economic and technological, but also closely related to the national 
security and defence policies of Member States. For example, the nature of defence procurement 
requires sources of supply to be guaranteed for the entire duration of an arms programme no matter 
at times of peace or at times of war, as well as demands confidentiality of information concerning its 
technical specifications.124  
The list of possible criteria contained in the Code is non-exhaustive, and there are no explicit 
restrictions on the scope of permissible award criteria as those of the EC directive, such as the 
requirement that award criteria should be linked to the subject-matter of the contract. Arguably, 
Member States may include additional award criteria for consideration as they see fit. Again, this 
wide state discretion can be explained by the sensitivity of the procurement contracts that fall under 
the scope of the Code. 
Although the vast majority of the Code rules are very soft in terms of broad discretion given to 
states in implementation, some are quite prescriptive and to a large extent constrain states’ discretion. 
For example, the Code foresees the establishment of a single online portal operated by the EDA, the 
Electronic Bulletin Board, and requires that all relevant new defence procurement opportunities 
should be published on that portal in advance.125 This requirement largely restricts states’ discretion 
over the choice of media for publication. In this regard, the Code follows the approach of many hard 
law regimes such as the EC, the GPA, the NAFTA and the FTAA by requiring the use of precisely 
indicated media for advertising procurement opportunities.126  
However, relevant rules of other soft law regimes may be found less restrictive; for example, the 
COMESA directives only suggests that national law should require the publication of a notice of 
contract award for contracts the value of which exceeds a specified threshold, without any guidance 
on what types of media should be used for the publication127. Similarly, in the case of APEC NBPs, 
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procurement opportunities are generally recommended to be published in ‘a medium readily 
accessible to suppliers’, such as official journals/gazettes, newspapers, specialised trade journals, 
and internet.128 
 
4.2.4.4 Delegation 
4.2.4.4a Inter-governmental Mechanism 
Given its non-binding nature, the non-compliance with the Code will result in political 
embarrassment rather than legal consequences. As clearly stated in the Code, ‘no sanction is 
envisaged for any non-observance of this Code by any SMS (‘subscribing Member States’), beyond 
the requirement to account to the other members of the regime’.129 There is no delegation of 
adjudicative power to a third party to enforce the rules, and instead a monitoring and reporting 
system is created to induce state compliance. 
According to the Code, the EDA is not expected to assume the role of independent investigator of 
the Member States’ compliance, but it will function as monitor of the regime with regular reports to 
the Steering Board which consists of defence ministers of 24 participating states.130 Apparently, the 
EDA is delegated with no specific power to take actions against those Member States which breach 
the Code, but may report the breaches to its Steering Broad where the circumstances can be debated 
by Member States.  
Such a monitoring and reporting system may exert significant ‘peer pressure’ on Member State to 
comply. In the absence of legally binding rulings, sanctions or other hard law enforcement 
mechanisms, ‘peer pressure’ is regarded as the driving force which makes the soft law rules effective, 
and it has been frequently resorted to by many other soft law regimes such as the APEC (see Section 
4.6.4.4a) and the OECD (see Section 5.2.2.4). 
In the case of the Code, the generation of ‘peer pressure’ mainly involves the invocation of the 
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exemption provided by the Code. The Code permits non-competitive procurement in certain 
exceptional cases, which is subject to certain safeguard measures: states are required to provide an 
explanation for non-competitive procurement to the EDA. 131  The EDA may then report any 
suspicious incompliance to the Steering Board so that the matter can be discussed in that forum.  
‘Peer pressure’ can be generated through the discussion and debate among Member States, which 
may bring the non-complying Member back in line with the Code rules. Furthermore, although the 
Code relies on Member States voluntarily choosing to comply with its principles and rules, it 
operates on a reciprocal basis. Member States may refrain from violating the Code rules out of fear 
that their own national defence industries could be locked out from the defence procurement market 
of other Member States, which was described by Georgopoulos as ‘another hidden stick’ to the Code 
regime.132 
Nevertheless, in contrast with other soft law regime such as the APEC and the OECD (see Section 
4.6.4.4a and Section 5.2.2.4), the Code still lacks an institutionalised ‘peer review’ system, under 
which comprehensive and systematic peer reviews will be conducted on a regular basis to monitor 
compliance. The details of the monitoring procedure remain unclear – it spells out neither how the 
discussions in the Steering board will proceed nor in what circumstances such discussions can take 
place. Therefore the influence of the Code monitoring system is still hard to be predicted. 
 
4.2.4.4b National challenge procedures 
The Code does not require Member States to make available any national challenge system for 
aggrieved suppliers concerning the defence procurement contracts to which the Code applies 
 
4.3 North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’) 
4.3.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
The NAFTA is a regional binding agreement between Canada, the U.S., and Mexican to implement 
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a free trade area, which was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1994. Such an agreement 
largely builds upon the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (‘CFTA’) with an extension to Mexico133, 
but it includes many expansions and improvements of the CFTA rules.134 
The objective of the NAFTA is to integrate the whole North American continent into one free 
trade area and to promote trade and economic co-operation between North American and South 
American countries.135 The issue of public procurement is dealt with in the NAFTA Chapter 10, 
which is regarded as one of the most outstanding achievements of NAFTA as well as one of the 
most difficult to accomplish. The aim of the NAFTA Chapter 10 is to liberalise procurement 
measures so as to create balanced, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent government 
procurement opportunities for firms from all Member States.136 
Similar to that of the GPA, the heart of NAFTA Chapter 10 is national treatment, 
non-discrimination and transparency provisions. Also, the obligations contained in the NAFTA 
Chapter 10 clearly reflect the influence form the EC procurement rules and GATT Government 
Procurement Code (‘the GATT Code’). Like the approach adopted by the EC and the GPA, detailed 
minimum procedural rules for the award of contracts have been set out to support its general 
principles of national treatment, non-discrimination and transparency. 
 
4.3.2 Coverage 
The coverage of NAFTA Chapter 10 is considerably wider than that of the old GATT code as well 
as CFTA in terms of entities and types of contracts covered. Unlike the EC directives, NAFTA 
Chapter 10 does not include a uniform coverage for Member States, and it simply lists covered 
entities in Annex 1001.1a in a schedule for each party, including federal government entities and 
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enterprises. As with state and provincial government entities, the negotiation failed to include any 
such kind of entities under the regime and thus the list for state and provincial government entities is 
currently left blank. However, the three parties are committed to commence further negotiations in 
order to eventually subject them to this agreement.137 
The NAFTA rules apply not only to contracts for goods but also to contracts for services. NAFTA 
Chapter10 takes the ‘negative’ list approach, where in principle all goods and services are covered 
unless specifically exempted.138 In general, the NAFTA’s approach to coverage are similar to that of 
the GPA (see Section 3.2.2): the coverage offered by the parties is largely based on the principle of 
reciprocity in terms of market opportunities, which eventually ends up with non-MFN treatment 
among parties of the same agreement. For instance, Canadian firms (but not Mexican firms) are 
denied access to most of the government enterprises listed in the U.S. schedule until Canada opens 
procurement by its provincial hydro utilities to U.S. firms.139   
Also, like most of international procurement regimes, the value of procurement contracts will 
need to be above certain financial thresholds in order to trigger the application of the NAFTA 
rules,140 and the rules for valuation of contracts are also in place to prevent parties from splitting 
contracts to avoid obligations under the agreement.141  
 
4.3.3 Secondary Policies 
Both Canada and the U.S. have many existing programmes or legislations concerning the use of 
procurement as a policy tool, while the Mexican government enjoys extensive control over its 
national key industries. Consequently, the issue of secondary use of procurement has received 
particular attention under NAFTA Chapter 10.  
Like the GPA or the EC procurement rules, the implementation of any secondary policies can be 
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affected by the national treatment and non-discrimination rule142 as well as its detailed rules on 
award procedures. NAFTA Article 1006 explicitly prohibits the use of offsets in the qualification 
and selection of suppliers, goods or services and evaluation of tenders.143 Offset measures are 
considered to produce trade-distorting effects, and although they are not allowed under the EC 
Treaty, NAFTA is the first international procurement agreement that provides a clear prohibition 
against such measures.144  
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the later new GPA has also incorporated a similar prohibition 
subject to special provisions for developing countries. Different from the position under the GPA, 
Mexico, as a developing country is not entirely exempted from this prohibition, but only permitted 
to impose a limited local content requirement under certain circumstances.145 Canada and the U.S. 
are allowed to continue the existing set-asides programmes for small and minority business is 
allowed146, while Mexico, which does not have parallel programmes, has been permitted to allocate 
a non-specific sector set-aside subject to specified restrictions147  
Furthermore, it is interesting to find that there are joint programmes for small business under 
Article 1021 of NAFTA, which call for the establishment of the Committee on Small Business to 
facilitate procurement policies in each country for small businesses. In view of the free trade 
objective of NAFTA Chapter 10, it seems a bit odd to include such programmes under the regime 
since they are to be conducted through trade discrimination, despite the fact that the promotion of 
small businesses may in itself be well worthy of Member countries’ own domestic concerns. It can 
be argued that such programmes would be better justified if they are required to be conducted in the 
way that each Member’s set-asides procurement opportunities are equally opened to small and 
minority businesses from all three parties.148 
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4.3.4 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
4.3.4.1 Bindingness 
NAFTA is a legally binding instrument. Art.105 of NAFTA provides that Member States ‘shall 
ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this 
Agreement’. In Art.103 and Art.104, it states its relationship to pre-existing rules of other 
international agreements to which its Member States are also parties. Member States’ existing rights 
and obligations under the GATT and other agreements are affirmed, but the NAFTA agreement shall 
prevail in the case of any inconsistency between it and such other agreements, except as otherwise 
provided in the NAFTA agreement.149 As regards legal formalities, the NAFTA agreement went 
through the traditional legal formalities of signature, ratification, and finally entered into force in 
1994 on an exchange of written notifications certifying the completion of necessary legal 
procedure.150 
As a whole, both the content and the form of this agreement reflect the intent of the participating 
parties to create legally binding obligations rather than merely personal or political obligations in 
effect. 
 
4.3.4.2 Precision  
Both Canada and the U.S. were parties to the old GATT Code, but Mexico had not yet joined the 
GATT Code. As a result, a complete set of detailed provisions are laid down under the NAFTA 
Chapter 10 rather than the parties relying on direct incorporation of the GATT Code rules by 
reference with certain modifications, which is found under the CFTA.  
Like the GATT Code, the NAFTA Chapter 10 includes general principles prohibiting 
discrimination in procurement as well as detailed transparency procedural rules to ensure 
non-discrimination. However, it goes into much greater detail than the GATT Code in almost every 
topic, and makes significant changes in certain aspects. For example, both the GATT code and the 
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EC procurement directives do not contain any express provision on the circumstances in which the 
post-tender negotiation with suppliers can be used. The NAFTA Chapter 10, however, introduces 
new disciplines governing the use of such negotiations, under which negotiations can only be 
allowed in two circumstances as specified under NAFTA Article 1014.1151. A similar provision on 
the use of the negotiation was later adopted under the new GPA152. 
Except for the inclusion of additional detail, the NAFTA rules are very similar, if not identical, to 
those of the GPA on nearly every aspect including minimum time-limits for tendering and 
qualification criteria, because both regimes closely mirror the old GATT Code.  
Taking the issue of minimum time-limits for tendering as an example, exactly like the GPA’s 
approach, the NAFTA Chapter 10 lays down general principles as well as prescriptive rules to ensure 
that suppliers have sufficient time to prepare and submit their tenders. On the one hand, Article 1012 
generally requires that the procuring entity provide suppliers with adequate time to prepare and 
submit their tenders, and also illustrates factors it must take into account when determining 
time-limits. On the other hand, it sets out specific minimum periods that must be allowed for the 
preparation, submission and receipt of tenders.  
The wording and content of the NAFTA’s general principles and precise rules on time limits 
closely resembles that of the GPA with only minor differences. For example, both the NAFTA 
Chapter 10 and the GPA provides that in selective procedures the period for the receipt of tender 
shall generally not be less than 40 days from the date of the initial issuance of invitations to tender, 
with the possibility of this standard time-limit being reduced in specified circumstances.153  
However, the GPA specifically states that this minimum period applies regardless of whether or 
not the date of initial issuance of invitations to tender coincides with the date of the publication of 
the notice of the list,154 while the NAFTA Chapter 10 further requires that there shall not be less than 
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40 days between the publication of the notice of the list and the receipt of tenders where the initial 
issuance of invitations to tender does not coincide with the date of publication of the notice.155  
In general, the transparency procedural rules of the NAFTA Chapter 10 share a similar degree of 
precision with those of the GPA.  
 
4.3.4.3 Discretion 
Similar to the GPA’s approach, and in contrast with the EC rules, the NAFTA Chapter 10 does not 
attempt to define a uniform coverage for Member States, and thus states have a broad discretion 
when negotiating their coverage schedules.  
Each party can freely make its offer regarding the covered contracts and entities as well as its 
country-specific threshold. However, like the position under the GPA, the coverage offered by the 
NAFTA parties is mainly based on the principle of reciprocity with the consequential result of the 
non-MFN treatment among members. As a result, small or developing countries may enjoy less 
discretion than big or developed countries in negotiating their coverage due to less market 
opportunities available for the former to offer, as discussed at Section 3.2.4.3. 
When it comes to states’ discretion in implementing their obligations, the NAFTA rules only set 
out minimum procedural standards under which states have a significant discretion to formulate their 
own domestic procurement rules. Since the NAFTA rules are very similar to those of the GPA in 
many respects, it is not surprising that a similar degree of discretion is granted to states in 
implementation under both regimes. For example, compared with the GPA rules, the NAFTA 
Chapter 10 also allows states a free choice between open and selective tendering for normal 
contracts, with the exception of limited tendering in specific circumstances, which are defined 
almost identically to those under the GPA with some new additions.156  
This is also the case with regard to the rules governing award criteria. Both of the regimes require 
that contracts be awarded to either the lowest-priced tender or the most advantageous tender in terms 
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of the specific evaluation criteria set out in the notices or tender documentation, but leave undefined 
the scope of acceptable non-price criteria. 157   
As previously discussed in Section 2.3.1, soft law can be resorted to in order to accommodate 
states with different levels of readiness for legalisation in a particular area. In practice, more 
discretion is often given to developing countries in implementing their obligations, which is the case 
under the GPA. By contrast, the EC directives apply exactly the same rules to every Member States 
without granting any more discretion to any one of them, probably because of the comparative 
similarity of their economic, political, and legal conditions. 
Mexico is the only developing country of the NAFTA members, whose procurement system was 
not as transparent, predictable and sophisticated as those of either Canada or the U.S. prior to its 
accession to NAFTA.158 As a result, Mexico had to make significant changes to its procurement 
system to make it compatible with the NAFTA regime. 
The nature of Mexico’s reluctance to undertake the same level of commitment as Canada and the 
U.S. is analogous to that of other less developed countries towards the obligations under other 
procurement agreements.159 These countries whose weak economies, institutions and laws prevent 
them from implementing hard legal commitments may possibly accept softer forms of agreement 
through S&DT provisions. Over time, the initially reluctant states may accept harder commitment if 
the soft arrangements work well without serious adverse consequence.  
NAFTA Annex 1001.2a sets out transitional provisions to provide special concessions to Mexico 
for the gradual opening of its procurement market on one hand, and to temporarily soften certain 
procedural requirements for Mexico on the other. In terms of market access obligations, the 
liberalising rules initially apply only to a certain degree to some of its entities and sectors, then, are 
progressively extended to all the contracts covered by its schedule. For example, Pemex and CFE, 
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two of the dominant Mexican energy enterprises, are allowed to set aside from the obligations of 
Chapter 10 the specified percentage of the total value of their procurement contracts, and the 
specified percentage for exemption started at 50% in 1994 but gradually decrease at the annual rate 
of 5% eventually ending in 2003.160  
These concrete concessions given by the NAFTA are much more meaningful than those under the 
S&DT provisions of the GPA. As argued in Section 3.2.4.3, the GPA S&DT provisions only states 
certain possibilities rather than concrete market concessions, under which developing countries may 
exercise a certain degree of discretion in terms of exempting certain entities, products or services 
from the national treatment rules, but subject to the prior consent of other parties. In contrast, 
Mexico can, at its sole discretion, make similar exemptions from the NAFTA rules for listed entities 
and sectors according to its specified transitional arrangement.  
In terms of procedural requirements, Mexico may also enjoy a higher degree of discretion in 
implementation pursuant to these transitional provisions. For example, it provides that ‘Mexico shall 
use its best efforts to comply with the 40-day time limit requirements of Article 1012’.161 According 
to the NAFTA Article 1012, states are legally bound to ensure a minimum period of 40 days for 
suppliers to prepare and submit their tenders. Mexico, because of the above-stated special provision, 
is only under a legally binding obligation to ‘use its best efforts’ to comply with the requirement, 
which gives more discretion in implementation.  
These transitional provisions have arguably made it easier for Mexico to accept the NAFTA rules 
and to agree to the inclusion of its state-owned enterprises for regulation. However, the greater 
discretion Mexico has in implementing its obligations is not permanent. Mexico has to fully comply 
with the NAFTA rules once its specified transitional period expires. Soft law provisions, in the 
context of NAFTA Chapter 10, have therefore served as an intermediate step towards the eventual 
hard law regulations which were unachievable at the negotiating stage. 
Meanwhile, the introduction of the NAFTA procurement disciplines in Mexico may have also 
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speeded the process of its accession to the GPA, because the compliance with the NAFTA rules 
have made things easier for Mexico to comply with the GPA rules owing to the similarity of 
procedural requirements between the two regimes.  
Further, if Mexico’s experience with open procurement markets turns out to be positive, other 
developing countries might be encouraged to consider the idea of liberalising their procurement 
markets.162 More importantly, the soft and gradual approach of NAFTA Chapter 10 to Mexico sets a 
valuable example for other international procurement instruments seeking wider participations from 
the part of developing countries. 
 
4.3.4.4 Delegation 
4.2.4.4a Inter-governmental mechanism  
Chapter 20 of NAFTA provides a means for resolving disputes 163 over the interpretation or 
application of the NAFTA agreement including Chapter 10.  
The procedures set out in Chapter 20 encourage states to make every attempt to arrive at a 
mutually satisfactory solution of any dispute, if at all possible. Like many other inter-governmental 
DSM, including the WTO DSM (See Section 3.2.4.4a), the NAFTA process calls first for mandatory 
consultations between governments concerned.164 If consultations fail, a party may also require 
conciliation before the ‘Free Trade Commission’165, which is comprised of the Trade Ministers of 
the Parties.166 If the Commission is unable to resolve the dispute, any consulting party may request 
the establishment of an arbitral panel.  
Like the WTO DSU, mutual consent is not required to initiate the panel process and an arbitral 
panel will be automatically established on an ad hoc basis by the Commission upon the request of 
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any complaining party.167 The arbitral panel consisting of five panellists is selected from national 
Rosters168, members of which are chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound 
judgment, and expertise in international trade law.169 Also, the arbitral panel shall be established by 
using a reverse selection process - instead of picking from one’s own national roster as happened in 
the CFTA, the disputing parties are required to select panellists from each other’s rosters.170 It can 
be argued that such a reverse selection process greatly increases the impartiality of the panellists.  
The panel shall present the disputing parties with a final report which contains findings of fact, a 
determination as to whether the measure at issue is or would be inconsistent with the Agreement and 
any recommendations to resolve the dispute. Like the WTO DSU, the final report of the panel shall 
automatically be adopted unless there is consensus not to do so.171  
The arbitral decision is, however, not automatically applicable and binding upon the parties. 
Rather, it is more in the nature of a strong recommendation: upon receipt of the final report, the 
disputing parities shall agree on a resolution which should ‘normally’ conform to the panel 
recommendations, and the resolution shall be non-implementation or removal of a measure 
inconsistent with the Agreement or, failing such a resolution, compensation.172 
If mutual agreement has still not been reached at this stage, the complaining party may retaliate 
with the suspension of trade benefits of equivalent effect; and the party need not have to approach 
the panel for authorisation.173 Then, while the disputant is entitled to turn to a panel to determine 
whether the level of suspension is ‘manifestly excessive’, it’s left unaddressed for the choices 
available to the disputant even if the panel so concludes.174 
Therefore, different from the GPA and the EC, NAFTA Chapter 20 allows the disputing parties 
themselves to tailor a remedy and grants a wide discretion to the complaining party to assess the 
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other party’s implementation. Although it essentially delegates the legal authority to an ad hoc panel 
for formal adjudication, the recommendatory nature of the arbitral panel decision reflects a softer 
arrangement, under which the dispute resolution process involves political bargaining to reach a 
‘mutually satisfactory resolution’ and disputing parties can accept or depart from an arbitral decision 
without legal justification. Thus it represents a DSM that blends legalistic and political elements.  
The NAFTA DSM also clearly manifests a preference for reaching political solutions by leaving 
the implementation of panel decision solely to the disputing parties themselves without legalistic 
supervision. It can be argued that such a system may discriminate in favour of more powerful states 
against weaker ones owing to the power asymmetry, under which the latter are more vulnerable to 
the former’s greater penalties. 
Again, like most of inter-governmental DSMs, no right of action for private parties is provided 
under the NAFTA DSM. Private suppliers have to lobby its government in order to initiate the 
NAFTA DSM machinery.  
 
4.3.4.4b National Challenge Procedures 
Apart from the inter-governmental DSM under NAFTA Chapter 20, a national bid challenge system 
is also introduced by Article 1017 of NAFTA. Member States are required to adopt and maintain a 
bid challenge system which allows aggrieved suppliers to challenge any aspect of the procurement 
process.  
However, the requirements of national bid challenge procedures under NAFTA Chapter 10 are 
considered to be weaker in comparison with those under other procurement regimes such as the 
GPA and the EC (See Section 4.1.4.4b & 3.2.4.4b). For example, as regards the status of a review 
body, the NAFTA rules simply require that the review body shall have ‘no substantial interest in the 
outcome of procurements’175 There are no further requirements concerning the independence of the 
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review body like those under the GPA or the EC directives.176  
More importantly, the review body decisions are only recommendations, which should normally 
be followed, rather than binding decisions pursuant to NAFTA Article 1017(k(l). In contrast, the EC 
rules explicitly state that challenge decisions shall be legally binding and effectively enforced.177  
 
4.4 Free Trade Area of the Americas (‘FTAA') 
4.4.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
In 1994, the FTAA was founded by 34 countries in South, Central, and North America178, with the 
aim of uniting the economies of the Americas into a single free trade area.  
The FTAA negotiations were formally launched in 1998 and it was agreed that the FTAA 
Agreement shall be balanced, comprehensive, WTO-consistent and will constitute a single 
undertaking.179 There are three drafts of the FTAA Agreement on its official website and each of 
them includes a chapter on government procurement. The latest one is the third draft which has been 
available to public since 2003. More recently, the FTAA negotiations have been stalled mainly due 
to the unsettled differences between the approaches of the U.S. and Brazil.180 The negotiations had 
not been successfully completed by the agreed deadline, 31 January 2005. 
The latest or the third draft of FTAA agreement is made up of three sections, namely, General 
Aspects, Substantive Provisions and Procedures and Institutions. In General Aspects, Article 2 
provides that the objective of planned Chapter XVIII on Government Procurement is to expand 
access to the procurement markets of the FTAA members. In order to achieve the said objective, 
certain general principals are laid down including the principles of non-discrimination, transparency 
and the principle of differential treatment. Similar to other procurement regimes including the GPA, 
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the EC, and the NAFTA, detailed procedural requirements on the award of contracts are set out so as 
to ensure the implementation of the above principles.181 
Furthermore, explicit provisions can be found requiring Member States to criminalize relevant 
corrupt practices in procurement.182. As argued in Section 3.3.2, the maintenance of ‘probity’ is one 
of main domestic objectives for governments to regulate procurement, and consequently major 
efforts to deal with corruption are often made at national level.  
However, corruption can pose a significant problem for trade in the sense that market access 
commitments may have little impact in practice whilst corrupt practices continue.183 The impact of 
corruption as a barrier to trade has led to several international initiatives aimed at combating 
corruption in the domain of pubic procurement, notably, the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which is to be discussed 
in Section 5.2. 
 
4.4.2 Coverage  
Like NAFTA Chapter 10, the third draft of FTAA Chapter XVIII does not attempt to provide a 
general definition of procuring entity, but instead it includes a positive list of covered entities for 
each FTAA countries. However in contrast to the position under NAFTA, the FTAA intends to 
apply to the procurement of all goods and services for the listed entities except particular 
procurements contained in Article 3.2, and thus all the Member countries will have a uniform 
product coverage.  
Moreover, the FTAA acknowledges the possibility to apply different financial thresholds to 
different Member countries.184 It was agreed, in principle, that there should be higher thresholds for 
the smaller economies.185 As with the entities covered, it is envisaged that there should be broad 
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coverage including central or federal level government entities and entities belonging to other 
categories of government.186  
However, it is not very clear about the exact way that Member countries shall make their offers. If 
offers were to be made on the basis of reciprocity as happened under the GPA and NAFTA regime, a 
number of small and poor countries would probably end up with no offers attractive enough to big 
and rich countries. In light of the principle of differential treatment, it was agreed to develop specific 
measures with regard to coverage entity that take into account the differences in the level of 
development and size of the economies.187  
 
4.4.3 Secondary policies 
It seems that the FTAA third draft provides a greater scope for smaller countries to use procurement 
as a tool to pursue secondary objectives. 
Despite the national treatment rules set forth in Article 5, smaller countries may retain the right to 
utilise procurements to promote secondary policies under certain circumstances. For instance, 
according to Article 6.1 and 6.2, it remains possible for smaller countries to employ procurement to 
promote the development of the national production apparatus and the participation of small, 
medium enterprises, or to support national industries as long as they are wholly or substantially 
dependant on government procurement.  
In many small FTAA countries, production of national industries are confined to a narrow range 
of goods and services by virtue of their limited resource endowment and limited size of the domestic 
market, which makes these countries heavily dependent on a wide range of imported goods. As a 
result, foreign suppliers in many fields would not be significantly affected by such secondary 
procurement policies as long as the MFN rules are observed owing to the unavailability of similar 
domestic goods or services in those small countries.  
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Moreover, smaller or developing Member countries may apply offsets in accordance with their 
scheduled market access commitments to be negotiated.188 Also, small or developing countries may 
be allowed to temporarily institute emergency safeguards by means of higher percentage offsets, set 
asides, higher thresholds and margins of preference etc pursuant to Article 6.4. This might be 
justified by the smaller countries’ concentration on a limited range of export goods and services also 
makes them extremely vulnerable to many factors such as the fluctuation in the price of exports and 
the changeable demand of international market.  
 
4.4.4 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
4.4.4.1 Bindingness 
The FTAA agreement had not been concluded by the end of 2005 which is the deadline originally 
fixed. As early as 1994, the heads of the 34 economies of the Americas agreed to conduct 
negotiations towards a FTAA agreement. During its preparatory phase, the structure for the 
negotiations has been set out and general principles and objectives to guide these negotiations have 
been agreed to guide the negotiations. Among these general principles, it requires that ‘all countries 
shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative procedures conform to their obligations 
under the FTAA agreement’.189  
The FTAA negotiations were formally launched in 1998 and three versions of the draft FTAA 
agreement have been made available till now. The draft FTAA agreement has been increasingly 
detailed and comprehensive over time. Art.4.1 of both the second draft and the third draft provides 
that ‘each party is fully responsible for the observance of all provisions of the FTAA Agreement, 
and shall take such reasonable measure as may be available to it to ensure such observance by 
regional and local governments and authorities within its territory’. 
It can be discerned from the FTAA negotiating history and the content of the draft agreement that 
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the intent of negotiating parties is clearly to conclude a legally binding agreement though the 
agreement has not yet entered into force at present. 
 
4.4.4.2 Precision  
Like most of other procurement instruments, the FTAA third draft attempts to regulate procurement 
by certain general principles which are supported by detailed procedural rules on the award of 
contracts. The procedural rules under the FTAA seem to be formulated in a relatively high degree of 
precision compared with other regimes. This high degree of precision can be illustrated by reference 
to, for example, its relevant provisions concerning the issues of minimum time-limits for tendering 
and qualification criteria. 
With regard to the issue of minimum time-limits for tendering, the FTAA Chapter XVIII, like the 
GPA, the EC directives, and the NAFTA Chapter 10, lays down general principles as well as 
detailed rules on the minimum time-limits for submitting tenders. On the one hand, it generally 
provides that ‘the Parties shall guarantee that the prescribed time periods for the tendering process 
shall be adequate to allow participating suppliers of all Parties to prepare and submit responsive 
tenders’.190  
On the other hand, precise rules are set out to prescribe certain minimum deadlines that must be 
allowed for the preparation, submission and receipt of tenders. For example, it provides that in open 
tendering procedures a procuring entity shall provide bidders with no less than 40 [or 30 – the exact 
figure has yet to be decided] calendar days after the date of publication of a notice of invitation to 
tender for delivery of their proposals.191  
Another example to be discussed is the relevant provision on qualification criteria. The FTAA 
Chapter XVIII does not include a detailed list elaborating grounds for excluding suppliers from 
participation and relevant evidences which procuring entities may demand as means of proof of 
standing, which can be found in the EC public sector directives (see Section 4.1.4.2). Instead, similar 
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to the GPA’s approach (see Section 3.2.4.2), the FTAA generally provides that technical 
qualification should be ‘limited to the areas of greatest importance and significant value of the 
procurement’.192  
However, in this regard, the FTAA is a bit more precise than the GPA in the sense that the former 
further specifies what kind of conditions for participation should not or may be imposed. For 
example, according to the FTAA, the procuring entity should not impose certain conditions for 
participation, including that the supplier has previously been awarded one or more contracts by that 
party or that the supplier has prior work experience in the territory of that party.193 
 
4.4.4.3 Discretion 
Instead of trying to harmonise the procurement rules of Member economies, the FTAA Chapter 
XVIII intends to merely provide a normative framework to ensure non-discrimination and 
transparency, under which states are left with a considerable discretion in implementing the rules 
according to their specific domestic conditions.  
In general, the FTAA regime seems to accord a similar degree of discretion to states as the GPA 
and NAFTA. For example, similar to the GPA and the NAFTA rules (see Section 3.2.4.3 and 
Section 4.3.4.3), the FTAA allows both open and selective tendering procedures for normal 
contracts, while it restricts the conditions for the use of procedures departing from these formal 
competitive procedures - limited tendering procedures.  
Regarding the issue of award criteria, the FTAA rules reflect an awareness of the need for state 
discretion. Similar to the GPA, the EC and the NAFTA, the FTAA provides that the contract shall be 
awarded to either the lowest price or the most advantageous tender. In determining the most 
advantageous tender, like the GPA and the NAFTA but not the EC, it is silent on the scope of 
acceptable non-price criteria. Therefore it can be assumed that the procuring entity is free to consider 
a broad range of non-price criteria in the absence of relevant judicial interpretation. 
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Moreover, the FTAA differential treatment provisions for developing and/or small economies 
mean that such economies have more discretion in implementing their obligations. It is expressly 
stipulated that Member economies may assume different levels of commitments, and smaller or 
less-developed economies are allowed to implement softer forms of agreement by means of 
transitional periods and differential thresholds etc.194  
Meanwhile, small economies have more discretion in implementing certain procedural 
requirements. For example, regardless of the FTAA’s general rules on procurement methods, it 
specifically states that small economies retain the right to utilise all procurement methods, provided 
that such methods are used in a transparent manner.195 Lastly, the specified emergency safeguards 
can be temporarily resorted to by developing and/or smaller economies.196 
The main reason for granting different levels of discretion to different Member economies can 
arguably be explained by the wide differences between the FTAA countries. There are massive 
differences in terms of size of population, land mass, availability of national resources, culture, 
economic development and political system etc. the FTAA will be unique among regional trading 
blocs in the sense that it will bring within the same economic regime the world’s largest and most 
powerful economies and the smallest, poorest, and most vulnerable economies.197 Consequently, the 
highly diversified conditions of FTAA countries have always been a major concern for the planned 
draft of Chapter XVIII. 
Besides the higher degree of discretion accorded to developing and/or small economies, 
developed countries are imposed with a legally binding obligation to give small economies certain 
market concessions, which is seldom the case under other procurement regimes. For example, it 
provides that ‘developed Parties shall guarantee, for the benefit of Parties with smaller economies, a 
procurement quota equal to (…)198 of the total value of the contracts to be awarded’199  
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Although developed countries may still have a certain degree of discretion in deciding the precise 
way to meet such a quota, they do not have a choice over whether to meet it, as they are under a 
legally binding obligation to do so. In contrast, the GPA also requires developed Members to give 
developing Members concessions during negotiations or in the later modification of their coverage 
lists, but it deliberately leaves developed countries a very broad discretion by using the 
‘best-endeavour’ clause (see Section.3.2.4.3).  
However, the obligation to provide technical assistance, which is regarded as one of fundamental 
principles, is very soft in terms of states’ discretion in implementation. For example, it provides that 
‘developed economies shall endeavour to provide technical cooperation and assistance to smaller 
and developing economies upon request, … The mode, scope and extent of application shall be 
agreed bilaterally among the relevant Parties’. Similar to the position under the GPA, it seems here 
that developed economies can freely decide whether or how to provide technical assistance, owing to 
the presence of the subjective terms such as ‘best endeavour’ and ‘agreed bilaterally’ in these 
provisions.  
 
4.4.4.4 Delegation 
4.4.4.4a Inter-governmental mechanism 
The dispute settlement provisions contained in the third draft Chapter XXIII were mainly based on 
Chapter 20 of NAFTA, but with significant modifications. Chapter XXIII is envisaged to apply to all 
disputes arising between the FTAA parties regarding the interpretation, or application of the FTAA 
Agreement.  
The process begins with government-to-government consultations, and then if the dispute is not 
solved, the party that requested consultations may then request the establishment of a neutral panel. 
Lastly, parties to the dispute may appeal a final report issued by the neutral panel before the 
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Appellate Body.200 As for other alternative methods of dispute resolution procedures like good 
office, conciliation and mediation, they may be undertaken voluntarily at any time if the Parties to 
the dispute so agree.201 
Generally speaking, the DSM of the FTAA third draft Chapter XXIII represents a more legalised 
approach than that of the NAFTA. For example, like the WTO DSU, an appellate level of review is 
available before the standing Appellate Body upon the request of any disputing Party.202 Provisions 
regarding the Appellate Body and appellate procedure here are closely modelled on those under the 
WTO DSU. The Appellate Body is composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any 
one appeal, on a rotating basis and members of the body serve a four-year term, with the possibility 
of reappointment once for an additional term. The relatively small numbers, serving for relatively 
long periods on multiple cases may help to achieve a higher level of legal expertise and consistency 
in dealing with FTAA Chapter 10 cases.  
Another notable example of its more legalised feature is the binding nature of final decisions. 
Under the FTAA DSM, the decisions of neutral panel where no appeal is sought; or otherwise the 
decisions of the Appellate Body will be binding on the disputing Parties from the moment of their 
notification and have the force of res judicata.203  
 
4.4.4.4b National challenge procedures 
The FTAA Chapter XVIII also provides for national challenge procedures for suppliers.204 Many 
requirements here are similar to those under NAFTA Chapter 10, including the establishment or 
designation of an independent review authority, the availability of interim measures and the 
provision of decisions in a timely fashion.  
However, the FTAA may impose more stringent requirements in many respects. For instance, 
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interim measures, pending the resolution of a challenge, may be taken by the review authority, 
including suspending the contract award or the performance of a contract that has already been 
awarded.205 In the case of the NAFTA rules, or even the GPA and EC procurement rules, interim 
measures including only the possibility of suspending the award procedures but arguably not of 
suspending the performance of a concluded contract are required to be made available under the bid 
challenge system.206  
In general, the requirement for establishing national challenge systems for private suppliers is 
essential to ensure compliance and also not difficult for many Member countries to comply with 
since they’ve already undertaken similar commitments by virtue of their participation in other 
procurement regimes such as the EC and the GPA. This remains, however, a big problem for a 
number of small and less-developed FTAA countries taking into account their limited resources 
available. 
 
4.5 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (‘COMESA’) 
4.5.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
There are many African initiatives aimed at developing a harmonised regional public procurement 
regime, such as Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). This section will look at 
the COMESA but no others, as it is the only one of these African initiatives which has the English 
version of relevant document available.  
COMESA was established in 1994 and now has 19 Member States.207 The main objective of 
COMESA is to fully integrate the countries of eastern and southern Africa into an economic union 
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through trade and investment.208 As the region gets more integrated and more liberalised, the 
COMESA Council has recognised the importance of harmonising procurement policies in line with 
the process of effective liberalisation of trade.209  
A sample study conducted by the Secretariat indicated that many aspects of procurement laws in 
COMESA countries tended to restrict trade and concluded that a more detailed study needed to be 
carried out to facilitate the development and harmonisation of procurement rules within the 
COMESA region.210 As a result, COMESA Public Procurement Reform Project (PPRP), funded by 
the African Development Bank, was launched in 2001, and commenced operations in 2002 with a 
baseline survey of the procurement rules and practices of its Member States until 2004.211 In essence, 
the PPRP seeks to liberalise the procurement market in the region through harmonised and improved 
domestic systems. 212  
In contrast, the objective of both the GPA and the EC procurement regimes is not to harmonise 
procurement laws of Member States, but rather to liberalise and expand trade in procurement mainly 
through non-discrimination rules and detailed transparency procedural requirements. However, it can 
be argued that the EC has resulted in significant de facto harmonisation in practice. Reich even 
argued that the GPA also had an important harmonising effect on its Member States’ laws.213 
Under the PPRP, the COMESA public procurement framework was approved in 2003, which was 
mainly developed on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, 
Construction and Services (the UNCITRAL Model Law).214 It is a set of public procurement 
directives, setting out the main principles and essential components of modern national legal 
frameworks.  
The COMESA procurement directives are divided into two parts, namely, ‘Part A: Core contents 
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of a national procurement law’ and ‘Part B: Specific principle for enhancing regional integration of 
procurement markets’. Instead of detailed procedural rules similar to those under the EC directives, a 
principled approach is employed here to formulate essential components of national legal 
frameworks. Also, the COMESA directives deal with issues which are absent from the EC directives. 
For example, it is required that the COMESA Member States should adopt measures to ensure 
adequate supervision of the performance of procurement contracts.215 
 
4.5.2 Coverage 
With regard to the COMESA directives Part A, it contains core contents of an appropriate national 
procurement law rooted on the principles of good governance and therefore it states that it should be 
apply as widely as possible.216 As with the principles set forth in Part B aimed at enhancing regional 
integration, it was agreed that certain thresholds should be set to define the applicability of certain 
parts of the reform initiative, such as region-wide advertisement of bidding opportunities.217 Also, 
certain types of procurement are expressly excluded from Part B application including defence 
related procurement and donor-funded procurement. 
 
4.5.3 Secondary Policy 
Under the COMESA Part A, there are no explicit rules restricting the implementation of secondary 
policies in procurement. On the contrary, Measures to promote participation by small and 
medium-sized enterprises are identified as a core element of a national procurement law. In this 
regard, it also provides many examples for measures favouring small business, such as establishing 
small-enterprise set-sides and making awards first to small enterprises in the event of equal low bids.  
However, Part B includes the principles of national treatment and non-discrimination. 
Consequently, the implementation of secondary procurement policies with discriminatory effect will 
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be caught by the above principles. For example, it is required that any use in individual state of a 
preference in favour of domestic bidders should be replaced by a regional preference with regard to 
procurement above the COMESA thresholds. Also, it is stated that bidders from other COMESA 
Member States should not be barred from participation even for procurement contracts below the 
thresholds.  
However, different from the position under the GPA or the EC rules (see Section 3.2.3 and Section 
4.1.3), secondary uses of procurement without discrimination may not be affected in any way due to 
the absence of detailed rules on contact award procedures.  
 
4.5.4 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
4.5.4.1 Bindingness    
The COMESA directives are non-binding in nature. Member states are expected to voluntarily adopt 
relevant national legislation to give effect to such directives. Given the fact that the COMESA 
directives were mainly developed on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model law, Member States which 
adopted their procurement legislations according to the UNCITRAL Model Law such as Zimbabwe, 
would be fully consistent with the COMESA Directives.  
The creation of a Technical Committee of Procurement Experts (‘TCPE’) makes the procurement 
reform initiative a permanent programme of COMESA.218 The Committee is made up of the Heads 
of national procurement agencies and will be setting on a regular basis to provide strategic and 
tactical guidance to the reform.219 One of the immediate challenges facing the technical committee is 
to commence negotiation on a Regional Public Procurement Agreement, which is expected to be a 
legally binding instrument.220 
 
4.5.4.2 Precision  
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The COMESA directives are much more skeletal than other procurement regimes despite the fact 
that the COMESA seeks harmonisation as an objective per se. Unlike the GPA or the EC directives, 
the COMESA regime does not include detailed procedural rules governing the award of contracts.  
Instead, it lays down the main principles and essential components of modern national legal 
frameworks in a general manner. For example, several fundamental mechanisms are stated to be 
necessary for ensuring transparency in procurement process, one of which is a notice of contract 
award. Regarding this mechanism, it only generally provides that national law should require the 
publication of a notice of award for contracts, the value of which exceeds a specified threshold. 
However it does not provide detailed guidance on issues, such as what type of media should be used 
for the publication; what kind of information should be included in the notice; and the period within 
which the notice should be published. 
Under the COMESA directive, there are no rules specifically addressing the issues of minimum 
time-limits for tendering and qualification criteria etc, as we can find in other procurement regimes 
 
4.5.4.3 Discretion 
The COMESA directives set out a broad framework under which states have a large amount of 
discretion in implementing their obligations.  
Taking procurement methods as an example, under the COMESA directives, as a general rule, 
contracting authorities shall use ‘tendering’ as the normal method for procurement of goods or 
construction, and request for proposals for procurement of consultant services. It is required that 
national law shall specify the types of situations in which methods other than either of the above 
methods can be used, but there is no guidance at all on what kind of situations could justify 
alternative methods or how these contract award procedures should proceed. As a result, different 
from the restrictive approach adopted by other regimes such as the GPA and the EC, states are 
entirely free to formulate their own requirements on the derogations from formal competitive 
tendering.  
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Furthermore, clear guidance is not provided on many issues such as award criteria, which are 
frequently addressed under other procurement regimes. In view of the non-binding nature and vague 
content of the COMESA directives, states are left with a very wide discretion in applying the 
COMESA directives to their domestic systems.    
 
4.5.4.4 Delegation 
4.5.4.4a Inter-governmental Mechanism 
The COMESA directives can not be enforced through any inter-governmental dispute mechanism. 
The compliance with the rules mainly depends on Member States’ attitude towards it, which 
represents a soft law approach in terms of delegation. 
Nevertheless, operational measures have been taken to induce Member States to comply with the 
directives. Given the fact that 13 out of 19 Member States are on the World Bank list of least 
developed countries, the lack of capacity can be a major deterrent to the effective implementation of 
procurement reform. In light of this, the COMESA Secretariat has established a Regional Public 
Procurement Centre to provide capacity building for the Member States.221 Apart from capacity 
building, the TCPE is also delegated with the authority to monitor and keep constant reviews on the 
implementation of the COMESA directives by Member States. 
By September 2004 nine of the nineteen member states had either put legislation in place or were 
in the process of amending existing legislation according to the COMESA directives.222 
 
4.5.4.4b National Challenge Procedures 
The availability of national challenge procedures is mentioned both in Part A as an essential element 
for modern national procurement law, and in Part B as an important factor to ensure national 
compliance.223 However, no further guidance is given on the detailed requirements of such national 
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challenge procedures. 
 
4.6 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (‘APEC’) 
4.6.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
APEC was established in 1989 in order to promote, as its name suggests, economic co-operation 
within the Asia-Pacific Region. The forum currently has 21 members 224 and 3 observer 
organisations225. APEC is the only intergovernmental grouping in the world operating on the basis of 
non-binding commitments, under which decisions are reached by consensus and commitments are 
undertaken on a voluntary basis.226 
In 1995, the Government Procurement Expert Group (‘GPEG’) within APEC was set up to 
consider ways to improve transparency and to achieve voluntary liberalisation of procurement 
markets throughout the Asia-Pacific region.227 Pursuant to its 1996 Osaka Action Agenda, the GPEG 
had developed a set of Non-Binding Principles (NBPs) on public procurement by 1999. The original 
set of NBPs comprised Transparency; Value for Money; Open and Effective Competition; Fair 
Dealing; Accountability and Due Process; and Non-Discrimination. The principle of Transparency 
has now been subsumed into the APEC Transparency Standards on Government Procurement.  
Among the NBPs developed by the GPEG, it is interesting to note that the principles of Value for 
Money, Fair Dealing and Accountability and Due Process also assist individual government to 
achieve the objectives of ‘best value for money’ and ‘integrity’ in procurement, which are often 
addressed by national procurement regulation. In view of the APEC’s trade goal, the principle of 
Value for Money might be justified to some extent by the concept that foreign suppliers may be 
more willing to compete for government contracts in a system in which value for money is 
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effectively implemented. Also, it promotes trade in a way that the best firms will thrive should 
contracts always be awarded to the most competitive firms.  
Similarly, principles of Fair Dealing and Accountability and Due Process, which contribute to the 
objective of integrity, could guide Member states to achieve optimum allocation of resources or 
domestic good governance on the one hand, and address corrupt practices in procurement as a trade 
barrier on the other. In essence, the APEC NBPs promote trade through measures aimed at 
improving domestic procurement systems of its Member States in which foreign suppliers are 
assumed to be more willing to compete for government contracts. 
 
4.6.2 Coverage 
The non-binding nature of the APEC NBPs makes it unnecessary to formulate detailed rules 
concerning types of entities and contracts covered.228 Individual Member countries can freely decide 
how to implement the APEC principles in their own systems including the coverage issues. The 
freedom in coverage may avoid many problems associated with negotiations on coverage of a 
binding agreement such as the problem of ‘reciprocity’ on coverage, the difficult balance between 
free trade goals and the legitimate domestic concerns and the high negotiating and implementing 
costs. 
 
4.6.3 Secondary policies 
According to the principle of Non-discrimination, national procurement laws, regulations and 
policies should not favour to or discriminate against the goods, services or suppliers from any 
particular Member economy.229It also illustrates several ways through which non-discrimination can 
be achieved, one of which requires that criteria for qualification of suppliers, evaluation of bids, and 
award of contracts should be based solely on suppliers’ ability to meet the procurement requirements 
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such as technical competence and value for money considerations. 230  In this regard, the 
implementation of secondary policies in procurement could be largely restricted.  
However, these illustrative practices included in NBPs are never intended to be prescriptive or 
exhaustive. In practice, the APEC members could always balance the non-discrimination principle 
with other domestic concerns, and then find appropriate ways to give effect to the elements of this 
principle, or even depart from this principle where they feel it is necessary. As a result, the APEC 
Member countries’ ability to employ procurement as a policy tool remains unaffected. 
 
4.6.4 Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
4.6.4.1 Bindingness   
Like the usual APEC approach, the APEC NBPs is a non-binding instrument that explicitly negates 
any intent to create legal obligations. This is clearly indicated by the very title of this instrument - 
‘APEC Government Procurement Experts Group Non-Binding Principles on Government 
Procurement’. This non-binding nature is further confirmed in its introduction by expressly saying 
that ‘the principles developed by the GPEG are non-binding’.231 Undoubtedly, the NBPs are merely 
an informal understanding instead of legal commitments in international treaty. 
 
4.6.4.2 Precision  
Compared with most other procurement rules like the GPA or the EC directives, the APEC NBPs are 
much less detailed and prescriptive. The NBPs only generally identify the basic elements of these 
principles and state possible ways to give effect to them in practice. By way of illustration, this 
section will undertake discussions on the relevant rules governing the issues of minimum time-limits 
for submitting tenders and qualification criteria, as has been done with other regimes, to show the 
degree of precision of these NBPs 
The APEC NBPs provide some general guidance on the issue of minimum time-limits for 
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submitting tenders. Firstly, one important element of the Transparency principle is that procurement 
opportunities should be transparent, and it is also stated that certain measures may possibly be 
adopted in practice to promote this element, one of which is ‘allowing adequate and reasonable time 
for interested suppliers to prepare and submit responsive bids’.232  
Secondly, under the principle of Open and Effective Competition, ‘sufficient time for tendering is 
allowed to enable interested suppliers to prepare tender’ is considered to be necessary to ensure that 
a procurement action facilitates effective competition.233 Lastly, as an element of the principle of 
Fair Dealing, the procurement process should be fair, and should treat all parties even-handedly. 
Possible practices to achieve it have been specified including that ‘clear and reasonable time limits 
should be set for various stages of the procurement process’.234  
Despite the repetitive emphasis on this issue by the different NBPs, vague terms like ‘adequate’, 
‘reasonable’ or ‘sufficient’ are employed without further clarifying the actual meaning of these terms. 
The NBPs set out neither possible factors to be considered in setting time-limits nor detailed rules on 
minimum deadlines for the preparation, submission and receipt of tenders, which can often be found 
in other procurement regimes such as the GPA and the EC (see 3.2.4.2 and Section 4.1.4.2). 
Regarding the issue of qualification criteria, it is stated that the principle of Non-discrimination 
can be achieved through certain practices including the envisaged correct practice for setting 
qualification criteria. It generally provides that qualification criteria should be ‘based solely on the 
ability to meet the procurement requirements’.235 It also illustrates the acceptable criteria including 
‘technical competence, and value for money considerations in terms of relevant benefits and costs on 
a whole of life basis’.236 However, the guidance on qualification criteria is still in very general terms, 
and detailed elaborations such as a highly prescriptive list of acceptable qualification criteria, which 
can be found in the EC public sector directives, are not included in the APEC NBPs. 
                                                        
232
 Ibid. para.8 
233
 Ibid. para.40 
234
 Ibid. para.47 
235
 Ibid. para.72 
236
 Ibid. 
 146
In general, it can be seen that the APEC NBPs mainly lay down general principles rather than 
setting out precise rules, and therefore possess a lower level of precision than most of other 
procurement regimes 
 
4.6.4.3. Discretion 
Given the non-binding nature of the APEC NBPs, economies are free to decide which principles to 
apply and whether to translate an element of a principle into a practical measure. It is explicitly 
stated that ‘individual members economies are in the best position to decide on the applicability of 
individual elements to them, taking into account the specific characteristics of their economy and the 
costs and benefits of adopting specific measures’.237 That is to say, Member economies have 
absolute discretion in practice to depart from the principles.  
Even if an APEC country decides that certain NBPs should apply, it will still enjoy a very broad 
discretion over how to achieve the principles of the system. Under many procurement regimes such 
as the GPA and the EC (see Section 3.2.4.3 and Section 4.1.4.3), states are obliged to put in place 
certain domestic measures to give effect to the detailed procedural rules but may exercise a certain 
degree of discretion on exactly how to do it. 
In contrast, the APEC regime does not set out detailed procedural rules to restrict Member 
countries’ freedom to decide how best to translate an element of NBPs into a practical measure 
according to their own particular national conditions, which vary from state to state in a significant 
way. Consequently, the APEC NBPs accord states a greater discretion in their implantation, which 
will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs by reference to the issues of procurement methods 
and award criteria.  
Firstly, one element of the Transparency requires ‘making open and competitive tendering the 
generally preferred method of tendering’ with the possibility of using other procurement procedures. 
However, like the position under the COMESA directives (see Section 4.5.4.3), it does not define 
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specific circumstances under which other less competitive procedures can be used. Therefore states 
can freely decide the range of procurement methods that can be used and what kind of situations 
could justify the use of less competitive procurement methods.  
Despite its indicated preference for open and competitive tendering, it is further clarified under the 
principle of Value for Money that the procuring entity should choose an appropriate procurement 
method in consideration of achieving the best value for money outcome.238 It involves balancing the 
aim of encouraging competition among suppliers with the anticipated value for money gained from 
that competition. 
This position is also confirmed under the principle of Open and Effective Competition. It provides 
that ‘procurement methods should suit market circumstances and facilitates levels of competition 
commensurate with the benefit received’.239Consequently, states have a very wide discretion in 
formulating their own rules on the use of procurement methods. Some may require the use of open 
tendering for most procurement followed with detailed transparency rules to limit the exercise of 
discretion by procurement officers to ensure value for money, while other states with professional 
officials buying in well-developed markets with little corruption may prefer leaving a broad 
direction with procurement officials by using the less competitive procurement procedures. 
Secondly, with regard to the issue of award criteria, relevant guidance can be found under the 
principles of Value for Money; Non-discrimination; and Transparency. Under the principle of Value 
for Money, it provides that evaluation of bids should be done in a whole-of-life context to ensure the 
best value for the procurement.240  It mainly suggests that bids evaluation should be done in 
consideration of best value for money. However, states’ discretion in setting out award criteria may 
not be affected in any way by this principle, as what exactly the best value for money means in 
different procurements can only be determined by the relevant states themselves.  
Meanwhile, the principle of Non-discrimination also provides that criteria for award of contracts 
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should be based ‘solely on the ability to meet the procurement requirements such as technical 
competence, and value for money considerations in terms of relevant benefits and costs as a whole 
of life basis’.241 As an element of the principle of Transparency, award criteria should be transparent 
and bids should be evaluated strictly according to these criteria.  
 
4.6.4.4. Delegation 
4.6.4.4a Inter-governmental Mechanism 
Despite the remarkable states discretion offered by the APEC NBPs, the central question is how the 
APEC procurement regime can generate enough incentive for Member governments to comply with 
these principles since they are entirely voluntary.  
Two features of binding agreements such as GPA make government officials refrain from taking 
measures contrary to the agreement.242One is the expectation of future trade negotiations and the 
market access benefits that they can bring to a nation’s exporters; the other is that disputes can be 
brought before an independent body, and sanctions may be authorised against nations that break the 
provisions of an agreement. However, these features are obviously absent in the APEC procurement 
regime.  
Rather, voluntary policy review, a kind of soft enforcement mechanism or more accurately 
managerial mechanism, has been used to induce compliance. It is a process for Member economies 
to report to the GPEC their voluntary review of the consistency of their procurement systems with 
the NBPs, through which Members are exploring how best to implement the principles and to 
voluntarily bring their system into conformity with the principles. Presentations on the voluntary 
review against the NBPs have also been conducted as a fundamental element of GPEG activities in 
promoting information sharing and greater understanding of procurement regimes of Member 
economies.  
Such policy review and assessment are not primarily accusatory or adversarial, the object of 
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which is to discover how the systems of individual economies can be improved. The dynamics of 
dialogue and accountability are most valued. Although in comparison with a hard law system with a 
high level of delegation in enforcement this procedure may lack coercive force, it still exerts 
significant pressures on Member economies to comply. For the most part it relies on persuasion, but 
frequently the threat of exposure or public shaming is a powerful spur to action towards compliance  
All Member countries have now completed their voluntary reviews and reports of their 
procurement systems against the NBPs, and will continue to update any changes to their 
procurement rules that may enhance the NBPs. 
Meanwhile, the GPEC has also been working on capacity building and dissemination of 
procurement information within the APEC region. For example, workshops, seminars, training 
courses on government procurement procedures, laws, and regulations have been hold for 
educational purposes, and a large amount of information has been made available at its official 
website including information on specific procurement opportunities voluntarily offered by Member 
economies. 
 
4.6.4.4b National challenge procedures 
Although the availability of a national challenge system for suppliers is widely considered to be 
essential for monitoring and ensuring compliance with procurement rules, in practice it acts as a 
deterrent to accession by many non-member states and to negotiations towards a broader coverage 
by existing Member states under many binding procurement agreements such as the GPA. As 
discussed in Section 3.3.5.4b, it was also one of most controversial issues during negotiations for the 
proposed WTO transparency agreement.  
However, the availability of a channel for domestic review of complaints was agreed to be an 
element of Transparency as well as Accountability and Due Process principles despite the highly 
diversified membership of the APEC, probably because the non-binding nature of the APEC regime 
makes it much easier for Members to agree on what should be included in NBPs than would 
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otherwise be the case. 
The APEC NBPs only provide very broad guidance on this issue, without setting out any 
procedural rules on exactly how such a challenge system should work, such as rules requiring the 
availability of certain kinds of ‘remedies’ similar to those under the GPA or the EC directives. It is 
generally stated that such mechanisms should provide independent, impartial, transparent, timely 
and effective procedures for the review of complaints.  
Certain examples are also provided to illustrate some of the possible ways to give effect to the 
above principles. These illustrative examples include designating a review body which may take the 
form of a court, an independent review body, a government agency not directly involved in the 
procurement, or a reputable private sector arbitration/mediation service; making the review 
mechanism available equally to domestic and foreign suppliers etc. However these examples are not 
intended to be prescriptive or exhaustive. Member countries have absolute discretion over how to 
put in place their own national challenge procedures. Even Member states which reject the 
fundamental idea of such national challenge system would not feel compelled to establish one owing 
to the optional nature of the NBPs.
Chapter 5 Other International Instruments with Trade Objectives 
 
Two categories of international procurement instruments have been discussed in previous chapters: 
Chapter 3 has examined trade-liberalising initiatives in procurement under the WTO, while Chapter 
4 has reviewed the major procurement instruments with trade objectives at regional level. There are 
still some other procurement instruments such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services (‘the Model Law’) and the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (‘the OECD Convention’), 
which can hardly be classified in either of the above categories. 
Although both the Model Law and the OECD Convention are aimed at liberalising international 
trade in procurement, they have significant differences compared to those instruments addressed in 
the previous two chapters. As with the Model Law, it was designed as a voluntary model comprising 
fundamental components of good procurement practice for states to follow when formulating or 
reforming their own procurement laws. Different from the international and regional procurement 
agreements mentioned in Chapter 3 & 4, there are no particular states subscribing to the Model Law. 
A state may decide, in its sole discretion, to adopt the Model Law in whole or in part, but without 
any legal or political commitment to do so.  
Regarding the OECD Convention, it is a legally binding instrument with the aim to diminish the 
trade-distorting effect of corruption in international business transactions. In the field of public 
procurement, non-discrimination procurement rules would have little significance in the event of 
corrupt procurement practice. Unlike the previously mentioned instruments, this convention contains 
no provisions on procurement procedures. Instead, it has general provisions requiring Member 
countries to adopt legislation to criminalise ‘bribery of a foreign public official’, which have deep 
impact on corruption in procurement. This chapter will specifically look at the Model Law and the 
OECD Convention. 
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5.1 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (‘the 
Model Law’) 
5.1.1 Introduction, objectives and general approach 
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’), as a representative 
inter-governmental technical organ of the UN General Assembly, has formulated a variety of widely 
used legal texts including conventions, model law and guides in the field of international trade law.1  
Among them, the Model Law was designed to serve as a blueprint for use by national legislatures 
in either the reform of their existing procurement laws or the establishment of new procurement 
regulations where none presently exists.2  In order to assist states using the Model Law, the 
UNCITRAL has also produced a Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (‘the Guide’). 
The draft work of the Model Law attracted wide participation of UN members at all levels of 
economic development and with different legal and political systems, which ensures it to be 
internationally recognised as the fundamental components of good procurement practice and to have 
a considerable impact on legal reform in the area of procurement.3A number of states especially 
many transition economies newly adopted or reformed their procurement legislation based on the 
Model Law. Although the Model Law emphasises its particular value for developing countries and 
countries whose economies are in transition, its wide use by transition economies in practice is 
largely due to the fact that its adoption took place coincidentally at a time when a significant number 
of transition economies were in the process of reforming their procurement systems.4 
As declared in its Preamble, the objectives of the Model law include maximizing competition and 
efficiency in procurement; fostering and encouraging participation in procurement proceedings by as 
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many suppliers and contractors as possible; promoting competition among suppliers and contractors; 
providing for the fair and equitable treatment of all suppliers and contractors; promoting integrity 
and fairness in the procurement process and achieving transparency in the procurement procedures.  
Taking into account that the UNCITRAL was established with the mandate to further 
harmonisation and unification of international trade law to tackle the trade obstacles caused by 
divergence in national laws5, it is not difficult to understand that the Model Law was mainly 
produced to promote international trade in procurement. Consequently, the content of the Model 
Law tries to discourage national preferences as a whole. However, the Model Law also recognises as 
a political reality that many countries may wish to utilise procurement as a policy tool to implement 
secondary objectives, and then it provides certain possibility for states to do so but restricts it in a 
transparent and least trade distorting fashion. 
The Model Law, however, is significantly different from most procurement instruments with trade 
objectives. Procurement regimes like the GPA are directed at eliminating discrimination by laying 
down non-discrimination principles as well as detailed transparency provisions to make 
discrimination more difficult to hide and to ensure procurement opportunities known to foreign 
suppliers. Moreover, they provide mutual trade-related rights and obligations for participating states 
but do not aim to provide any guidance on how to achieve domestic objectives such as value for 
money and the implementation of social/industrial policies.  
In contrast, the main effect of the Model Law has been to assist states in achieving their domestic 
procurement objectives of value of money, efficiency, integrity etc. The rationale for adopting the 
Model Law by UNCITRAL, an organisation primarily concerned with promoting trade, is that 
foreign suppliers would be more willing to compete under a system of sound and familiar rules, and 
consequently trade in procurement would be promoted through improved and harmonised domestic 
systems.  
However, states which adopt the Model Law, or essential features of it, do not obtain privileged 
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access to procurement markets of any other country.6 A government’s decision on whether to adopt 
the Model Law is solely based on its value to domestic procurement objectives without any 
motivation by the desire to improve market access for exporters. Nevertheless, given, as explained 
above, that the Model Law was conceived and adopted by the UNCITRAL as an instrument of trade 
liberalisation, during the process of evaluating the Model Law, a government is likely to find some 
provisions to belong to a multilateral procurement agreement rather than a national code, 
emphasising non-discrimination rather at the expenses of domestic interest in economy and 
efficiency.7  
 
5.1.2. Coverage 
It is expected that legislation enacted on the basis of the Model Law should be applicable to the 
procurement of goods, construction and services that are financed by public funds. This should 
include procurement by central and sub-central government bodies as well as by certain 
state-owned/controlled companies. It is envisaged that the objectives of the Model Law are best 
served by its widest possible application.8 
However, Article 1 (2) of the Model Law provides for the exclusion of defence and security 
related procurement, as well as other types of procurement that might be indicated by enacting states. 
In order to facilitate its widest possible application, Article 1(3) provides the possibility for the 
excluded procurements identified in Article 1(2) to be subject to the Model Law at the discretion of 
the procuring entities.  
In addition, it should be noted that the Model Law only sets forth award procedures to be used by 
procuring entities in selecting the most competitive supplier, but does not intend to address other 
issues like contract performance or implementation.9 
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 5.1.3. Secondary policies 
As a general rule, the Model Law prohibits discrimination against foreign suppliers and therefore the 
use of procurement to support national industries is prima facie precluded. However, the Model Law 
recognises that many sates may still wish to use procurement for industrial policies in some cases. It 
expressly provides certain possibilities for states to seek industrial policies, but restricts the 
implementation of such policies in a transparent and least trade-distorting fashion.  
Firstly, according to Article 8, a procuring entity may choose to restrict foreign participation in 
procurement subject to certain requirements: the grounds for restriction should be specified in the 
law; a statement of the grounds and circumstances on which it relied should be included in the 
record; and the restriction of foreign participations should be declared when first soliciting the 
participation in the procurement proceedings. These requirements are included in order to promote 
transparency and to prevent arbitrary or excessive resort to this exception. Enacting states are 
suggested by the Guide to only use this exception to protect ‘certain vital economic sectors of their 
national industrial capacity against deleterious effects of unbridled foreign competition’.10  
Secondly, Article 34 (4) (d) allows states to grant a margin of preference at the evaluation stage to 
support national industries. As contracts shall be awarded to either the tender with the lowest price 
or the lowest evaluated tender under the Model Law, Article 34 (4) (c) lists the criteria in 
determining the lowest evaluated tender in addition to price. Under this provision, certain criteria 
related to economic development objectives can be considered, including balance of payments and 
foreign exchange reserves considerations, ‘offsets’ requirements, local employment and transfer of 
technology. 
The provision leaves it open for states to include their own additional criteria such as regional 
development in the list, however the expansion of such secondary criteria contained in this provision 
should be cautious in view of the risk that such other criteria may pose to the objective of good 
                                                        
10
 The Guide Section I, para.25 
 156
procurement practice.11.  
It can be seen that the Model Law allows states to utilise procurement for industrial purposes 
mainly by using price preference instead of other more harmful types of methods like set-asides, 
which insulates domestic suppliers from any foreign competition. Nevertheless, the use of price 
preference in evaluating tenders is still trade-distorting and less objective, and the provisions can be 
found restricting its operation. For example, resort to the margin of preference may be made only if 
authorised by the procurement regulations and the margin calculated in accordance with the 
regulations and subject to approval by the state designated authority.  
Apart from the pursuit of industrial policies, the Model Law gives little advice on the issue of 
implementing social or environmental objectives in procurement. Article 6 (1)(iv) and (v) allows 
states to disqualify firms or their directors or officers which have been convicted of any criminal 
offence relating to their professional conducts. It also refers to the fact that firms which have been 
subject to administrative suspension or debarment proceedings could be excluded.  
However, it is unclear whether a margin of preference could be given to support social or 
environmental policies. However, it can be argued that the implementation of social or 
environmental objectives should be recognised in the Model Law and regulated through mechanisms 
similar to those used for the implementation of industrial policies, taking into account their 
widespread use in practice and the potential to operate them in a transparent and effective way.12 
 
5.1.4. Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
5.1.4.1. Bindingness   
The Model Law is in nature a non-binding instrument creating no obligations upon countries to 
adopt it, in whole or in part. Its very title indicates that it is solely served as a model to be followed 
voluntarily by national legislation, without any intent to be converted into an international treaty.  
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As has been discussed in Section 2.3.1, there is a matter of compromise among the four aspects of 
soft law. In the case of diversified domestic circumstances, interests and capacity, states might want 
to legally bind themselves only to ambiguous and modest rules. However, it would be normally 
easier for clear and ambitious rules to be adopted if they were put in a non-binding form. This is the 
case with the Model law, which serves as a universal model for all states to follow when establishing 
or revising their domestic legislation in procurement.  
 The Model Law was designed for states with different levels of economic development and 
diversified political and legal systems. Surely, only extremely vague and discretional rules could be 
agreed upon had it been made a binding instrument, which would be contrary to its original purpose 
of harmonisation and standardisation. Arguably, it is the non-binding nature of the Model Law that 
makes it benefit from a fairly high degree of clarity and being substantively drafted by specialists 
rather than politicians.  
The Model Law provides a good example which seems to support the argument that not all 
non-binding instruments are intended to become legally binding in the future, and they assume 
functions that go well beyond that of being an intermediate step to the formation of later treaties.  
 
5.1.4.2. Precision  
Like the APEC NBPs (Section 4.5.4.2), the Model Law intends to promote trade through improved 
and standardised domestic procurement system. However, the rules under the Model Law are far 
more detailed than those of the APEC NBPs. This section is to illustrate its degree of precision by 
looking at the relevant rules on time-limits for tendering and qualification criteria, in a similar way 
in which these rules have been reviewed in previous chapters. 
First of all, the Model Law contains no specific provisions governing the issue of time-limits for 
tendering. In the Guide, it is recognised that allowing suppliers a sufficient period of time to prepare 
their tenders is an important element in fostering participation and competition in procurement.13 
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Although the Guide also points out the possibility that an enacting state may establish in its 
procurement regulations minimum periods of time that the procuring entity must allow for the 
submission of tenders, neither the Model Law nor the Guide provides any guidance on the precise 
formulation of such minimum time limits.  
Next, the Model law has detailed rules governing qualification criteria. It contains a list of criteria 
only which the procuring entity may consider with respect to the qualifications of suppliers, 
including that they have the necessary professional and technical qualifications, financial resources, 
equipments, managerial capability, reliability, experience, reputation, personnel and other 
capabilities or facilities, to perform the procurement contact.14  
In this regard, the Model Law represents a more detailed approach than many other procurement 
regimes such as the GPA, the NAFTA, the FTAA and the APEC (see Section 3.2.4.2, Section 4.3.4.2, 
Section 4.4.4.3 and Section 4.6.4.3 respectively), which only lay down principles generally requiring 
that qualification criteria shall be limited to those essential to ensure the supplier’s ability to fulfil 
the contract or similar, without an illustrative or exclusive list of acceptable criteria. As with the 
proposed WTO transparency agreement, it was generally agreed that the precise approach with a 
detailed list of qualification criteria should be avoided (See Section 3.3.5.2).  
However, the acceptable qualification criteria listed under the Model Law are less detailed 
compared with those under the EC directives (see Section 4.1.4.2). For example, the Model Law 
only generally provides that a procuring entity may require suppliers to provide appropriate 
documentary evidence in accordance with the listed qualification criteria15, whilst every ground for 
exclusion listed under the EC directives is followed by the concrete evidences which procuring 
entities may demand as means of proof of standing (see Section 4.1.4.2).  
The above examples show that the Model Law is more precise than most of the previously 
discussed procurement instruments with the possible exception of the EC, though not universally so. 
The precise feature of the Model Law is largely due to the fact that its original objective was to 
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promote trade through improved and harmonised domestic systems. Bearing its objective of 
harmonisation in mind, the Model Law attempts to codify ‘good procurement practice’ in a manner 
that is sufficiently specific for enacting states to use it directly.16 More importantly, as argued above, 
the non-binding nature of the Model Law also makes it possible for such detailed rules to be 
adopted. 
 However, despite the precise feature of the Model Law, it envisages the issuance by enacting states 
of procurement regulations to fill in the procedural details and to customise the procurement 
procedures to the specific needs of the enacting states.17 It is necessary for the Model Law to 
deliberately leave gaps for enacting states to fill in according to their own specific domestic 
circumstances, as it is designed as a template for the universal application in almost any state, 
irrespective of its level of economic development and type of legal system. As a whole, the Model 
Law provides a ‘framework’ rather than a complete and comprehensive code for the regulation of 
procurement in spite of its high degree of precision. 
In addition, as can also been seen from the above examples, the degree of precision can vary 
between rules governing different issues, which can hardly be attributed to any particular reason. 
Apart from the varied degree of precision with regard to the rules governing different issues of 
tendering procedure, the Model Law goes into every detail on tendering procedure but does not do 
so on other procurement procedures. 
 
5.1.4.3. Discretion 
The detailed nature of the Model Law does not prejudice a substantial discretion it gives to enacting 
states in implementation. Most important of all, the non-binding nature of the Model Law ensures 
states’ discretion. It was adopted as recommendations and thereby enacting states are free to accept 
or reject any elements of the Model Law. National choice over the adoption of the Model Law only 
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has some implications as to whether the national procurement system in question could represent 
internationally recognised good practice. 
Meanwhile, the discretion possessed by enacting states can be illustrated by reference to its 
contents. As regards the methods of procurement of goods or construction, the Model law prescribes 
the use of ‘tendering’ proceedings as the standard procurement method for acquiring goods or 
constructions, leaving the possibility of using other procurement procedures only in limited cases.  
The standard procurement method ‘tendering’18 referred to under the Model Law should be what 
is normally called ‘open tendering’ under other regimes with certain adaptations, under which a 
contract is publicly advertised and all interested firms have a chance to bid. Even for the restricted 
tendering procedure, essentially a formal tendering process is allowed only in specified 
circumstances, which differs from the ‘tendering’ procedure only in that it permits the procuring 
entity to invite a limited number of suppliers to submit the bids and it does not require any 
advertisement of the procurement.19  
As for the use of procurement methods, the Model Law seems to share a similar level of hardness 
with the EC rules in terms of states’ discretion. Although the EC rules allow the procuring entity a 
free choice between ‘open’ and ‘restricted’ tendering procedures (see Section 4.1.4.3), the 
‘tendering’ procedure under the Model Law is more similar to the EC restricted tendering procedure, 
because both require an advertisement of the procurement and both allow a pre-qualification stage 
which is not permitted under the EC open tendering procedure.20 One major difference between the 
‘tendering’ procedure under the Model law and the EC restricted tendering procedure is that the 
procuring entity can shortlist the pre-qualified suppliers for bidding under the latter but not under the 
former.21   
Consequently, the Model Law represents a harder approach compared with many other regimes in 
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terms of state discretion. The GPA, the NAFTA, and the FTAA regimes, as previously examined in 
Section 3.2.4.3, Section 4.3.4.3 and Section 4.4.4.3, do not indicate any preference between ‘open’ 
and ‘selective’ procedures for ‘normal’ contracts, and under the ‘selective’ procedure the procuring 
entity can only invite a limited number of suppliers to submit tenders.   
When compared with instruments like the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs, which allow 
states to freely define specific circumstances under which other less competitive procedures can be 
used despite their general requirement or preference for open tendering (See Section 4.5.4.3 and 
4.6.4.3), the Model Law restricts states’ discretion by laying down detailed conditions for the use of 
procurement methods other than ‘tendering’. 
Nevertheless, a variety of flexible procurement procedures which involves informal competition 
are provided by the Model Law such as two stage tendering, request for proposal, and competitive 
negotiation.22 It specifies the detailed conditions under which procuring entities may choose one of 
these methods as an alternative to ‘tendering’ proceedings. Enacting states may, at their sole 
discretion, adopt one or more of these alternative methods in their own domestic legislation. This 
optional approach utilised by the Model Law on many issues provides detailed guidance both for 
states opting for a strict choice and those selecting a comparatively liberal solution.23  
When it comes to the issue of award criteria, the Model Law requires contracts to be awarded 
either to ‘the tender with lowest tender price’ or ‘the lowest evaluated tender’.24 It further requires 
procuring authorities to only apply certain specified criteria in determining the lowest evaluation 
tender.25 Under the Model Law, it seems superficially that states’ discretion in awarding contracts is 
largely constrained by the control over the scope of non-price criteria to be considered.  
As has been examined, procurement regimes like the GPA, the NAFTA, the FTAA and COMESA 
and the APEC provide no clear guidance on the scope of the acceptable award criteria, and others 
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such as the EC only have certain general rules on the issue. In contrast, the Model Law adopts a 
more precise approach by listing all the award criteria the procuring entity is allowed to consider in 
determining the lowest evaluated tender. 
Furthermore, unlike the above-mentioned instruments which lay down general award criteria rules 
applicable for all procurement procedures, the Model Law sets out the different award criteria rules 
for different procedures: for example, ‘unrestricted solicitation of suppliers’, which is the principal 
method for procurement of services, has a different list of the permissible range of award criteria 
compared to the one for the ‘tendering’ procedure. In this regard, the Model Law provides more 
detailed guidance on the issue of award criteria than other procurement regimes. 
However in terms of applying award criteria to industrial objectives, enacting states retain a 
substantial degree of discretion in implementing the detailed rules of the Model Law on award 
criteria, as such criteria are explicitly included in the list of acceptable award criteria. According to 
the guide, it is important for procuring entities in some countries, especially developing or 
transitional countries, to be able to evaluate tenders in the context of economic development 
objectives.26 In contrast, such criteria are generally banned under many regimes including the GPA, 
the EC, the NAFTA and the FTAA by virtue of the non-discrimination principle for covered 
procurement. 
As argued in Section 4.1.4.3, the more precise approach may not necessarily of itself imply 
greater constraints in states’ discretion but just greater clarity of treatment. This is also the case here: 
by allowing economic development criteria in the evaluation of tenders, the detailed rules of the 
Model law leaves states more discretion in implementing industrial objectives at the evaluation 
stage.  
The main reason for the inclusion of industrial consideration for award criteria can largely be 
explained by the fact that the Model Law intends to promote trade through harmonising divergent 
national procurement practice, but with limited ambitions in market access commitments. 
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Meanwhile, it was recognised that many countries would still utilise procurement as a policy tool to 
implement industrial objectives even if the Model Law had banned it, since states can always easily 
depart from any rules of the Model law due to its voluntary nature.  
Therefore the Model Law compromises best practice with political reality – it lays down the rules 
to ensure transparency and efficiency to the largest extent possible where procurement is used to 
promote industry objectives. For example, the use of price preference on award criteria is allowed 
under the Model Law27, which is a kind of protective practice with trade-distorting effect. However, 
it is regarded as a preferable means of fostering the competitiveness of domestic industry as it can be 
conducted in a transparent way and also avoids total insulation from foreign competition. 
In general, the voluntary nature of the Model Law itself accords enacting states a substantial 
discretion in implementation. As for its contents, on the one hand, as being a standardised template 
for all states, the Model Law tends to design its rules in a way that gives a significant discretion to 
accommodate diversified needs of different enacting states; on the other hand, the non-binding 
nature of the Model Law makes it possible to constrain states discretion on a number of issues, 
which seems to be proven unachievable under other binding procurement regimes.   
 
5.1.4.4. Delegation 
5.1.4.4a. Inter-governmental Mechanism  
There is no inter-governmental enforcement mechanism available for the Model Law. It is designed 
as a voluntary model to assist states in establishing or reforming their public procurement legislation. 
There are no particular signatories to the Model Law and the enacting states are entirely free to 
accept or reject whole or parts of the Model Law. 
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5.1.4.4b.National challenge procedures  
Given the importance of national review procedures to ensure the proper implementation of 
procurement rules and to promote confidence in that system, the Model Law provides for a tiered 
system for supplier review.  
Firstly, suppliers shall submit their complaints to the procuring entity itself unless the procurement 
contract has already entered into force.28 This compulsory review by the procuring entity is included 
to facilitate efficiency and economy in the view that the procuring entity could immediately correct 
procedural errors29, which could arguably operate as an obstacle to rapid review.  
Subsequently, the review may be sought from higher administrative authorities provided that such 
a procedure is consistent with the legal structure of enacting states30, The Model Law lays down 
detailed suggestions on procedure and remedies on administrative review.31 Finally, it affirms the 
right to judicial review under the existing domestic legislation, but it does not provide any guidance 
on the procedural or other aspects of the judicial proceedings, which are left to the applicable 
national law.32 
Enacting states are free to choose either administrative review or judicial review or both according 
to their established legal frameworks. The Model Law envisages that adequate and effective 
procedures for review should be provided no matter what the exact form of such review 
procedures.33 In general, the provisions on review are less detailed than other portions of the Model 
law, and less stringent than those of many other procurement agreements due to the fear of 
interfering with fundamental conceptual and structural framework of legal systems.34  
During the drafting process of the Model Law, some more detailed and stringent provisions 
modelled after the EC remedies directive were proposed35 but eventually rejected for political 
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reasons. The alleged reason for opposition was that a mere recommendation would not be an 
effective means of ensuring that enacting states would also provide for the necessary review 
procedure, and also, it was expected to be less effective than the EC directive in the absence of 
similar enforcement machinery to which the EC is subject.36 
Although the non-binding nature of the Model Law makes it easier for states to agree on rules 
which are more detailed and less discretionary, there still exists a compromise between ideal 
procurement rules and political constraints in reality. It was envisaged that more detailed and 
stringent rules especially those on sensitive issues like judicial review might risk making the Model 
Law politically unpopular as a whole. Therefore its rules on remedies were formulated as a 
remarkable exception to the overall detailed feature of the Model Law. 
Remedies provisions of most procurement instruments such as the GPA, the EC, the NAFTA and 
the FTAA are skeletal, leaving a significant discretion to states over how to put in place domestic 
review procedures. Compared to the GPA, the EC, or even the FTAA, the Model Law provides less 
stringent rules on domestic procedures in many respects.  
First of all, both the GPA and the EC set out provisions emphasising the independence of the 
review body to guarantee its judicial or quasi-judicial nature: for examples, the GPA requires that the 
members of the review body shall be secure from external influence37, whilst the EC provides that 
such members shall be appointed and leave office under the same conditions as members of the 
judiciary.38  
In contrast, the Model Law, similar to the NAFTA and FTAA, contains no requirement for the 
availability of judicial or quasi-judicial review body to hear the complaints. It requires states to 
provide for either administrative review or judicial review or both, and where judicial review is not 
made available, no provisions can be found in the main body of the Model Law to ensure the 
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independence of the administrative review body. Such an administrative body is only required in the 
Guide to be independent of the procuring entity but not of the government.39 On the contrary, most 
examples it gives as the possible administrative body seem to be part of government organs such as 
‘one that exercises overall supervision and control over procurement in the state’ and ‘the body that 
exercises financial control and oversight over the operations of the government and of the public 
administration’.40   
Moreover, all of the GPA, the EC and the FTAA require that review procedures shall provide for 
certain ‘remedies’ and decisions of the review body shall be legally binding, while the Model Law 
only includes a list of ‘remedies’, which might be granted or recommended by the review body.41 
Meanwhile, it makes clear that enacting states can freely choose one or more of the listed remedies 
and the review body may either be authorised the power to ‘grant’ the remedies chosen, or merely 
the power to ‘recommend’ such remedies. 
However, when compared with the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs, the Model Law 
seems to be more detailed. It contains a number of provisions dealing with procedural issues which 
are absent from the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs. In particular, it specifies detailed 
procedural rules regarding administrative review. On the one hand, the Model Law is made more 
stringent than the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs by virtue of certain procedural rules. For 
instance, Article 54 provides that the administrative body shall issue a written decision concerning 
the complaint within 30 days, stating the reasons for the decision and the remedies granted, if any.  
On the other hand, the inclusion of detailed procedural rules does not always make the Model 
Law more stringent. For example, Article 52 lists certain decisions of the procuring entity which are 
not open to private challenge including decisions on the selection of the method of procurement and 
decisions to limit participation on the basis of nationality. These listed decisions are regarded as 
being only internal matters to the administration and the limitation on them is designed to avoid an 
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excessive degree of disruption.42 However, the exemption from review for such decisions could 
arguably provide procuring entities with excessive discretion, which could easily be abused in 
practice.  
 
5.2 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (‘the OECD Convention’) 
5.2.1. Introduction, Objectives and general approach 
Corruption affects all types of nations, from industrialised, to poor, to transitional, and it has 
flourished throughout the history without exception to today’s global society. There are many 
detrimental consequences of corruption for economic and social development. 43  In public 
procurement, corruption practices can lead to numerous undesirable consequences. Most notably, it 
prevents public authorities from achieving value for money by awarding contracts to the largest 
bribe makers rather than the best and cheapest goods producer or services provider, which results in 
the waste of taxpayers’ money as well as the misallocation of resources. 
Most countries prohibit public officials from receiving bribes but some are lax in enforcement 
allowing the demand side of corruption to flourish44. Certain states have taken measures to deter 
their own businesses from becoming involving in corrupt activity outside their own jurisdiction 
because of moral and political considerations as well as the adverse impact that corruption can have 
on international trade.45 Famously, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (‘FCPA’)46 has been enacted as 
a federal law in the U.S. to make it a crime for American individuals or corporations to engage in 
corruption abroad since 1977.  
Apart from domestic initiatives, there are several major international initiatives targeting the 
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supply side of corruption47, most notably, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (‘the OECD Convention’). This Convention 
was signed in 1997 by the OECD’s all 30 member states and 5 non-members48, and entered into 
force in 1999. It is considered one of the most far-reaching international efforts towards combating 
trans-national bribery as it represents the first successful effort to establish between major exporting 
countries a set of binding commitments targeting trans-national corruption practices. 49  The 
signatories to the Convention represent collectively over 70% of exports world-wide and over 90% 
of foreign direct investments.50 
The main objective of the OECD Convention is to address the trade-distorting effect of corruption 
in international business transactions. Previously, many countries had no effective laws or 
regulations in place to prohibit their firms from making bribery payments to foreign officials, and 
some even encouraged foreign bribery by allowing bribery payments to be tax deductible. 
Recognising that these practices undermine good governance and distort international competitive 
conditions, the Convention was therefore adopted aimed at preventing countries which are lax on 
foreign bribery or even support it from gaining a competitive advantage in international trade. 
Before the conclusion of the Convention, the OECD Council issued a series of non-binding 
instruments to build up consensus. The first Recommendation on Bribery in International 
Transactions was adopted in 1994 (‘the 1994 Recommendation’), which called on states to ‘take 
effective measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection 
with international business transactions’. 51  In 1996, a second Recommendation on the Tax 
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Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Officials (‘the 1996 Recommendation’) was adopted, which asks 
Member States which allows the deductibility of bribes to foreign public officials, to re-consider 
such treatment with the intention of denying this deductibility.52 
The above Recommendations were revised, and the Revised Recommendation of the Council on 
Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (‘the Revised Recommendation’)53 was 
adopted in 1997 to include specific suggestions for criminal procedures, tax laws, business 
accounting practices, banking provisions and public procurement rules etc. Signatories to the 
Convention are also committed to implement the Revised Recommendation 
Regarding the rules on public procurement, the Revised Recommendation contains three items in 
relation to trans-national bribery in procurement:54 firstly, it encourages Member States to support 
the WTO initiative on transparency in procurement (see Section 3.3); secondly, it requires states to 
allow their procuring authorities to suspend from competition for public contracts firms determined 
to have bribed foreign officials; and thirdly, it recommends the adoption of anti-corruption provision 
in bilateral aid-funded procurement. 
Compared with the Revised Recommendation, the Convention contains binding commitments in 
the limited field of criminal law targeting the supply side of corruption. There are no specific 
provisions on procurement under the OECD Convention, except that general provisions requiring 
Members to adopt legislation to criminalise ‘bribery of a foreign public official’ would have a 
significant impact on corruption in procurement.  
According to Article 1 of the Convention, the scope of ‘bribery of a foreign official’ offence is 
widely defined. Individuals or corporations of the Convention Member countries making bribery 
payment or advantage to a foreign public official in procurement will always comment a criminal 
offence, irrespective of the value of the advantage, its results, perceptions of local custom, or the 
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tolerance of such payment by local authorities etc.55  
Moreover, it would be an offence even for the best qualified bidder which could properly have 
been awarded the contract in procurement to engage in bribery in order to guarantee its success 
where corruption is a usual practice rather than an exception.56 In this regard, foreign suppliers from 
Parties to the OECD Convention could arguably be competitively disadvantaged since other less 
competitive suppliers which offer bribes would end up wining the contract.  
In addition to the definition for ‘bribery of a foreign official’, the Convention sets out provisions 
governing how and to what extent the action of ‘bribery of a foreign official’ should be criminalised 
and provisions enhancing the effectiveness of criminalising the action of ‘bribery of a foreign 
official’.  
 
5.2.2. Soft Law & Hard Law Issues 
5.2.2.1. Bindingness   
Some have argued that a multilateral treaty of binding nature would be the most effective way of 
requiring countries to adopt measures to stop or discourage corruption outside of their borders.57 
Although it is the case with the OECD Convention now, it took several steps for the OECD to 
achieve an agreement of binding nature.  
Before the OECD initiatives on combating bribery, the U.S. was the only country outlawing 
exterritorial bribery under the FCPA. This U.S. policy was perceived as putting their own exporting 
industries at a comparative trade disadvantage when competing with other firms from countries that 
allowed, or in some cases encouraged, bribery of foreign public officials. Under strong pressure 
from its private sector, the U.S. had repeatedly tried to bring about comprehensive international 
anti-bribery legislation in an attempt to level the playing field for American firms in international 
                                                        
55
 See OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, 21 November 1997 Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/searchResult/0,2665,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html> para.7 
56
 Ibid, para.4 
57
 Linarelli, ‘Corruption in Developing Countries and in Countries in Transition: Legal and Economic Perspective’ in 
Arrowsmith and Davies (ed), note 3, at p.131 
 171
business.58 But this U.S. effort failed repeatedly in bilateral negotiations, at the United Nations, and 
elsewhere.59  
The major reason for the failure was explained by Abbott and Snidal to be that the U.S. had no 
interest-based negotiating leverage, at least within the issue area: it could not offer any reciprocal 
anticorruption concession to other negotiating parties, as it had already acted; or threaten to retaliate 
for inaction by relaxing its own legislation.60 
Despite the repetitive failure, the U.S. efforts to negotiate international rules on trans-national 
bribery did not stop. The 1988 amendments of the FCPA explicitly require the US President to 
conduct negotiations on foreign bribery among the members of the OECD.61 It was recognised that 
other 29 OECD countries are the major business competitors of the U.S and account for a large 
proportion of international contracting. However even within the OECD forum, it was also the case 
that firms from European countries or Japan etc face commercial incentives to conduct the bribery of 
foreign officials and their governments face political incentives to support them.  
The U.S. originally believed that the ultimate product of OECD negotiations must be ‘hard law’ – 
a legally binding convention with a meaningful implementation mechanism, ideally with sanctions 
equivalent to the criminal penalties under the FCPA.62 Given the fact that this objectives could not 
be achieved on the basis of quid pro quo bargaining in the short run, the U.S adopted a gradualist 
strategy to achieve it through one or more stages of ‘soft law’.63 
The OECD is particularly famous as an organisation in the area of ‘soft law’, and much of its 
work leads to no-binding instruments such as Recommendations. The development of OECD 
instruments combating corruption illustrates its general approach that ‘soft law’ or particularly 
non-binding instruments are frequently resorted to on difficult issues where nothing mandatory 
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could be achieved, but without the prejudice to the possibility to harden up certain elements of such 
soft law where possible and desirable.  
When the U.S. initially brought the issue to the OECD in 1989, again there was limited interest of 
other Member countries in negotiating a multilateral anti-bribery agreement. Many states such as 
Germany, France, Japan and Spain openly opposed any ant-bribery intervention.64 Nevertheless, the 
anti-corruption initiative firstly resulted in some non-binding instruments that were used to build up 
consensus for the later passage of the Convention.  
The first milestone in the OECD effort against international bribery was the adoption of the 1994 
Recommendation, calling Member countries to criminalise the payment of bribes to foreign officials, 
which is far from a treaty in nature. It was argued that the 1994 Recommendation had all the 
advantages and disadvantage of ‘soft law’: bold political statements could be made without 
immediate legal obligations to act.65 The U.S. initially made a strong push to make it legally binding, 
but this was objected to by Japan, with the backing of many European nations.66 
The 1994 Recommendation contains a so-called ‘shopping list’ of items to be further examined67, 
and a dynamic process of close-up examinations of these items was undertaken over the next three 
years, leading to another ‘soft law’ instrument: the 1997 Revised Recommendation.68 This Revised 
Recommendation then includes concrete and specific suggestions for the listed items in the 1994 
Recommendation.  
More importantly, it was agreed in the 1997 Revised Recommendation to open negotiations 
promptly on a convention to make payment of bribes to foreign public officials a crime in all OECD 
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countries.69 This was the moment that many countries felt that a mere ‘soft law’ approach was not 
enough, and a legally binding form should be used and terms needed to be defined as clearly as 
possible, whilst some others feared that the dynamic process could be stalled by a too early move 
into binding law.70 For instance, in 1997 France and Germany, which previously expressed a strong 
resistance to the OECD’s involvement in acting against bribery, surprisingly became the most vocal 
in asserting that the only way to ensure fairness was to negotiate a binding convention.71 This 
position was denounced by the U.S., saying that Germany and France might be using the argument 
as a delaying tactic to protect their domestic laws allowing the tax deductibility of bribes.72 
The final achievement is a compromise between different aspects of ‘soft law’ and ‘hard law’. In 
1997, the OECD Convention, a hard law instrument in terms of its legally binding form, was 
eventually reached, whilst its substance continued on the basis of soft law in the terms of its vague 
content and broad discretion in implementation.   
The formation of the Convention involved a process of prioritising and compromising, since a 
hard law approach in all the four aspects – bindingness, precision, discretion and delegation was 
proven unachievable within a short period of time. On the one hand, its legally binding form was 
widely perceived as an indispensable tool for resisting long-term political pressure from exporting 
industries. furthermore, the wide participation of all major trading countries in the Convention was 
vital for any potential signatory as no one wanted its national firms to be placed in a similar position 
as the U.S. firms under the FCPA – being prohibited from engaging in foreign bribery while 
competitors from other countries without such prohibitions were wining the contracts.  
On the other hand, the vague and discretional feature of the Convention and the OECD’s inherent 
soft law enforcement system could better accommodate states’ divergent legal principles, which 
conversely made it possible for such a legally binding convention to be speedily adopted as well as 
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to attract wide participation.  
From the gradual process of achieving a OECD convention on foreign bribery, it can be seen that 
‘soft law’ in terms of non-binding recommendations was resorted to as an ‘intermediate step’ 
towards the formation of a binding ‘hard law’ convention by providing a basis as well as building up 
consensus for later treaty negotiations. Furthermore, the combination of hard and soft law features of 
the Convention itself suggests that certain hard law aspect of an international instrument could be 
more easily achieved when softening the other aspects. 
 
5.2.2.2. Precision 
The OECD Convention is formulated as relatively vague and general ‘standards’ which are only 
meaningful with reference to specific situations. For example, Art. 1 provides that ‘each party shall 
take such measure as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any 
person intentionally to offer promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage…in order to 
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international business’. This 
provision only establishes a sort of ‘standard’, under which states are not required to use its precise 
terms in defining the offence under their domestic laws.  
In order to assist the interpretation of the Convention’s vague standards, Commentaries on the 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction 
(‘the Commentaries’) were also adopted to serve the functions of clarifying the intended meanings 
of each provision of the Convention as well as giving definitions for key terms used in the 
provisions. 73  Although the Commentaries are not legally binding as an integral part of the 
Convention, it is an extremely important document to be referred to in case of divergent 
interpretations between Member States, as it can reflects the original intention of Member States 
during the negotiating process.  
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As a result, the Commentaries may, in effect, make the ambiguous principles of the Convention 
more precise. As regards the previous examples raised, the meaning of vague terms like ‘other 
improper advantage’ in Art.1 is defined in the Commentaries.74 Moreover, it clarifies whether certain 
conduct shall be within the meaning of the offence under Art.1. For instance, it is made clear in the 
Commentaries that it is irrelevant whether or not the company concerned was the best qualified 
bidder or was otherwise a company which could properly have been awarded the business when 
determining whether there is a conviction for the offence under Art.1.75  
 
5.2.2.3. Discretion 
The OECD Convention only sets forth minimum standards, which allows states a substantial 
discretion in implementation. Paragraph 2 of the Commentaries clearly states that the Convention 
‘seeks to assure a functional equivalence among the measures taken by the Parties to sanction 
bribery of foreign public officials, without requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental principles 
of a party’s legal system’. 
The above articulates the important principle of ‘functional equivalence’, according to which the 
Convention standards can be implemented in a way consistent with a given Member country’s 
existing legal systems. This principle makes the Convention directly comparable to the EC’s 
secondary legislation known as directives which are binding on the EC Member States ‘with respect 
to the result to be achieved’, but leaves national authorities with the choice of form and methods.76  
The ‘functional equivalence’ principle of the Convention ensures a high degree of discretion given 
to states in implementation, which can also be reflected by the vague and discretional wording of its 
provisions. For example, Art.2 provides that Member States shall ‘take such measures as may be 
necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for the 
bribery of a foreign public official’. The language such as ‘as may be necessary’ and ‘in accordance 
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with its legal principles’ imply that states are left with a significant discretion in implementing the 
rules. 
Although the clarification provided by the Commentaries can sometimes curtail states’ discretion 
for reasonable interpretation, it may not necessarily impose more constraints on states’ discretion but 
just provide a greater clarity of the rules or even an emphasis on states’ discretion. For example, 
regarding Art.2, the Commentaries make it clear that a Member State shall not be required to 
establish such criminal responsibility if criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons 
under the legal system of that Member State.77 
 
5.2.2.4 Delegation 
There is no delegation of power to a judicial or quasi-judicial body under the OECD regime to 
interpret and enforce the agreed rules or standards. Instead, ‘peer review’, a soft law enforcement 
method, is used extensively in the OECD to monitor the states’ compliance with its conventions and 
recommendations. The term ‘peer review’ has been described as ‘the systematic examination and 
assessment of the performance of a state by other state, with the ultimate goal of helping the 
reviewed state improve its policy making, adopt best practice, and comply with established 
standards and principles’.78  
The OECD peer review process is conducted on a non-confrontational and non-adversarial basis. 
Its Member States accept the method of ‘peer review’ in most policy areas and as a whole, the 
OECD has been considered as a success in coordinating Members’ policy over a broad range of 
areas in the absence of hard law enforcement mechanisms.  
The monitoring system of the implementation of the OECD anti-bribery rules is illustrative of the 
general OECD peer review process. It was agreed in both the OECD Convention and the 1997 
Revised Recommendation that a programme of systematic follow-up should be conducted within the 
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 See the Commentaries, para.20 
78
 See F. Pagani, ‘Peer Review: a Tool for Cooperation Change: an Analysis of an OECD Working Method’, (2002). 
Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/16/1955285.pdf at p.1 
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framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business and Transactions (‘the 
Working Group’).79 In practice, this peer review process is divided into Phase 1 and Phase 2. The 
purpose of Phase 1 is to evaluate the adequacy of a country’s legislation to implement the 
Convention as well as the 1997 Revised Recommendation.  
The evaluation was conducted under a rigorous system of peer review. Under this review process, 
each signatory is required to produce a report against a questionnaire drawn up by the Secretariat, 
and the Secretariat then drafts a descriptive text based on the national report produced by the country 
under the review as well as legal materials submitted by them.80 Two lead examiner countries 
chosen from a delicately balanced rota are assigned to give their opinion on the standard of 
implementation of the examined country.81 
 The Working Group then holds two hearings per examined country.82 The first hearing begins 
with a presentation by the examined country of the measures it has taken to comply with the rules, 
upon which the two examining countries present their evaluation, and then there are discussions 
within the Working Group - each signatory is allowed to ask questions and express an opinion where 
appropriate. The next hearing concentrated on finalising the evaluation, and in this phase, a final 
report is written up and adopted verbatim by the Working Group, detailing the collective opinion 
concerning the examined country’s compliance with the Convention, and the final text of the report 
is submitted to the Ministerial Council of the OECD for formal adoption and then de-restricted for 
public availability. 
Although any adopted report or recommendation on the implementation of the examined country 
is non-binding, the compliance with the OECD rules has largely been improved by such soft policy 
review procedures. Phase 1 of the monitoring process of OECD Convention has been substantially 
completed, and these rigorous and comprehensive country policy reviews have proven to be a 
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 See OECD convention Art and the Revised Recommendation, Section VIII 
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 See OECD, Bribery Convention: Procedure of Self- and Mutual Evaluation-Phase1. available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649_37447_2022613_1_1_1_37447,00.html> 
81
 Ibid. 
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 M. Pieth, note 52, at pp.7-8 
 178
powerful tool for inducing compliance.  
All of the 36 signatories to the Convention to date have passed implementing legislation 
criminalising trans-national bribery and have submitted their implementation reports to the Working 
Group, and the examination of domestic implementing legislations has taken place in an efficient 
and effective manner, identifying shortcomings where they have been evident, and the majority of 
which strengthened their legislation following their Phase 1 review and assessment by the Working 
Group.83 
As the OECD convention is the critical first step towards attaching the supply-side of corrupt 
payments at the international level, it was reasonable to expect that the signatories with varied 
domestic circumstances would confront great hurdles in implementing the rules, including adverse 
influence from their exporting industries and lack of implementing capability or resources. Given 
divergent national policies and strong opposition from domestic vested interests, any ‘hard law’ 
enforcement mechanism might arguably achieve limited success, with the potential risk of the 
unintended and opposite effect of breeding animosity. 
The ‘soft law’ quality of peer review seems more effective in encouraging and enhancing 
compliance than any traditional ‘hard law’ enforcement mechanism including the delegation of 
power to a court or other judicial bodies. On the one hand, the voluntary nature of peer reviews may 
make the reviewed country more co-operative during the process, with an increased willingness to 
provide information, respond to questionnaires and even highlight areas where a country may be 
encountering difficulty.  
On the other hand, unlike a judicialised enforcement system, the peer review system can take into 
account a country’s particular circumstances and look at its performance in a historical and political 
context. Therefore it can assess and encourage trends toward compliance even among relatively 
poorly performing countries, while noting negative trends in countries with a relatively highly 
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 The Working Group, Statement of BIAC, ICC, TUAC and TI Regarding Consultations in Phase 2 of the OECD 
Monitoring Process, 14 August 2001, DAFFE/IME/BR/WD(2001)23. available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/39/1837866.pdf> 
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performance record.84  
Peer pressure is frequently pointed out to explain the efficiency of OECD-like soft international 
law regimes. It is a means of soft persuasion which can became important force to stimulate 
countries to make changes and meet standards. The peer review process can give rise to peer 
pressure in various ways. As described above, the process contains a mix of informal dialogues 
between the peer countries and formal recommendations adopted by the Working group, inevitably 
involving comparisons or even ranking among Member countries. 
In addition to the emergence of peer pressure to stimulate the compliance, the peer review system 
has many other merits including promoting transparency, motivating information and experience 
learning. Firstly, it serves as a transparency mechanism by evaluating and disclosing the 
implementing measures taken by the Signatories against the standards set by the Convention and the 
Recommendation. In practice, transparency has proved to be one of the most appreciated functions 
of the review mechanism. The OECD peer review process provides each Member country with 
opportunities to present and clarify national rules, practices and procedures. Also, the implementing 
reports of all the country are published on the OECD website at the end of review process.  
It can alert national authorities, their trading partners, and the public whether or if so, to what 
extent the national implementing legislation meet the agreed rules or whether there are particular 
aspects the examined country may consider improving. Therefore, states are likely to respect their 
legal obligations no matter whether the binding ones contained in the Convention or the non-binding 
ones in the Revised Recommendation out of the fear of ruining their trustworthy reputation. In this 
sense, transparency itself is instrumental to the enforcement of the OECD rules. 
Secondly, the peer review process performs the function of fostering information sharing and 
mutual learning by conducting a regular exchange of information and experience on the 
implementation of the OECD bribery rules. Besides the objective of monitoring compliance, another 
important purpose of peer reviews is to provide states with an opportunity to consult on difficulties 
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 See F. Pagani, note 80, at p.12 
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in implementation and to learn form the solutions found by other countries.85  
The process is not only an exercise of evaluating whether the examined countries comply but also 
a chance for the examining countries and all other members participating in the process to learn. The 
translation and adaptation of foreign experience can be valuable for any participating states, and is, 
moreover, an important capacity-building instrument. In this regard, the value of the involvement of 
the Secretariat cannot be ignored. The Secretariat consisting of the related and neutral experts have 
expertise needed to produce documentations and analyses, to stimulate discussions, and to uphold 
quality standards in this learning process. 
Phase 2 of the monitoring process examines actual performance of national systems with regard to 
the enforcement of domestic legislations implementing the Convention from an informal exchange 
of views with key representatives of the private sector, trade unions and civil society. Accordingly, 
teams of international experts will be sent to each Member State to meet with its political, 
administrative, police, customs and judicial authorities, or any other relevant body and discuss its 
actual implementation of the agreed standards.86  
This informal exchange of view in Phase 2 is important to enhance the effectiveness of the 
monitoring process because it involves non-governmental participation which would provide 
additional perspective and information important and valuable to implementation of the Convention. 
The Phase 2 review represents an important step in the sense that the focus of monitoring process is 
not only on examination of national laws and court cases, but also on the actual performance of 
domestic implementing legislations adopted by Member States.87  
Phase 2 of monitoring process began in 2001, and it was agreed that the review should be 
completed by 2005 at the latest.88 However, the review has yet to be completed and Phase 2 reports 
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 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Procedure of Self- and Mutal Evaluation – Country Monitoring Principles, 
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have been completed for 27 member stats.89 Although these over 20 phase 2 reviews have trigged 
further changes by Member States90, the general result of Phase 2 reviews still call for further 
monitoring.  
In conclusion, the rigorous and comprehensive peer review system has proven to be a powerful 
tool for inducing compliance with the Convention and the Revised Recommendation. However, 
more efforts remain to be taken to urge states that have yet to fully and effectively implement the 
standards set by the OECD anti-corruption instruments for change.
 
89
 See Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention and the 1997 Revised 
Recommendation. Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,2340,en_2649_37447_1933144_1_1_1_37447,00.html > 
90
 See N. Ehlermann-Cache, ‘Fighting Corruption in International Business Transactions: Impact on Public Procurement’, 
(2006), P.P.L.R.2006, 6, NA195-204 
Chapter 6 An Overview of International Instruments Regulating Public 
Procurement with Non-trade Objectives 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, it was explained that domestic discriminatory procurement practices 
constitute a significant barrier to international trade, and consequently various arrangements have 
been concluded at both international and regional levels to open up international procurement market. 
Besides those international initiatives with the aim of market liberalisation, there are a number of 
other international instruments regulating procurement with non-trade objectives, or with major 
objectives other than trade.  
Firstly, many international aid institutions such as World Bank provide financial aid for projects in 
developing countries, and they also formulate their own procurement rules to be applied to the 
projects that they fund to ensure the effective spending of aid proceeds. This chapter will generally 
review the World Bank’s rules governing its aid-funded procurement to illustrate how aid institutions 
can supervise and monitor the procurement process of their funded projects. The similarities as well 
as differences between the World Bank’s rules and those of other aid institutions will also be 
discussed.  
Although most aid institutions have sound procurement rules in place, the lack of capacity in the 
recipient countries can still present a practical barrier to effective procurement. In this regard, the 
World Bank initiative to improve the procurement system of the recipients as a whole will be briefly 
introduced.  
Next, differences in various donor procurement policies and procedures can also reduce the 
effectiveness of external aid. International initiatives towards harmonising multiple applications of 
different donor regimes will then be discussed. Lastly, this chapter will address the practice of tied 
aid by many donors, which requires that the proceeds of their funded project are spent to benefit the 
donor country’s industry as a condition for the provision of aid. 
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Because of the trade focus of this thesis, this chapter is only intended to provide a general 
introduction to rather than a detailed analysis of these international instruments with non-trade 
objectives. 
 
6.2. Donors’ procurement rules 
6.2.1. Introduction 
Multilateral development banks and bilateral and regional aid institutions provide financial aid for 
many important projects in developing countries and transitional economies. These normally take 
the form of loans or grants. Aid was initially provided for specific projects in infrastructure, industry 
and agriculture such as highways, dams or hospitals, but has increasingly been provided for 
structural or sectoral reforms of the recipient states.  
Financial aid made by these institutions or countries is usually granted to governments or public 
sectors, in most cases which will carry out relevant procurement procedures. In order to ensure that 
the funds are used for project-related purposes as well as in economic and efficient ways, the aiding 
institutions or countries condition their loans or grants on the observance by the recipient states of 
particular procurement procedures laid down by them. 
Financial aid of this kind is often provided through development banks, that is, the World Bank 
Group1; and many regional development banks that work in specific regions of the World such as 
Inter-American Development Bank (‘IDB’); The Asian Development Bank (‘ADB’); The African 
Development Bank (‘AfDB’); and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development etc 
(‘EBRD’). Apart from development banks, aiding institutions can also be regional organisations like 
the European Community (‘EC’); the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (‘OPEC’), and 
individual countries, notably, the U.S.; Canada; Japan and some EC member states.  
Among them, the World Bank procurement procedures have a significant influence on those of 
                                                        
1
 The World Bank Group is comprised of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the 
International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The ‘World Bank’ 
is the name that has come to be used for the IBRD and IDA. See www.worldbank.org 
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other multilateral development institutions and bilateral aid agencies of many individual countries. 
Most of multilateral development banks follow the World Bank’s model in terms of procurement 
rules for projects they fund. Many bilateral aid agencies, such as the Overseas Economic 
Co-operation Fund of Japan, adopted procurement guidelines similar to those of the World Bank.2 
Therefore, the World Bank’s Procurement Guidelines are to be mainly discussed to illustrate the way 
in which aid institutions regulate their funded procurement. 
 
6.2.2. The World Bank procurement rules 
6.2.2.1. Introduction, objective and approach 
The World Bank is the most prominent and important multilateral aid institution in terms of both the 
volume of finance and the formation of procurement policies. It provides low-interest loans, 
interest-free credits, and grants to help developing countries to build schools and hospitals, to 
provide water and electricity, and also, increasingly to conduct domestic reforms.3 Meanwhile, the 
World Bank, as required by its Articles of Agreement, works to ensure that ‘the proceeds of any loan 
are used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations 
of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or 
considerations’.4 
The implementation of aid project including the award and administration of contracts often rests 
with the recipient states.5 The World Bank is neither a party to the procurement process nor a party 
to the procurement contract. However, it formulated a set of rules for international competitive 
bidding in its procurement Guidelines and sponsored various types of standard biding documents for 
use by receipt states.  
                                                        
2
 See Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Jr, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspective 
(Kluwer Law International Ltd, 2000) at p.115 
3
 The World Bank has provided nearly US$350 billion in financing for some US$6,000 development projects since its 
inception; in the World Bank’s fiscal year 2007, it provided US$34.3 billion for over 620 projects in developing countries 
worldwide See www.worldbank.org 
4
 See IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article III, Section 5.(b) and IDA Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 1(g)  
5
 However, it is not always the case that aid institutions devolve the power of procurement to recipient countries in their 
financed projects, see the discussion in Section 6.2.3 
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The detailed rules and procedures for the award of goods, works and services are laid down in the 
World Bank Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (‘the Guidelines’). The 
principal aim of the Guidelines is to ensure that loan proceeds are spent on goods, works, services 
needed to carry out the intended project on the most efficient and economical terms possible.6 The 
rules and procedures are laid down to limit the chance of the Bank loans being misused for other 
irrelevant purposes or being siphoned off through corruption.  
The Bank views competition as the basis for economic and efficient procurement. The current 
version of the Guidelines does not contain procurement restrictions based on nationality and the 
borrowers are required to give all qualified bidders from any country an equal opportunity to bid for 
Bank-financed projects.7 However, in order to encourage the development of domestic industries, 
the borrowers are allowed to build in a limited margin of preference to bids offering domestically 
manufactured goods and to bids for works contracts from eligible domestic firms.8  
Furthermore, transparent procedural rules are laid down to promote competition, to secure probity, 
and therefore to achieve better value for money. In general, the Guidelines are considered to be very 
strict. For example, in most cases it requires the use of International Competitive Biding (‘ICB’) for 
the procurement of goods, works and services. ICB refers to a very formal tendering procedure in 
which the contract is opened to international competition, and awarded through a formal tendering 
procedure9 Under ICB, procurement opportunities are widely advertised; a clear specification is set; 
bids are submitted to a common set deadline; ‘post tendering negotiations’ are banned; bids are 
opened in public; and all qualified bidders are entitled to have their bids considered. 
Similarly, the main rules governing the procurement of consultancy services are set out in the 
Guidelines for Use of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers and the World Bank as Executing 
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 See the Guidelines, Section 1.2  
7
 Ibid Section 1.6, and exceptions to this are noted in Section 1.8. In contrast, the previous editions of the Bank Guidelines 
require that the procurement opportunities of the projects financed by the World Bank are not open to countries which are 
not Bank members. Such a restriction is contained in the January 1999 edition of the Procurement Guidelines and the May 
2002 edition of the consultant guidelines.   
8
 Ibid. Appendix 2 
9
 Tucker, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Procurement Procedures of the World Bank’, In Arrowsmith and Davies  
(ed), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (Kluwer Law International, 1998) at p. 145 
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Agency (‘Consultancy Guidelines’). The procedures for the award of consultancy services contracts 
are quite different from those for the award of goods, works and other services contracts. 
Consultancy Guidelines place greater emphasis on quality than the Guidelines do and Quality-and 
Cost-Based Selection (‘QCBS’) is the most commonly recommended method in the current version 
of Consultancy Guidelines.10 
 Meanwhile, the Bank procurement rules also impose the use of Standard Bidding Documents 
(SBD)11 issued by the Bank for the procurement of goods, works and consulting services, which are 
intended to fill in the details for application of the basic procurement procedures contained in the 
Guidelines.12 
 
6.2.2.2 Coverage 
The Bank’s procurement rules contained in the Guidelines shall apply to all contracts for goods, 
works and services financed in whole or in part from the Bank loans.13 There is no express monetary 
threshold set in the Guidelines below which the Bank’s rules do not apply. In practice, however, the 
Bank will assess the adequacy of a borrower’s procurement system early in the project cycle of a 
specific project, and the Bank’s rules are not always required for small contracts if the borrower’s 
own procurement procedures are regarded as adequate.14  
As for large contracts, the Bank usually insists on the use of its procurement procedures instead of 
those of the borrower even if that borrower has its own procedures which are considered as adequate. 
It is hard to understand how the Bank’s position for large contract can be reconciled with one of its 
main considerations specified under the Guideline to encourage the development of domestic 
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 Consultancy Guideline II 2.1 
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 The latest version of the Bank Standard Bidding Documents is available at 
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/PROCUREMENT/0,,contentMDK:20062006~menuPK:84
284~pagePK:84269~piPK:60001558~theSitePK:84266,00.html> 
12
 The Guidelines, Section II B Biding Documents; Consultancy Guidelines, Section II 2.12 Contract 
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 The Guidelines, para.1.5 and Consultancy Guidelines, para.1.7 
14
 Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Jr, note 2 at p.114. A procurement system adopted on the basis of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law is regarded as adequate provided that it does not follow the Model Law’s provisions on the use of competitive 
negotiations. 
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industries in the borrowing country.15 In fact, the multiple applications of different donor regimes 
present a big problem for national procurement officers and harm aid effectiveness and the 
ownership of recipient states (to be discussed in Section 6.3). 
 
6.2.2.3. Soft law & hard law issues 
6.2.2.3a. Bindingness 
The World Bank procurement rules can be categorised as a kind of internal policy, but may still 
acquire a legally binding force through being incorporated into loan agreements as a precondition for 
the grant of loans. The government agency who receives the funds must abide by the Bank’s 
procurement policies and procedures, which is one of the key obligations in the loan agreement 
between the Bank and that government agency. It is submitted that the loan agreement between the 
World Bank and the borrowing state has the effect of treaties and is thus subject to international law 
instead of domestic laws of that borrower.16 
 
6.2.2.3b. Precision  
The Guidelines set out basic procedural standards for contract awarding process, while the extensive 
SBDs issued by the Bank fill in the details for the application of the Guidelines.17 Different from the 
framework feature of other procurement regimes in the previous chapters, SBDs are a series of 
comprehensive and complete documents including standard bidding documents and standard form 
for various types of contracts, which have all details these documents should have in practice and 
can be used directly after being filled out with concrete project information for a particular 
procurement.  
Consequently, the Bank procurement rules possess an extremely high degree of precision, which 
can be illustrated by reference to the relevant rules on the issues of minimum time-limits for 
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 The Guidelines, Section 1.2 
16
 See Head, ‘Evolution of the Governing Law for Loan Agreements of the World Bank and other Multilateral 
Development Banks’, 90 A.J.I.L. 
17
 The Guidelines, para 2.12  
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tendering and qualification criteria. 
Regarding the issue of minimum time-limits for tendering, the Guidelines, like the GPA, the EC 
directives, the NAFTA, and the FTAA (see Section 3.2.4.2, Section 4.1.4.2, Section 4.3.4.2. and 
Section 4.4.4.2 respectively), lay down general principles as well as prescriptive rules. It provides 
that the time allowed for the preparation and submission of tenders ‘shall be determined with due 
consideration of the particular circumstances of the project and the magnitude and complexity of the 
contract.18 Meanwhile, it also requires that the minimum time-limit for tender submission shall 
generally be not less than 6 weeks for ICB, from the date of invitation to bid or the date of 
availability of bidding documents, whichever is later, and this period shall generally be not less than 
12 weeks for the large or complex contracts.19 
So far as qualification criteria are concerned, the Guidelines require that they shall be ‘based 
entirely upon the capability and resources of prospective bidder to perform the particular contract’.20 
In addition to this general requirement, the Bank issued a Standard Prequalification Document for 
use by the borrowing countries. In this document, the rules governing qualification criteria are 
elaborated to enormous details. As argued in Section 4.1.4.2, the EC may represent the most detailed 
among all the regimes reviewed, in terms of the rules on qualification criteria. The Bank’s rules 
governing qualification criteria are at least as detailed as those of the EC directives if not more 
detailed, stating grounds for exclusion and relevant evidences which procuring entities shall demand 
as means of proof of standing.21 
It can be seen that the Bank rules are more detailed than any of the previously examined 
procurement regimes. The main reason behind its exceptionally high level of precision lies in the 
special relationship between the Bank and the borrowing countries. Different from states’ free will to 
participate in a particular procurement agreement, the borrower countries have no involvement in 
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 Ibid. para.2.44 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. para.2.9 
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 See the World Bank, Standard Procurement Document: Prequalification Document for Procurement of Work and User’ 
Guide. Section III. available at 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/Prequal-08-06-ev1.doc > 
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formulating the rules or no choice over whether to apply them for the Bank funded projects, as they 
must agree on the observance of the Bank rules in order to obtain the Bank’s loans or grants. On the 
part of the Bank, without actual participation in the procurement process, it choose to laid down the 
rules as precisely as possible, with the aim of maintaining control over it. 
 
6.2.2.3c. Discretion 
States’ discretion in implementing the Bank rules is highly restricted, as demonstrated by reference 
to its rules governing the issues of procurement methods and award criteria.  
As with the issue of procurement methods, similar to the approach of the GPA, the EC, the 
NAFTA and the FTAA (see Section 3.2.4.3, Section 4.1.4.3, Section 4.3.4.3. and Section 4.4.4.3 
respectively), the Guidelines require the use of ICB as standard procurement method for most 
contracts, with the possibility to use other methods in strictly defined and limited circumstances.22  
Even in the case of alternative methods, it can be argued, they are primarily methods relying on 
formal competition bidding procedures, or dealing with situations where the disadvantages of 
departure from open competitive bidding procedures are not significant.23 For example, Limited 
International Bidding is ‘essentially a ICB by direct invitation without open advertisement’ and is 
only permitted where there is only a limited number of suppliers or other exceptional reasons, while 
National Competitive Bidding is a competitive bidding procedure between suppliers from the 
borrower country, and can only be used where the nature or scope of the procurement is unlikely to 
attract foreign interest.24 
As regards the issue of award criteria, the Guidelines provide that the contract shall be awarded to 
‘the bidder whose bid has been determined (i) to be substantially responsive to the bidding 
documents and (ii) to offer the lowest evaluated cost.25 The relevant Bank SBD provides more detail 
on this point, and states’ discretion is substantially limited by the SBD’s restriction on the criteria 
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 The Guidelines, para.3.1 
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 See Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Jr, note 2, at p. 117 
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 The Guidelines III 3.2 & 3.3 
25
 Ibid. para.2.59 
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and methodologies to be used in determining the ‘lowest evaluated cost’ and by the requirement that 
‘no other criteria or methodology shall be allowed’.26 
 
6.2.2.3d. Delegation 
In order to guarantee the effective application of its procurement rules, the Bank takes up a 
supervisory role to prior or post review of procurement documentation.27 A suitable threshold level 
should be agreed on in the loan agreement to determine whether a procuring contract is subject to 
prior or post review. As a general rule, the threshold for prior review will be set to include contracts 
for about 50-80% of the total value of Bank financed contracts in a project.28 
In the case of prior review, the award procedure will be reviewed as it proceeds. All relevant 
documents and decisions made by the borrower should be approved by the Bank before the borrower 
proceeds with each step of the procurement process.29 As for all borrower actions subject to prior 
review, a ‘no-objection letter’ must be issued stating the Bank has no objection to the decision taken, 
without which the Bank may refuse the borrower’s demand for drawing on finance under the loan 
agreement.  
However, it is important to note that such a ‘no-objection letter’ is issued based on the 
documentary evidence provided by the implementing agency. The Bank will neither get involved in 
actual proceedings and nor be responsible for verifying the accuracy of the substantive matters 
indicated in the documentation. As a result, the ‘no-objection’ letter does not guarantee the legality 
of actual procurement process in practice, but only indicates that the procurement procedures record 
in the documentation presented comply with the conditions of the loan agreement. 
Nevertheless, the Bank may still declare misprocurement even if the contract has been awarded 
after obtaining a ‘no objection’ from the Bank, provided the ‘no objection’ was issued ‘on the basis 
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 Standard Bidding Documents for Procurement of Goods (May 2004, revised May 2005), para.36 
27
 The Guidelines, the introductory part and the Appendix I 
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 However the acceptable coverage may vary between sectors and projects taking into account the different nature and 
size of contracts as well as the procurement capacity of the borrower’s implementing agency and the level of risk involved. 
See the World Bank Procurement Manual Section 20.3 
29
 For a detailed list of the document to be review normally, see the Guideline Appendix I and the Procurement Manual 
Section 20.2 
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of incomplete, inaccurate or misleading information furnished by the borrower or the terms and 
conditions of the contract had been modified without Bank’s approval’.30 
As for lower value contracts below the prior review threshold level, the Bank will conduct a post 
review to the procedure. All major documentation referent to the procurement process shall be kept 
by the borrower during the project implementation and up to two years after the closing date of the 
loan agreement.31 Post review is similar to prior review in terms of scope and method, but is carried 
out only on a random sample of awarded contracts and procurement related documentation.32 If 
misprocurement is revealed during such a review, the borrower will be advised to take corrective 
actions, and be obliged to repay any amount improperly withdrawn from the loan for the 
misprocured contract if any, and be subject to a more intensified review of past and future 
procurement documentation.33  
In this way, without being a party to the contract awarding process, the Bank still supervises and 
monitors the procurement process of the projects it funds. In the case of misprocurement detected by 
the review, the Bank might take several actions that are fatal to the project: it may choose to suspend 
or cancel the portion of the loan allocated to the misprocured goods and works, or decide to suspend 
or cancel the entire loan and to accelerate the maturity of the principal.34 
As discussed in Section 2.4.3, the deprivation of loan benefits can serve as a powerful sanction 
against non-compliance of the borrower. Although it is not a usual practice for the Bank to take such 
destructive actions against the borrower, the threat of taking these actions can still deter breaches 
from happening or to correct the ones that have already happened in many cases. 
However, The Bank’s review mechanism is not designed with any intention to provide aggrieved 
suppliers with means to challenge procurement procedures and decisions. Aggrieved bidders are 
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 See the Guidelines, Section 1.12 
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 Ibid. Appendix I, 5 
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 See the Procurement Manual Section 20.6.1 
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 Ibid. Section 20.6.2 
34
 See IBRD, General Conditions Applicable to Loans and Guarantee Agreement for Single Currency Loans, May 30,1995 
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suggested to contact the borrowing state concerned directly,35 but they are free to send copies of 
their correspondences with the borrower to the Bank or to write to the Bank directly.36 The Bank 
might refer to the borrower with its comments and advice if the complaint from suppliers is received 
prior to the closing date for submission of the bids; if otherwise received after the opening of the 
bids, the Bank might consider the complaint in deciding whether its procurement rules has been met 
in the case of contracts subject to the prior review.37 
Nevertheless, the Bank will not enter into discussions or correspondences with any bidder during 
contract awarding process, and its communications with the borrower and considerations regarding 
the complaint from suppliers are conducted in its sole discretion.  
As stated in Procurement Manual, the main aim of this review mechanism is to ‘ensure that its 
funds are used for the purposes intended and that procurement procedures outlined in the Loan 
Agreement are followed in letter and spirit’,38 which is echoing the major concern of the Guidelines 
to achieve best value for loan proceeds rather than promoting trade in its funded procurement.  
Bearing the main concern of the Guideline in mind, it is also not surprising to notice that the 
borrower is not required to have certain national bid challenge system in place, which is often 
required under the procurement regimes with trade objectives.  
It can be argued that private suppliers could play a more important role in reinforcing the 
implementation of the Bank rules and thus assisting the Bank in achieving its goals, because they are 
usually in a better position to detect breaches and have greater incentives to complain in the case of 
suspected breach. In practice, aggrieved bidders may bring their complaints to the Bank through the 
Executive Directors39of their countries, which could arguably be the most effective mechanism 
available to bidders. The Guidelines does not mention such kind of complaints, but Procurement 
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Manual does provide for the relevant guidance.40 
 
6.2.3. The procurement rules of other aid institutions 
Compared with the procurement rules of the World Bank, other aid institutions share similar 
objectives of economy, efficiency, competition and transparency, and in most cases, competitive 
tendering is required to attain the optimum utilisation of their loan proceeds by the recipients. For 
example, the OPEC Fund’s Procurement Guidelines seek to ensure that its aid-funded procurements 
are conducted in a way as to achieve the objectives of ‘economy, efficiency and social equity’ as 
stated in the preface of the Guidelines, and like the World Bank’s approach, preference is also 
accorded to ICB as the standard procurement method with alternative methods available for 
exceptional circumstances.41  
However, the procurement systems of other aid institutions are very different from that of the 
World Bank with respect to the devolution of decision-making-power to the recipient countries, 
procurement thresholds, eligibility criteria and specific award methods.  
Taking the EC external aid procurement regime as an example, the responsibility for the 
implementation of the aid-funded procurements does not rest solely with the recipient countries. 
There are two possible ways to manage the procurement procedures for projects financed under the 
EC external aid programmes. The European Commission directly conducts the aid-funded 
procurements, acting for and on behalf of the recipient countries in the case of centralised 
programmes, while the recipient countries implement the procurement process under decentralised 
programmes.  
As regards procurement thresholds, the EC system lays down extremely precise thresholds for 
each type of procedures, which is very different from the World Bank system where no monetary 
thresholds exist for this purpose.  
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Another important difference between the World Bank and the EC lies in the eligibility rules. The 
EC has the nationality rule for supply contracts that extends to its Member States and associated and 
aided countries. All purchases made under a supply procurement it funds must originate in the EU or 
in an eligible country as defined in its nationality rule. In contrast, the World Bank does not have 
rules of origin restricting the eligibility of bidders based on nationality.  
Additionally, difference can also be found between the World Bank and the EC in terms of 
specific award methods. For example, the EC allows for the use of ‘competitive negotiated 
procedure’ under certain conditions, which is completely banned under the World Bank’s rules. 
 
6.3 Improvement of borrowers’ procurement system 
The World Bank has attracted many criticisms for its rigorous procurement policies. Particularly, a 
criticism of the previous practice of the World Bank is that insufficient attention was given to the 
need to ensure the capability of the borrowers to procure efficiently in connection with the project 
once the immediate involvement of the Bank had ceased.42  
The procurement officials of recipient countries, who are not always very well-trained, lack of 
procurement skills to properly apply the Bank’s procurement rules, as well as to effectively carry out 
the project on their own once initial procurement has been completed. As the World Bank’s 
experience has shown, programmes and projects it helped finance may have been technically sound 
but failed to deliver intended results for reasons connected to the quality of government action.43 
Indeed, other aid institutions have also encountered a general problem of lack of capacity in their 
client countries despite having sound procurement guidelines in place for specific projects. 
Consequently, the World Bank has increasingly paid more attention to general capacity building and 
technical assistance in developing countries. Since 1990s, its lending for law reform projects has 
been given a priority, including project or sector investment loans containing funds for legal 
technical assistance tasks, free-standing technical assistance and institution/capacity building 
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loans.44  
This is based on the view that the Bank cannot afford to look the other way when a country is run 
by deeply dysfunctional public sector institutions. Sound procurement policies and practices are 
deemed to be essential to good governance. The World Bank assists its borrower countries in 
analysing their present procurement policies, procedures and institutions. This has been conducted 
mainly through Country Procurement Assessment Report (‘CPAR’) since 2000. 
A CPAR is not limited to examining whether the country in question is complying with the World 
Bank procurement rules in projects funded by the Bank, but looks more generally at the issues of a 
country’s procurement system, and to examine the application and enforcement of the related 
procedures and regulations in practice; and eventually provide a key input to the Country Assistance 
Strategy45 for the Bank to support procurement reform of the concerned country as part of an agreed 
implementation strategy.46 The main function of CPAR is to recommend an action plan to improve a 
country’s procurement system after formulating a diagnosis of current situations and needs for 
change.  
   
6.4 Harmonisation of donors’ procurement rules 
6.4.1. Introduction 
As above mentioned, donor institutions or countries normally require their procurement procedures 
to be used instead of national procedures for their financed projects to ensure the efficient spending 
of their funds. In many cases, this has been helpful to achieve competition, transparency, and thus 
better value for money than would have been achieved using the less effective procurement rules of 
the recipient.  
However, an additional burden is created if the local implementation agency is not familiarised 
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with the donor’s procurement policies, or if it has to simultaneously handle several processes under 
different donor-funded projects. Although the recipient government and donors apparently subscribe 
to common objectives and principles of free competition, transparency, integrity and value for 
money, they use a multitude of different public procurement policies and procedures.  
The multiplicity of donor regimes produces a number of failings in terms of aid effectiveness and 
the ownership of recipient states.47 The differences in requirements from various donors result in 
significant administrative overload for aid recipients especially taking into account the limited 
administrative capacity of recipients and the increased number of donors over time.48 The array of 
donors in a given recipient country can create an unworkable environmental for the country 
government. A large number of donors and donor projects, each with its own specific procurement 
polices and procedures, can be staggering. A recent OECD survey conformed that difficulties with 
donor procedures were perceived as the second most important burden with regard to effective aid 
delivery and the restrictions over procurement was ranked as the biggest area in which the use of 
donor procedures caused problems 49  
As a result, multilateral and bilateral donors have launched many harmonisation initiatives. These 
initiatives generally fall into two categories: the first one is to harmonise operational procurement 
policies and procedures of different donor institutions with the objective of progressively adopting 
agreed common guidelines; the second is to focus on capacity building in recipient countries with 
the objective of greater reliance over time on the countries’ own procurement systems. 
 
6.4.2. Adoption of agreed common guidelines 
In 1997, the World Bank and many other major donors embarked on an initiative to harmonise their 
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own procedures, which have had an impact on policies and procedures in the area of procurement.50 
Informal meetings of the Heads of Procurement (HOP) were held on common procurement concerns, 
and in 1999, the HOP agreed on and started using the first MBD on procurement of goods, which 
was later updated for continued use in 2002. It serves as standard bidding documents by four MDBs, 
namely, the ADB, AfDB, IDB and the World Bank. Similarly, harmonised standard bidding 
documents for procurement of works and a ‘request for proposal’ document on consulting services 
have been agreed on by the HOPs.  
The two major groups of development institutions – the MDBs and the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD - have worked through various technical groups on the issue of 
harmonisation in many areas including donors’ procurement procedures. At the High Level Forum 
on Harmonisation held in Rome in 2003, a declaration was made to promote harmonised approaches 
in global and regional donor programs, referring to several aspects including procurement. More 
than 40 multilateral and bilateral development institutions and 28 aid recipient countries endorsed 
the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation.  
The World Bank could arguably play a leading role in harmonising procurement procedures 
among donors given the wide recognition of its detailed guidelines on procurement procedures. Its 
procurement procedures are already used by the Netherlands, precisely ‘in an effort to develop 
uniform internationally acceptable standards for procurement’.51  
However, such exercises are still limited and it seems very difficult that different donors could 
agree amongst themselves and then present a single package to recipient countries. Some differences 
among donor’s procurement rules such as the application of rules of origin are policy-oriented and 
may prove difficult to align. Even with regard to differences which are procedural in nature, donors 
tends to consider that their own procedures are best satisfy the objectives but hardly know anything 
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about the other donors’ methods, which also makes it difficult to encourage them to harmonise their 
procedures.52 
 
6.4.3. Reliance on recipient countries’ own procedures 
Another type of initiative to tackle the question of the multiple applications of donors’ rules is to rely 
on recipient countries’ procurement procedures where their procurement systems are sufficiently 
developed.  
This approach could serve the dual purposes of reducing administrative costs of both recipients 
and donors on the one hand, and solving a general problem of lack of capacity encountered by 
donors in recipient countries on the other. Also, it is an effective way of increasing the ownership of 
recipients in the aid process.  
In 2002, the OECD/DAC-World Bank Joint Round Table Initiative on Strengthening Procurement 
Capacities in Developing Countries was established, aimed at strengthening the recipient country 
procurement systems and their ownership of the procurement process, and ultimately moving 
towards the use of recipient’ own systems to improve aid effectiveness. At its Third Round Table in 
Johannesburg, participants endorsed the good practice papers they developed on mainstreaming, 
capacity development, benchmarking, monitoring, and evaluation.53 
The World Bank’s CPAR is considered an important instrument for benchmarking and improving 
a country’s procurement system as a whole. The countries under review would have the matrix 
available as a tool to understand how they are benchmarked and immediately see where they need to 
focus their own attention with regard to implementing changes in their procurement system.54 The 
CPAR, which has been widely accepted by the donor community, could be also used as the matrix 
tool to identify the risks in the system as well as where to focus financial and capacity building 
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support in the recipient country.55  
 
6.5. International initiatives to untie aid 
6.5.1. Introduction, objective and approach 
In contrast to the relatively open eligibility requirements of the MDBs56, many bilateral and regional 
donors have often required recipients to buy products and services only from donor countries as a 
condition for awarding loans or grants. In building a bridge, for example, donors may insist that their 
companies, exports and equipments be used. Whether the aid is given may depend on the recipient 
country agreeing to do so, even if it would be more efficient to acquire the goods and services 
needed elsewhere.  
Under certain circumstances, donors may choose not to make it a legally binding obligation that 
aid must be spent in the donor country but to simply make that outcome more likely.57 This 
‘informal tying’ occurs when powerful governments of donor countries exert their influences on the 
recipient governments to give preference to donor country suppliers in the bidding process.58 
Such restrictions on the eligibility of contractors and products on the basis of nationality in aid 
procurement could be seen as an export subsidy to enterprises from donor countries-a form of 
protectionism in international trade that runs counter to the idea of free trade as a means of 
increasing the global welfare.  
Apart from its distortive effect on trade, there are a number of problems associated with tied aid.59 
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First of all, it reduces value for money in the funded procurement. Tied aid has been estimated to 
cost on average between 15-30% more than if the goods or services were procured through 
international competition or local sources.60  
Secondly, tying aid implies that the development of recipients is not the only concern of the donor 
countries, often resulting in inappropriate aid which does not address the real needs of the recipients. 
For instance, the projects selected for aid may be motivated primarily by potential benefits for donor 
export industries rather than the development priorities of recipients. Recipient countries are likely 
to be supplied with incompatible pieces of equipment provided by different donors, each with 
separate requirements for spares and back-up. For example, a survey in Kenya found more than 16 
different kinds of water pumps in use, each funded by a different donor country.61  
Lastly, tied aid reflects donors’ lack of confidence in local systems and often excludes recipients 
from decision-making process for which the aid is granted, which severely undermines ‘ownership’ 
of the aid by the recipients and with it the effectiveness of the aid.  
The DAC of the OECD has been discussing the concept of untied aid62 since 1969. An early effort 
in 1960s to reach an agreement on untying bilateral aid failed owing to the reticence of some DAC 
members.63  In 1974, a Memorandum of Understanding for the reciprocal untying of bilateral 
development loans was endorsed by ten donors but never became operational owing to the oil price 
shock that constrained donors’ aid budgets.64 In 1991, the ‘Helsinki Arrangement’ was agreed by 
OECD members to regulate the use of tied export credits.65  
After having an agreement on a set of disciplines to guide the use of tied aid, the High Level 
meeting of the DAC in 2001 eventually reached a Recommendation on Untying Aid to the Least 
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Developed Countries (‘the Recommendation’), which was amended on 2006 with the elimination of 
the thresholds criteria from the Recommendation.  
This recommendation is the first multilateral instrument on aid untying. The main commitment 
endorsed under the Recommendation is to untie Official Development Assistance (‘ODA’)66 to the 
Least Developed Countries to (‘LDC’) the greatest extent possible.67 Donors are required to ‘take 
any steps necessary to ensure that ODA untied in accordance with this Recommendation is both de 
jure and de facto untied’.68 In order to achieve a de jure and de facto untying of ODA, the 
Recommendation has laid down a set of transparency principles and operational procedures aimed at 
providing foreign suppliers with equal opportunity to participate in the biding process.  
Moreover, a number of other obligations have been set out to help in completing and 
strengthening this untying initiative. For example, DAC members are obliged to ensure adequate 
ODA flows, especially to the least developed countries, and the level of ODA should not be 
diminished by virtue of the implementation of this Recommendation.69 It would go against the very 
objectives of the Recommendation if donors attempt to circumvent their untie obligations by means 
of constraining ODA flows to LDCs.  
  
6.5.2. Coverage 
Under the Recommendation, aid loans and grants covering a wide range of financial support should 
be open to international competition. However the obligations of donors are subject to a number of 
limitations and exclusions, which significantly reduce the impact of the Recommendation on total 
OECD bilateral aid.70  
Firstly, the application of the Recommendation is only limited to ODA to Least Developed 
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countries (LDCs) as listed in Annex II of the Recommendation.71 Secondly, certain categories of 
ODA, namely technical co-operation and food aid, are excluded from the Recommendation’s 
coverage.72  
The coverage of the Recommendation was previously restricted by a threshold clause, which 
specifies minimum monetary thresholds for triggering the application of the Recommendation.73 The 
major achievement of 2006 amendment on the Recommendation is the abolition of the threshold 
clause for its general application. Currently, this threshold clause is only relevant with regard to the 
Members’ obligation of ex ante notification under the transparency principle.74  Therefore the 
coverage of the Recommendation is significantly expanded. In particular, a large number of small 
aid projects are brought subject to the regulation of the Recommendation, which may be more 
attractive for the participation of local enterprises of aid recipient countries. 
Despite its limited coverage, donors are encouraged to untie their aid ‘to a greater extent’ than that 
set out in the Recommendation: they are invited to continue to provide untied aid in areas not 
covered when they already do so, and to study the possibilities of extending untied aid in such 
areas.75  
 
6.5.3. Soft law & hard law issues 
6.5.3.1. Bindingness  
The notable feature of the Recommendation is its non-binding nature. This instrument is framed as 
‘a recommendation’, which explicitly negates any intent to create legally binding obligations. As 
mentioned in Section 6.4.1, tied aid had been an established practice of donor countries for a long 
time before the Recommendation came into force. Despite its evident harmfulness, it was still 
politically difficult to untie, which can be demonstrated by the failure of early attempts to untying 
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bilateral aid by means of binding agreements.  
The Recommendation represents a remarkable breakthrough towards addressing the problem of 
tied aid. As the first multilateral instrument on aid untying, it can be argued that the non-binding 
form might be the only way acceptable to major donor countries in terms of the obligation of 
untying. 
More importantly, the non-binding recommendation is arguably more appropriate than a binding 
agreement taking into account the nature of subject matter regulated. It is expressed stated in the 
Recommendation that one of the share intentions of DAC Members is to ensure that ODA to the 
least developed countries will not decline over time as result of implementation of this 
Recommendation.  
In this regard, on the one hand, hard law in terms of binding obligations on untying aid may 
probably affect donors’ decision on the volume or direction of ODA owing to their reluctance to 
untying certain kinds of aid as well as to infringe binding international law. On the other, it is 
infeasible for any international regime to impose mandatory requirements on the donors’ provision 
of ODA because of the voluntary nature of aid. As a result, the use of binding form may end up 
being contradictory to the original intention of DAC Members.  
Furthermore, promoting a more balanced effort-sharing among Members in their efforts to unite 
aid is a key principle of the Recommendation.76 It has been recognised that the impact that the 
Recommendation has on each Members could be very different owing to variations in structures and 
geographical orientations of their aid programmes.77 As the initial situations of Members evolve 
over time, a reference indicators matrix system is set up to help donors identify and undertake 
supplementary actions to promote a more balanced effort-sharing. Therefore, hard law in terms of 
bindingness seems inapropriate since states’ behaviours are likely to change periodically in response 
to the assessments during the peer review process.  
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6.5.3.2. Precision  
The main body of the Recommendation is vague and general, setting out abstract standards rather 
than detailed rules, while its Annex I details provisions concerning operational procedures and 
undertakings related to its coverage and implementation. The transparency rules discussed above can 
serve as an example: general standards are laid down in the main body of the Recommendation, 
followed by detailed rules contained in the Annex I to explain the precise obligations Members 
should fulfil to meet each of these transparency standards.  
For instance, the Recommendation generally provides that Members should respond ‘promptly’ 
and ‘fully’ to enquiries by other Members concerning the covered untied aid offers. However, the 
Annex I clarifies the meaning of the words ‘promptly’ and ‘fully’ as being ‘within 14 calendar days’ 
and ‘providing all information relevant to the request, including information concerning donor 
financing of services related to the design and implementation of the notified project’ respectively.78 
Moreover, it further restricts the form of communications, by requiring that such enquiries and 
responses should use electronic means of communication.79  
Therefore, the Recommendation, as a whole, possesses a high degree of precision. It can be 
argued that the non-binding nature of the Recommendation may contribute to its precision, as states 
may be more ready to accept prescriptive rules when they take a non-legally binding form. As with 
the above example, under binding regimes such as the GPA and the NAFTA, similar rules can be 
found but they only generally require that upon request each state should provide to anther state 
information concerning the covered procurement.80 There are no further rules detailing the types of 
information states should provide or the timing and the means of communications.  
Nevertheless, in this regard, similarly prescriptive rules are still absent under some other 
non-binding instruments including the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs. The COMESA 
directives suggest the establishment of a Procurement Policy Office, which may serve as an 
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international contact point or information centre on national procurement rules and opportunities.81 
Similarly, the APEC NBPs generally recommend establishing contact points for enquiries on 
national procurement system. 82  It can be seen that neither of them impose any prescriptive 
requirement as the Recommendation does.  
One possible reason that might be raised to explain the difference is that Members of the 
Recommendation are mainly advanced industrial states with homogenous political and economical 
systems and with a long tradition of effective cooperation under the auspices of the OECD. Taking 
into the diversified membership of the COMESA and the APEC, such prescriptive rules may be 
either undesirable or unreachable, as some less developed states may consider the detailed 
requirements such as responding enquiries ‘within 14 calendar days’ or the use of ‘electronic means 
of communication’ constituting a huge administrative burden even though these rules are 
non-binding. 
 
6.5.3.3. Discretion 
The non-binding nature of the Recommendation itself may give Members a significant discretion in 
their implementation. The DAC Members can depart from any principle or rule of the 
Recommendation without assuming the legal liabilities for breach of binding international law. 
So far as the content of the Recommendation is concerned, it confers as well as restricts states’ 
discretion. On the one hand, a broad discretion is awarded to states by using hortatory, 
best-endeavour language in certain legal provisions. For instance, regarding the obligation of 
effort-sharing, it provides that ‘members agree to undertake their best endeavours to identify and 
implement supplementary effort-sharing actions’. The presence of wordings like ‘best endeavours’, 
‘to the greatest extent possible’ and ‘as they believe’ in the Recommendation largely soften the legal 
nature of these provisions and give states substantial discretion in their implementation.  
On the other hand, as discussed in the previous section, detailed rules are included in Annex I to 
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concretise the general standards contained in the main text. Although the precision does not 
necessarily constrain discretion83, some prescriptive rules do largely curtail states’ discretion in 
choosing the way how the required general standards can be met. For example, the rule requiring the 
use of ‘electronic means of communication’ in response to enquires explicitly excludes other 
possible expeditious ways of communication such as courier or face-to-face communication, which 
may equivalently meet the general requirement of responding ‘promptly’.  
Moreover, the Recommendation contains a derogation clause for individual aid offers in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ where ‘they believe it to be justified on the basis of overriding, 
non-trade related, development interests’.84 No definitions or explicative lists are provided for terms 
of ‘exceptional situation’ or ‘overriding, non-trade related, development interests’. By virtue of this 
derogation clause, donors are granted a great deal of discretion in departing from their obligations 
under the Recommendation.   
Nonetheless, certain transparency requirements are laid down as safeguard measures for avoiding 
misuse of the derogation: donors who want to apply the derogation must justify in ‘a letter to the 
Secretary-General of the OECD and to the DAC Chair’, and the application of the derogation will be 
followed up in review procedures. Therefore, donors’ discretion can be controlled to a certain extent 
as the subjectivity of this derogation clause has been made more objective by a secondary obligation 
of notification. Donors have to fulfil the notification obligation before invoking the derogation 
clause and their failure to notify is by itself a breach of an obligation which has a more objective 
element and can be more easily determined in the case of non-compliance.  
 
6.5.3.4. Delegation 
The Recommendation is a kind of soft law instrument with no delegation of judicial power to a third 
body to enforce the agreed rules. There is neither enforcement mechanisms available to aggrieved 
private parties at the international level, and nor does the Recommendation become enforceable law 
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domestically unless it is incorporated into national law of Members. Instead, the DAC is designated 
with the role of monitoring the implementation of the Recommendation through a combination of 
different mechanisms including self-reporting, annual progress reports and peer review.  
  First of all, the DAC Members are obliged to provide ex ante notification for the untied aid offers 
above a certain specified threshold value, as well as to report ex post information on contract awards 
pertaining to all the covered untied aid offers.85 Such reporting helps Members to share pre and post 
procurement information, thus promoting transparency and confidence building. It generates 
information indicative of each Member’s performance of its obligations, which may induce 
compliance in three possible ways. Firstly, information reported serves a kind of early warning 
system for substantive compliance problems, which can be discussed and debated in the context of 
the overall review procedure. Solutions may be reached or suggestions may be given to address the 
compliance problem.  
  Secondly, the self-reporting requirement exercises deterrence against non-compliance. States 
contemplating non-compliance may refrain from actual infringement of the rules when the relevant 
information of contract award has to be reported and made available to other Members and 
eventually the public.  
  Lastly, this self-reporting system also provides reassurance for each Member that others are 
complying. As with the particular issue of untying aid, members may hesitate to untie aid 
unilaterally out of the fear that their domestic industries would remain disadvantaged in foreign 
market for aid originated from other Members while being deprived of the previous privileges under 
national tied aid policy. This situation has been described by Chimia as ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, which 
can only be resolved if all major donor countries untie together.86 The information collected from 
this self-reporting system reassures each Member that others are also untying aid in accordance with 
the Recommendation and its own domestic industries are not being taken advantage of.  
  Secondly, annual reports are reviewed by The DAC, covering ‘all aspects of the Recommendation 
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as well as the experience in delivering its objectives’.87 The work of the DAC is supported by the 
Development Co-operation Directorate (‘the DCD’), which is made up of experts and professionals 
specialised in the fields of review and evaluation, policy coherence, policy co-ordination and 
statistics and monitoring.88 It is important for the DAC to have expertise needed to measure the level 
of compliance, to ascertain progress achieved, to discover unsatisfactory factors and make relevant 
recommendations.   
  Thirdly, ‘peer review’ is also included as a working method of the DAC. Every three to four year 
each of the 23 DAC Members is reviewed by its peers and five different Members are peer reviewed 
every year. Similar to the peer review procedures conducted within the framework of the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business and Transactions (see Section 5.2.2.4), the peer 
review process under the DAC is carried out on a non-adversarial basis, resulting in a report that 
assesses accomplishments, spells out shortfalls and makes recommendations.  
  In this regard, both the self-reporting and the annual reports provide information and input for the 
peer review of individual DAC members. Compared with annual report, peer review seems 
politically more effective than annual reports due to its individual focus.89 However, the final 
outcome of neither annual report nor peer review takes the form of a binding act or a legal judgment, 
which does not involve coercive measures such as sanctions. Instead, it depends on political pressure 
and works as a sort of ‘soft persuasion’ which could become an important driving force to encourage 
positive change, support mutual learning and thus raise the overall effectiveness of the regime.90
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<http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,2340,en_2649_33721_1925604_1_1_1_1,00.html> 
89
 See La Chimia, note 59, at pp.7-16 
90
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Chapter 7 Analysis of advantages & disadvantages of soft law in 
regulating public procurement from a trade perspective – the Dimension 
of Bindingness 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The first dimension of soft law discussed in the current thesis is non-bindingness, that is to say, that 
laws can be soft in the sense that they are not legally binding. As examined in Section 2.3, soft law 
in terms of non-bindingness can play an important role in serving as a second best to hard law when 
a binding form is unachievable in the short run: non-binding rules are sometimes deliberately chosen 
as an intermediate step towards a later binding agreement; also it has been further argued that soft 
law is better than nothing even when there is no prospect of a hard law agreement at all. 
 Non-binding soft law, however, assumes functions more than of being a second best to hard law. It 
has its own value and is often preferable on its own terms. It has been argued that soft law can even 
be regarded as a better alternative to hard law under certain circumstances: sometimes it can produce 
practical effects comparable to hard law but with lower costs, and may also provide certain benefits 
not available under hard law. 
 
7.2 Non-binding law being a second best to binding law 
The first general argument is that soft law is better than nothing in the case that a hard law approach 
has been expressly rejected or proven to be unachievable, but the subject matter still demands at 
least a degree of international regulation. Non-binding soft law has therefore been resorted to break 
deadlocks during negotiations and to provide certain degree of regulation in its implementation. 
Such soft law regulation can sometimes serve as a stepping stone towards a future binding hard law, 
but surely this is not necessarily the case.  
Public procurement is widely considered a sensitive subject area in which states are often jealous 
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of their sovereign autonomy for a number of reasons. Many states have a long tradition of utilising 
procurement as a policy tool to promote secondary objectives. States may desire to use procurement 
to implement their protectionist measures favouring uncompetitive national industries, which goes 
against the basic idea of comparative advantage underlying any free trade agreement.  
Meanwhile, public procurement in many countries is extensively used to promote social equality 
or sound environmental standards, which often affects the participation of foreign suppliers. For 
example, states may reserve a certain number of procurement contracts exclusively for firms owned 
by some disadvantaged ethnic groups, or disqualify firms having a bad environmental record in the 
procurement process.  
In addition, public procurement can be used by public officials for illegitimate purposes such as 
political patronage or corruption. The difficulty has been proved in eliminating such discriminative 
procurement policies owing to political reasons. It is politically difficult for governments to 
withdraw from discriminative procurement policies even if they wish to do so. Significant political 
influence may be exerted from lobbyists representing interests of certain categories of national 
industries which are beneficiaries of protectionist procurement policies, or even from public officials 
who have illegitimate interests in corrupt procurement practices. 
History has showed that public procurement has always been a controversial issue during 
international trade negotiations, and it is not surprising that negotiating parties may find themselves 
stuck in a substantial disagreement on many aspects of the issue. 
At the regional level, as mentioned in Section 4.4.1, the negotiations on FTAA were stalled mainly 
due to the unsettled disagreement between the US and Brazil. During negotiations, the U.S. pushed 
for a single comprehensive agreement to reduce trade barrier for goods but excluding real disciplines 
on agricultural subsidies, while Brazil wanted to pursue an agreement on market access in goods but 
to put off for later rounds more controversial issues including public procurement.1 According to 
Schott, Brazilian negotiators showed strong resistance over reforms of important regulatory barriers 
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 See D.R. Mackay, ‘The Miami FTAA Ministerial Meeting’, (2003) FOCALPOINT Spotlight on the Americas Special 
Edition, ISSN 1703-7964, at p.1, available at < www.focal.ca/pdf/special_edition_november03.pdf > 
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including opening of some public procurement contracts for foreign participation, because although 
such reforms were supported by some parts of Brazilian business community, they were staunchly 
opposed by protectionist interests.2 
Different legal traditions and values across states can further complicate the negotiations. It has 
proven even more difficult to negotiate a procurement agreement at the multilateral level. The firm 
resistance against negotiating a WTO transparency agreement in procurement demonstrates the 
general difficulty in negotiating a multilateral procurement agreement. 
In view of the public procurement sector’s significant implications for international trade, efforts 
have been made to develop multilateral disciplines on procurement, and the WTO has become the 
major locus of such efforts. However, the WTO initiative to negotiate the proposed transparency 
agreement ended in deadlock by failing to produce a consensus over a number of major issues. As 
explained in Section 3.3, apparently, the failure to commence negotiating the proposed transparency 
agreement was mainly due to substantial disagreements among the WTO Members.  
The disagreements concerned both the content and the form of the proposed agreement. In 
particular, substantial disagreements over its binding nature, its coverage and its challenge procedure 
were regarded as the three major obstacles on the road to the proposed transparency agreement.3 
There were heated arguments over whether the agreement should take the non-binding form4; 
whether it should have a broad coverage extending to goods, services and construction services, to 
central entities as well as sub-central entities5; and whether the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
should be applicable and domestic review procedures should be made available for aggrieved parties 
under the agreement.6  
However, as explained in Section 3.3.1, behind the apparent disagreements over specific aspects 
of the proposed transparency agreement, there was an underlying difficulty in reconciling the 
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 See J.J. Schott, ‘Does the FTAA Have a Future’ (Institution for International Economics, 2005), at p.12, available at < 
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5
 For detailed discussion, see Section 3.3.3 
6
 For detailed discussion, see Section 3.3.5.4 
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opposite positions held by developed and developing Member countries. Developed countries were 
keen to obtain a greater share of the developing countries’ procurement market, while developing 
countries wanted to preserve their current procurement policies. 
It can be argued that the above mentioned reasons explaining state’s resistance to relinquish their 
sovereign power in procurement are particularly relevant for developing countries. As for the 
consideration of protecting national industries, developing countries with less competitive national 
industries may fear that they would suffer if foreign companies were put into direct competition with 
their unprotected national industries. National industries with vested interests under discriminatory 
procurement policies will be active in lobbying their governments to block a multilateral 
procurement agreement, and this opposing voice tends to be much louder than that in developed 
countries as they are more vulnerable to foreign competition.  
Further, corrupt procurement practices are particularly rampant in many developing countries with 
loose or opaque procurement rules and weak monitoring systems, and consequently corrupt public 
officials and politicians may constitute another important political force against the proposed 
transparency agreement.  
With regard to the value of soft law being a second best to hard law, in Section 2.3.1, it has been 
pointed out that soft law has been repeatedly resorted to as a method to overcome deadlocks during 
negotiations and to avoid the costs of having no agreement at all. The choice of soft law can be 
instrumental in negotiating an international agreement, and among its four dimensions, soft law in 
terms of non-bindingness has been argued as the first and foremost means to foster compromises 
where there are substantive disagreements. 
The value of non-binding soft law for being an effective device for overcoming deadlocks 
deserves special attention in the area of procurement, in view of the difficulties in negotiating 
procurement agreements at both regional and multilateral levels. 
First of all, when negotiating an international procurement agreement, different opinions 
concerning specific aspects of the agreement would more likely be resolved if negotiating parties 
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could agree on a non-binding form for the agreement. Taking the proposed transparency agreement 
as an example, if it were agreed to be of a non-binding nature, it would be unnecessary for the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure to be applied, it would be no need to formulate complex coverage rules, 
and it would be much easier for negotiating parties to agree on the precise content of the agreement. 
Consequently, it seems that almost all the substantial disagreements over the content and the form of 
the proposed agreement could easily be resolved by resorting to a non-binding form. 
More substantially, the choice of soft law could arguably foster compromise between the different 
positions held by negotiating parties. As for the negotiations on the FTAA concerning the issue of 
procurement, the different positions held by Brazil and the U.S. would more likely be reconciled if a 
non-binding form were agreed for the agreement. Domestic opposition from Brazilian vested 
interests would be expected to be weaker if the relevant procurement disciplines were to be adopted 
in a non-binding form, while the U.S. might consider the non-binding international regulation to be 
better than nothing in terms of opening up Brazilian procurement market.  
Similarly, in the case of the negotiations on the proposed transparency agreement in procurement, 
it is likely that many of the developing countries’ concerns could be well addressed by resorting to 
non-binding soft law. Political oppositions against the transparency agreement in many countries 
especially developing countries might be mitigated by agreeing on a non-binding form for the 
agreement. Even for countries which opposed the very idea of having any agreement in procurement, 
they were more likely to accept the proposed transparency agreement if they were ensured to retain 
absolute freedom to respond in the case of unfavourable circumstances.  
Meanwhile, as for developed countries aimed at opening up developing countries’ procurement 
market, the non-binding transparency agreement could be regarded as a gradual approach towards 
future binding agreement in procurement. By accommodating different concerns of developed and 
developing countries, the non-binding soft law can probably resolve deadlocks during negotiations, 
promote mutual agreement between negotiating parties, and then avoid the failure of negotiations as 
a whole.  
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The development of the OECD instruments combating foreign bribery in international business 
transactions (see Section 5.2.2.1) provides a successful example of utilising non-binding instruments 
to overcome deadlocks during negotiations. The U.S., being the only country outlawing exterritorial 
bribery brought the issue of foreign bribery to the OECD with the aim to level the playing field for 
its exporting industries in international business transactions. Other OECD states had, however, 
political incentives to allow their export industries to engage in foreign bribery, and thus were not 
genuinely interested in negotiating an anti-bribery agreement.  
During the negotiation, some negotiating parties attempted to use the high costs of a binding 
treaty to impede any agreement on this issue. The U.S responded by taking a gradualist approach to 
achieve its ultimate goal of concluding a binding convention through a series of non-binding 
Recommendations.    
The value of non-binding soft law is, however, beyond promoting agreement at the negotiation 
stage. At the implementation stage, it can provide a certain degree of regulation, which may, but not 
necessarily contribute to the later formation of hard law.  
A non-binding procurement agreement can provide states with learning opportunities to know 
about the consequences of the agreement, while allowing them to maintain substantial control if 
adverse circumstances arise. It enables participating states to learn more about the subject, to build 
up confidence, and to gain real benefits, which may contribute to the final conclusion of legally 
binding rules in the future.  
With the adoption of more transparent procurement rules and procedures, governments of 
participating countries might start to appreciate the more predictable domestic procurement market, 
the improved efficiency of public spending, and the reduced level of corruption in procurements. 
These benefits countries could actually reap by participating in a non-binding procurement 
agreement could often lower the perceived costs of subsequent moves to a binding one. 
The use of non-binding soft law as an intermediate step towards binding hard law can be found in 
international procurement law. For example, as examined in Section 4.5.4.1, in the context of 
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COMESA, it has been recognised that hard law obligations could not immediately be obtained in 
face of major difficulties such as deficiencies in procurement practices and weak institutional 
capacities of its Members. Consequently, the non-binding directives were adopted to serve as an 
intermediate step towards the final realisation of a legally binding regional agreement by means of 
building capacity, generating consensus and promoting confidence in the area of procurement.  
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that non-binding soft law is better than nothing even where 
there is no prospect of a hard law agreement at all. The APEC NBPs discussed in Section 4.6.4.1 
furnish a good example. The APEC NBPs explicitly deny any intention to create legally binding 
obligations for its Members both at present and in the future. Despite its unchanging non-binding 
nature, the soft regulation provided by the APEC NBPs is surely better than no regulation at all 
especially for those which are yet to undertake any legally binding commitment under the GPA or 
regional procurement regimes.  
 
7.3 Non-binding law as a better alternative to hard law 
7.3.1 Possible advantages of non-binding soft law 
The value of non-binding soft law is far beyond simply serving as a method to overcome deadlocks 
during negotiations or as an intermediate step towards the later formation of binding hard law where 
hard law is temporarily unachievable.  
It has been argued in Section 2.3.2 that non-binding soft law can be regarded as a better 
alternative to hard law even where the latter is attainable. Non-binding soft law is sometimes 
preferable on its own terms, and may produce similar effects of hard law but avoid some of the costs 
of hard law. First of all, it can be used as a method to reduce negotiating and implementing costs 
associated with an international agreement; secondly, it entails less sovereignty costs for 
participating states; thirdly, it can offer better options to deal with changing circumstances; and lastly, 
the non-binding form may sometimes be chosen for technical reasons. All these arguments can 
generally apply in the area of public procurement and the first four are particularly relevant with 
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regard to international procurement law. 
 
7.3.1.1 Reduced Negotiating costs 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, every agreement entails some negotiating costs and the negotiating 
costs of international treaties may probably be higher than those of non-binding agreements, as 
states are normally more cautious in negotiating and drafting legally binding agreements owing to its 
higher costs of violation. In particular, negotiating costs tend to be especially high where subject 
matters are sensitive or complex, and public procurement is exactly an area that is generally 
sensitive and often complex for international regulation.  
As we saw in the previous reviews on various procurement instruments with trade objectives, 
their common approach is to lay down minimum procedural requirements governing the award of 
contract to ensure transparency, which is believed to make the concealed discrimination more 
difficult and thus to guarantee equal market access. Indeed, most instruments have to address 
numerous procedural aspects of procurement that are essential to the whole concept of transparency, 
including qualifications of suppliers, time limits for the submission of bids, minimum information 
required in tender documentation, and the award of contract. Such provisions on transparency are 
often comprehensive and complicated, and therefore potentially very difficult to negotiate and draft. 
It may take a long and tedious process for different countries with significant difference in their 
approach to regulation to agree on a single set of rules.  
In principle, so far as a binding procurement agreement is concerned, the more complex its 
procedural rules are; the more diversified circumstances its participating countries have; the higher 
negotiating costs it will involve. As examined in Section 3.2.4.1, the negotiation for the current GPA 
was initiated from 1987 and eventually completed in 1993. The GPA’s lengthy and heated 
negotiating history can demonstrate the high negotiating costs that a binding multilateral 
procurement agreement with detailed procedural rules may possibly entail.  
In contrast, the EC procurement regime, which includes more detailed and complex rules than the 
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GPA, seems to involve lower negotiating costs. Besides the comparative similarity of EC Members’ 
economic, political, and legal conditions, the EC’s comparatively lower negotiating costs must be 
understood in the light of the particular institution where the negotiations took place. The EC is 
considered as a unique intergovernmental negotiating system due to the existence of supranational 
actors, bodies and decision-making procedures7, which are absent in other international regimes 
including the WTO. It is envisaged that the highly-institutionalised negotiating system largely 
facilitates negotiation and bargaining at the EC level. 
In addition to the complexity of procedural rules, the complexity of coverage rules also 
contributes to the difficulty of negotiations on many procurement agreements. As explained in 
Section 3.2.2, Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.4.2, most binding procurements instruments such as the 
GPA, the NAFTA, and the FTAA adopt a flexible approach for coverage in order to achieve a 
reasonably broad coverage. The EC procurement regime is an exception, which laid down a uniform 
as well as comprehensive coverage for all EC Members. Again, this is mainly due to its similarly 
minded membership as well as highly integrated institutional context. 
However, as with most binding instruments opted for a flexible approach, the difference in 
coverage for different states along with the principle of reciprocity add much more difficulty in 
negotiations. The GPA’s negotiations on coverage are illustrative on this point. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, by adopting a flexible approach for coverage, the GPA Member 
States were, in fact, conducting item-for-item bilateral negotiations between each other, in relation to 
types of covered contracts, types of regulated entities and thresholds. The principle of reciprocity 
further complicated this exercise: this tit-for-tat negotiation ended up with most states having a 
detailed and complicated list of derogations to different Members. It has been argued that the GPA is 
more like a series of bilateral agreements under the multilateral framework of the GPA rather than a 
multilateral agreement.  
Due to the complexity of the issue, legal or economic specialists were often consulted to facilitate 
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 For information about the EC’s legislative process, see 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/droit_communautaire/droit_communautaire.htm#2.3> 
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negotiations. Most famously, the U.S. and the E.U. commissioned Deloitte Touche to prepare a 
report examining the dollar value of their respective procurement opportunities in some important 
areas such as sub-federal procurement in order to ensure a general equivalence between their offers.8 
The continued negotiations to expand the GPA coverage have been carried out for years. Mostly 
recently, in 2006, states reached a provisional agreement on the text of a new procurement 
agreement to supersede the current GPA. However, it seems still difficult and time-consuming for 
parties to reach an agreement on coverage. Based on the publicly disclosed information, the EU has 
been highly disappointed by its alleged low level of ambition reflected in other major parties’ 
offers.9 The EC warned that its revised offer might end up with a reduced coverage compared to its 
current one under the GPA, unless other parties’ offers are substantially improved. 10  The 
negotiations on coverage failed to be completed in the first half of 2007 as originally expected and it 
remains to be seen if any agreement will be reached.  
                                                       
Taking into account the complexity in procedural rules and coverage rules, a procurement 
agreement may involve considerably high negotiating costs, especially in the case of diversified 
membership. However, such high negotiating costs might arguably be reduced by resorting to soft 
law in terms of bindingness, precision and delegation. This section focuses on the dimension of 
bindingness, and the other two will be discussed in the following sections. The non-binding nature of 
a procurement agreement could arguably better address the complexity in procurement.  
As far as the complexity of procedural rules is concerned, non-binding agreement might avoid 
detailed transparency rules or make it easier for negotiating parties to agree if such rules were 
included. It can be seen that most of non-binding procurement instruments examined in the current 
thesis, i.e. Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the EC Member States (see Section 4.2.4.2), 
the COMESA directives (see Section 4.5.4.2) and the APEC NBPs (see Section 4.6.4.2) do not 
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2007 at p.6 
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 See ‘EU Warns It Could Pull Back GPA Commitments Over SME Treatment’ Inside US Trade, 2 March 2007 
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include a complete set of detailed procedural rules, which can be found in many binding 
procurement regimes such as the GPA, the EC directives, the NAFTA, and the FTAA (see Section 
3.2.4.2; Section 4.1.4.2; Section 4.3.4.2 and Section 4.4.4.2 respectively).  
These non-binding procurement instruments tend to set out general principles rather than detailed 
transparency rules, and consequently the high negotiating costs associated with complex procedural 
rules can be largely avoided. However, even for a non-binding procurement agreement setting out 
detailed procedural rules, it is assumed that such non-binding procedural rules could be agreed upon 
with lower negotiating costs, as the non-binding nature of the agreement provide parties with 
substantial discretion in practice to depart from the rules where they feel it is necessary. 
Moreover, given the voluntary nature of non-binding agreements, it seems not necessary for 
parties to negotiate and draft detailed rules concerning its scope in terms of types of entities and 
contracts covered, derogations for security reasons or secondary objectives etc, as is the case with 
most binding procurement agreements. For instance, the non-binding COMESA directives (see 
Section 4.5.2) only generally provide that its principles and rules should be applied as widely as 
possible with the exception of certain parts of its reform initiative subject to certain threshold to be 
set, whilst the APEC NBPs (see Section 4.6.2) include no rules for coverage. The generally defined 
uniform rules or even no rules for coverage avoid the problem of reciprocity and thus the occurrence 
of intensive arguing, bargaining and intricate negotiating for equivalence between their offers. 
Indeed, it has been proved that the choice of non-binding form can largely reduce negotiating 
costs compared with that of binding agreements. The negotiating history of APEC NBPs provides 
some evidence. The clearly declared non-binding nature of these NBPs made the negotiation process 
comparatively simple and speedy, albeit with its large and highly diversified membership. The 
Osaka Action Agenda adopted in the 1995 Leaders’ meeting firstly included the objective of 
liberalising the procurement markets of member economies, and in the same year the Government 
Procurement Experts’ Group (‘the GPEG’) was established for this purpose. The GPEG developed a 
set of non-binding principles on government procurement, which were endorsed by all the APEC 
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economies in 1999. 
 
7.3.1.2 Reduced implementing Costs 
Secondly, non-binding soft law can be argued to entail lower implementing costs than binding hard 
law. By entering into an international agreement, states are required to implement their obligations 
under it. As explained in Section 2.3.2, some international obligations call for states’ to refrain from 
certain actions, while others demand positive actions. The implementation of international 
obligations demanding positive actions can be costly for participating states.  
The majority of procurement agreements including all examined under the current thesis set forth 
positive rules with which participating states are required to comply. Implementation of a 
procurement agreement would often involve amendments to the existing national procurement 
regime and training of procurement officers to get acquainted with the international rules. This might 
prove a costly process if the agreement is binding in nature and sets out very detailed rules which are 
complex and difficult to apply in practice.  
The implementing costs could be even higher in countries where existing procurement rules are 
less developed and thus more difficult to be adapted in line with the requirement of the agreement. 
However, these countries, most of which were developing or least developed countries, often lacked 
sufficient technical knowledge and financial resources needed for implementing the agreement. 
According to Hunjia, ‘complexity of substantive issues involved’ and ‘paucity of technical 
knowledge and capacity’ constitute two of the three most difficult obstacles to public procurement 
reform in developing countries.11 
The use of non-binding form for a procurement agreement could arguably reduce its possibly high 
implementing costs for participating states. By entering into a non-binding procurement agreement, 
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 See R. Hunjia, ‘Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Developing countries’ In S. Arrowsmith & M. Trybus (eds), 
Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (2003)235 at pp.17-18 U. Although Hunjia identified these major 
impediments mainly in the context of developing countries’ unilateral reform, the author holds the view that these reasons 
may also apply, to a large extent, to the reforms initiated by their participating in an international procurement regime, or 
partly explain the difficulty in attracting their participation in any procurement agreement.  
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states would be provided with a learning process of adapting national procurement policies to the 
requirements of the agreement, without fear of facing adverse legal consequence of the breach of 
international law.  
A non-binding agreement could allow states with diversified conditions sufficient time to work 
out their own appropriate national legislation and to train procurement staff with the aim to fully 
comply with the agreement. Meanwhile, the experience of the applications of non-binding rules 
would enable participating states to review the rules and make them more responsive to the needs 
and realities in developing countries before they are made of binding nature. 
 
7.3.1.3 Reserved regulatory autonomy to implement legitimate national goals 
The third argument in favour of choosing non-binding soft law rather than hard law is that the 
former involves less sovereign costs. As explained in Section 2.3.2, every international agreement 
imposes sovereignty costs on its member states though such costs may vary according to different 
subject areas.  
In the area of procurement, as explained in Section 7.2, states are often jealous of their sovereign 
autonomy for various reasons. As for states’ protectionist policies, most of them are undesirable 
practices any free trade agreement in procurement is aimed to eliminate. In this regard, sovereignty 
costs are significant but are frequently outweighed by the benefits of market liberalisation.  
However, with regard to states’ legitimate concerns about national security, social equity and 
environmental protection, a proper balance should be stricken between trade and other national 
objectives when formulating a procurement agreement. In particular, certain kinds of procurement 
are, because of the very nature of the procured products, especially sensitive such as defence 
procurement. Defence procurement is highly sensitive in the sense that it may be closely connected 
with national security and sovereignty costs are extremely high in areas related to national security. 
Even on a given subject, sovereignty costs can vary across states. The sovereignty costs of a 
procurement agreement are typically higher for developing countries where the sector is 
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economically less competitive but politically more important.  
In Section 2.3.2, soft law has been argued to be better equipped to promote cooperation while 
preserving state sovereignty. This argument also applies to the area of procurement. By adopting soft 
law in terms of non-binding, precision, discretion or delegation, states can protect themselves from 
excessive sovereignty costs as a result of participating in a procurement regime. 
The adoption of non-binding soft law, which is relevant under this section, can largely preserve 
states’ ability to employ procurement as a policy tool to pursue social or environmental objectives. 
The APEC NBPs provides a good example. As discussed in Section 4.6.3, due to the non-binding 
nature of the APEC principles, the APEC members could always balance these principles with 
domestic objectives and find their appropriate ways to give effect to them, or even depart from them 
where they feel it is necessary. In contrast, under binding regimes such as the GPA and the EC, 
states’ ability to use procurement for secondary purposes is largely restricted.12 
Regarding certain types of procurements which are closely related to national security, their 
extremely high sovereignty costs may make them inappropriate for any international hard law 
regulation. Taking defence procurements as an example, the protection of national security interests 
is widely considered as one of legitimate reasons to exempt certain defence procurements from 
international regulation. Most procurement regimes explicitly exclude their application to defence 
procurements that are closely related to national security interests.  
Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the EC Member States Participating in the European 
Defence Agency is the only procurement regime regulating defence procurements linked with 
national security interests. As explained in Section 4.2.4.1, legally binding rules such as the EC 
Treaty or directives are both theoretically inappropriate and politically infeasible to regulate such 
procurements. Meanwhile, it is undesirable to leave them completely unaddressed, especially in the 
case of states’ extensive use of derogation from the hard law rules. Consequently, the non-binding 
Code was brought in to fill the gap, providing a certain degree of soft law regulation.  
                                                        
12
 See Section 3.1.2.3 and Section 4.1.3. 
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In this regard, non-binding soft law can be argued as a more appropriate means to regulate subject 
areas involving extremely high sovereignty costs. It is worth mentioning that such subject matters in 
procurement are not limited to defence procurement sector. The procurement of certain types of civil 
goods or services can also involve extremely high sovereignty costs owing to their important impact 
on national economy.  
For example, in the context of the EC, the ECJ’s judgement in Campus Oil case13 upheld an Irish 
measure requiring all importers of refined petroleum products to purchase a certain proportion of 
their requirements of petroleum products from a refinery situated in the national territory. This 
trade-restrictive measure was justified on the ground of public security: the measure was directed at 
ensuring a minimum supply of petroleum products at all times rather than purely economic reason, 
because of their exceptional importance as an energy source for a country’s existence since.14 
 
7.3.1.4 Better Adaptation to changes 
The fourth argument concerns the value of soft law in its adaptation to changes. It has been argued 
that soft law can offer a number of attractive alternatives for dealing with changing circumstances.  
Public procurement is a complicated and fast-evolving area for international regulation. In the 
context of many binding procurement regimes, difficulties have been found to adjust their complex 
procedural and coverage rules to technological and economic developments. The slow progress in 
reforming procurement rules to take account of the emergence of electronic procurement and new 
procurement strategies is illustrative on this point.  
Along with the fast development of e-commerce in the last decade, new information technology 
has increasingly been used to increase procurement efficiency. The use of internet helps streamlining 
the traditional tendering process: the procuring entity may advertise contracts and communicate with 
providers electronically, which makes the tendering process easier, faster and less expensive. Also, 
the application of electronic commerce in procurement develops more novel procurement methods 
                                                        
13
 Case 72/83, Campus Oil [1984] E.C.R. 2727, ECJ 
14
 See Judgement of the Court of 10 July 1983, Summary, para.7 Case 72/83, Campus Oil [1984] E.C.R. 2727, ECJ 
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such as electronic reverse auctions15. 
However, procurement instruments which were adopted many years before the emergence of 
e-commerce, may fail to accommodate modern electronic procurement. The old EC procurement 
directives provide good illustrations. From their adoption in 1990s till the recent passage of the new 
directives, it had been unclear whether or how far procuring entities or suppliers could require 
communicating electronically in many actions.  
The detailed nature of the EC’s procedural rules limited the ability of regulated entities to exploit 
e-commerce. It was argued by Arrowsmith that, although a sensible interpretation of the rules could 
largely help accommodating many e-procurement practices, the old directives did present some 
significant obstacles to e-commerce.16 This legal uncertainty remained until the adoption of new 
directives in 2004 which include explicit authorisation of electronic communications for many 
actions17as well as reduce minimum time-limits for key phases when electronic means are used18. 
Similar situation can also be found in the GPA and its newly-revised provisional text takes into 
account the important role of electronic means in procurement.19 
Apart from the need to adapt to technological development, market development may also have 
significant impact on procurement rules. In particular, the coverage rules of hard law procurement 
regimes have to update constantly in accordance with the development of market liberalisation.  
For instance, in the context of the EC, the utilities sectors of EC states have experienced a 
substantial progress of privatisation and liberalisation since 1990s. Many utilities sectors, which 
used to be vulnerable to government pressure to undertake discriminatory procurement practices, 
have started operating in a competitive market. However, the 1990 utilities directive only provided 
exemptions for limited sectors leaving entities in competitive markets still subject to regulation. The 
application of rules to entities which have already been operating under commercial pressure 
                                                        
15
 Electronic reverse auctions refer to tendering procedures in which all tenderer post their tenders electronically, and can 
view information on other tenders and then amend their tenders through electronic means to beat others. 
16
 For a systematic analysis, see Arrowsmth, ‘E-commerce Policy and the EC Procurement Rules: the Chasm between 
Rhetoric and Reality’, (2001) 38 C.M.L.R. 1447-1477 
17
 See the Public Sector Directives Art. 42(1) & Art.1(12); and the Utilities Directives Art.48(1) & Art.1(11).   
18
 See the Public Sector Directives Art. 38(5)(6); and the Utilities Directives Art.45(5)(6)    
19
 The text of provisional agreement can be found in document GPA/W/297, available at <www.wto.org> 
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burdened them with bureaucratic procedural rules in procurement, which hindered the commercial 
performance of such entities, and placed them at a disadvantage when competing with other entities 
which were not subject to similar rules.  
The problem persisted until the recent adoption of new utilities directives which reduce the 
coverage of the utilities rules by redefining the concept of ‘special and exclusive rights’ and adding a 
new exemption for entities in competitive market.20 However, Arrowsmith argued that an exemption 
from the EC directive alone is of limited value for entities also covered by the GPA as the latter 
imposes similar procedural rules.21 In order to free them completely from detailed procedural 
requirements, the EC has to remove such entities from its coverage list of the GPA. This normally 
requires a renegotiation of concessions among the GPA members, which will be a complex and 
lengthy process, as we saw from the discussion earlier in this section. 
International procurement law needs to adapt to the modern technological tools and changing 
industrial landscape. Hard law procurement regimes solve the inherent uncertainty in procurement 
mainly by either delegating the power to a third party for reasonable interpretation of the agreed 
rules, or constantly issuing legislative amendments. However, the former solution may involve 
significant sovereign costs, whilst the latter may experience considerable delays in legislative action. 
In contrast, soft law can offer a number of better alternatives to address the issue of uncertainty. The 
more ambiguous the legal rules are; the stronger capability they will have in the face of rapidly 
changing environment (to be discussed in Section 8.3.1.4).  
In addition, and relevant for the current discussion, soft law in terms of non-bindingness is often 
more easily adapted to changing circumstances. Non-binding rules can be amended more quickly 
and easily than binding ones to accommodate changing reality. More importantly, the non-binding 
nature of a procurement instrument could avoid a situation in which states are locked into rigid rules 
with the change of circumstances.  
                                                        
20
 For a critic evaluation of the EC’s new procurement directives, see S. Arrowsmith, ‘An Assessment of the New 
Legislative Package on Public Procurement’, (2004) C.M.L.R. 41:1277-1325  
21
 Ibid. 
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The APEC NBPs are suggestive on this point. It is explicitly stated that NBPs, economies are free 
to decide which principles to apply and whether to translate an element of a principle into a practical 
measure. Member economies, in practice, have absolute discretion to depart from the principles. 
Therefore, unlike binding instruments such as the GPA and the EC rules, the APEC NBPs are, in no 
way, affecting states’ ability to exploit information technology in procurement or to modify its 
application scope according to changing market environment. 
 
7.3.1.5 Some other technical reasons 
Lastly, it has been argued that non-binding soft law may sometimes be preferable to binding hard 
law only for technical reasons – in some cases, it is chosen only for avoiding time-consuming and 
complex treaty approval and ratification formalities, typically involving legislative authorisation. 
This general argument can also apply in negotiating a procurement agreement. 
  
7.3.2 Possible disadvantages of non-binding soft law  
Despite various possible advantages soft law can better offer over hard law, possible disadvantages 
of soft law have also been identified. Firstly, soft law may lack the function of hard law being served 
to strengthen the credibility of commitment; secondly, soft law may raise the transaction costs of 
subsequent interactions. Both of the above arguments can be applied in the area of public 
procurement.  
The first argument mainly concerns the dimensions of soft law being non-binding; of a low degree 
of precision; of a high level of discretion or of a low degree of delegation, and the second one is 
mainly concerned with soft law in the sense of low level of precision and delegation. This section 
will mainly focus on the dimension of bindingness. 
The choice of soft law in terms of its non-bindingness sacrifices the binding form of agreements, 
which may affect the credibility of the rules for both internal and external purposes. As explained in 
Section 2.4.1, compared with non-binding soft law, binding agreements make a difference in legal 
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consequence of non-compliance. The law of responsibility fixes consequences for the violations of 
binding obligations, whilst there are no similar legal consequences in the case of violating 
non-binding soft obligations. The legal consequences flowing from binding obligations induce 
conforming behaviours by making the choice of non-compliance more costly. 
This function of binding form can be used for internal purpose – to resist domestic negative 
political pressure and to bind government themselves or their successors in the future. This is 
particularly relevant in the area of procurement. It is envisaged that states’ compliance with a 
procurement agreement can be severely challenged by significant political influence from lobbyists 
representing interests of certain categories of national industries which are beneficiaries of previous 
discriminatory procurement policies, or even from public officials who have illegitimate interests in 
corrupt procurement practices. In the absence of formal legal consequences for non-compliance, the 
compliance of soft law procurement agreements may possibly be more vulnerable to the strong 
domestic political influence. 
Indeed, certain non-binding procurement rules can be found to have a very low rate of compliance 
or even being completely disregarded. The Coherent Policy Document towards the establishment of 
a European Defence Equipment Market (‘EDEM’) serves an example. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, 
in the absence of an effective monitoring system, the non-binding nature of the EDEM makes its 
compliance largely depending on the political willingness of participating states, and in practice it 
was largely ignored from the outset. 
However, it is worth mentioning in this regard that this possibly different implication of 
non-binding form for compliance is only relevant in the case of states’ deliberate choice of 
non-compliance. As explained in Section 2.4.2, in many cases, states may be willing to meet or 
comply with their international obligations, but are incapable of doing so. Violations may result from 
financial, administrative or technological incapacities rather than unwillingness to comply. 
This is particularly the case with regard to procurement agreements demanding positive 
implementing actions. The COMESA directives furnish a good example. As discussed in Section 
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4.5.4.4a, although many states have adopted relevant national legislations to implement COMESA 
directives, there is still a large gap between the directives objective and output to date, which is 
arguably mainly due to lack of capacity at member state level.22 In this case, it is irrelevant whether 
the procurement rules take a legally binding form or not, as states do not comply simply because 
they face no choices.  
Besides the function of binding form for internal purpose, it can also be used to enhance the 
credibility of commitments for external purpose. Because of the high cost of violation, the legally 
binding form of an agreement by itself may give states some assurance of each other’s compliance. 
Obviously, the non-binding soft law lacks such assurance.  
This kind of assurance tends to be quite important for procurement agreements with reciprocal 
market access commitments and non-simultaneous performances such as the GPA and the EC. In the 
area of procurement, despite evident benefits of market liberalisation, most countries are reluctant to 
do so unilaterally due to political difficulties. As a result, many procurement agreements, like the 
majority of trade agreements, are reached on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. Under such 
arrangements, strong opposition from domestic vested interests can be overwhelmed by supports 
from specific export-oriented domestic industries which will benefit from more liberalised foreign 
procurement markets. The action of entering into a binding agreement can assure states complying 
with their obligations that others will also comply. 
Furthermore, the credibility of commitments in the area of procurement is also very important in 
terms of promoting confidence of foreign suppliers. Foreign suppliers may be more willing to 
compete for procurement contracts in a system in which governments legally commit themselves to 
give equal treatment to foreign bidders. In this regard, the non-binding soft law may be less 
attractive than binding hard law in terms of providing foreign supplier with confidence in national 
procurement markets of participating members. 
However, it can be argued that the possible disadvantage of non-binding soft law’s lack of 
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 Karangizi, Government Procurement in COMESA (8-10 June 2004) (Paper Presented to the WTO Workshop in Accra, 
Ghana) at p.13 
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credibility might be well addressed by introducing effective monitoring mechanisms, which will be 
discussed in Section 10.3.2.1. In terms of resisting domestic negative political influence, the 
non-binding rules’ lack of legal consequence for non-compliance might be compensated for by some 
soft law enforcement means. Peer review, for example, as examined in Section 5.2.2.4, can give rise 
to a kind of soft persuasion force to stimulate the compliance with non-binding rules. Even in the 
absence of legal consequence for non-compliance, states may still choose to comply with their 
non-binding obligations for other reasons, such as maintaining good relationship with other 
countries and their trustworthy reputation. 
Furthermore, although the adoption of binding form can provide a certain degree of assurance of 
compliance among participating states and for foreign suppliers, it is definitely not the only way to 
do so. The assurance of each other’s compliance can similarly be achieved in other ways. For 
example, as discussed in Section 6.5.3.4, the OECD Recommendation on untying aid includes a 
self-reporting system requiring states to provide the relevant pre and post procurement information, 
which is indicative of each other’s performance of its obligations. It has been argued that the 
information collected from this self-reporting system reassure each member that other members are 
also untying aid in accordance with the Recommendation and its own domestic industries are not 
being taken advantage of.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
It has been argued in this section that non-binding soft law can be regarded as a second best or even 
as a better alternative to binding hard law. Non-binding soft law plays an important part when 
binding hard law is temporarily unachievable owing to the political opposition from domestic vest 
interests of negotiating states, especially that of developing countries.  
A number of reasons have been pointed out to explain the reluctance of many states to relinquish 
their sovereign power in the area of procurement. Public procurement has always been a 
controversial issue during international trade negotiations, and negotiating parties may get stuck in 
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deadlocks and fail to reach any agreement, as what happened in the negotiations on the FTAA and 
the proposed transparency agreement.  
In this regard, non-binding soft law has been argued as an effective device for breaking deadlocks 
and fostering compromises during negotiations. It is more likely that substantial disagreements 
among negotiating parties over specific aspects of a procurement agreement would be resolved if a 
non-binding form could be agreed for the agreement. More importantly, non-binding soft law can 
arguably reconcile different oppositions held by different negotiating parties and mitigate political 
oppositions from domestic vested interests.  
In addition to its value at negotiating stage, non-binding soft law is also desirable in terms of 
providing a certain degree of regulation, which may, but not necessarily contribute to the later 
formation of binding hard law. 
Moreover, non-binding soft law is sometimes considered more desirable than binding hard law 
even if the latter is attainable, because non-binding soft law may entail less negotiating costs, 
implementing costs as well as sovereignty costs, and it has its independent advantages of being 
better adapting to changing circumstances.  
It has been argued that the adoption of a procurement agreement may entail significant negotiating 
owing to the complexity of its procedural rules and coverage rules. The more detailed its procedural 
rules are, the more diversified membership it has, the higher negotiating and implementing costs it 
involves. The non-binding form of a procurement agreement can lower its negotiating costs by 
making it easier for detailed procedural rules to be adopted as well as avoiding the necessity of 
negotiating and draft detailed procedural and coverage rules.  
Further, the implementation of a procurement agreement can also be costly for states because it 
often involves amendments to the existing national procurement regime and training of procurement 
officers to get acquainted with the agreed rules. Non-binding soft law could arguably reduce 
implementing costs by providing states with diversified conditions a learning process to work out 
their own particular way to comply with the agreement. 
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Next, adoption of international agreements entails sovereignty costs for all participating states. In 
the area of procurement, international trade objective should be balanced with states’ legitimate 
concerns when formulating a procurement agreement. In this regard, the choice of non-binding soft 
can largely preserve the ability of states to exploit procurement for legitimate national objectives. As 
with certain types of procurements which entail extremely high sovereignty costs, non-binding soft 
law is arguably the only appropriate and possible means to subject them to international regulation.  
Lastly, public procurement is a fast-changing area for international regulation and international 
procurement regimes need to adapt to technological and economic developments in this area. The 
problems associated with adjusting procurement rules to the emergency of e-commerce and change 
of market reality under the EC and the GPA can demonstrate the general difficulty of a binding 
procurement agreement in its adaptation to changes. It has been argued that the complex procedural 
and coverage rules combined with the difficulties of updating internationally may present an 
important obstacle to binding procurement agreements. The choice of on-binding form can, however, 
make it much easier for a procurement agreement to adapt to changing circumstances: it can be 
amended more quickly and easily than binding agreements, and more significantly, the non-binding 
nature of the agreement itself provide states with flexibility in adapting to changes. 
 Meanwhile, the possible disadvantage of binding hard law has also been pointed out: it may 
arguably weaken the credibility of the rules in the absence of formal legal consequences for 
non-compliance. The adoption of binding form can serve to strengthen the credibility of states’ 
commitments for both internal and external purposes, which is fairly important with regard to a 
procurement agreement, owing to its perceived challenge of negative political influence and 
reciprocal nature of obligations. The choice of non-binding soft law sacrifices the binding form of 
agreements and thus may be deprived of an important means to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, it 
also mentioned that the credibility of non-binding rules could still be assured by introducing a 
well-designed monitoring system. 
 
Chapter 8 Analysis of advantages & disadvantages of soft law in 
regulating public procurement from a trade perspective – the Dimension 
of Precision 
 
8.1 Introduction  
The second dimension of soft law for the purpose of this thesis is precision, referring to the degree 
of precision of language defining states’ obligations in legislative text. In Section 2.3, it has been 
argued that vague soft law can serve as a second best to precise hard law when the latter is 
temporarily unachievable, but the subject matter still demands international regulation.  
Similar to the dimension of non-bindingness, soft law in terms of precision can be resorted to in 
order to avoid the failure of international negotiation and to provide a certain degree of regulation, 
based on which more precise regulation could possibly be developed in the future. This is considered 
at Section 8.2. However, vague soft law is not always less desirable than precise hard law, and 
because of its possible advantages identified in Section 8.3.1, the latter might often be deliberately 
chosen and perform the desired function more effectively, which is to be addressed at Section 8.3. 
 
8.2 Vague soft law being a second best to precise hard law 
Soft law with a lower level of precision may be adopted where precise hard law cannot be achieved. 
As explained in Section 2.2.2, hard law with a higher level of precision may be unattainable for 
various reasons when drafting international agreements. First of all, it is impossible for negotiating 
parties to write down an agreement anticipating all possible future contingencies given bounded 
rationality, and if the relevant contingencies are yet to be known, negotiating parties cannot achieve 
the precision of hard law even if they wish to do so. This is also the case in the area of procurement. 
For example, many procurement instruments do not address novel procurement methods such as 
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electronic reverse auctions because such concepts did not exist as a practical methodology when 
these instruments were formulated.  
More importantly, it is also possible that negotiating parties cannot agree on more precise rules 
even if the relevant contingencies are reasonably predictable. States may be reluctant to commit 
themselves to precise international obligations especially with regard to controversial issues, because 
the degree of precision in international rules may affect the degree of discretion states have in 
implementing their obligations though this is not necessarily the case. 
In the area of public procurement, because of its sensitive nature as explained in Section 7.2, 
many states are only willing to undertake very vague commitments when negotiating an 
international procurement agreement. The attitude of many states towards the proposed WTO 
transparency agreement can provide an example. As has been examined in Section 3.3.5.2, many 
states especially developing countries, insisted that a robust principle-based approach should be 
employed for the future transparency agreement, which does not seek to define in any detail the 
content of national procurement procedures.  
Even for generally more precise procurement instruments in which detailed procedural rules are 
agreed such as the GPA and the EC directives, the degree of precision may vary widely among their 
provisions and some obligations can be found being worded in a very vague and imprecise way. For 
example, the GPA’s general principles governing national challenge procedures has been argued to 
be too vague to ascertain any concrete obligations it entails (see Section 3.2.4.2). Similarly, in the 
case of the EC directives, it has been maintained that the public sector directive rules on accessibility 
are too vague to create any legally binding obligations (see Section 4.1.4.1). 
Thirdly, the choice of vague soft law may result from the nature of the relevant obligations. As 
argued in Section 2.4.3, it would be infeasible to impose precise hard law obligations on states with 
respect to issues such as financial or technical assistance owing to the very nature of such 
obligations. Consequently, the provisions of financial or technical assistance are normally couched 
in very vague language in most international agreements including public procurement agreements.  
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Under the circumstances where precise hard law cannot be agreed for the above specified reasons, 
vague soft law may arguably have an important part to play in fostering compromise at the 
negotiating stage as well as providing a certain degree of regulation at the implementing stage, 
which might have the potential to develop into more precise rules over time.  
Firstly, vague soft law can be chosen to facilitate negotiations among states, as found in many 
procurement agreements. The initiative towards negotiating the proposed transparency agreement 
can serve as an example. As for many countries especially developing ones, they had never 
participated in any international procurement regime, suspecting that the agreement would only 
serve the export interests of the developed countries. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that 
these countries preferred to leave the agreement imprecise to avoid the possibility of being caught in 
unfavourable commitments.  
However, as mentioned in Section 3.3.5.2, some other countries represented by the U.S. and the 
E.C. initially intended to include prescriptive procedural rules to ensure transparency in procurement. 
In view of the strong opposition against detailed rules, the EC later made a compromise by revising 
its original draft text for the proposed transparency agreement in favour of a more 
principles-oriented approach. Eventually, there was a broad consensus among negotiating parties that 
a principles-based approach should be employed for the proposed transparency agreement. 
However, general consensus reached on this particular aspect did not lead to the successful 
conclusion of the proposed transparency agreement, and instead the relevant negotiations were 
shelved at the WTO Doha Round. Although soft law has been argued as a method to overcome 
substantial disagreements and foster compromise among negotiating parties, it has different roles to 
play in terms of its four different dimensions.  
The agreement on the use of vague soft law may, to a certain extent, reduce oppositions from 
many WTO Members but arguably it may not be as effective as the use of non-binding form. Some 
concerns of many states could be addressed by the choice of vague soft law, whilst some others 
could not. For example, states’ resistance arising from the fear of possibly high implementing costs 
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associated with the transparency agreement could largely be reduced by opting for a principled 
approach. However, political oppositions from domestic vested interests against having any 
agreement in procurement could possibly not so easily be mitigated solely by virtue of the agreed 
approach on more ambiguous rules, especially considering the possible adoption of a binding form 
as well as the potential application of hard law enforcement system such as WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism.  
Consequently, it seems to suggest that the use of soft law in terms of vagueness can, to a certain 
extent, help facilitate negotiations, but by no means, guarantee the success of negotiations at least at 
a multilateral level. 
Apart from the situation where there lacks substantial agreement over major issues, the function 
of vague soft law can be particularly important when some uncertainties and controversies threaten 
to upset the overall deal. Vague soft law allows negotiating parties to achieve mutually preferred 
compromise on difficult issues and to avoid the controversies impeding the successful conclusion of 
the agreement. 
The GPA’s rules on national challenge procedures provide a good example of this point. As 
mentioned in Section3.2.4.4b, the issue of national challenge procedure in the GPA was one of the 
most controversial issues during negotiations. Some negotiating parties such as the U.S. proposed 
that detailed and stringent rules should be drafted to ensure compliance, whilst some others like 
Korea opposed the very idea of including a common set of national challenge procedures in view of 
the diversified national traditions of judicial review.1  
Rather than hold up the overall agreement, vague soft law provisions were deliberately formulated 
to deal with the controversial issue of national challenge procedures, which allowed negotiating 
parties to proceed with the rest of the agreement. It can be seen that the GPA provisions on national 
challenge procedures are not as detailed as its other transparency procedural rules, and some general 
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 See M. Footer, ‘Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement’ (1995) 4 P.P.L.R. 80 at p.89 
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principles have been laid down but without specifying the precise and concrete meaning of them (see 
Section 3.2.4.1). 
In this way, soft law facilitates compromise among different states by requiring the availability of 
a national challenge system to ensure the proper implementation of the procurement rules, but 
leaving unaddressed the precise way of putting in place such a system to respect the different 
litigation cultures of Member States.  
Apart from the function of soft law to facilitate compromise during negotiations, vague soft law 
may also have the potential to develop further details in the future. It provides a broad framework 
within which states can learn by experience and may pursue more imprecise hard rules through 
gradual negotiations. This can be demonstrated by looking at the prior example of rules governing 
national challenge procedures under the GPA.  
The provisionally agreed new GPA text develops more detailed rules governing national 
challenge procedures on the basis of the currently effective legislative text. For instance, the current 
GPA only generally requires the availability of national challenge procedures to enable suppliers ‘to 
challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement’.2 In this regard, the new GPA text further elaborates 
the way ‘to challenge breaches of the Agreement’: an aggrieved supplier may challenge either a 
breach of the agreement directly, or a failure to comply with national implementing measures where 
the supplier is not entitled to challenge directly a breach of the agreement under the relevant national 
law.3  
Although precise hard law is more likely to evolve from vague soft law than from no law at all, 
this does not imply that all vague soft law is only a means to more precise law. Certain vague soft 
law is never intended to or will never actually develop into more precise hard law. In particular, the 
main reason for some soft law rules being vague and imprecise is, as mentioned above, due to the 
very nature of those rules. As the nature of such rules remains unchanged, it is difficult to see how 
such vague rules could be redrafted in a more detailed and meaningful way through further 
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 See the GPA Art.XX.2 
3
 See the new GPA text Art.XVIII.1 
 237
negotiations. In the case of the GPA, for example, although its provisionally agreed new text 
contains more detailed and concrete S&DT provisions for developing countries, the new rules are 
made even more ambiguous when it comes to the issue of technical assistance.4  
Nevertheless, similar to non-binding soft law without any prospect of becoming binding over time, 
even vague soft law with no prospect of developing into more precise hard law could arguably be 
better than nothing because soft law commits states to certain forms of discourse and procedure no 
matter how imprecisely it does so.  
 
8.3 Vague soft law as a better alternative to precise hard law 
8.3.1 Possible advantages of vague soft law 
It has been argued in Section 2.3.2 that soft law in terms of precision may be more desirable than the 
relevant hard law even where the latter is attainable. Like soft law in terms of non-binding, soft law 
with a lower degree of precision can produce similar effects of hard law but with less costs. Firstly, 
vague soft law may entail less negotiating costs and implementing costs than precise hard law; 
secondly, vague soft law can accord states more discretion in implementation, and in this sense, it 
involves less sovereignty costs for participating states; thirdly, vague soft law may be more adaptive 
to changing circumstances. It seems that all the above advantages of vague soft law are very relevant 
with respect to international procurement law. 
 
8.3.1.1 Reduced negotiating costs 
The first argument in favour of vague soft law rather than precise hard law is that the former may 
involve less negotiating costs. As discussed in detail in Section 7.3.1.1, every international 
agreement entails some negotiating costs, and the negotiating costs of most binding procurement 
agreements tend to be extremely high due to the complexity of their procedural rules and coverage 
rules, as demonstrated by the negotiating history of the GPA.  
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 See the new GPA text, Article IV.8 
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Apart from their binding form, the detailed feature of their procedural rules may arguably 
constitute another major factor that contributes to the high negotiating costs, in consideration of the 
complex nature of procurement as well as the diversity of states’ regulatory approach in procurement. 
In this regard, the choice of vague soft law may help significantly reduce the negotiating costs of 
procurement instruments. 
The common approach of most procurement agreements is, as mentioned in Section 7.3.1.1, to set 
out minimum procedural requirements governing the award of contract. However, it is often difficult 
to draft and agree on detailed procedural rules for a binding procurement agreement, which can be 
illustrated by reference to the rules on minimum time-limits for tendering.  
Many regimes such as the GPA (see Section 3.2.4.2), the EC directives (see Section 4.1.4.2), and 
the NAFTA (see Section 4.3.4.2) lay down general principles as well as detailed rules on time-limits 
for submitting tenders in order to ensure that suppliers are granted sufficient time to prepare and 
submit their tenders. Besides general requirement such as ‘a sufficient period’ or ‘a reasonable 
period’ of time, detailed rules are included concerning all kinds of procurements with different levels 
of complexity, different types of procedures, and different publication or communication methods 
etc. By opting for a detailed approach, the complexity of the situations involved leads to inevitably 
complicated rules and sometimes even drafting errors. 
Article XI of the GPA furnishes a good example on this point. As examined in Section 3.2.4.2, the 
provision includes both general principles and detailed rules. Apart from general principles, it sets 
out standard minimum time periods for tendering in open tendering and selective procedures with or 
without the use of a permanent list of qualified suppliers. Also, it specifies in great detail various 
circumstances under which such standard time periods for tendering may be reduced to certain days 
including the use of specified publication methods and state of urgency etc. 
 Despite the highly elaborated feature of this provision, Arrowsmith argued that the rules still fail 
to consider all the different methods of publications, and to cater sufficiently for iterative procedures, 
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and are now outdated in light of new developments in information technology.5 Such drafting errors 
and outdated rules need to be redrafted, which may lead to more complicated rules if the detailed 
approach is retained, as happened in the provisionally agreed new text of the GPA Article XI. It 
again involves a costly and time-consuming process. 
The difficulty to draft, amend and update detailed rules on time-limits, which is only a small 
aspect of transparency in procurement, demonstrates the potential problems associated with the 
detailed approach for drafting transparency rules of a procurement agreement as a whole. However, 
even if a complete set of comprehensive and flawless transparency rules could be drafted, it would 
still take considerable time, efforts and resources for states to agree if at all possible.  
The negotiating costs tend to be relatively lower if transparency rules are adopted at the regional 
level with similar minded membership such as at the EC. In principle, so far as a binding 
procurement agreement is concerned, the more detailed its rules are, the more diversified 
circumstances its participating countries have, the higher negotiating costs it will involve.  
As a result, the negotiating costs associated with detailed transparency rules increase as 
negotiations move from regional to multilateral level. It seems extremely difficult to develop a single 
set of detailed procedural rules at the multilateral level within which states’ divergent regulatory 
approaches in procurement can be accommodated.  
In particular, as pointed out by Linarelli, there is a trend towards regulatory diversity in 
procurement: developing countries choose to use more formal methods, whilst developed countries 
increasingly opt for informal methods of procurement.6 In recently years, many developing and 
transitional countries have undertaken reform of their national procurement legislation based on a 
system of formal procurement procedures.7 In contrast, some developed countries, such as the US 
and the UK, have increasingly switched away from stringent transparency rules to greater reliance 
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 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law International Ltd, 2002) at pp.198-201 208- 211, 
419-422, 431 
6
 See J. Linarelli, ‘The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory’, In S. 
Arrowsmith & M. Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (2003)235 at pp.247-248 
7
 In particular, many transitional countries have newly adopted or reformed their procurement legislation based on the 
UNICTIRAL Model Law, see Section 5.1.1 
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on the exercise of professional judgment of procuring officials.8  
Giving the difficulties of devising and updating detailed procedural rules suitable for all states, 
vague soft law can be argued as a more desirable option: it avoids the difficulty in formulating 
detailed rules addressing complicated situations in procurement, lowers the incidence of drafting 
errors and consequent redraft, and reduces the need for updating.  
This can be demonstrated by looking at the previous example on time-limits again. If vague soft 
law rules on time-limits were adopted, generally requiring that a sufficient or reasonable period of 
time should be allowed for suppliers to submit their tenders without elaborating further details on the 
specific minimum time-limits, there would be no need to deal with complicated situations in 
procurement since such vague rules could apply to all types of procurement procedures and 
accommodate all circumstances.  
Furthermore, such vague rules have a greater ability in adapting to changes and thus significantly 
reduce the need for repeated negotiations and legislative amendments, which will be discussed in 
Section 8.3.1.4. In the above example, the vague requirement for ‘a sufficient or reasonable period 
of time’ would not need any updates in view of the development of information technology 
More importantly, it is much easier for negotiating parties to agree on vague soft law than precise 
hard law because the former can better accommodate states’ divergent regulatory approaches in 
procurement. Vague rules such as the requirement of a sufficient or reasonable period of time in the 
above example can accommodate the regulatory difference between countries opting for informal 
methods of procurement and ones replying on stringent transparency rules. Even for states with 
stringent national procurement law, they may hold different views regarding the precise minimum 
time-limits to be included in a procurement agreement and such vague rules can also be helpful in 
this regard to avoid arguments by leaving the formulation of detailed rules at the discretion of 
participating states.  
 
                                                        
8
 See S. Arrowsmith, ‘Reviewing the GPA: The Role and Development of the Plurilateral Agreement after Doha’, J.I.E.L. 
(2002) 761-790 at p.773 
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8.3.1.2 Reduced implementing costs 
The second argument is that vague soft law involves lower implementing costs than precise hard law. 
In the area of procurement, most binding agreements such as the GPA (see Section 3.2.4.2), the EC 
directives (see Section 4.1.4.2) and the NAFTA (see Section 4.3.4.2) lay down the basic principles as 
well as detailed minimum procedural requirements to support the basic principles. Detailed positive 
rules can be found addressing award procedures from invitation to participate to award of contracts.  
The implementation of a procurement agreement entails either the amendment to the existing 
national procurement regime or the establishment of new procurement regulations where none 
presently exists in accordance with the requirements under the agreement. Participating states have 
to comply with not only the underlying general principles (vague soft law) but also the detailed 
procedural rules (precise hard law) under the relevant agreements.  
As with vague soft law of general principles, they normally do not impose any positive obligation 
on states by the wording of legislative texts. For example, the principle of non-discrimination in 
most procurement regimes only imposes negative obligations on states to refrain from certain 
positive measures that restrict free access to procurement contracts. In principle, there are no 
implementing costs related to such vague general principles.  
However, exceptions can be found in the case of procurement regimes in which a third party is 
delegated with a high level of authority to interpret the rules. Under the EC regime, for instance, the 
ECJ in Telaustria innovatively developed a positive obligation of advertisement from the 
non-discrimination principles under the Treaty (see Section 4.1.4.2). It can be seen that general 
principles could possibly be interpreted in a way to impose precise obligations. 
Regarding precise hard law of detailed procedural rules, participating states have to revise the 
details of their existing national legislation consistent with detailed procedural rules of a 
procurement agreement, even when domestic rules and practices conform to the underlying 
principles of the agreement. It proves a costly process because of the detailed and complex feature of 
procedural rules of many procurement agreements, as illustrated by time-limits rules discussed 
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above. Also, resources have to be spent on training procurement officials to get acquainted with the 
newly adopted implementing rules.  
Furthermore, the implementation costs can be increased taking into account the requirement for 
the availability of national challenge procedures under many procurement regimes. Apart from the 
costs of setting up and maintaining a national challenge system, states’ implementing costs may be 
increased by virtue of detailed procedural rules of a procurement agreement. This is because, as 
argued by Arrowsmith, the detailed rules create greater potential for litigation including ones over 
technical breaches in situation where there is no real risk of discrimination.9 
Vague soft law without a high level of delegation can significantly reduce implementing costs to 
the parties. For example, procurement regimes such as the COMEA directives (see Section 4.5.4.2) 
and the APEC NBPs (see Section 4.6.4.2) simply lay down general principles without prescribing 
any detailed procedural rules. Also, there are no designated organs equivalent to the ECJ in the 
context of the EC to interpret these general principles. Consequently, vague soft law in COMESA 
and the APEC NBPs entail much less implementing costs than precise hard law in the 
above-mentioned hard law instruments such as the GPA, the EC directives and the NAFTA. 
Participating states in the COMESA directives or the APEC NBPs only have to make sure that 
their national procurement legislation complies with the general principles contained in the relevant 
instrument. There are no prescriptive requirements for them to adjust the details of their procurement 
rules. As a result, the costs of adapting legislation and training procuring officials can largely be 
reduced. This is particularly important for developing countries in view of their less-developed 
procurement legislation and limited resources available.  
 
8.3.1.3 Reserved regulatory autonomy to implement legitimate national goals 
Vague soft law may also be deliberately chosen as one of many possible ways to reduce sovereignty 
costs of hard law procurement rules.  
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As discussed in Section 7.3.1.3, Entering into a hard law procurement agreement often involves 
high sovereign costs for states, whilst states are especially jealous of their sovereignty autonomy in 
the area of procurement. Except states’ protectionist procurement practices, the free trade objective 
of procurement agreements should be balanced with states’ legitimate concerns about value for 
money, national security, social equity and environmental protection etc.  
The high sovereignty costs of hard law procurement agreements can arguably be reduced by 
resorting to vague soft law. It allows states to implement their commitments to their particular 
situations rather than trying to accommodate divergent national circumstances within a detailed 
single text. 
The general emphasis of the detailed transparency procedures contained in procurement 
agreements is aimed at making concealed discrimination more difficult so as to ensure effective 
market access for foreign suppliers. Although such transparency procedures can also contribute to 
many of the above-mentioned domestic concerns and have been widely utilised by domestic 
procurement legislation, they do, to different extents, restrict states’ ability to achieve domestic 
objectives because they are solely motivated by free trade objectives.10  
First of all, the details of transparency rules of many procurement regimes may affect states’ aim 
to achieve value for money and efficiency. Such detailed rules may often restrict states’ discretion in 
implementations and thus affect states’ ability to pursue value for money, as to be discussed in 
Section 9.3.1.2. 
Secondly, the detailed transparency rules may also restrict states’ ability to employ procurement 
to implement secondary objectives. The EC’s detailed rules on qualification criteria serve as a good 
example on this point. As examined in Section 4.1.4.2, the EC public sector directive require that 
suppliers can be excluded from participation only on certain explicitly stated grounds, followed by a 
highly elaborated list specifying grounds for exclusion and relevant evidences which procuring 
entities may demand as means of proof. Consequently, procuring entities are precluded from 
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disqualifying a firm on the grounds that are not included in the list such as disqualifying a firm 
which does not meet certain social or environmental criteria, even if there is no discrimination 
involved against foreign suppliers.  
In contrast, vague soft law can help reduce unnecessary restrictions on states’ freedom to 
implement legitimate secondary policies. Taking the COMESA directives as an example again, as 
discussed in Section 4.5.4.2, it is generally required that qualification criteria may only be used if 
they are of the type permitted by law. This general requirement leaves states with absolute freedom 
to formulate their domestic rules on qualification criteria, which can allow procuring entities to 
disqualify suppliers for secondary reasons, so long as it is consistent with the underlying principle of 
non-discrimination. 
In addition to the function of vague soft law giving states more discretion in achieving value for 
money and legitimate secondary objectives, vagueness can sometime be used to limit the binding 
character of certain obligations to protect the parties in case the obligation turns out to have hidden 
sovereignty costs. In the area of procurement, this use of vague soft law can be well demonstrated by 
the GPA’s four general principles governing national challenge procedures. As argued in Section 
3.2.5.1, the general principles governing national challenge procedures create little or no obligations 
due to their lack of precision. In this case, the vagueness of these principles negates the general 
presumption of all the GPA rules being binding and avoids the fear shared by many states of being 
locked into hard law commitments they regret.  
However, it is not necessarily true that the use of vague soft law can always lower sovereignty 
costs. In the case of procurement regimes involving a high level of delegation in enforcement such 
as the EC, as elaborated in Section 4.1.4.2, even vague general principles can imply very precise 
obligations through judicial interpretation.  
From this perspective, even vague soft law sometimes entails significant sovereignty costs. 
Meanwhile, as argued in section 4.1.4.3, precision may not necessarily of itself imply higher 
sovereign costs but just greater clarity of treatment, and it can even be used to lessen sovereignty 
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costs by precisely elaborating escape clauses or explicitly giving discretion.  
 
8.3.1.4 Better adaptation to changes 
The fourth argument in favour of vague soft law is about its better adaptation to changes. In Section 
2.3.2, it has been argued that vague soft law is more capable of adapting to changes. It provides a 
broad framework within which states can automatically adapt their obligations as circumstances 
change. This general argument also applies in the area of public procurement.  
As discussed in Section 7.3.1.4, public procurement is a fast-evolving area for international 
regulation, and international procurement agreements need to adapt to new technological and 
economic developments. It can be quite difficult to update a binding procurement agreement in light 
of new developments in this area, which could be even more difficult where there are complex 
procedural rules and coverage rules in the agreement.  
So far as the transparency procedural rules are concerned, it has been articulated in Section 7.3.1.5 
that many binding procurement regimes have experienced difficulty in adjusting their complex 
procedural rules to technological developments such as the emergence of e-commerce, and the use 
of non-binding form could arguably make it much easier for a procurement agreement to adapt to 
changing circumstances. However, even if a binding form is chosen for the agreement, the choice of 
vague soft law for its procedural rules can still be argued as an alternative way to make the rules 
more adaptable to changes. In principle, the lower the degree of precision, the greater ability such 
rules have to adapt to change.  
This viewpoint can be demonstrated by looking at the previous example of the rules on 
time-limits. As discussed above, many binding procurement regimes contain detailed rules 
regulating time-limits for submitting tenders. The GPA, for example, lays down both the general 
principle and specific minimum time-limits for tendering. However, these specified periods are 
outdated in view of new developments in information technology, and the new version of GPA text 
to be adopted includes more detailed rules taking into account the speed of electronic 
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communications.11 Similarly, the newly adopted EC directives also add more detailed rules to the 
previous directives specifying the shortened time-limits for tendering when electronic means are 
used.12 
Compared with the GPA and the EC’ approach to issue more detailed amendments, it can be 
argued that the use of vague soft law can well resolve the problem but without the consequence of 
more complex procedural rules. Also, it reduces the need for future updating through lengthy and 
costly legislative amendments. If a vague soft law rule were chosen, generally requiring that states 
must be allowed a sufficient or reasonable period of time for tendering, it could easily be adapted to 
the recent development of electronic communications without any amendments, as the vague term 
‘sufficient’ or ‘reasonable’ can imply different minimum time-limits where there different types of 
publication or communication methods are used. 
However, it is not true that the use of vague soft law in procedural rules can completely avoid the 
need for updating a procurement agreement. The coverage of hard law procurement regimes has to 
update constantly in accordance with the development of market privatisation and liberation no 
matter how vague their transparency rules are. For instance, as explained in Section 7.3.1.4, the EC 
new utilities directive had to reduce the previous coverage rule to provide an exemption for the 
newly privatised entities which have started operating in a comparative market. In the case of the 
GPA, Members are committed to conduct further negotiations periodically to extend their coverage 
to the agreement by virtue of its Art. XXIV.13  
 
8.3.2 Possible disadvantages of vague soft law  
Although the choice of vague soft law over precise hard law can largely reduce negotiating, 
implementing and sovereignty costs and have a greater ability in adapting to changes, disadvantages 
of vague soft law have also been identified in Section 2.4. Firstly, vague soft law may weaken the 
                                                        
11
 See Article XI of the new GPA text 
12
. See the EC Public Sector Directive Article 38(5)(6) and the EC Utilities Directives 45(5)(6) 
13
 See Art.XXIV:7(b) 
 247
credibility of legal commitments; and secondly vague soft law may raise the transaction costs of 
subsequent interactions. Both of the above arguments are highly relevant to a procurement 
agreement. 
 
8.3.2.1 Weakened credibility of obligations 
The use of vague soft law in the procurement rules may arguably weaken the credibility of the rules 
by making it harder to determine whether a state is living up to its commitments and increasing the 
possibility of divergent interpretation of the rules among participating states. In Section 2.4.2, 
ambiguity of the rule has been identified as one of important factors for states’ non-compliance with 
international rules. 
Firstly, precise hard law rules that do not require the significant exercise of discretion make it 
relatively easy to determine if states’ procurement practices comply with the agreed rules. As with 
the previous example of the rules on time-limits, it is pretty mechanical and straightforward to judge 
whether a particular proceeding observes the rules if the rules specify the precision of a certain 
minimum time-limits for tendering under various precisely defined circumstances. 
However, if the rules are couched in vague terms such as a ‘sufficient’ or ‘reasonable’ period of 
time, various information has to be considered such as the complexity of the procurement concerned 
and particular publication or communication methods used in order to determine whether the actual 
time-limit given to supplier for tendering is consistent with the general requirement of ‘sufficient’ or 
‘reasonable’.  
The difficulty associated with vague soft law in determining compliance can be very problematic 
in light of potentially strong negative political influence from domestic vested interests as well as the 
reciprocal nature of many procurement regimes. As mentioned in Section 7.3.2, states’ compliance 
with international procurement rules can be severely challenged by significant political influence 
from their domestic vested interests. From this perspective, the vague soft rules in procurement may 
create opportunities for states to shirk their obligations out of domestic political pressure.  
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For example, as examined in Section 4.2.1, Article 296 of the EC treaty vaguely provides a 
general exemption from its procurements rules for certain defence procurements which states 
consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of their security. However, due to the 
vague and discretional wording of this Treaty provision, the derogation has been extensively used by 
the EC states in practice, and in practice the majority of the defence contracts are awarded on the 
basis of discriminatory national procurement policies.  
As with the importance of assuring state compliance for external purpose, it can be argued that 
vague soft law is less desirable than precise hard law in the sense that the former gives states less 
assurance of each other’s compliance, as the former makes it more difficult for participating states to 
determine whether each other is living up to its commitments. The assurance of each other’s 
compliance has been argued in Section 7.3.2 to be very important for most binding procurement 
agreements with reciprocal market access commitments and non-simultaneous performance. Also, a 
clear knowledge of a country’s compliance with its international procurement obligations can help to 
build up the confidence of foreign suppliers to compete for procurement contracts in that country. 
Secondly, vague soft law may increase the chance of divergent interpretation of the rules among 
participating states. International rules, even for those that are quite precise, must be interpreted to 
apply to specific factual situations. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.2, unlike the position under 
domestic legal systems with well-established courts to interpret and apply rules, international rules 
are, in practice, most often interpreted and applied by implementing states.  
States have the right to interpret international law, i.e. the right of auto-interpretation in the 
absence of a delegated interpreting organ. However states’ right of auto-interpretation on 
international rules may lead to divergent interpretation and consequently inconsistent 
implementation of the rules. The precision of international rules may constrain the scope of 
self-serving auto-interpretation, as it can limit states’ discretion in interpreting and applying the 
rules.  
On the contrary, the vague soft law provides states with a wider scope for auto-interpretation and 
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inconsistent implementation, which threaten the credibility of the rules both for internal purposes to 
resist domestic negative pressure, and for external purposes to provide the assurance of each other’ 
compliance. In particular, the inconsistent implementation of the procurement rules may have the 
effect of discouraging foreign suppliers from participating in foreign procurement markets, because 
states can be dissuaded from competing for contracts under rules they are not familiar with.   
Nevertheless, the vague soft law rules’ possibly weakened credibility can arguably be 
compensated by issuing more detailed guidance regarding their implementation as well as 
incorporating an effective monitoring system. Furthermore, a high degree of delegation in 
interpreting the vague rules may largely help to constrain auto-interpretation and the tendencies to 
shirk obligations, but it involves significant sovereignty costs (see Section 10.3.1.3). 
 
8.3.2.2 Increased transactional costs 
The choice of vague soft law may also increase the transaction costs of subsequent interactions, that 
is, mainly the process of applying and elaborating agreed rules and the process of resolving disputes.  
As with the process of applying and elaborating agreed rules, international rules even those that 
are quite precise, have to be interpreted to apply to concrete factual situations and elaborated to 
resolve ambiguities. Vague soft law, however, implies more transaction costs in applying agreed 
rules. This is because, as above mentioned, it provides states with a wider scope for 
auto-interpretation, which may possibly lead to divergent interpretation and consequential 
inconsistent implementation among participating states. 
States normally designate a third party to take on the role of ensuring consistent interpretation of 
agreed rules. Generally speaking, the more ambiguous the agreed rules are, the harder the consistent 
interpretation and implementation of rules can be achieved. This general argument can also apply to 
the area of international procurement law. 
As regards the process of resolving disputes, there are various means of international dispute 
settlement (see Section 2.2.4). Under soft law dispute statement mainly based on political bargaining 
 250
such as negotiation and meditation, there is virtually no substantial difference in costs between 
precise hard law and vague soft law. However, under hard law dispute settlement mainly based on 
agreed rules like judicial settlement, vague soft law is arguably more expensive to enforce in 
comparison with precise hard law.  
As for disputes over precise hard law rules, determining whether a violation has occurred is 
relatively mechanical and does not require significant information. However, in the case of disputes 
over vague soft law rules, it is often lengthy and costly for courts or other legal institutions to have 
relevant information in hand; to conduct judicial reasoning and eventually to make a judgement over 
the compliance with the rules. This disadvantage of vague soft law deserves serious consideration, 
because as explained in Section 3.2.4.4, the speedy legal proceedings in procurement is very 
important in terms of preserving commercial opportunities for aggrieved supplies. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out by Arrowsmith, the advantages of detailed hard law can be obtained 
in other ways, notably by issuing more detailed guidance on how the rules should apply.14 Such 
more detailed but possibly non-binding guidance would be useful in providing information for 
parties implementing the rules as well as for judicial organs interpreting the rules, and the higher 
transaction costs of vague soft law would therefore be largely reduced. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
It has been argued in the current section that vague soft law can be regarded as a second best or even 
as a better alternative to precise hard law. Vague soft law has an important part to play where precise 
hard law is temporarily unattainable due to the bounded rationality of drafters, the controversy of the 
issues or the nature of the relevant obligations etc.  
At the negotiating stage, vague soft law may facilitate compromise and avoid the failure of the 
agreement as a whole. At the implementing stage, vague soft law can provide a certain degree of 
regulation as well as a broad framework within which more precise hard law might possibly be 
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developed through gradual negotiations over time. However, not all vague soft law will necessarily 
develop further details at a later stage, and even vague soft law with no prospect of hardening up can 
arguably be better than no law at all. 
Moreover, vague soft law is sometimes considered more desirable than precise hard law even if 
the latter is attainable. Vague soft law may arguably entail less negotiating costs, implementing costs 
as well as sovereignty costs, and also is of the better capability in adapting to changing 
circumstances. Meanwhile, there are certain possible disadvantages of adopting vague soft law: it 
may weaken the credibility of legal commitments and raise the transaction costs of subsequent 
interactions. Consequently, the possible advantages of vague soft law have to be balanced with its 
possible disadvantages in consideration of specific characteristics of a certain area of law. 
In the particular area of international procurement law, the incorporation of detailed procedural 
rules has been argued to involve higher negotiating costs, implementing costs and sovereignty costs 
than those of agreements regulating other areas of law, owing to the specific features of public 
procurement.  
Firstly, the generally complicated feature of procurement makes it very difficult to draft a set of 
comprehensive and detailed procedural rules to address all possible contingencies. Also, the recent 
trend towards regulatory diversity in procurement makes it more difficult for negotiating parties to 
agree on the detailed rules. Secondly, most procedural rules of a procurement agreement demand 
positive actions and states have to amend the details of the existing nation procurement legislation, 
and to train public officials to get acquainted with the new rules. This has proven a costly process for 
many countries especially for developing and least-developed countries with limited resources 
available.  
Thirdly, some detailed procedural rules of a procurement agreement constrain states’ discretion in 
implementation; and thus entail high sovereignty costs by restricting states’ ability in pursuing value 
for money and legitimate secondary objectives. In addition, public procurement is considered a 
fast-evolving area for international regulation, which makes precise hard law less desirable because 
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of its poor ability in adapting to changes. 
From this perspective, the choice of vague soft law in a procurement agreement can be valuable in 
terms of its reduced negotiating, implementing and sovereignty costs, especially in cases where the 
agreement is couched in a binding form.  
It has been argued that the use of vague soft law in a binding procurement agreement can 
significantly reduce its negotiating costs by avoiding difficulty in drafting complicated rules, 
lowering the incidence of drafting errors and reducing the need for updating; as well as by making it 
easier for states with divergent regulatory approaches to agree. Meanwhile, the lower level of 
precision can also lower the implementing costs by including less prescriptive requirements for 
states to adjust the details of their national procurement rules.  
The high sovereignty costs of a binding procurement agreement can also be reduced by resorting 
to vague soft law, because it preserves states ability in pursuing vague for money and legitimate 
secondary objectives. With the increase of negotiating, implementing and sovereignty costs, vague 
soft law may be more attractive in proportion to the level of divergence among the regulatory 
preferences of states, which increases almost automatically as negotiations move form regional to 
multilateral. 
The above benefits of vague soft law, however, do not come without costs. The choice of vague 
soft law over precise hard law in a procurement agreement may arguably weaken the credibility of 
the agreed rules by making it harder to determine states’ compliance.  
Vague soft law may create opportunities for states to shirk their obligations particularly in face of 
potentially strong political pressure from domestic vested interests. As with the credibility of the 
rules for external purposes, vague soft law may also be less desirable in terms of giving states the 
assurance of each other’s compliance and promoting the confidence of foreign suppliers, which is 
quite important for most binding procurement regimes with reciprocal obligations.  
Meanwhile, vague soft law may increase the possibility of divergent interpretation and 
inconsistent implementation of the rules among participating states. Furthermore, vague soft law can 
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also increase the transaction costs of subsequent interactions of applying and elaborating agreed 
rules and of resolving disputes over agreed rules. Nevertheless, these possible disadvantages of 
vague soft law might arguably be avoided by issuing more detailed guidance or delegating the power 
of interpretation to a third party.
Chapter 9 Analysis of advantages & disadvantages of soft law in 
regulating public procurement from a trade perspective – the Dimension 
of Discretion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
The third dimension of soft law to be discussed in this section is discretion, which refers to the 
degree of discretion states have in negotiating and implementing their obligations. Like the 
dimensions of bindingness and precision, soft law in terms of a lower degree of discretion has been 
argued in Section 2.3 to serve as a second best to hard law with a higher level of discretion when the 
latter is temporarily unachievable.  
Soft law in terms of discretion can foster compromises during negotiations. At the implementation 
stage, it can provide a certain degree of regulation, and may have the potential to harden up at a later 
stage when circumstances permit. This is to be considered at Section 9.2. Furthermore, soft law with 
a higher level of discretion is sometimes preferable on its own terms – it may perform desired 
functions more effectively or with lower costs, which is to be discussed at Section 9.3. 
 
9.2 Soft law in terms of its higher level of discretion as a second best to hard law with a lower 
level of discretion 
Soft law which accords states a higher level of discretion in negotiating and implementing their 
obligations may be adopted as a second best where the relevant hard law is unattainable. As argued 
in Section 2.3, soft law in terms of discretion is helpful for reaching a compromise during 
negotiations. 
As explained in Section 7.2, public procurement is a sensitive area and states are often unwilling 
to give up their regulatory freedom to use procurement for protectionism purposes. Procurement has 
been widely used to generally protect national industry and employment or more specifically to 
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support the development of particular regions or industries. For instance, governments may accept 
foreign bids only if the lowest domestic bid is more than certain percentage higher than the foreign 
one or set asides of certain public contracts for industries located in less developed regions.  
Unlike barriers to trade in general goods, discriminatory procurement practices do not take the 
form of visible barrier imposed at the border such as tariff, but originate from government decisions, 
or sometimes are required by national legislation. Their effects are not easily measured, and also it is 
politically sensitive for international rules to address them.  
When it comes to negotiations on trade liberalisation, political considerations often prevail over 
economic ones. Otherwise countries would engage in unilaterally liberalising their own procurement 
markets if economic considerations dominated, as governments can gain economically from more 
liberalised domestic procurement markets by obtaining better value for money in public contracts 
and maintaining the competitiveness of national industries. 
However, most governments can hardly achieve such gains owing to strong political opposition 
from certain categories of national industries benefiting from protectionist procurement policies. 
Discriminatory procurement measures may sometimes be considered as a last-resort form of 
protection with other protectionist trade measures such as tariffs, quotas and subsidies being 
prohibited or restricted by the GATT and other WTO agreements.  
In addition, political opposition against the liberalisation may also come from public officials who 
desire to use procurement for illegitimate purposes such as political patronage or corruption. The 
currently high level of protection in procurement is indicative of strong vested interested. In this 
regard, soft law may operate to promote the agreement among negotiating parties mainly by 
mitigating the political opposition from their domestic vested interest groups. 
When negotiating a procurement agreement, it is not surprising to find that negotiating parties are 
only prepared to give up their protective measures over certain types of procurement, which could be 
quite different in terms of covered entities and contracts according to their own particular 
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considerations. The negotiating technique used for procurement is often different from the tariff 
negotiation.  
Instead of negotiations on progressive tariff reduction in a wide range of goods for all states and 
the general application of MFN principle, the negotiation process of most procurement agreements is 
conducted bilaterally based on the principle of reciprocity, and states are normally given a significant 
discretion in negotiating their coverage to the agreements. For example, under the GPA (see Section 
3.2.2), each state can freely decide which entities should be covered, the types of contacts covered 
and its country-specific thresholds, provided its offer is acceptable to other negotiating parties. Also, 
the GPA members are free to depart from the MFN principle by including specific derogations to 
exempt them from certain obligations to other members which do not offer reciprocal coverage.  
This flexible approach in negotiating coverage is not unique in international trade agreements, and 
a similar approach can be found in the negotiation of service commitments in the GATS. The GATS 
negotiations aimed at liberalisation involve a bilateral exchange of request and offers, followed by 
the bilateral negotiation on an item-by-item basis across all services sectors.1 The WTO members 
can freely decide whether to include a specific service sector in its schedule of national treatment 
and market access commitments, and exemptions can be made to avoid the automatic application of 
the MFN principle on grounds of insufficient reciprocity.  
Similar to trade barriers in procurement, barriers in services take the form of discriminatory or 
burdensome regulatory requirements rather than tariffs, focusing on the local consumption of 
services or the local provision of services. 2  The similarly flexible approach in negotiating 
procurement commitments and service commitments may arguably be justified by reference to the 
general difficulty in tackling trade barriers embedded in domestic regulations. 
Soft law with a high level of discretion over coverage can reduce the political opposition from 
particular interest groups of negotiating parties against a procurement agreement. The freedom states 
                                                        
1
 G. Feketekuty, ‘Assessing and Improving the Architecture of GATS’, In Sauve, P. and R. Stem (eds), Services 2000: New 
Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, (Brookings Institution and Harvard University, 2000), at p.89 
2
 Ibid. at p.91 
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have in negotiating their country-specific coverage lists enables them to exclude particularly 
sensitive areas or entities from international regulation.  
Also, it leaves open the possibility of states to negotiate derogations from international 
procurement rules to cover specific industrial policies, as discussed in Section 3.2.3. Although it is 
envisaged that such derogations are temporary and subject to future negotiations, they may help 
negotiating parties to make market access commitments by avoiding the direct objection from 
particularly strong political forces and interest groups domestically. 
As with most binding procurement agreements, it can be argued that significant state discretion in 
negotiating their coverage seems inevitable in order to reach a reasonably broad coverage for every 
participating state. An only exception is the EC procurement regime (see Section 4.1.4.3), under 
which states have little discretion in negotiating their coverage schedules, since a uniform coverage 
is set out for all members without any possibility of derogation for particular entities or sectors. The 
achievement of both comprehensive and uniform coverage in the context of EC is largely due to its 
highly integrated internal market.  
Different from international organisations like the WTO or the NAFTA, the EC is the main 
economic organisation of the European Union (‘EU’), which is a unique inter-governmental or 
supra-national organisation which involves formal sovereignty-sharing across a wide range of policy 
areas from health and economic policy to foreign affairs and defence.  
It had been a long process of gradual regional cooperation and integration before the EC states 
managed to withstand resistance from domestic vested interests and voluntarily concede shares of 
their sovereignty including regulatory freedom to the whole community for the establishment and 
administration of a common single market against. This evolving process is also reflected in the area 
of procurement. Initially, the EC provided its member states with a transitional period within which 
they could gradually eliminate discriminatory measures (see Section 4.1.4.3).  
However, the previous soft approach has been developed into a hard one, and the current approach 
rules out any possibility for states seeking accession to the EC to negotiate for transitional measures. 
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Late comers are now obliged to abolish their discriminatory policies and to meet the detailed 
procedural requirements for all the covered procurement contracts without any derogation 
immediately after joining the regime. 
However, the EC’s uniform approach is unlikely to be applied in other binding regional or 
multilateral procurement regimes if a comparatively wide coverage is to be attained. For example, 
the GPA, as argued in Section 3.2.4.3, would probably have been an agreement very narrow in scope 
had it follow the EC’s approach to adopt a uniform coverage applicable to all states. In consideration 
of its binding nature and comparatively wide coverage, it seems impossible to include a uniform 
coverage rule in the short run. 
Apart from the difficulty in achieving a unified coverage to a procurement agreement among 
participating states, it may arguably be more difficult to attract more participation especially on the 
part of developing countries. Most developing countries are resolutely against the idea of giving up 
their freedom to use procurement as a policy tool for protectionist purposes.  
Many developing countries have claimed that they need to use procurement to protect their ‘infant 
industry’.3 However, even if preferential procurement policies in favour of ‘infant industries’ are 
theoretically justifiable, these policies are not generally successful in practice because governments 
are not in a position to judge commercially which industries to protect, and instead their decisions 
are frequently influenced by political lobbying rather than sound economic considerations.4 Local 
content requirements and the protection of domestic industries against foreign competition may have 
done more harm than good to the growth prospects of some developing countries.  
Despite various alleged reasons for their use of preferential procurement policies, the reluctance 
of developing countries to undertake free trade procurement commitments may arguably reveal the 
political difficulties they face domestically - significant internal pressures can be exerted by 
lobbyists representing interests of certain categories of national industries which are beneficiaries of 
                                                        
3
 According to infant industry argument, infant industry protection is necessary for developing countries at early stages of 
industrialisation in face of massive export expansion from developed countries. 
4
 See Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Jr, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspective (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International Ltd, 2000), at p. 252 
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such preferential procurement policies or even by some of government officials who have 
illegitimate interests in corrupt procurement practices. 
With regard to their participation in a procurement agreement, developing countries tend to incur 
more political costs in comparison with their developed counterparts. As argued by Hunja, the 
reform of public procurement law in developing countries is extremely difficult: those in private 
sector and their collaborations in the public institutions may have a very strong vested interest in 
maintaining a legal framework that prohibits competitions from foreign supplier, and in many 
developing countries, access to public contracts also serves as a means to reward political supports 
to finance political parties.5  
Furthermore, Trionfetti pointed out that certain structural differences in the nature of markets 
between developed countries and developing ones may explain why preferential procurement 
practices are politically more difficult to be eliminated in the latter.6 
Indeed, developing countries’ less competitive industries which are beneficiaries under 
discriminatory procurement policies will be more active in lobbying their governments not to join in 
any procurement agreement, as they are more vulnerable to foreign competition. Meanwhile, corrupt 
procurement practices are most rampant in many developing countries with loose or opaque 
procurement laws and their corrupt public officials may become another political force against any 
international discipline in procurement.  
Lack of economic resources and legal expertises can also make it difficult for developing 
countries to participate in a procurement regime. Many international procurement agreements, as 
examine in Section 7.3.1.2, set out detailed and complicated procedural rules, which require states to 
conduct a relevant legislative reform to give effect to them as well as to maintain an efficient 
                                                        
5
 See R. Hunja, ‘Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Developing Countries’, In Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds) 
Public Procurement: the Continuing Evolution, (2003) at pp.17 
6
 Three possible reasons concerning the nature market has been suggested: first, the size of procurement market in 
developing countries is likely to create larger scope for political interplay between the government and domestic suppliers 
than in developed countries; second, discriminatory procurement may be utilised as a tool to protect domestic suppliers 
from a structural cost disadvantage; and third, procurement may be used as a tool to counter unfavourable agglomeration 
forces. See Trionfetti, ‘Discriminatory Procurement and International Trade’, (2003) 23 T. W. E. 57  
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administrative apparatus to implement them. The incapability of implementing procurement rules 
can arguably serve as a big deterrent to the participation of many developing countries.  
Given the current political and economic realities of developing countries, it would be extremely 
hard to include them in a multilateral procurement agreement if rules imposed on them are of a 
similar level of hardness to those on developed countries. Consequently, soft law with a higher level 
of discretion may be formulated specifically for developing countries from the perspective of 
attracting their participation. For example, ‘gradual accession’ was proposed by Trionfetti, which 
allow developing countries to remove the discriminatory procurement policy over a determined 
period of time while benefiting from full access to other countries’ procurement market 
immediately.7 
Soft law with a higher level of discretion for developing countries may arguably address many of 
their concerns, and sometimes make it easier for them to accept procurement rules during 
negotiations. It allows developing countries to devise a plan for gradually opening up their 
procurement market according to their particular domestic circumstances and to prepare domestic 
industries ready for foreign competition once the specified period elapses.  
Strong political opposition from their domestic vested interests can be largely mitigated since 
there is no immediate danger of foreign competition, which might subsequently be overwhelmed by 
the support from domestic exporters winning more foreign government contracts under the improved 
market access to other member states of the agreement. The soft approach that gives developing 
countries more discretion in negotiation and implementation might arguably be more suitable for 
securing greater willingness on their part to accept the procurement rules, than one which imposes 
rigid and binding obligations. 
In view of their lack of capability in implementing procurement rules, soft law enables developing 
countries to build up technical capacity through practice and eventually undertake hard law 
commitments similar to their developed counterparts. In this regard, soft law in terms of discretion 
                                                        
7
 Ibid. at pp.72-73 
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allows different categories of states to participate in a cooperative arrangement based on their ability 
to do so. 
In practice, this function of soft law has been frequently resorted to, and increasingly valued in 
international procurement regulation. It can be seen that many binding procurement agreements8 
such as the NAFTA and the GPA include the S&DT provisions for developing or/and least developed 
countries. Such S&DT provisions might possibly serve as an effective mechanism of ‘gradual 
accession’, in the words of Trionfetti9, whereby a transitional period is made potentially available to 
developing countries, under which they would initially be allowed to undertake only part of their 
obligations, then, progressively, would be extended to assume all the obligations under the 
agreement.  
For instance, as examined in Section 4.3.4.3, the NAFTA lays down transitional provisions for the 
only developing country member Mexico, which gradually extend the liberalising rules to its 
covered contracts, as well as temporarily soften certain procedural requirements for liberalised 
procurements. It was recognised that these transitional provisions have made it easier for Mexico to 
accept the NAFTA procurement rules and to agree to the inclusion of its state-owned enterprises for 
regulation. 
Moreover, as discussed in Section 3.2.4.3, the S&DT provisions of the current GPA also seek to 
provide developing countries with a high level of discretion in implementation, but have been argued 
to only set out a kind of possibility rather than to establish an automatic right for developing 
countries to obtain such a higher level of discretion. Although the newly revised GPA text spells out 
the more clearly specified transitional measures for developing countries, it has been argued that 
such measures still fail to guarantee a higher degree of discretion for developing countries because 
whether or to what extent a developing country can enjoy such a transitional period is subject to the 
                                                        
8
 As for the non-binding procurement instruments such as the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs, it seems 
unnecessary to incorporate additional S&DT provisions for developing countries, as the non-binding nature of these 
instruments itself has already granted all states a very wide discretion in applying the relevant standards and principles in 
their domestic systems. See Section 4.5.4.3 and Section4.6.4.3 
9
 See Trionfetti, note 6, at pp.72-73 
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consent of other parties during negotiations.  
Limited coverage to most procurement agreements and little participation on the part of 
developing countries reflect the reality that the liberalisation of procurement markets cannot be 
attained overnight and that not every country can move at the same pace. Soft law with a higher 
degree of discretion reduces the likelihood of negotiations being blocked by domestic vested interest 
of negotiating states, and encourages wider participation of developing countries. In this sense, soft 
law in terms of discretion can be regarded as a second-best where an immediate and full 
liberalisation of procurement market is infeasible because of strong political oppositions. 
In addition, soft law can be resorted to as a method to resolve disagreements over the substantive 
contents of a procurement agreement. As for controversial issues such as the issue of national 
challenge procedures, as discussed in Section 7.2, states hold different opinions regarding whether or 
how to set out the rules on national challenge procedures in a procurement agreement. Consequently, 
as with most procurement agreements such as the GPA, the EC, the NAFTA, discretion granted to 
states in implementing the rules on national challenge procedures is generally higher than that of 
other rules of those procurement agreements. 
  Besides its function of facilitating compromise at the negotiating stage, soft law with a high level 
of discretion is also desirable in terms of providing a certain degree of regulation, as well as having a 
potential to evolve into harder law over time. For example, the above-mentioned phase-in period 
clauses legally commit developing countries to certain forms of discourse and procedures, though 
granting a higher level of discretion in implementation.  
Developing countries can only exercise their discretion in exempting certain procurement 
contracts from the implementation of non-discrimination rules or departing from some procedural 
requirements according to their specific transitional arrangements. Apparently, such softer 
regulations are much better than no regulation at all in terms of opening up the procurement market 
of developing countries.  
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Furthermore, the greater discretion developing countries enjoy in implementing their obligations 
is only temporary, and they are expected to fully comply with the relevant procurement rules when 
their specified transitional periods expire. In this regard, soft law in terms of a higher level of 
discretion for developing countries is supposed to harden up at a specified time in the future.  
However, it is untrue that all soft law with a high level of discretion will always evolve into hard 
law over time. For instance, it is unlikely that the discretional soft law rules on technical assistance 
will turn into any harder law, as the nature of the rules will remain unchanged. Again, even 
discretional soft law with no prospect of developing into less discretional hard law can still be agued 
to be better than no law at all. 
 
9.3 Soft law in terms of its higher level of discretion as a better alternative to hard law with a 
lower level of discretion 
9.3.1 Possible advantages of soft law with a higher level of discretion 
As argued in Section 2.3.2, soft law in terms of a high level of discretion may sometimes be 
preferable to the relevant hard law. Soft law can be deliberately chosen over hard law even if the 
latter is attainable. Soft law with a low level of state discretion can be more desirable than hard law, 
and has its own advantages which are not available under hard law. First of all, soft law in terms of 
discretion involves less implementing costs than the relevant hard law; and secondly it is less 
intrusive on national regulatory autonomy. Both the above advantages of soft law can be applied in 
the area of procurement, and may have significant importance in practice.  
 
9.3.1.1 Reduced implementing costs 
Soft law in terms of discretion can be argued to involve lower implementing costs than the relevant 
hard law. As explained in 8.3.1.2, the implementation of international procurement rules demanding 
positive action can be costly for participating states, and they have to amend the details of their 
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existing national legislation to comply with the transparency rules under the agreement and train 
procuring officials to get acquainted with the rules.  
Soft law with a high level of states’ discretion in implementation may arguably help lower the 
possibly high implementing costs of procurement rules. Firstly, soft law in terms of discretion may 
lower the implementing costs by offering states a wider range of choices in implementing their 
obligations, from which states are more likely find a cost-effective way to transpose international 
rules into national legislation.  
For instance, most regimes including the GPA, the EC and the NAFTA (see Section 3.3.5.4b, 
Section 4.1.4.4b and Section 4.3.4.4b) require states to make available an independent body to 
review complaints from aggrieved suppliers. Instead of prescribing a certain type of courts to take on 
this role, all of the above regimes provide for a number of possibilities for members to choose from 
including either an administrative or judicial authority or both which meet the specified 
independence and procedural requirements. Accordingly, states can freely establish or designate 
challenge review bodies depending on their own legal systems and available resources. 
Secondly, soft law with a high level of discretion may also reduce the need for states to revise the 
details of their existing legislation. For example, the EC public sector directive provides that as a 
general rules the period for the receipt of tenders in open tendering shall not be less than 52 days 
from the date of publication of notice of intended procurement.10 This provision allows states to set 
their own general minimum time limit of any days longer than 52 days for the receipt of tender in 
open tendering. Assuming that a state has 50 days in its national procurement law, it thus needs to 
change it.  
However, in the case of the GPA which confers a slightly wider scope of state discretion on this 
issue, requiring that such a general minimum time limit is no less than 40 days, there is then no need 
for this state to make any changes of its rule. Or as with the general requirement of ‘reasonable’ or 
‘sufficient’ period of time suggested for the proposed transparency agreement (see Section 3..3.5.3), 
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 the EC Public Sector Directive Article 38.2 
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the state with 50 days in its law will have no pressure in practice to change its law until the relevant 
court interprets the requirement as implying a certain number of days shorter than 50 days. 
  
9.3.1.2 Reserved regulatory autonomy to implement legitimate national goals 
As pointed out in Section 2.3.2, the choice of soft law can largely reduce the high sovereignty costs 
an international agreement may involve, and soft law in terms of discretion, which is relevant under 
this section, can significantly reduce sovereignty costs by leaving states more discretion in 
negotiating and implementing their obligations. In the particular area of public procurement, the use 
of soft law with a high level of states’ discretion may operate to avoid overly restrictive approaches 
to national regulatory freedom. 
International procurement rules with a trade objective are designed to ensure market access and 
not directly promote economic efficiency or social welfare. On the contrary, such procurement rules 
may often be at odds with such national goals. Since trade barriers in public procurement are 
embodied in a wide range of administrative and regulatory measures, the introduction of 
international procurement disciplines will inevitably add significant constraints on national 
regulatory autonomy.  
The challenge here is to develop procurement rules which effectively tackle protectionist practices 
but without infringing the right of countries to pursue legitimate national goals. A common approach 
of many procurement regimes is to set out general principles of non-discrimination and detailed 
procedural requirements to ensure transparency. Both such general principles and detailed 
transparency requirements may potentially affects states’ to obtain the ‘primary’ objectives such as 
‘value for money’ and ‘integrity’ and the legitimate ‘secondary’ objectives such as social equality 
and environmental protection. 
The principle of non-discrimination generally prevents states from using procurement to promote 
social or environmental objectives in a way which discriminates against foreign suppliers. For 
instance, under the principle of discrimination, governments are not allowed to reserve certain 
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procurement contracts for certain disadvantaged groups or give price preference in evaluating the bid 
to firms which meets national standards of sound environmental policy. Further, as discussed in 
Section 8.3.1.3, states’ ability of pursuing legitimate domestic goals may also be affected by detailed 
procedure rules in procurement even if there is no discrimination.  
The most notable advantage of soft law with a higher level of discretion is that it largely reserves 
states’ regulatory freedom to implement legitimate national goals. Firstly, soft law in terms of 
discretion can lower sovereignty costs by allowing states to freely decide the scope of their 
procurement contracts subject to international regulation. The flexible approach in coverage allows 
states to retain regulatory freedom over certain entities or types of procurement not only for 
protectionist concerns but also for legitimate non-economic concerns. Under the GPA (see Section 
3.2.3), for instance, many states include specific derogations to exempt certain existing programmes 
under which procurement may be used as a tool of social or environmental policy. By way of 
contrast, the EC procurement regime (see Section 4.1.3) lays down uniform coverage rules for all 
Member States, and therefore rules out any possibility of derogation for certain procurement 
programmes under national social or environmental policies.  
Secondly, soft law in terms of discretion can significantly mitigate the infringement of 
international procurement rules on national regulatory autonomy by leaving states with considerable 
discretion in implementing their obligations. Most procurement agreements include only a limited 
body of rules on key issues, under which states have different degrees of discretion to tailor their 
own procurement rules to the needs of specific domestic objectives. 
Generally speaking, the more restrictive the international rules are, the less discretion states have 
in implementation, and then the weaker ability they have in achieving their domestic objectives. 
Hard law with a lower level of state discretion in a procurement agreement may hinder states’ aim to 
get value for money and efficiency in procurement as well as to use procurement as a policy tool to 
achieve secondary objectives. 
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As for states’ primary aim of getting value for money and efficiency in procurement, hard law 
transparency rules of procurement agreements may largely affect states’ ability to achieved it. For 
example, many procurement agreements such as the GPA (see Section 3.2.4.3), the EC (see Section 
4.1.4.3) and the NAFTA (see Section 4.3.4.3) require the use of a certain kind of formal competitive 
tendering procedures as the standard method for normal procurement, with the possibility to use 
more informal procurement methods under clearly defined exceptional circumstances. This 
requirement largely restricts procuring entities’ freedom to choose more informal procurement 
methods for a particular procurement.  
In view of the recent trend of many developed countries opting for more informal procurement 
methods as explained in Section 8.3.1.1, states’ ability to pursue value for money can be limited by 
virtue of their constrained discretion over the choice of procurement methods. Although the use of 
formal competitive tendering may ensure transparency, promote competition and reduce the chance 
of corruption, it is time-consuming, costly and inflexible process. In the words of Arrowsmith, ‘a 
state with professional officials buying in well-developed markets with little corruption might well 
find that the costs of open procedures (a kind of formal competitive tendering procedure) often 
outweigh the benefits’.11 
In this regard, the use of soft law with a high degree of discretion can lower sovereignty costs by 
providing states with more freedom of choice in pursuing value for money. This can be 
demonstrated by reference to the relevant rules of the COMESA directives. As examined in Section 
4.5.4.3, unlike the GPA, the EC and the NAFTA, the COMESA allows states to freely decide over 
what kind of situations can justify the use of alternative methods or how alternative methods shall 
proceed. States mainly relying on strict transparency rules can formulate stringent requirements on 
the derogations from formal competitive tendering, whilst others in favour of greater reliance on the 
exercise of professional judgement of procuring officials are free to permit the use of other informal 
procedures in a broad range of circumstances. 
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 See S. Arrowsmtih, ‘Transparency in Government Procurement: The Objectives of Regulation and the Boundaries of the 
World Trade Organization’, (2003) J.W.T. 37(2) 283-303 at p.299 
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Meanwhile, the general principles of non-discrimination and detailed transparency rules contained 
in procurement agreements also restrict states’ ability to employ procurement to implement 
legitimate secondary objectives. Discriminatory industrial polices are precluded by national 
treatment principle which targets at protectionist practices under most procurement agreements. 
However, social and environmental policies without any discriminatory effect may also be 
prohibited by the transparency rules on contract award procedure. 
The EC’s rules on award criteria serve as a good example on this point. As examined in Section 
4.1.4.3, the EC public sector directive does not generally allow environmental considerations to be 
included as contract award criteria unless they relate to the ‘subject matter of the contract’. For 
example, it is unacceptable to give price preference to firms with a generally good environmental 
records, but preferences can be given to firms which produce and deliver the procured goods in a 
most environmental-friendly way. Clearly, this requirement rules out many award criteria relating to 
secondary policies.  
 The GPA, in contrast, may probably represent a softer approach in terms of the freedom of states 
using award criteria to implement social or environmental policies in procurement. As argued in 
Section 3.1.2.3, social or environmental criteria which have nothing to do with the contract awarded 
could possibly be considered under the GPA. In the absence of the relevant judicial interpretation, 
states may enjoy a broad discretion in practice to take into account a wide range of social or 
environmental considerations as award criteria.12  
In addition, as generally argued in Section 2.3.2, soft law in terms of discretion can reduce 
sovereignty costs by serving as a softening device to circumscribe the obligatory force of hard law 
rules. By incorporating such softening devices into a procurement agreement, participating states can 
be protected in case the obligation turns out to have hidden sovereignty costs.  
This function of soft law is very important in the area of procurement taking into account its 
possibly close connection with national security and stability. Public procurement includes the 
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 However whether the GPA member states are actually allowed to use award criteria not relating to the contract’s subject 
matter is still subject to the future judicial interpretation. 
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government’s purchasing of a wide variety of goods and services, ranging from office equipments 
such as desks and paper to military weapons including tanks and missiles.  
When it comes to certain defence procurements closely related to national security, sovereignty 
costs of free trade rules are extremely high. For example, it would damage national security if a state 
had to purchase military helicopters from enemy states at war according to international procurement 
rules. This is not limited to defence procurements. The procurement of certain types of civil goods or 
services can also involve extremely high sovereignty costs owing to their important impact on 
national economy (see Section 7.3.1.3). Consequently, governments should be allowed to depart 
from international procurement disciplines when it is necessary for the protection of their essential 
national interests. 
One frequently used softening device is the escape clause. Most binding regimes including the 
GPA, the EC and the NAFTA contain certain exemption and derogation clauses, which limits the 
obligatory force of the relevant agreements, albeit to different extents. For example, the GPA Article 
XXIII permits states to derogate from their obligations under the agreement for the protection of 
national security interest and other specified public interests such as protection of health. Such 
escape clauses allow states to have more discretion in implementing their hard law obligations and 
protect them from being locked into unfavourable situations where they find the implementation of 
their obligations is detrimental to their essential national interests. 
 
9.3.2 Possible disadvantages of soft law with a higher level of discretion 
Although the use of soft law with a high level of state discretion can significantly lower 
implementing costs and sovereignty costs of an international agreement. It also has some possible 
disadvantages as pointed out in Section 2.4. Firstly, soft law in terms of discretion may affect the 
credibility of legal commitments and provide states opportunities to shirk from their obligations; and 
secondly, it may entail higher negotiating costs owing to the flexibility it offers in negotiation. Both 
of these disadvantages are very relevant to a procurement agreement.  
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 9.3.2.1 Weakened credibility of obligations 
The choice of discretional soft law in a procurement agreement may arguably weaken the credibility 
of the agreement by making it harder to determine if a participating state is living up to its 
commitments and thus increasing the chance for opportunistic states to shirk from their obligations. 
Soft law rules that grant states a very broad discretion in implementation may sometimes make it 
very difficult to determine states’ compliance. The ‘best endeavour’ obligations furnish an example. 
Even if such discretional soft law rules are couched in a binding form, it will only constitute a 
binding obligation to make best endeavour to achieve a certain outcome.  
Failure to achieve the specified outcome does not necessarily constitute the non-compliance of the 
obligation. States comply with their obligation as long as they have used their ‘best endeavour’ but 
in practice it is often hard to determine whether states have done so. As with the previous example of 
the GPA Article V.3, it is difficult to know or challenge whether a particular developed country has 
failed to make their ‘best endeavour’ to include entities of export interests to developing countries 
Such discretional soft law rules in procurement may create opportunities for states to circumvent 
their obligations. As explained in Section 7.3.2, states’ compliance with international procurement 
rules can be severely threatened by significant political influence from their domestic vested 
interests. Under the strong political pressure, the discretion provided by soft law in implementing 
legitimate national objectives can possibly be abused by states to support discriminative 
procurement policies.  
The EC’s experience on defence procurement provides an example of this possibility. As 
examined in Section 4.2.1, the EC Treaty provides a general exemption from its procurement rules 
for certain defence procurements which states consider necessary for the protection of the essential 
interests of their security. However, because of the discretional wording of this Treaty provision, this 
exemption has been extensively used by the EC states in practice, and the majority of the defence 
contracts within the EC are awarded on the basis of discriminatory national procurement policies.    
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However, the possibly weakened credibility of discretional soft law might be remedied for by 
introducing an effective monitoring system (to be discussed at Section 10.3.2.1), for instance, the 
establishment of a self-reporting system. Also, the credibility of discretional soft law rules may also 
be enhanced by private party enforcement, as most procurement agreements demand the availability 
of national challenge procedures for aggrieved supplies, which may, to a large extent, empower 
private suppliers motivated by self-interest to enforce the agreed procurement rules. 
 
9.3.2.2 Increased negotiating costs 
In contrast with the function of the other three dimensions of soft law to lower negotiating costs, soft 
law in terms of discretion may increase the negotiating costs of a procurement agreement. 
As discussed in Section 7.3.1.1, hard law procurement agreements often entail high negotiating 
costs owing to the complexity of their procedural rules and coverage rules. The choice of soft law 
granting states a high level of discretion may help reduce the negotiating costs by making it easier 
for states to agree on procedural rules especially for controversial issues. However, it can be argued 
that soft law in terms of discretion can also raise negotiating costs, in a more significant way, by 
complicating the process of market access negotiations for a procurement agreement. 
Soft law in terms of states’ discretion in negotiation allows states freely to offer their 
country-specific coverage, which could be quite different in terms of covered entities and contracts 
according to their own particular considerations. This difference in coverage for different states may 
lead to the problem of ‘reciprocity’. The difference in coverage along with the principle of 
reciprocity adds much more difficulty to negotiating a binding procurement agreement. As discussed 
in Section 7.3.1.1, considerable negotiating energy was devoted to negotiating the coverage issue 
under most procurement agreements, as demonstrated by the GPA’s negotiating history. 
Furthermore, the use of soft law with a higher level of states’ discretion exclusively applicable to 
developing or least developed countries may also increase the negotiating costs of a procurement 
agreement. It takes time and resources for developing or least developed countries to bargain for 
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transitional measures as well as for all participating states to agree on them. The relevant transitional 
provisions included in the agreement can be drafted in a very precise and concrete way. For instance, 
as examined in Section 4.3.4.2, the NAFTA formulates specific transitional provisions for Mexico 
indicating the precise degree of exemption as well as the concrete sectors and entities to be excluded.  
It can be seen that discretional soft law employed by most procurement agreements such as the 
GPA in negotiating coverage is labour intensive and easily loses the benefits of a multilateral deal as 
negotiators bargain bilaterally. However, it has been argued in Section 7.3.1.1 that a high level of 
states’ discretion in negotiation is crucial for most procurement regimes in terms of archiving a 
reasonably wide coverage and participation, and the hard law approach of the EC just cannot be 
copied by other procurement regimes in the short run.  
As for a procurement agreement at the multilateral level, a short-term solution may arguably lie 
somewhere between the hard law approach of the EC and the current soft law approach of most 
procurement regimes. For example, in view of the difficulty in persuading the GPA Members to 
adopt more principled coverage approach in the short term, it was suggested by Wang that 
‘indicative criteria’ capable of demonstrating the effective elimination of government control or 
influence over an entity’s covered procurement should be fully explored.13  
According to Wang, such indicative criteria can serve as guidance on what entities should be 
tabled for accession negotiation.14 This suggestion can largely address the GPA’s current difficulty in 
preparing the offer of entity coverage due to the lack of unified practices but leaving states’ broad 
discretion in negotiation unaffected. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
In this section, soft law in terms of a high level of states’ discretion in negotiation and 
implementation has been argued to serve as a second best or even as a better alternative to the 
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 P. Wang, ‘Coverage of the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement: Challenges of Integrating China and Other 
Countries with a Large State Sector into the Global Trading System’, J.I.E.L. 2007 10(4), at pp887-920 
14
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relevant hard law.  
Soft law in terms of discretion may be adopted where hard law cannot be attained. Apart from the 
exceptional case of the EC procurement regimes, currently it seems inevitable for procurement 
agreements to be soft in terms of discretion in negotiating coverage in order to achieve a reasonably 
broad coverage for every participating state. Moreover, soft law with an even higher level of 
discretion exclusively applying to developing countries has been argued indispensable for a 
procurement agreement in terms of attractive wider participation, given the economic and political 
reality of developing countries.  
Compared with their developed counterparts, developing countries tend to incur more political 
costs to join in a procurement agreement and may lack of technical and financial ability to 
implement the agreement. Soft law with a higher level of discretion may address the above concerns 
of developing countries, and in practice, it has been frequently resorted to, and increasingly valued 
in international procurement regulation.  
In addition, discretional soft law may foster compromise on controversial issues of a procurement 
agreement, and to agree on binding rules on voluntary aid actions. Apart from the function of soft 
law to facilitate agreement among negotiating parties, it is also desirable in terms of providing a 
degree of regulation, and potentially evolving into harder law over time. However even discretional 
soft law with no prospect of developing into hard law has also argued to be better than no law at all. 
Furthermore, soft law with a higher level of discretion can sometimes be considered more 
desirable than the relevant hard law even if the latter is attainable. In the area of procurement, the 
most notable advantage of soft law in terms of discretion is the reduced sovereignty costs of a 
procurement agreement.  
Taking into account the fact that trade barriers in public procurement are embedded in a wide 
range of administrative and regulatory measures, it is virtually impossible to develop effective 
multilateral trade disciplines in procurement without interfering with national sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, it is both desirable and feasible to develop procurement rules without unduly limiting 
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states’ regulatory freedom. The use of soft law with a high level of discretion in negotiation and 
implementation enables states to retain entirely regulatory autonomy in particular procurement 
contracts by excluding them from their coverage offers, as well as provides states with more 
freedom of choice in pursuing legitimate national goals.  
Regarding international procurement regulation, it is important to strike an appropriate balance 
between the free trade goal and states’ right to implement legitimate domestic policies. As pointed 
out above, not all soft law with a high level of state discretion will develop into hard law. It can be 
further argued that the process of soft law turning into hard law cannot necessarily be considered as 
a positive step.  
It was noted that the EC regime has been moving markedly from its original broad framework 
character in the direction of a system of common rules, which have significantly reduced the 
discretion left to its member states. However, the desirability of the EC’s current trend towards 
harder law is doubtful, given the different national circumstances and values of its member states.15 
In contrast, the current GPA has been argued to provide a proper regulatory balance. 
Another major advantage of soft law in terms of discretion is to lower implementing costs, which 
is especially important for developing countries with limited financial and technical resources 
available. The adoption of soft law in procurement offers states a wide range of choices in 
implementing their obligations, from which states are more likely find a cost-effective way. Also, it 
reduces the need for states to revise the details of their existing legislation. 
Despite the above-mentioned advantages, soft law with a higher degree of discretion may possibly 
lead to the weakened credibility of rules and the increased negotiating costs. The choice of 
discretional soft law in procurement makes it more difficult for states to determine each other’s 
compliance and thus raise the chance for opportunistic states to shirk from their obligations. 
However, this may possibly addressed by establishing both effective international monitoring 
systems and domestic challenge procedures.  
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Moreover, the choice of discretional soft law raises the negotiating costs way by complicating the 
process of market access negotiations. In a short run, it has been argued that the optimal solution to 
the coverage rules of a multilateral procurement agreement may lie somewhere between the EC’s 
hard law approach and the GPA’s soft law one such as elaborating certain ‘indicative criteria’ to 
facilitate negotiations. 
Chapter 10 Analysis of advantages & disadvantages of soft law in 
regulating public procurement from a trade perspective – the Dimension of 
Delegation 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The fourth dimension of soft law is delegation, which refers to the degree to which states have 
delegated the power to independent third parties, including courts, arbitral tribunals and 
administrative organisations, to interpret and apply the agreed rules. As elaborated at Section 2.2.4, a 
hard law enforcement system with a high level of delegation is characterised by the presence of 
independent third parties with the authority to adjudicate disputes, to interpret the agreed rules and 
apply them to particular facts.  
Also, the degree of power delegated to such third parties in enforcement may vary. The delegation 
of power is at its highest level when the designated third parties are left with a significant discretion 
to interpret the rules and empowered to give legally binding rulings, which is the case under the EC 
regime (see 4.2.4.4a). At the other end of spectrum, soft law with a very low level of delegation does 
not involve the presence of any independent adjudicative bodies but instead provides a forum for 
negotiations and consultations such as the APEC rules (see Section 4.6.4.4a). The enforcement 
system of most procurement regimes fall somewhere between these two ends. 
  In Section 2.3, it has been argued that soft law with a low level of delegation can be a second best 
to the relevant hard law when the latter is temporarily unattainable. In this regard, soft law can be 
used to avoid the failure of international negotiations and to provide a certain degree of regulation 
which has a potential to develop into hard law regulation. This will be discussed at Section 10.2. 
However, soft law in terms of its low level of delegation may sometimes be regarded as a better 
alternative to the relevant hard law and this will be considered at Section 10.3. 
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10.2 Soft law in terms of its lower level of delegation as a second best to hard law with a higher 
level of delegation 
Soft law with a lower degree of delegation may be chosen in the case of unachievability of the 
relevant hard law. As argued in Section 2.3.1, it is generally difficult to mobilise political support for 
the establishment of a strong judicial body that would significantly restrict the autonomy of 
participating states. This is particularly true in the area of international procurement law because, for 
the reasons elaborated in Section 7.2, public procurement is a sensitive subject area in which states 
are often reluctant to relinquish their regulatory freedom. Soft law with a low level of delegation can 
be utilised to foster agreement among negotiating parties by mitigating the political opposition from 
domestic vested interests. 
As for an international procurement agreement, it is often politically difficult for states to agree on 
a hard law enforcement system under which an independent third party is delegated with the power 
to interpret the agreed rules, to adjudicate disputes, to issue binding rulings and to award remedies in 
disputes.  
This difficulty can be demonstrated by reference to the initiative to negotiate a transparency 
agreement in procurement at the WTO level. As pointed out in Section 7.2, substantial 
disagreements over the issue of dispute settlement procedures, i.e. over the application of WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (‘DSU’) and the requirement for the availability of national 
challenge procedures, were considered as one of the three major obstacles on the road to a 
conclusion of the proposed transparency agreement.1 Insisting on the use of a hard law enforcement 
system by some negotiating parties might have reduced the likelihood that some others, notably 
developing country parties, would accept the proposed new commitments in procurement, leading to 
a breakdown in the negotiations as a whole.  
Furthermore, behind the apparent disagreements over specific aspects of the proposed 
transparency agreement, it has been argued in Section 7.2 that one of the main reasons for the failure 
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to negotiate the agreement might lie in the resistance of some states to give up their freedom to use 
procurement for illegitimate purposes including protectionism, political patronage and corruption.  
Arguably, it would be more likely for opposing states to accept a set of transparency rules in 
procurement which are soft in the sense of no coercive measures to enforce them though it may not 
be the case for those which oppose the very idea of entering into a procurement agreement. In this 
regard, the choice of soft law enforcement system is not a systematic flaw but rather a deliberate 
device to mitigate strong oppositions from certain negotiating parties as an agreement with a 
relatively softer enforcement system is preferable to no agreement. 
In addition, certain procurements, because of the very nature of procured products and services, 
are extremely sensitive and closely connected with national sovereignty and security. As for a 
procurement agreement regulating procurements of such a nature, it is just politically impossible for 
states to agree on any hard law enforcement mechanism for them. This is the case with the EDA 
Code which addresses the defence procurements closely related to states’ essential interests (see 
Section 4.2). 
Apart from the sensitive nature of procurement, the choice of soft law in terms of delegation for a 
procurement agreement can also be attributed to the relevant institutional context in which the 
agreement is reached. As for loose international groupings as exemplified by the APEC, no binding 
obligations are required of its participants; and decisions are reached by consensus and commitments 
are untaken on a voluntary basis. Therefore, it is not surprising that the APEC NBPs contain no hard 
law enforcement measures either (see Section 4.6.4.4a). 
The sensitive nature of procurement as well as the informal political context may sometimes 
prevent states from agreeing on a hard law enforcement system for a procurement agreement. Under 
the circumstances where hard law with a high level of delegation is unattainable, soft law can be 
valuable in terms of facilitating negotiations and promoting agreements. Furthermore, it remains 
possible for a soft law enforcement system to evolve into a comparatively harder one over time, 
which can be demonstrated by the development of the GPA enforcement procedures. 
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  As discussed in Section 3.2.4.4a, under the old GATT system, the Tokyo Round Agreement on 
Government Procurement (‘AGP’) delegated a very low level of authority to its inter-governmental 
Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’), and the relevant dispute settlement rules optioned for political 
consensus in dispute settlement rather than legal certainty in rule application.  
However, as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the GATT system has been replaced by 
the WTO as an international organisation and the dispute settlement system of the original GATT has 
also been transformed from consensus-based to quasi-judicial. A number of reforms were adopted 
towards the ‘hard’ end of the delegation spectrum. The new GPA reaps the benefits of the more 
judicialised WTO dispute settlement procedures by explicitly referring to the WTO Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (‘the DSU’)2 as its own dispute 
settlement procedures with a few adaptations taking into account the particular features of 
procurement disputes.  
Compared with its GATT predecessor, the new GPA has significantly enhanced the level of 
delegation to the DSBs. Notably, it strengthens the independent adjudicative power of its DSBs by 
removing the right of individual states under the old AGP to block the establishment of panels and 
the adoption of panel rulings.  
  Another important hard law element in the WTO dispute settlement system is the introduction of a 
standing Appellate Body (‘the AB’) delegated with the task of reviewing the legal aspects of panel 
reports. The appellate report, like the panel report, is subject to the DSB’s automatic adoption. The 
establishment of the AB indicates the separation of the judicial power from the other organs of the 
organisation, and its standing nature also contributes to the consistency of decisions.  
Apart from the applicability of a more judicialised inter-governmental dispute settlement system 
to GPA disputes, the most innovative hard law feature of the current GPA is the mandatory 
requirement for establishment of a national challenge system, under which states may confer the 
authority on national courts or on other independent review bodies to hear challenges by aggrieved 
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suppliers. In essence, as explained at Section 3.2.4.4b, it is required that such challenge review 
bodies should be delegated with the power to adjudicate disputes, give rulings, and award damages 
or even rapid interim measures to correct breaches of the agreed rules, which may result in the 
suspension of the procurement process.3  
It was pointed out in Section 3.2.4.4b that some WTO agreements include the obligation to set up 
similar domestic review bodies whilst others do not. Bajno argued that national challenge review is 
provided for the violations of certain WTO rules which will cause the biggest adverse material effect 
on business operators4.  
Although the main area of the WTO rules which exempts states from setting up a domestic review 
system is the rules governing internal measures, the rules governing internal measures are covered 
whenever they are crucial obligations in the relevant agreement.5 This is the case with the GPA 
under which the rules addressing internal measures are core provisions, because trade barriers in 
procurement are mainly represented by national administrative and regulatory measures and the 
interests of foreign suppliers are most harmed by discriminatory procurement policies violating the 
National Treatment rule.   
Furthermore, in the case of the GPA, compared with its inter-governmental dispute settlement 
procedures, the requirement for the availability of national challenge procedures arguably responds 
more closely to the specific nature of individual procurement disputes. First of all, this requirement 
aims at expediting the dispute settlement process, which is deemed essential in the context of 
procurement. This is because the procurement proceeding is often a one-off event as opposed to 
normal trade activities which involve a longer duration.  
It is possible that the contract concerned may be concluded or even partly performed by the time 
the dispute is resolved, whilst it often contradicts public interest to delay contract award proceedings 
pending a dispute settlement procedure. Apparently, the longer period it takes to resolve disputes, the 
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more problematic the situation will be. By providing direct access for aggrieved suppliers to 
domestic adjudication, suppliers can save time lobbying their governments to initiate the lengthy and 
cumbersome inter-governmental dispute settlement procedures. 
Secondly, compared with inter-government DSMs, national challenge procedures can be argued to 
provide a better channel to resolve individual procurement disputes. Most inter-governmental DSMs, 
because of limited resources available, are often incapable of dealing with possibly a large number 
of day-to-day individual procurement disputes. 
 More importantly, national review bodies, compared with inter-governmental ones, are in a better 
position to handle conflicts of interest when hearing a specific procurement dispute. For instance, as 
we have seen, any interruption of procuring proceedings or interference of concluded procurement 
contracts may affect public interest, whilst in some cases the suspension of award procedures or 
even concluded contract must be awarded pending the hearing in order to preserve commercial 
opportunities for aggrieved suppliers.  
National review bodies are arguably in a better position than its inter-governmental counterpart to 
balance all interests likely to be affected and then decide whether such measures shall be awarded. 
Also, in view of the sensitivity of the procurement issues (see Section 7.2), a decision reached by 
national review bodies may be more politically acceptable and more easily implemented than one 
made at inter-governmental level.  
Thirdly, in addition to international DSMs, the availability of national challenge systems may give 
more teeth to international procurement rules. It provides an important deterrent to non-compliance 
with the rules. Private suppliers are the primary parties to the procurement, and thereby they have 
the best opportunities to spot breaches as well as the greatest incentive to bring proceedings.  
The right of private suppliers to file complaints before national review bodies increases the chance 
of non-compliance being detected and challenged and thus improves deterrence.  Furthermore, as 
argued by Arrowsmith, the introduction of national challenge procedures also removes the 
possibility for governments to limit enforcement as a quid pro quo for a restrained approach by other 
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parties.6 The right of private suppliers to challenge, which is not dependent on the discretion of their 
governments, helps to ensure that the free trade rules are not undermined by protectionists influence 
at the enforcement level.7 
Despite the desirability of national challenge procedures as mentioned above, it was impracticable 
for the old AGP to go that far to include it. Actually, the possibility of using domestic dispute 
settlement was proposed for the old AGP but this turned out to be too ambitious to accept.8  
However, the experience of old AGP showed that relying solely on the inter-governmental DSMs 
is inadequate to address individual procurement disputes, which was highlighted in the Trondheim 
case9 during the course of the new GPA negotiation. In fact, states were reluctant to utilise it to 
resolve individual violation of the rules and there were only four disputes initiated under the old 
AGP. 10  Having learnt from the past experience, the GPA states implicitly agreed that 
inter-governmental WTO DSMs could not always sufficiently address complaints over specific 
procurement awards and national challenge procedures might be more desirable in terms of dealing 
with individual complaints under the agreement.  
More importantly, the GPA’s plurilateral character and limited membership arguably made it 
possible for states to accept the lessons from the old AGP. The successful inclusion of the 
requirement for national challenge procedures in the current GPA could be partly attributed to the 
simultaneous evolution of regional procurement regimes such as the EC and the NATFA. 
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It can be seen that the GPA rules on national challenge procedures are largely modelled on the 
relevant EC legislation.11 It also made a consensus easier to be reached that many original GPA 
parties had already put similar national challenge procedures in place as a result of their membership 
to those regional agreements such as the EC Member States. 
However, this is not to suggest that all soft law procurement instruments would follow the step of 
the GPA to evolve into hard law. For instance, the APEC economies never sought and probably 
never will seek to create a regional institution with interpretative, adjudicative or rule-making 
powers.12 As a result, the APEC NBPs, in the foreseeable future, will probably remain soft in term of 
its low level of delegation in enforcement. Similarly, it is unreasonable or even undesirable to expect 
the EDA Code to adopt any hard law enforcement measures at a later stage since the extremely 
sensitive nature of its regulated matter will remain unchanged. Nevertheless, even soft law 
agreements without any possibility to harden up in the future have their own values and are better 
than no agreement at all. 
   
10.3 Soft law in terms of its low level of delegation as a better alternative to hard law with a 
higher level of delegation 
10.3.1 Possible advantages of soft law with a lower level of delegation  
As generally argued in Section 2.3.2, soft law in terms of delegation may sometimes be more 
desirable than the relevant hard law even where the latter is achievable. This is because soft law has 
its own independent advantages and may produce similar practical effects of hard law but with 
reduced costs. The use of soft law can reduce the costs of negotiating and implementing an 
international agreement. More importantly, it can largely avoid unanticipated sovereign costs 
associated with hard law involving a high level of delegation in enforcement and thus protect states’ 
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regulatory autonomy to achieve legitimate national goals. All the above arguments are applicable in 
the area of public procurement.  
 
10.3.1.1 Reduced negotiating costs 
The first advantage of soft law over hard law in terms of delegation is that soft law may help reduce 
negotiating costs of a procurement agreement. As discussed in Section 7.3.1.1, the negotiating costs 
of hard law procurement agreements tend to be very high because of, first sensitive nature, and 
secondly, complex nature of procurement. Soft law with a low level of delegation in enforcement 
may arguably reduce the high negotiating costs of a binding procurement agreement. 
As shown in the negotiating process of both the GPA (see Section 3.2.4.4) and the WTO 
transparency agreement in procurement (see Section 3.3.5.4), the dispute settlement mechanism was 
always one of most controversial issue when negotiating a binding procurement agreement. Many 
countries especially developing countries do not want to subject their procurement policies and 
decisions to formal dispute settlement measures either internationally or domestically. Even for those 
prepared to accept hard law enforcement mechanisms, the precise content of the provisions 
governing national challenge procedures may not be easily agreed upon, as the litigation culture 
differs from one state to another. In this regard, the choice of soft law enforcement system may help 
reduce negotiating costs by accommodating the differentiated views of negotiating parties on 
enforcement.  
Moreover, soft law with a low level of delegation may arguably make it easier for states to agree 
on other procedural rules and the coverage rules of a procurement agreement since the agreed rules 
will not be enforceable through coercive hard law measures.  
As pointed out in Section 7.3.1.1, most international procurement agreements lay down 
transparency procedural rules governing the award of contract, which are often comprehensive and 
complicated, and thus potentially very difficult for countries with different regulatory approach to 
agree on a single set of rules. It has been argued in Section 8.3.1.1 that vague soft law may help 
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significantly reduce the high negotiating costs of a binding procurement instrument by making it 
easier for states to agree on the relevant procedural rules.  
In a similar way, soft law with a low level of delegation in enforcement can also lower the 
negotiating costs of a binding procurement agreement. Taking the rules on time-limits as an example, 
many procurement regimes include provisions on the minimum time-limits for submitting tenders to 
ensure that suppliers are granted sufficient time to prepare and submit their tenders, whilst the 
complexity of the situations involved and the difference among states make it very hard for states to 
negotiate and agreed on the relevant provisions.  
The choice of soft law in terms of delegation can help states reach an agreement on this issue. If 
the relevant provisions are to be formulated only in vague terms such as a ‘sufficient’ or ‘reasonable’ 
period of time, a soft law instrument without delegating the interpreting authority to a third party 
will allow states a significant discretion in defining the precise meaning of these terms, which may 
arguably make the provisions more acceptable to states of diversified conditions. Even if the 
provisions include precise rules which largely restrict states discretion in implementation, states 
which are not entirely happy with the rules would be more likely accept the rules if they are not 
going to be enforced by coercive measures. In both cases, it seems easier for states to agree on the 
provisions on time-limits.  
Regarding the negotiating costs associated with the coverage rules of a procurement agreement, 
soft law in terms of delegation can reduce the costs only in the sense that it makes a uniform 
approach in coverage more likely to be achieved which avoids complicated tit-for-tat bilateral 
negotiations. It can be assumed that states might be more willing to subject more entities and 
contracts to international regulation if soft law with a low level of delegation is adopted, which 
leaves room for political bargaining at the enforcement stage. The more entities and contracts each 
individual state is prepared to offer, the more likely a uniform and reasonably broad coverage can be 
achieved for all negotiating states.  
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However, it has been noted in section 7.3.1.1 that a uniform coverage can hardly be obtained in 
most binding procurement regimes in the foreseeable future if a comparatively wide coverage is to 
be attained. In this regard, soft law in enforcement will not make much difference in the negotiating 
costs of coverage where a flexible approach is adopted and the principle of reciprocity is maintained 
in negotiating coverage. This is because states may still hold their market access concessions as a 
strategy to force others to open up their markets even if they are ready to open their market, and 
therefore the costs of bilateral bargaining among states cannot be mitigated by the introduction of 
soft law with a lower level of delegation in enforcement. 
 
10.3.1.2 Reduced implementing costs 
Next, soft law with no delegation to domestic review bodies entails lower implementing costs for 
states. Apart form the costs of amending the existing national legislation and training procurement 
officials, the implementing costs of a procurement agreement may be increased by its requirement of 
establishing national challenge procedures. The costs of setting up and maintaining a national 
challenge system can be fairly high, especially for developing countries which lacks financial or 
technical capability to do so. As a result, soft law that does not contain such a requirement partly 
reduces the implementing costs of procurement agreements.  
  Moreover, soft law involving no delegation of adjudicative power to inter-governmental and 
domestic bodies avoids the potential litigation costs. It is often costly for governments or procuring 
entities to respond to legal proceeding brought against them for alleged breach of the agreed rules. 
Besides the potential litigation costs, extra burden may also be imposed on governments or 
procuring entities in order to reduce the risk of legal challenge.  
  This represents significant costs in many hard law regimes. For instance, in the case of the EC, an 
impact assessment report on remedies showed that the increased risk of litigation forces the 
procuring entities to provide arguably unnecessarily more detailed and documentation13 and the 
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actual litigation costs are also substantial: around 2.5% of invitations to tenders published in the EC 
Official Journal lead to litigation and the average cost of a procurement case might be between 10% 
to 20% of contract value.14  
 
10.3.1.3 Avoidance of unanticipated constraints on states’ regulatory autonomy to pursue 
legitimate national goals 
The delegation of legal authority to an independent international judicial or review body may, as 
explained in Section 2.3.2, provide the greatest source of unanticipated sovereign costs. The 
designated bodies may exert their delegated authority in ways that go beyond the initial intentions or 
anticipations of the contracting states, which may significantly restrict states’ regulatory freedom in 
many respects. In contrast, soft law with a low level of delegation may largely protect states from 
such unanticipated sovereignty costs.  
This advantage of soft law deserves special attention in the area of procurement. As elaborated in 
Section 9.3.1.2, trade barriers in public procurement are embodied in administrative and regulatory 
measures and therefore the introduction of international procurement disciplines will inevitably put 
certain constraints on national regulatory autonomy; however, the right of states to pursue legitimate 
national goals such as ‘value for money’ and ‘integrity’ and social or environmental secondary 
objectives in procurement should be protected.  
A balance between international trade goals and national legitimate concerns should be struck 
when drafting a procurement agreement. As for a hard law procurement agreement, the exercise of 
judicial authority by the delegated body in interpreting and applying the agreed rules may threaten to 
upset such a delicate regulatory balance achieved by negotiating parties.  
The best example on this point is the ECJ in interpreting the EC Treaty principles and 
procurement directives. As discussed in Section 4.1.4.4a, the EC procurement rules were initially 
intended to be a broad framework within which states should have significant freedom to tailor their 
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own procurement rules to the needs of specific domestic objectives; however in practice such 
regulatory freedom of states has been increasingly limited and rapidly diminishing mainly as a result 
of the ECJ’s creative judicial interpretation.  
As elaborated in Section 4.1.4.3, by looking for the ‘spirit’ behind the languages of legal 
provisions rather than the languages of provisions themselves, the ECJ tends to interpret both the EC 
Treaty and procurement directives in an expansive way to impose detailed requirements without 
explicit grounding in the legislative text or the original intent of Member States. Many issues which 
are not mentioned in the legislation and were previously believed to be left to the choice of member 
states are now regulated by the rules created by the ECJ through its expansive judicial interpretation. 
Consequently, states’ ability to implement their national procurement policies has been increasingly 
restricted.15 This risks undermining the carefully achieved regulatory balance between the goal of 
free trade and other domestic concerns.  
By way of contrast, soft law with a low level of delegation in enforcement can largely avoid the 
unexpected high sovereign costs to states. In fact, even for procurement regimes which involve the 
delegation of judicial power to a third party, the unexpected sovereign costs associated with the 
delegation can be largely reduced by curtailing the breadth of the mandate granted to the dispute 
settlement body as well as the legal effect of its rulings. For example, under the GPA, as discussed in 
Section 3.2.4.4a, the WTO DSB is entrusted with the power to adjudicate disputes and to give 
rulings binding upon the parties to the dispute. However, in terms of its discretion in interpreting the 
rules, the WTO DSB differs from the ECJ, in the sense that it is required to adhere to the exact 
wording of the treaty texts without adding or diminishing the rights and obligations provided in the 
agreement.  
More importantly, the interpreting role of the WTO DSB has been restricted owing to a lack of 
abundant cases brought before it. There is no designated organ within the WTO to actively pursue 
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breaches and to bring legal proceedings as the European Commission does in the context of the EC. 
As argued in Section 3.2.4.3, the GPA states’ freedom to promote national objectives is not so much 
affected by the fact that an adjudicative power is delegated to the DSB.  
The NAFTA procurement regime represents an even softer approach in terms of delegation. As 
examined in Section 4.3.4.4a, although it essentially delegates the legal authority to an ad hoc 
arbitral panel for formal adjudication, the recommendatory nature of the arbitral panel decision 
manifests its soft law nature – it involves a process of political bargaining to reach a mutually 
satisfactory resolution and disputing parties can accept or depart from the panel decision without 
legal justification. As a result, the delegation in the NAFTA does not pose any threat to the discretion 
member states currently have in pursuing national procurement policies. 
Moreover, as for soft law regimes involving no delegation of adjudicative or interpretative power 
such as the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs, states’ regulatory autonomy in procurement is 
best preserved under those soft law arrangements. For example, under the APEC NBPs, Member 
economies’ ability to employ procurement as a policy tool is in practice left unaffected, as they can 
always balance the NBPs with other domestic concerns and find appropriate ways to give effect to 
them, or even depart from one or more of the principles where they feel it is necessary (see Section 
4.6.3).   
Apart from unexpected sovereign costs associated with the delegation of judicial authority at the 
inter-governmental level, the delegation of legal authority to independent domestic courts or review 
bodies to interpret and apply the agreed international rules can cause similar unexpected costs. The 
right of private suppliers to invoke international rules directly before national review bodies marks a 
hard law feature of an international agreement.  
As mentioned above, private suppliers are in the best position to detect breaches as well as most 
motivated to file complaints. As argued by Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter, private access seems 
to increase the expansiveness of legal institution.16 The increased number of cases brought before 
                                                        
16
 Keohane, R.O., A. Moravcsik, and A.M. Slaughter (1997), ‘Toward a Theory of Legalization’, I.O.  
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national review bodies create more opportunities for them to interpret and apply the rules, which 
may have adverse impact on the ability of governments to implement national procurement policies.  
This is the case with the EC procurement rules. As examined in Section 4.1.4.4b, most substantive 
rules of the directives governing contract award procedures have direct effect. That is to say, private 
suppliers have the right to rely on the EC procurement rules before national courts even if states fail 
to properly transpose the rules into their national law. However, this direct link between the EC 
directives and domestic law found in the EC is unique among international agreements. As for other 
procurement agreements, international rules can only take effect in domestic legal system through 
legal incorporation or statutory recognition.  
In most national systems that do not give an international agreement direct effect, the agreement 
cannot be invoked before national courts unless the relevant national legislation has been adopted to 
implement it. In this sense, states have ultimate control over domestic courts or review bodies in 
interpreting and applying international procurement rules.  
For example, under the GPA, if a GPA member government maintains a procurement practice 
giving price preference to firms with sound environmental policies which is expressly permitted 
under the national law, then its national review body will be precluded from ruling out this practice 
through its interpretation of the GPA rules, no matter whether this practice is actually inconsistent 
with the GPA. In general, as with most procurement agreements, the domestic delegation generally 
implies lower sovereign costs for states in comparison with the delegation of legal authority to 
independent bodies at the international level.   
 
10.3.2 Possible disadvantage of soft law with a lower level of delegation 
Despite the fact that soft law with a low level of delegation may help reduce the negotiating, 
implementing, sovereignty costs associated with the relevant hard law, the possible disadvantages of 
soft law have also been identified in Section 2.4. Firstly, the use of soft law may affect the credibility 
of international agreements because of a lack of an effective deterrent to non-compliance and legal 
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uncertainty; and secondly, soft law may raise the subsequent inter-government transactional costs in 
the absence of a delegated body to interpret the agreed rules and to resolve disputes. Both of the 
above disadvantages are relevant to an international procurement agreement. 
 
10.3.2.1 Weakened credibility of obligations 
The choice of soft law with a low level of delegation in enforcement may arguably affect the 
credibility of the agreed rules by failing to provide an effective deterrent to non-compliance and to 
maintain legal consistency and predictability. At the inter-governmental level, some soft law 
procurement instruments such as the COMESA (see Section 4.5.4.4a) and the APEC NBPs (see 
Section 4.6.4.4a) directives do not delegate any third party with the authority to interpret the rules 
and to adjudicate disputes over the application of the rules.  
As explained in Section 8.3.2.2, international legal provisions must be interpreted to apply to 
specific factual situations, and in the absence of a delegated interpreting organ, states have the right 
of auto-interpretation which may lead to divergent interpretation and consequently inconsistent 
implementation of the rules.  
Meanwhile, as mentioned in Section 7.3.2, it is envisaged that states’ compliance with a 
procurement agreement with a trade objective may be challenged by significant political influence 
from domestic vested interest of its members. Without the authoritative interpretation from an 
independent party on the agreed rules, a significant risk exists that states may take advantage of the 
vagueness of rules and to interpret them in a way to facilitate protectionist measures in procurement 
under strong domestic political pressure from vested interests.  
Furthermore, even in the case of an apparent breach by a state, there are no independent third 
parties to which other states can make the complaint and no coercive enforcement measures such as 
sanctions can be awarded to address the non-compliance. It has been argued in Section 2.4.3 that 
compliance would be better fostered if allegations of non-compliance could be submitted to a sort of 
‘hard law’ dispute settlement that provides for judicial or quasi-judicial rulings.  
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Furthermore, the availability of coercive enforcement measures may encourage compliance in the 
sense that reluctant states would probably be convinced that the likelihood that a violation will be 
detected and sanctioned makes the expected costs of violation exceed those of compliance. For 
example, according to an empirical research in 2006, the compliance with EC procurement 
directives had increased over time and became substantial.17 Although there are many factors 
influencing state choice of compliance as identified in Section 2.4.1, it can be argued that the hard 
law enforcement system of the EC might be one of important factors which contribute to this 
relatively high level of compliance.  
In the absence of dispute settlement bodies and coercive enforcement measures, soft law 
procurement agreements seem to fail to provide an effective deterrent to non-compliance especially 
in view of the perceived strong internal negative political influence. 
Meanwhile, soft law in terms of delegation and its consequential divergent interpretation and 
application of the rules may also undermine the legal inconsistency and predictability of the rules, 
which is important in terms of encouraging the participation of foreign suppliers. Foreign suppliers 
are less willing to compete for procurement contracts in a system with which they are unsure 
whether the fair competition rules will be carried out and their rights will effectively protected in the 
case of violation of the rules.  
Nevertheless, despite the possibly weakened credibility of procurement agreements resulting from 
a low level of or no delegation in enforcement, it can be argued that carefully designed soft law 
enforcement measures could also induce states’ compliance and promote the confidence of foreign 
suppliers. That is to say, the disadvantage of soft law could be well addressed.  
Certain soft law preventative measures including self-reporting and policy review have been 
pointed out in Section 2.4.3 as measures to induce compliance, which mainly reply on efforts to 
inspect and evaluate state behaviours before violations occur rather than to detect and investigate 
                                                        
17
 See note 13, at pp. 15-48  
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them afterwards. Although such preventative measures do not involve formal adjudication and 
coercive force, they may to a certain extent raise obstacles to non-compliance.  
Most notably, peer review18, a soft law enforcement measure, is often employed by non-binding 
procurement agreements including the APEC NBPs (see Section 4.6.4.4.), the OECD Convention on 
Bribery (see Section 5.2.2.4) and the DAC Untying Aid Recommendation (see Section 6.5.3.4).  
In the context of OECD which provides a very institutionalised and systematic peer review system, 
peer review is conducted on a non-confrontational and non-adversarial basis. Under the review 
process, the review countries make documents and data available, the examining countries represent 
the collective body and guide the debate, and the OECD Secretariat supports the whole process. The 
core output of the peer review comes in form of a final report, which contains policy evaluations and 
recommendations for the reviewed country. Although the final report neither takes the form of a 
legal binding judgement nor involves coercive measures, it can arguably exert significant ‘peer 
pressure’ on states, and becomes important forces to stimulate states to make changes and meet 
standards.   
The publication and dissemination of self-reported and peer-assessed information also improves 
transparency and provides an opportunity for public critique and evaluation of a state’s procurement 
policies. This exposure or public shaming increases the reputation costs of violation, which may 
serve as a powerful spur to action towards compliance. Similar to the function of sanctions, states 
contemplating non-compliance may refrain from actual infringement of the rules when the relevant 
information on contract awards has to be reported and made available to other members and 
eventually the public. 
Furthermore, the disclosure of information regarding states’ national procurement system and 
their compliance with international procurement rules may help foreign suppliers better understand 
the procurement regimes of different states and encourage their participation in national regimes 
with sound procurement policies. Meanwhile, the availability of information regarding states’ 
                                                        
18
 For the meaning of peer review, see Section 5.2.2.4 
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compliance may also provide reassurance for each member that others are complying, which is 
important in respect of reciprocal nature of many procurement agreements.  
Despite the varying degrees of hardness in delegation at the inter-governmental level, most 
instruments including all examined under this thesis except the EDA Code demand/recommend the 
availability of national challenge procedures for aggrieved suppliers though with a different degree 
of hardness in delegation. Some require/recommend that the designated national challenge bodies be 
delegated with power to give legally binding adjudicative rulings, whilst others do not.  
In either case, the requirement/recommendation for the availability of national challenge 
procedures to a large extent empowers private suppliers to enforce the relevant agreement before 
national review bodies.19 States are obliged or recommended to establish and maintain under their 
national legislation a system which is competent to receive complaints from aggrieved suppliers 
against one of their public entities. This requirement/recommendation strengthens the credibility of 
soft law agreements by promoting the confidence of suppliers. A private supplier that knows that it 
can sue a procuring entity for violating international procurement rules before national courts is 
more likely to tender than one whose redress depends on the discretion of its own government to 
invoke inter-governmental dispute settlement procedures. 
 
10.3.2.2 Increased intergovernmental transactional costs 
Soft law that involves no delegation of judicial power to a third party may increase the costs of 
subsequent inter-governmental transactions. As for all international agreements, even for those that 
are very precise, their legal provisions must be interpreted to resolve ambiguity; and applied to 
specific fact situations and to address new and related issues. The delegation of judicial power to a 
third party can be regarded as an effective way to interpret international procurement law. 
Meanwhile, the delegation is also efficient in terms of updating international rules. As mentioned 
above, the absence of authoritative interpretations from the designated body leads to states’ right of 
                                                        
19
 However, the difference between the GPA/the NAFTA rules and the EC rules should be noted. See Section 2.2.4.4b, 
Section 4.3.4.4b and Section 4.1.4.4b.  
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auto-interpretation. If all the parties agree on a uniform interpretation, no problem will arise; and if, 
as frequently happens in practice, divergent views are held by different parties, disputes may then 
arise. However, under a soft law system without a delegated third party to adjudicate disputes, the 
parties to a dispute might spend years in political negotiations in order to reach a mutually 
acceptable solution. 
Moreover, as explained in Section 7.3.1.4, public procurement is a fast-evolving area for 
international regulation and international procurement agreements need to adapt to new 
technological and economic developments. In this regard, the delegation of judicial power to a third 
party can provide reasonable interpretation of the agreed rules taking into account the change of 
circumstances. However, in the case of soft law with no delegation of interpreting power to a third 
party, the fast-changing nature of procurement may demand constantly issuing legislative 
amendments to a binding procurement agreement, which often involve considerable delay especially 
in view of the complex procedural rules and coverage rules a procurement agreement may possibly 
have.  
Nevertheless, hard law with a high level of delegation is by no means the only way to address the 
evolving nature of procurement. As argued in the previous sections, the use of soft law in terms of 
non-bindingness (see Section 7.3.1.4) or in terms of vagueness (see Section 8.3.1.4) can also make a 
procurement agreement more capable of adapting to changes. 
 
10.4 Conclusion 
It has been argued that soft law in terms of delegation in enforcement can be regarded as a second 
best or even as a better alternative to the relevant hard law. It is often politically difficult for states to 
agree on a hard law enforcement system for a procurement agreement owing to the sensitive nature 
of its regulated subject and/or the informal political context in which the agreement is reached. Soft 
law with a lower level of delegation can play an important part where hard law is unachievable. It 
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can facilitate negotiations and promote agreements by mitigating the strong opposition from certain 
negotiating parties and avoids the failure of having no agreement. 
Furthermore, soft law enforcement systems may have the potential to develop into a relatively 
hard one over time, which can be illustrated by the development of the GPA enforcement 
procedures.  
Nevertheless, it is neither feasible nor desirable for all procurement regimes to move towards the 
hard law pole of enforcement system. Soft law with a low level of delegation can sometimes be 
more desirable than the relevant had law for various reasons. Soft law with a low level of delegation 
can reduce the negotiating and implementing costs of a hard law procurement agreement. But most 
important of all, it can largely avoid unanticipated sovereign costs associated with hard law and 
therefore preserve states’ regulatory autonomy to pursue legitimate national procurement policies. 
The exercise of judicial power by designated international bodies may impose unanticipated 
constraints on states’ regulatory freedom to promote legitimate national goals, as demonstrated by 
the ECJ’s interpretation of the EC procurement rules. The ECJ’s restrictive approach in judicial 
interpretation has deprived states of much of their previous freedom to pursue national procurement 
policies, which threatens to undermine the carefully designed regulatory balance achieved by 
member states.  
In contrast, soft law with a relatively lower level of delegation can largely avoid the unexpected 
sovereign costs associated with hard law. Even for procurement regimes involving the delegation of 
adjudicative power to a third party, the delegated power can be softened by limiting the mandate 
granted to the third party or by weakening the legal effect of its rulings, as it is the case with the 
GPA and the NAFTA procurement regime respectively. In both cases, states’ regulatory freedom in 
procurement is not much affected by the delegation of adjudicative power to the third party. 
However, states’ regulatory autonomy is best protected under soft law regimes without any 
delegation in enforcement such as the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs.  
Regarding the delegation of judicial authority to domestic review bodies, most procurement 
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regimes, with the exception of the EC directives which have direct effect, may often involve relative 
low sovereignty costs because the scope of judicial discretion of domestic review bodies is largely 
constrained by the relevant national implementing legislation. 
When it comes to the disadvantages of soft law with a low level of delegation, the first and 
foremost one discussed is the possibly affected credibility of the agreed rules. It has been argued that 
the choice of soft law may affect the credibility of a procurement agreement by failing to provide an 
effective deterrent to non-compliance and to maintain legal consistency and predictability. Without a 
designated interpreting organ at the inter-governmental level, there exists a significant risk that states 
may exploit their right of auto-interpretation and interpret procurement rules in a way to facilitate 
protectionist measures.  
Furthermore, in the absence of dispute settlement bodies and coercive enforcement measures, soft 
law may also be argued to fail to provide an effective deterrent to non-compliance especially in view 
of the perceived strong internal negative political influence.  
Secondly, it has also been argued that the choice of soft law in terms of delegation may increase 
the costs of subsequent inter-governmental transactions. The absence of an international adjudicative 
body to interpret and apply international procurement law may result in divergent interpretation 
among states and in the case of disputes frequent political bargaining. Also, soft law with no 
delegation of judicial power for reasonable interpretation with the change of circumstances, the 
fast-evolving nature of procurement may require constant legislation amendments to a binding 
procurement agreement. 
Nevertheless, the possible disadvantages of using soft law in terms of delegation can be largely 
avoided if it is well designed. It has been pointed out that certain soft law enforcement measures 
could also serve the function of inducing states’ compliance and promoting the confidence of foreign 
suppliers. A carefully designed peer review system, for example, can generate significant political 
pressure on states to comply. The disclosure of self-reported and peer-assessed information increases 
the reputation costs of non-compliance and helps foreign suppliers to better understand the 
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procurement system of different states.  
Furthermore, the fact that most soft law procurement instruments also recommend the availability 
of national challenges procedures for aggrieved suppliers may to a certain extent enhance the 
credibility of such soft law regimes because of increased confidence on the part of private suppliers.  
Moreover, except hard law in terms of delegation, soft law can offer a number of attractive 
alternatives for dealing with changing circumstances. Consequently, soft law with a lower level of 
delegation in enforcement may arguably produce similar effects of the relevant hard law but with 
reduced costs. 
Chapter 11 Proposals for Developing a Multilateral Agreement on 
Government Procurement by Use of Soft Law 
 
11.1 Introduction  
As discussed in previous chapters, discriminatory public procurement practices in many countries 
present a significant barrier to international trade however they remain largely unaddressed by 
international trade regulation. Having recognised the economic importance of public procurement, a 
number of international instruments with different objectives, approaches as well as other key 
features have been brought in to regulate procurement, many of which have been examined in the 
current thesis. 
With regard to international instruments with trade objectives, the first one examined was the GPA, 
which remains the most important instrument regulating procurement under the WTO despite its 
plurilateral nature (See Chapter 3). Meanwhile, major regional procurement instruments have been 
discussed including the EC procurement rules, the NAFTA chapter 10, Chapter XVIII of the third 
draft of the FTAA agreement, the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs (see Chapter 4). 
Additionally, some other international instruments regulating procurement towards market 
liberalisation have been reviewed i.e. the UNCITRAL Model Law and the OECD Bribery 
Convention (see Chapter 5).  
Besides those international instruments with the aim of free trade, many international instruments 
regulating procurement but with major objectives other than trade have also been addressed such as 
the World Bank’s rules governing its aid-funded procurement, the CPAR and international initiatives 
to untie aid (Chapter 6). 
However, it can be seen that no international disciplines are currently available at the multilateral 
level to regulate public procurement from a trade perspective. In view of the potential of 
procurement markets for international trade, there are international initiatives to develop multilateral 
disciplines on procurement, which mainly include the initiative to negotiate an agreement on 
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transparency in government procurement and the requirement under the GATS Article XIII.2 to 
institute negotiations on government procurement in services. However, as pointed out in Section 3.3 
and Section 3.4, both initiatives have now effectively been put on hold mainly due to the strong 
opposition against multilateral rules on procurement from many WTO members, especially 
developing countries members.  
Based on the previous analysis, states’ major concerns about entering into a multilateral 
agreement in procurement are arguably as follows: 
1. Many countries especially developing countries oppose the very idea of getting involved in a 
procurement agreement for both their legitimate and illegitimate concerns:  
” Legitimate concerns: they may fear that discretion in pursuing value for money and 
legitimate secondary objectives will be unduly restricted; and fear the possibly high 
negotiating and implementing costs of international procurement agreements 
” Illegitimate concerns: they may desire to continue using procurement as a policy tool to 
favour domestic industries; their corrupt officials may derive illegitimate personal or 
political gains from corrupt procurement practice and they may dislike the transparency 
rules of procurement agreements which make corruption more difficult 
2. Even states not opposed to international regulation in procurement are unlikely to support an 
agreement that does not offer significant benefits. 
  This Chapter will set out both the short-term and the long-term proposals for achieving an 
international agreement in procurement at the multilateral level. Without attempting to propose any 
substantive rules for a future multilateral procurement agreement, this chapter will explore ways in 
which soft law can be used to develop multilateral disciplines on procurement. Also, these two 
proposals are not tied to any particular institutional context like the WTO or any other international 
fora, existing or not yet existing. Thus, suggestions will be made without considering constrains set 
by any existing institutional approach to certain issues.  
Section 11.2 will discuss the feasibility of achieving a multilateral procurement agreement in the 
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short run by use of soft law, which will focus on the ways soft law can mitigate the negative political 
influence from domestic vested interests and thus help achieve a procurement agreement at 
multilateral level. Attainable soft law multilateral rules might arguably serve as a second best to 
unachievable hard law rules. Section 11.3 will set out a long-term proposal by exploring how 
hard/soft law can better serve the particular features of procurement in many respects as well as 
addressing the legitimate concerns of participating states. Even where hard law multilateral 
procurement rules could be reached, soft law may still be preferred to hard law in certain cases. 
Section 11.4 will conclude.   
 
11.2 A short-term proposal – the use of soft law as a second best to hard law where the latter is 
unachievable  
11.2.1 The imbalance in supply capability between developed and developing countries and its 
political implication for a future multilateral procurement agreement 
In the short run, it seems virtually impossible to achieve a hard law multilateral procurement 
agreement because of the unwillingness of many countries especially developing countries to accept 
any hard law international procurement regulation. The attitude of developing countries can be 
understood by looking at their response to the existing GPA. Except for Singapore and Hong Kong, 
no other developing country/area is currently a party to the GPA1, and even Singapore and Hong 
Kong have long been considered developed countries by many international organisations such as 
the IMF.2  
Although states that are currently negotiating accession to the GPA include many developing 
countries, it has been explained in Section 3.2.4.3 that most of these developing countries are new 
                                                        
1
 There is no widely accepted definition for the categorization of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. According to the 
UN, in common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in North America, Australia and New Zealand in 
Oceania, and Western European are considered ‘developed’ countries or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern 
African Customs Union is also treated as a developed region and Israel is a developed country; countries of eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union are not included under either developed or developing countries. The rest are developing 
countries or areas. See the UN Statistics Division, Definition of developed and developing countries (Code 491), available 
at  <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=491> 
2
 See International Monetary Fund; Country Information, available at <http://www.imf.org/external/country/sgp/index> 
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WTO members and they are doing so mainly because of the legal commitments they have 
undertaken as part of their WTO accession process WTO, as demanded by the EC and other GPA 
parties.  
It has become obvious that if a GPA type of hard law was to be made multilateral it would not be 
acceptable to most developing countries in the near future, which is the major reason behind the 
Singapore Ministerial Decision to restrict the proposed transparency agreement to the issue of 
transparency excluding market access commitments. However, despite the limited ambitions for the 
proposed transparency agreement, it has failed to be taken forward for negotiations during the Doha 
Round.  
As explained in Section 3.3.1, the failure to commence negotiating the proposed transparency 
agreement apparently results from substantial disagreements among the WTO members over a 
number of major issues, but more substantially reveals the difficulty in reconciling the opposite 
positions held by developed and developing countries – developed countries are keen to grab a 
greater share of the developing countries’ procurement markets but developing countries still desire 
to preserve their current discriminatory procurement policies.  
Although even unilateral liberalisation of a state’s own procurement market could have evident 
economic benefits such as better value for taxpayer’s money and more competitive national 
industries3, states are unlikely to do so for political reasons. Taxpayers who may gain significantly 
from increased foreign competition are too numerous and each have too little at stake to be 
organised politically to support liberalisation, while lobbyists representing the interests of national 
industries protected under discriminatory procurement policies and/or public officials having 
illegitimate interests in corrupt procurement practices can exert significant political pressure against 
market liberalisation.  
Many international trade agreements address this problem by earning political support for 
liberalisation from exporters through promoting the exchange of market access concessions. The 
                                                        
3
 It has been proven that protectionist procurement polices are not generally successful in promoting their economic 
development and sometimes even do more harm than good to the protected industries (Section 3.1.2.4.3) 
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support of export interests for liberalisation is expected to counter the opposition imposed by 
protected interests. However, it seems that this technique, used in many other trade agreements such 
as the GATT, does not work the same way in the particular area of procurement owing to the 
asymmetry in the distribution of potential import competing costs and export benefits between 
developed and developing countries.  
As elaborated in Section 9.2, compared with developed countries, developing countries may 
generally expect much tougher political opposition towards an international agreement liberalising 
procurement markets. Developing countries’ less competitive industries, which are beneficiaries 
under discriminatory procurement policies, will be more active in lobbying their governments not to 
join in any procurement agreement, as they are more vulnerable to foreign competition. Meanwhile, 
corrupt procurement practices are most rampant in many developing countries with loose or opaque 
procurement laws and their corrupt public officials and politicians may become another political 
force against any international discipline in procurement.  
However, the compensating offset of political support can hardly be mobilised from the export 
industries of developing countries because of their limited capacity to compete in the procurement 
markets of developed countries: both their relative weak competitiveness and the lack of expertise 
required in filing the tenders prevent them from competing in the procurement market of developed 
countries. 
Furthermore, this asymmetry between developed and developing countries is considerably 
exacerbated by the approach of strict reciprocity employed by many procurement agreements such 
as the GPA. Under the principle of reciprocity, parties to the GPA work out bilaterally the economic 
equivalence of market concessions between themselves and have extensive derogations from MFN 
to other parties which do not offer reciprocal concessions.4  
As argued in Section 3.2.4.3, this approach largely restricts developing countries’ discretion in 
negotiating the coverage of procurement of their interests simply because of their limited bargaining 
                                                        
4
 For detailed discussion, see Section 3.1.2.2 
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power. Although the GPA includes special provisions on negotiation involving developing countries, 
they have been criticised for being too soft to have any practical significance for developing 
countries.5 In practice, developing country applicants have often been requested by existing parties 
to the GPA to offer extensive coverage while finding them increasingly difficult to obtain 
derogations and in the end many have been discouraged from participation in the Agreement as a 
whole. 
With regard to the proposed transparency agreement in procurement, although it was explicitly 
limited to the transparency aspects, many developing countries still shared the fear that a multilateral 
transparency agreement would only be an intermediate step towards a full-blown GPA-like 
agreement with market access commitments, which only serves the export interests of the developed 
countries, given the imbalance in supply capability between developed and developing countries. 
Meanwhile, little political support can be gained from the export interests of developing countries by 
excluding the issue of market access. This may largely explain the failure to negotiate the proposed 
transparency agreement during the Doha Round.   
 
11.2.2 Possible ways to address the asymmetry and promote the participation of developing 
countries in a future multilateral agreement 
Consequently, in order to break the political logjam that prevents developing countries from 
liberalising their procurement markets, we can maximize domestic political support from their 
export interest or minimize the political opposition from their protected interest or do the both.  
Despite the failed initiatives to attract the participation of developing countries at the international 
level, many regional procurement instruments have been successful in involving members with 
different levels of development, which may provide useful guidance for a future multilateral 
procurement agreement. Under many regional regimes such as the EC and the NAFTA, the 
procurement rules form an integral part of these regional trade agreements addressing a wide range 
                                                        
5
 For detailed analysis, see Section3.1.2.4.3 
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of trade-related issues.  
It can be argued that the linkage between procurement and other trade issues under a single trade 
arrangement facilitates the acceptance of procurement rules even when there is a strong opposition 
from domestic vested interests. States that claims that adhering to the procurement rules would be 
disadvantageous to its development might still make compromises for the sake of potential benefits 
they could gain in other sectors from participating in a comprehensive regional trade liberalization 
programme. 
  At the international level, the success of the WTO Uruguay Round can partly be attributed to its 
negotiating strategy that involves linking issues across multiple sectors. The single undertaking 
concept of the Uruguay Round has allowed negotiating parties to overcome domestic obstacles to 
liberalisation by broadening the negotiation stakes. However, the plurilateral nature of the GPA 
places it outside the single undertaking for WTO membership, which largely denies the possibility of 
linking procurement to other areas which interest developing countries under the WTO from the 
outset.  
Although the role of the GPA has begun to change and prospective new WTO members are often 
requested to undertake a commitment to join the GPA as a precondition for their WTO accession6, it 
does not make any difference to the vast majority of existing WTO members which are not parties to 
the GPA and might never be. 
Apart from gaining political support from export interests, another possible way to achieve a 
future multilateral procurement agreement is to reduce the current political opposition of many 
developing countries towards the liberalisation of their procurement markets. In this regard, the 
experience of many regional procurement instruments may be valuable when it comes to their use of 
soft law to reach compromises and consensus.  
 
11.2.3. A short-term proposal  
                                                        
6
 For more discussion, see Section 7.2.1.1 
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Having reviewed various international and regional procurement instruments as well as examined 
the role of soft law serving as a second best to hard law, a short-term soft law proposal with market 
access commitments, consisting of a non-binding form, a low level of precision, a high level of 
discretion and a low level of delegation, is raised in this chapter for a future multilateral procurement 
agreement.  
This proposal is put forward on the basis that no hard law procurement agreement with the wide 
participation of developing countries is currently available and an achievable soft law multilateral 
agreement is better than none. As a result, the proposal is designed mainly with the aim to reduce 
political resistance to a multilateral procurement agreement especially from developing countries 
and overcome deadlocks during negotiations. 
Different from the proposed transparency agreement, the multilateral procurement agreement 
proposed in this chapter will include both market access commitments and transparency rules. This 
is because the value of a multilateral procurement agreement solely addressing the issue of 
transparency would be doubtful given its limited benefits of market liberalisation and potentially 
high costs of negotiation and implementation. 
 Furthermore, from the experience of negotiating the proposed transparency agreement as 
mentioned above, it can be learnt that although the issue of market access was explicitly excluded, 
many developing countries still believed that the proposed transparency agreement would only be a 
first and tactical measure to be taken to eventually improve market access for the exporters of 
developed countries. Therefore it seems that putting the market access issue back on the negotiation 
table for a multilateral procurement agreement would be unlikely to provoke more political 
opposition than has been generated for the proposed transparency agreement. However, it is assumed 
that a multilateral procurement agreement with market access commitments would mobilise more 
political support from domestic exporters than one without as the former might increase the 
probability of them winning profitable contracts from foreign governments.   
  Under the short-term proposal, member states will only undertake non-binding legal obligations, 
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which are worded in a vague and imprecise way and leave states a very broad discretion in 
implementation. As far as the coverage is concerned, developed country members will be 
recommended to extend all market access concessions they have made under other procurement 
regimes to developing country members, while developing country members will be encouraged to 
include as much procurement and as many entities as possible.  
Also, this proposed multilateral agreement will include neither inter-government dispute 
settlement mechanism nor coercive enforcement measures. Certain soft law preventative measures 
will instead be employed including self-reporting and policy review, which mainly rely on efforts to 
inspect and evaluate state behaviour before violations occur rather than to detect and investigate 
them afterwards. 
 
11.2.4 The short-term proposal to mitigate political oppositions and to induce agreement - how 
does it work? 
Firstly and most importantly, the choice of soft law in terms of non-bindingness is argued to be the 
key to making a multilateral procurement agreement acceptable to many countries especially 
developing countries. For the reasons explained above, the idea of a future multilateral agreement is 
currently unappealing to most developing countries.  
  Both the limited membership of the GPA and the failed experience of negotiating the proposed 
multilateral transparency agreement in procurement reveal the reluctance of many developing 
countries to participate in any procurement agreement. In particular, as shown in the exercise of 
negotiating the proposed transparency agreement, the unsettled disagreement over its binding nature 
was considered as one of the major impediments to the successful conclusion of the proposed 
agreement.  
As pointed out in Section 2.3.1, soft law can be instrumental in reaching an international 
agreement, and among all the four dimensions of soft law, non-bindingness is regarded as the first 
and foremost means to overcome deadlocks and foster compromises where there are substantive 
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disagreements. As for the failed initiative to negotiate the proposed transparency agreement, it has 
been argued in Section 7.2 that almost all other substantial disagreements over the content and the 
form of the agreement would probably have been resolved had a non-binding form been agreed upon 
it.  
More importantly, the different position held by developing countries and developed ones could 
probably have been reconciled by means of non-binding, soft law. On the one hand, as with 
developing countries, it is more likely that the strong political opposition from their domestic vested 
interests to the proposed agreement would be very much mitigated because a procurement agreement 
of a non-binding nature leaves them with absolute freedom to respond in the case of unfavourable 
circumstances. On the other hand, developed countries with the aim to open up developing 
countries’ procurement market, would probably prefer a non-binding agreement to no agreement at 
all because it can serve as an intermediate step towards a future binding, hard law agreement. 
Although there is no firm evidence for the proposition that a non-binding procurement agreement 
with market access commitments would be widely acceptable to both developed and developing 
countries as none exists at present, it can be argued that a non-binding multilateral procurement 
agreement might possibly be achievable in the near future.  
Soft law in terms of non-bindingness has been repeatedly resorted to as a method to overcome 
deadlocks and to promote agreement in many areas of international law. The use of non-binding soft 
law can help to reconcile different positions and produce an international agreement where there are 
strong political oppositions and there is no clear political support in many negotiating states. The 
negotiating history of the OECD instruments combating foreign bribery in international business 
transactions provides a good example on this point.  
As elaborated in Section 5.2.2.1, before the OECD initiatives on combating bribery, the U.S., 
which was the only country outlawing exterritorial bribery, had repeatedly tried to bring about 
comprehensive international anti-bribery legislation with the aim of levelling the playing field for 
American firms in international business. However, all those U.S. efforts had failed because it had 
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no interest-based, negotiating leverage within the issue area.  
When the U.S. first brought the issue of foreign bribery to the OECD, similarly, other OECD 
members were not genuinely interested in negotiating an international anti-bribery agreement and 
many even openly opposed any anti-bribery intervention since they had strong political incentives to 
allow their export industries to engage in foreign bribery. During the negotiations, some negotiating 
parties attempted to use the high costs of a binding treaty to impede any agreement on this issue. The 
U.S. responded by taking a gradualist approach to advocate non-binding rules instead and eventually 
achieved its ultimate goal of concluding a binding convention through a series of non-binding 
Recommendations.7 
The success of the OECD anti-bribery initiatives is enlightening for a future multilateral 
procurement agreement. Both of the subject areas are sensitive for international regulation in terms 
of political resistance from domestic vested interests of many states – the former was from expert 
industries having illegitimate gains from foreign bribery, while the latter mainly from domestic 
industries protected by national discriminatory procurement policies.  
Moreover, insufficient political support can be harnessed to counteract political opposition in both 
cases: as for the anti-bribery initiative, the U.S. could not offer any reciprocal anticorruption 
concession to other negotiating parties as it had already put the relevant national law in place; in the 
case of a multilateral procurement agreement, the reciprocal market concession offered by developed 
countries may not be very attractive to most developing countries because of the latter’s limited 
supply ability. 
Therefore for similar reasons, insisting on a binding hard law form at an early stage for a 
multilateral procurement agreement may render negotiations in deadlock and block the conclusion of 
any agreement on the issue, as happened with the initiative to negotiate a multilateral transparency 
agreement in procurement.  
  In contrast, a non-binding multilateral procurement may more likely be accepted by many 
                                                        
7
 The detailed discussion on the negotiating process towards the OECD anti-bribery instruments can be found in Section 
5.2.2.1.   
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countries especially developing countries. By reviewing existing procurement instruments, one can 
find that the procurement instruments which currently attract most developing country members are 
of a non-binding nature, notably, the APEC NBPs and the COMESA non-binding directives. 
Although the majority of developing countries are indifferent to the membership of binding 
procurement agreements such as the GPA, many of them are actively participating in non-binding 
regional procurement regimes.  
As has been examined in Section 4.6.1, the non-binding APEC NBPs attract the participation of a 
wide variety of both developed and developing countries including those that are unwilling to join 
the GPA or the proposed transparency agreement. The COMSA non-binding directives have 20 
member states, most of which are developing countries (see Section 4.5.1). It may suggest that many 
countries especially developing countries are more likely to commit themselves to non-binding 
multilateral procurement disciplines. 
   Furthermore, a non-binding multilateral procurement agreement may have the potential to 
harden up into a binding one. In the above example, although the OECD anti-bribery initiative 
initially only resulted in some non-binding Recommendations, these non-binding instruments were 
used to build up consensus for the later passage of a binding convention.  
This use of non-binding soft law as an intermediate step towards binding hard law can also be 
found in the area of procurement. For example, the COMESA non-binding principles were adopted 
towards the final realisation of a legally binding regional agreement within the region (see Section 
4.5.4.1). It has been argued in Section 7.2 that non-binding procurement rules can provide 
participating states with good opportunities to know more about the subject matter and to build up 
more confidence and consensus, which may contribute to the final conclusion of legally binding 
rules in the future. Therefore, as for states, especially developed countries, aiming for legally 
binding trade regulations in procurement, a non-binding multilateral agreement may still be valuable 
in terms of its potential to develop into a binding instrument.  
  As a result, it can be argued that non-binding soft law would probably help to reach a multilateral 
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procurement agreement mainly by promoting compromises between different states. States that are 
reluctant to join any procurement agreement might nevertheless be persuaded to accept a 
non-binding one because of their reduced domestic political opposition towards it, while some others 
with the ultimate aim of a binding multilateral agreement could still accept it by regarding it as an 
intermediate step towards future binding hard law.  
  Secondly, soft law in terms of a low level of precision can also facilitate the negotiation of a 
multilateral agreement in procurement. As we discussed in Section 2.2.3, the degree of precision in 
international rules may affect the degree of discretion states have in implementing their obligations 
though it is not necessarily the case. With regard to a multilateral procurement agreement, many 
states especially developing countries may prefer vague international disciplines to detailed ones in 
general. In the case of the proposed transparency agreement, many WTO members insisted that a 
simple and flexible agreement, without defining in any detail the content of national procurement 
procedures, should be negotiated (see Section 3.3.5.2).   
Given the reaction of most developing countries to the proposed transparency agreement, it is 
reasonable to expect that many developing countries would similarly be suspicious of the real aim of 
any future multilateral procurement agreement. Even for those without such suspicion, they would at 
least have some doubts over the possible outcomes of a multilateral procurement agreement because 
they might never have participated in any international procurement regime. 
Therefore when negotiating a multilateral procurement agreement, it would be not surprising that 
many states might desire to commit themselves only to vague rules which leave them a broad 
discretion on implementation to avoid the possibility of being caught up in prescriptive rules. In this 
sense, the use of vague soft law could generally make it easier for many developing countries to 
agree on the concrete content of the multilateral procurement agreement proposed in this chapter. 
  Besides the role of vague soft law to address the special concerns of developing countries, it can 
also be useful in terms of tackling controversial issues in negotiations. The choice of vague soft law 
allows negotiating parties to achieve a mutually preferred compromise on difficult issues and to 
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avoid the controversies impeding the successful conclusion of the agreement. For example, it has 
been widely used to deal with the issue of national challenge procedures in many procurement 
agreements such as the GPA (see Section 8.2).  
In a similar way, vague soft law can be used for a multilateral procurement agreement in the case 
of certain controversies threatening to upset the overall deal during negotiations. Rather than hold up 
the overall agreement, vague soft law provisions could be formulated on controversial issues to 
allow negotiating parties to proceed with the rest of the agreement.   
However, it should be noted that the use of vague soft law may not always be necessary in the 
context of the proposed short-term agreement. This is because the non-binding nature of the 
proposed multilateral procurement agreement enables participating states to retain ultimate control 
over whether or how to implement the rules. Consequently, it would be much easier for members 
with different concerns to agree on its precise content than would otherwise be the case.  
Furthermore, as explained in Section 8.3.1.3, not all precise procedural rules restrict state 
discretion: it is perfectly possible for a provision to be worded in a very precise way but still allow 
considerable discretion in its implementation; and precision can even be used to grant discretion by 
precisely elaborating escape clauses or expressly stating Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) 
to developing country members. Obviously, the inclusion of such precise provisions in a future 
multilateral procurement agreement would be welcomed by negotiating states, which have various 
doubts or suspicion about the agreement. 
  Thirdly, it can be argued that the use of soft law in terms of a high degree of discretion also helps 
the conclusion of the proposed multilateral agreement in the near future. This extents to the high 
degree of discretion states have in both negotiating and implementing their obligations. 
With regard to state discretion in negotiations, the proposed short-term multilateral agreement 
allows states freely to decide which kinds of procurement contracts are covered and to what extent 
they are regulated. In other words, states are allowed to exclude particularly sensitive sectors or 
entities from international regulation and negotiate derogations for their own specific industrial 
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polices. It has been pointed out in Section 9.2 that the freedom states have in negotiating their 
country-specific coverage enables them to reach a reasonably broad coverage for every member state 
under many binding procurement regimes such the GPA and the NAFTA. 
  In terms of negotiating a non-binding multilateral procurement agreement, the flexible approach 
in coverage can help negotiating parties to reach an agreement by avoiding the direct objection from 
particularly strong political forces and interest groups domestically. This is particularly important in 
view of the perceived strong political opposition from domestic vested interests of many developing 
countries against the conclusion of any multilateral procurement agreement (see Section 11.2.1). 
Therefore soft law with a higher degree of discretion reduces the likelihood of negotiations being 
blocked by domestic vested interest of negotiating states. 
Moreover, different from those binding procurement agreements which grant a broad discretion in 
negotiating the coverage issue, the proposed multilateral agreement would not have to face the 
problem of reciprocity on coverage owing to its non-binding nature. Like most non-binding 
procurement agreements, there would be no need for states to negotiate and draft detailed coverage 
rules and reciprocity-based derogations for a non-binding multilateral agreement in procurement. It 
can generally be suggested that the agreement should be applied as widely as possible.  
Further, in consideration of the imbalance in supply ability between developed and developing 
countries as we have explained in Section 11.2.1, developed country members may be recommended 
to extend their market access concessions made under other procurement regimes unconditionally to 
all developing country members within the proposed short-term multilateral agreement. 
This approach would not do any significant harm to developed countries but instead could benefit 
them in the long run. Due to the limited supply ability of developing countries, the extension of 
market access to developing countries would be unlikely to impose an imminent threat to the 
procurement markets of developed countries. Instead it could provide a good opportunity for 
developing countries to compete in foreign markets and possibly to identify their exporting strengths, 
which might make them more interested in entering into a future hard law multilateral agreement.  
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As with state discretion in implementation, a high level of discretion may derive from the way in 
which the substantive content of the proposed multilateral agreement is drafted. Soft law provisions 
either being couched in vague words to leave discretion or precisely stated to grant discretion can be 
helpful for reaching a compromise in negotiating a future multilateral agreement in procurement. 
However, even if the legislative text is drafted in a restrictive way, the non-binding form of the 
proposed agreement itself could grant participating states a very broad discretion in implementing 
their obligations. Therefore, it would be much easier for negotiating states to agree on such 
restrictively drafted but non-binding provisions than ones which impose rigid and binding 
obligations.   
Lastly, the choice of soft law with a low level of delegation could also make it easier to achieve 
the proposed multilateral agreement. As demonstrated by the failed initiative to negotiate the 
proposed transparency agreement, insisting on the use of a hard law enforcement system by some 
states may reduce the likelihood of some others, notably developing country parties, to accept new 
commitments in procurement, leading to the breakdown of negotiations as a whole.  
As a result, the short-term proposal for a future multilateral agreement will not include any 
coercive enforcement measures and instead, it may mainly employ soft law preventive measures 
such as peer review and self-reporting to induce state compliance. This soft law approach in 
enforcement may ease the concerns of many developing countries as well as mitigate political 
opposition from domestic vested interests. 
In sum, it can be seen that the short term proposal may tackle the illegitimate concerns of states 
and promote agreement by mitigating political opposition from domestic vested interests. Given the 
economic and political reality of developing countries, the use of non-binding soft law has been 
argued as the most decisive factor in terms of achieving a multilateral procurement in the near future. 
Moreover, the use of soft law in terms of vagueness, in terms of discretion, and in terms of 
delegation has also been considered as being instrumental in negotiating the agreement though none 
of them will play the same important role as non-binding soft law.  
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 11.2.5. The possible limitations of the short-term proposal 
Even if the short-term proposal could be achieved, there would be some possible limitations on the 
effects of the agreement. In particular, a doubt can naturally be raised over whether, or to what extent, 
states will respect the agreed rules. This is because the proposed agreement is soft law in all respects, 
which lacks the function of hard law to strengthen the credibility of commitment. Its non-binding 
nature will deny any formal legal consequence in the case of violating the agreed rules and there will 
be no independent third parties to which complaints can be made and no coercive enforcement 
measures can be used to address non-compliance under its soft law enforcement system. Moreover, 
its use of soft law in terms of vagueness and discretion will provide states with opportunities to shirk 
their obligations. 
However, it is possible that the enforcement of the soft law rules might still be assured by 
introducing a well-designed soft law monitoring system including the establishment of peer review 
system and self-reporting system. The inclusion of an OECD-type peer review system8 in the 
proposed short-term agreement may generate peer pressure to stimulate state compliance with the 
soft law rules.  
A self-reporting system requiring states to expose the relevant pre and post procurement 
information to public scrutiny may also serve as a powerful spur to the observance of the soft law 
rules by increasing the reputation costs of violation. 9  As elaborated in Section 10.3, such 
preventative measures may to a certain extent raise obstacles to non-compliance despite the fact that 
they do not involve formal adjudication and coercive force.  
Nevertheless, although the introduction of such soft law monitoring mechanisms can arguably 
induce states’ compliance, their actual effects in the area of procurement are still open to debate, 
especially in view of the perceived challenge from strong negative political influences. Nevertheless, 
no matter how effective the proposed agreement may be, the conclusion of a multilateral 
                                                        
8
 For detailed discussion on the OECD peer review system, see Section 5.2.2.4. 
9
 For detailed discussion on the role of a self-reporting system, see Section 2.4.6.1. 
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procurement agreement would be better than the current situation of no agreement at all and its value 
can also be seen in its potential to develop into a hard law agreement. 
Different from this short-term soft law proposal, the next section is to set out a long-term proposal 
based on the assumption that even if a hard law procurement instrument is attainable at the 
multilateral level, certain soft law elements will be still preferred to the hard law ones because of the 
particular features of public procurement. The long-term model will focus on how hard/soft law 
better functions in the context of a multilateral procurement agreement. Therefore it will combine 
both hard and soft law elements for future multilateral disciplines on public procurement. 
 
11.3 A long-term proposal – the choice of soft law as a better alternative to hard law 
So based on the analysis in previous chapters, this section will firstly identify the specific features 
and concerns of public procurement from an international regulatory perspective. A long-term 
proposal will then be raised in consideration of those features and concerns. It will mainly explore 
the way in which the proposed long-term model could address those features and concerns and lastly 
explain its limitations. 
11.3.1. The Main Features of Public Procurement and their implications for International 
Regulation 
11.3.1.1. Intrusiveness 
First of all, it has been argued in Section 7.3.1.3 that international public procurement rules tend to 
be more intrusive in comparison with many other areas of international trade law. As a general 
feature of international trade law, international procurement rules are designed to ensure market 
access and not directly promote economic efficiency or social welfare. On the contrary, they may 
sometimes be at odds with such national goals.  
However, different from international regulations addressing trade barriers imposed at the border, 
international procurement rules deal with discriminatory procurement measures, originating from 
government decisions or required by national legislation, and thus are more intrusive on national 
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regulatory autonomy.10  
  Furthermore, the intrusiveness of international procurement agreements may also result from the 
particular way in which they tackle national discriminatory procurement practices. As we have seen 
from the previous reviews on various procurement instruments, the common approach of 
procurement agreements is to lay down general principles of non-discrimination as well as minimum 
procedural rules governing the award of contracts to ensure transparency.  
While it is true that transparency procedural rules can enhance equal market access to foreign 
suppliers by making the concealed discrimination more difficult, the details of transparency rules 
contained in many binding procurement agreements may also restrict states’ ability to achieve better 
value for money and high efficiency in procurement and to utilise procurement to promote social or 
environmental objectives (see Section 7.3.1.3). 
  Consequently, there is a need to consider national objectives when designing international 
procurement rules. The challenge here is to develop multilateral procurement rules which effectively 
tackle protectionist practices but without infringing the right of countries to pursue legitimate 
national goals. In other words, a balance should be struck between the free trade objective and the 
ability of governments to implement legitimate domestic policies. Although this is the unchanging 
theme of all international trade agreements, this balance is particularly important for a multilateral 
procurement agreement owing to its instructive nature.  
 
11.3.1.2 Sensitivity 
Secondly, as explained in Section 7.2, public procurement is generally a sensitive subject area for 
international regulation because states have a long tradition of utilising procurement as a policy tool 
and often desire to retain their regulatory freedom in this area for both illegitimate and legitimate 
reasons.  
Some reasons are common to all trade topics whilst others are special to procurement. For 
                                                        
10
 For detailed discussion, see Section 7.2.3.1 
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example, like many other trade barriers such as tariff, quotas and subsidies, states may desire to use 
procurement to implement their protectionist measures favouring uncompetitive national industries 
or to promote social or environmental objectives. However, compared with other trade barriers, 
preferential procurement policies are politically more convenient and can often be implemented 
without parliamentary approval and the costs of policies are more invisible. 
Furthermore, the implementation of procurement policies have become increasingly important to 
many states as other types of trade barriers have been ruled out by international trade agreements. 
Apart from the difficulty of getting states involved in a multilateral procurement agreement as we 
discussed in the last section, it is also more difficult to ensure that states will in reality comply with 
the agreement.  
  As pointed out in Section 7.2, the difficulty has been proven in eliminating national 
discriminatory procurement policies owing to political reasons. Similar to other international free 
trade rules, it is envisaged that states’ compliance with international procurement rules may be 
severely challenged by significant political influence from lobbyists representing interests of certain 
categories of national industries, which are beneficiaries of previous discriminatory trade policies.  
However, in the particular area of procurement, such negative political pressure may even come 
from public officials who have illegitimate interests in corrupt procurement practices. Elections or 
other large social or political events may often change the bargaining power of domestic 
bureaucratic and political groups, which makes it possible for domestic interest groups, including the 
successor of governments, to undo their legal obligations under an international procurement 
agreement. Therefore, in consideration of the perceived challenge of negative political influence, it 
is particularly important for a future multilateral procurement agreement to include an appropriate 
institutional design of a compliance system to ensure the credibility of member states’ commitments. 
 
11.3.1.3 Complexity  
Next, public procurement has also been argued to be a complex area for international regulation and 
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the complexity of issues relating to procurement could possibly lead to complicated rules.11 In 
practice, many procurement rules have been considered complicated for both international 
negotiation and national implementation.12  
Firstly, the coverage of most binding procurement agreements such as the GPA (see Section 3.2.2) 
and the NAFTA (see Section 4.3.2) are very complex. Due to the sensitive nature of procurement, 
member states of these agreements are only prepared to subject certain types of procurement to 
international competition, which vary from state to state, and the relevant negotiation is conducted 
bilaterally based on the principle of reciprocity in terms of market opportunities (see Section 7.2). 
  Consequently, with the aim to expand the coverage to the greatest extent possible, most 
procurement regimes, instead of formulating uniform coverage rules for all member states, allow 
every member to have its own country-specific coverage with a detailed and complicated list of 
derogations to different members. However, despite its increased flexibility for negotiating parties 
and consequential wider coverage for a procurement agreement, the difference in coverage along 
with the principle of reciprocity adds much more difficulty to negotiations.13 An exception can be 
found in the EC procurement regime, which lays down a uniform as well as comprehensive coverage 
for all states. But this is mainly due to the EC’s similarly minded membership as well as highly 
integrated institutional context (see Section 4.1.4.3). 
  It seems that the coverage issue would be more problematic for a future multilateral agreement 
with a substantially higher number of members. On the one hand, if it adopts the EC’s approach to 
include uniform rules for coverage, its coverage would be scaled down to the level of the lowest 
common denominator, and the coverage which could be accepted by a large number of diversified 
states is assumed to be minimum if any, which would be no comparison to the EC’s broad coverage. 
On the other hand, if the agreement follows the GPA, the more negotiating parties it involves, the 
more diversified circumstances its negotiating parties have, the more complicated and 
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 For detailed discussion see Section 
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 For detailed discussion see Section 7.2.1.1 
13
 For detailed discussion see Section 
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time-consuming the negotiating process will be involved, but surely the multilateral nature of the 
agreement will make its negotiating costs even higher than those of the GPA. Obviously, either 
solution is far from desirable.  
  Meanwhile, the complexity of a procurement agreement may also be reflected in its procedural 
rules governing the award proceeding of public contracts. As mentioned above, many international 
procurement instruments reply heavily on minimum procedural rules to ensure transparency.  
However, as elaborated in Section 8.3.1.1, if a detailed approach is adopted, the complexity of 
situations involved in procurement will inevitably result in complicated rules addressing every detail 
of all kinds of procurements with different levels of complexity, of different types of procurement 
procedures, and of different publication or communication methods, etc. Such transparency rules are 
often comprehensive and complex and thus potentially very difficult to draft. Even if a complete set 
of detailed and flawless transparency rules could be drafted, it would still take considerable time, 
efforts and resources for different countries with diversified situations to agree on it, if at all 
possible.  
   As with a binding procurement agreement, the more detailed its rules are, the more diversified 
circumstances its participating countries have, the higher negotiating costs involved. The negotiating 
costs tend to be relatively lower if transparency rules are adopted at the regional level with similar 
minded membership such as the EC procurement rules (see Section 7.3.1.1). However the 
negotiating costs associated with detailed transparency rules increase as negotiations move from 
regional to multilateral level. The lengthy and heated negotiating history of the GPA14 can illustrate 
the high negotiating costs that a legally binding multilateral procurement agreement, with detailed 
procedural rules, might possibly entail. 
Consequently, it seems extremely difficult to develop a single set of detailed procedural rules for a 
future multilateral agreement within which states’ divergent regulatory approaches to procurement 
can be accommodated, particularly taking into account recent trends towards regulatory diversity in 
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 For a brief review of the GPA negotiating history, see Section 3.1.2.1 
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procurement.15 
  The complexity of procurement rules may also imply high implementing costs for participating 
states. Different from international rules calling for states’ abstention from certain actions, the 
minimum procedural rules contained in most procurement agreements are positive rules addressing 
award procedures from invitation to participate to award of contracts, which demand positive actions 
– either amending the existing national procurement legislation or establishing new procurement 
regulations where none presently exists.  
Participating states have to amend the details of their existing national legislation in accordance 
with detailed procedural requirements of a procurement agreement, even if domestic rules and 
practices conform to the underlying principles of the agreement. Also, more resources have to be 
devoted to training procurement officials to get acquainted with the newly adopted implementing 
rules. The implementing costs can be further increased by the requirement of most procurement 
agreements for the availability of national challenge procedures. It has been pointed out in Section 
7.3.1.2 that the complex and detailed feature of procurement rules make the implementation of many 
procurement agreements a very costly process.  
  As elaborated in Section 7.3.1.2, the implementing costs could be even higher in countries where 
existing procurement rules are less developed and thus more difficult to be adapted in line with the 
requirement of the agreement. However, these countries, most of which were developing or least 
developed countries, often lacked sufficient technical expertise and financial resources needed for 
implementing the agreement. It has been argued that complexity of substantive issues involved and 
lack of technical knowledge and capacity constitute two major deterrents to public procurement 
reform in developing countries.16  
  It can be seen that the high negotiating and implementing costs associated with the complex 
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 For detailed discussion, see Section 7.2.1.1 
16
 See R. Hunjia, ‘Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Developing countries’ In S. Arrowsmith & M. Trybus (eds), 
Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (2003)235 at pp.17-18 U. Although Hunjia identified these major 
impediments mainly in the context of developing countries’ unilateral reform, the author holds the view that these reasons 
may also apply, to a large extent, to the reforms initiated by their participating in an international procurement regime, or 
partly explain the difficulty in attracting their participation in any procurement agreement.  
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feature of international procurement rules creates obstacles to their wide acceptance and 
effectiveness. Therefore as regards a future multilateral procurement agreement, reducing its 
negotiation and implementing costs becomes one of the most important considerations in terms of 
calling for wide participation especially on the part of developing countries. 
 
11.3.1.4 Ongoing evolution  
Lastly, as we discussed in Section 7.3.1.4, public procurement is a fast-evolving area for 
international regulation, and international procurement agreements need to adapt to new 
technological and economic developments.  
Compared with national procurement legislations, it often involves more considerable delay to 
issue legislative amendments to binding international agreements. In particular, as with a binding 
procurement agreement, this would be even worse in view of complex procedural rules and coverage 
rules it may possibly have. The transparency procedure rules should be kept updated with the 
development of new technologies and new procurement strategies, while the coverage rules may 
need to be revised constantly in accordance with the progress of market liberalization.  
As demonstrated by the difficulty of the EC and the GPA in adjusting their procurement rules to 
the emergency of e-commerce and the change of market reality, the complex procedural and 
coverage rules combined with the difficulties of updating internationally may present an important 
obstacle to a multilateral procurement agreement.  
 
11.3.2 A long-term proposal 
Having considered the above features of public procurement and the possible advantages and 
disadvantages of soft law in terms of all the four dimensions identified in previous chapters, a 
long-term proposal for a multilateral procurement agreement is then raised, which is of a binding 
nature, with a low level of precision, a high level of discretion and a moderate level of delegation. 
Under this long-term proposal, participating states will undertake legally binding obligations and 
 323
make market access commitments. General rules will be included in defining its coverage subject to 
generally specified exceptions. There will be no scope for states to negotiate derogations for 
protectionist purposes. For example, a state is not allowed to include derogations for its industrial 
policies setting aside a certain number of contracts for its own car industry.  
However, each member state can negotiate country-specific derogations for existing procurement 
programmes promoting national social or environmental objectives. For example, states can 
negotiate derogations to exempt certain existing programmes under which price preferences are 
given to businesses employing disabled people or having sound environmental records even if they 
have adverse impact on foreign suppliers.  
The possibility for states to exempt certain social or environmental programmes is to respect 
states’ freedom to pursue their legitimate concerns while trying not to jeopardize the free trade 
objective. In this regard, the risk may still exist that such state discretion in implementing legitimate 
national objectives can possibly be abused to implement disguised protectionist procurement 
policies.  
Therefore states’ freedom to negotiate derogations for their procurement programmes will also be 
limited by certain abuse control techniques. For instance, states can negotiate derogations for their 
social or environmental programmes provided that the relevant programmes are not purely 
protectionist and satisfactory justifications are given, and the exempted programmes will be operated 
in a transparent way. Furthermore, an even higher level of discretion will be awarded to developing 
or least-developed countries - they will be allowed to negotiate transitional periods within which 
they can gradually adapt to the requirements of the agreement in implementation. 
With regard to the procedural rules of the proposed agreement, a principle-based approach will be 
employed for their legislative text; and a high degree of discretion will be given to states in 
negotiating and implementing their obligations. Thus a rule on minimum time limits, for example, 
could couched in terms of a general requirement of ‘reasonable’ or ‘sufficient’ period of time rather 
than specific standard minimum time limits rules as, for example, is the case with the GPA (see 
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Section 3.2.4.2) and the EC (see Section 4.1.4.2).  
Taking the rules on the choice of procurement methods as another example, it would follow the 
COMESA’s approach (see Section 4.5.4.3) and simply require the use of certain formal competitive 
tendering procedures as the standard methods, but leaving the possibility of using other alternative 
procurement methods to be defined by domestic law. However, the detailed, but possibly 
non-binding guidance, will be issued with the aim to provide information for parties implementing 
the rules as well as for judicial organs interpreting the rules. 
In addition, a moderate level of authority will be delegated to an independent body to enforce the 
agreement. This enforcement body is to be conferred with the task of ex-ante monitoring such as the 
publication and dissemination of self-reported and independently-collected information and ex post 
dispute settlement to hear challenges by aggrieved suppliers. As with its dispute settlement 
mechanism, although it involves the delegation of power to a dispute settlement body to adjudicate 
disputes, interpret rules and give rulings, the dispute settlement body’s discretion in interpreting the 
agreed rules will be confined to strictly adhering to the exact wording of the treaty texts, and its 
rulings will only be binding upon the parties to the specific dispute, but will not create binding 
precedents for future disputes. 
 
11.3.3. The long-term proposal to address the particular features of procurement and the 
legitimate concerns of participating states – How does it work? 
First of all, the intrusive feature of international procurement rules could arguably be mitigated 
under the proposed long-term multilateral agreement: it may largely preserve states’ regulatory 
freedom to implement their legitimate national goals while effectively eliminating national 
discriminatory procurement practices.  
With respect to its coverage, although the agreement includes general coverage rules applicable 
for all participating states, it leaves the way open for states to negotiate their country-specific 
derogations to exempt certain existing procurement programmes under which procurement is used as 
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a tool of social or environmental policy. In this way, the coverage of the agreement can target 
national discriminatory procurements in a wide range of sectors and industries but its relatively 
flexible approach still allows states to retain regulatory freedom over certain entities or procurement 
contracts for legitimate, non-economic concerns. 
As with its transparency procedural rules, the choice of soft law with a lower level of precision 
and a high level of discretion in the proposed long-term agreement allows participating states to 
implement their obligations according to their particular situations rather than trying to 
accommodate divergent national circumstances within a detailed single text. Bearing in mind the 
fact that a multilateral agreement on procurement will be applied by a diverse range of countries 
with significant differences in their approach to regulation, vague soft law granting states discretion 
is desirable in the sense that it enables states to implement national procurement policies in a way 
most appropriate to their circumstances.  
As explained in Section 8.3.1.3 and Section 9.3.1.2, soft law in terms of a low level of precision 
and a high level of discretion can provide states with more freedom of choice in pursuing value for 
money and efficiency. For example, it has been discussed that the detailed rules governing the choice 
of procurement methods in many procurement agreements such as the GPA (see Section 3.2.4.3); the 
EC (see Section 4.1.4.3) and the NAFTA (see Section 4.3.4.3) largely limit states’ ability to pursue 
value for money in procurement.  
By contrast, if the proposed long-term multilateral agreement follows the approach of the 
COMESA (see Section 4.5.4.3) directive and includes a general rule requiring the use of certain 
formal competitive tendering procedures as the standard methods, but without precisely defining 
conditions for the use of more informal procurement methods, states will have more freedom in 
designing their own systems. Those mainly relying on strict transparency rules can formulate 
stringent requirements on the derogations from formal competitive tendering, whilst others in favour 
of greater reliance on the exercise of professional judgement of procuring officials are free to permit 
the use of other informal procedures in a broad range of circumstances.  
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This discretion over the choice of procurement methods enables states to obtain best value for 
money and efficiency in procurement. The divergent approaches adopted by different states will not 
affect equal market accession to foreign suppliers as long as the general principles of 
non-discrimination and transparency are observed. 
Moreover, by resorting to soft law in terms of vagueness and discretion, the proposed long-term 
agreement can also avoid unnecessary restrictions on states’ freedom to implement legitimate 
secondary policies. It has been pointed out in Section 7.3.1.3 that both the general principles of 
non-discrimination and the detailed transparency rules contained in many procurement agreements 
restrict states’ freedom to employ procurement as a policy tool to implement industrial, social and 
environmental objectives. As for the proposed short-term agreement, such secondary policies with 
either de jure or de facto discrimination will also be prohibited by its national treatment principle. 
 However, there will no detailed and restrictive transparency rules on contract award procedure to 
limit the pursuit of those social or environmental policies without any discriminatory effect. In this 
way, the agreement will target states’ protectionist procurement practices while at the same time 
preserving states’ ability to implement legitimate social and environmental policies in procurement. 
Additionally, under the proposed long-term agreement, states’ preserved freedom to promote their 
legitimate procurement objectives will to a certain extent be guaranteed by its moderate level of 
delegation in enforcement at inter-governmental level. As illustrated by the EC’s experience (see 
Section 4.1.4.4a), precise and additional obligations can be developed from the vague wording of 
treaty provisions through expansive judicial interpretation, and consequently states’ ability to 
implement their own national procurement policies may be increasingly restricted.  
Indeed, as for a legally binding agreement with a high level of delegation in enforcement, vague 
soft law which is deliberately used to give states more discretion in implementation may also imply 
a wider scope for judicial interpretation, which may lead to more restricted states’ discretion.17 
However, although the proposed agreement will delegate an adjudicative power to a third party, its 
                                                        
17
 For detailed discussion, see Section 7.2.4.2a 
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mandate as well as the legal effect of its rulings will be largely curtailed. It will be required to stick 
strictly to the exact wording of legal provisions.  
Although the use of vague soft law in the proposed long-term agreement may leave the designated 
body more discretion in judicial interpretation, the detailed non-binding guidance issued alongside 
the general rules may largely restrain such discretion. The non-binding nature of the guidance makes 
it easily amendable in view of technological or commercial changes that affect the practice of 
procurement. Therefore the need for judicial organs to interpret the rules in adaptation to changing 
circumstances can be largely reduced. As a result, the threat posed by the designated adjudicative 
body to the regulatory balance achieved under the proposed agreement would be largely avoided by 
constraining its freedom in interpretation. 
So far as the delegation of judicial authority to domestic review bodies is concerned, states’ 
regulatory freedom often will not be too much threatened by the exercise of judicial power by 
designated domestic bodies. Like most procurement regimes, the proposed agreement will not have 
direct effect, and in most national systems that do not give an international agreement direct effect, 
the agreement can be invoked before national courts only if the relevant national legislation has been 
adopted to implement it. Consequently, the scope of judicial discretion of domestic review bodies in 
applying and interpreting the proposed agreement will be largely constrained by the relevant national 
implementing legislation. So states can ensure their freedom to pursue legitimate national objectives 
by explicitly writing them into their domestic law. 
Secondly, the long-term proposal is designed to ensure states’ compliance with the agreed rules 
taking into account the sensitivity of procurement. The choice of hard law in terms of bindingness 
for the proposed agreement may be justified on the assumption that it can increase the credibility of 
the agreed rules. As explained in Section 2.4.1, the legal consequences flowing from binding 
obligations can induce conforming behaviours by making the choice of non-compliance more costly. 
The form of legally binding convention has been argued in Section 7.3.2 as an indispensable tool for 
resisting long-term political pressure from domestic vested interest. Therefore in view of the 
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sensitive nature of procurement, a binding form is chosen for the agreement with the aim to resist the 
domestic negative political pressure and to bind government themselves or their successors in the 
future. 
Besides the binding form of the agreement itself, its delegation of power to a third body to 
adjudicate disputes can also serve as an effective deterrent to non-compliance in spite of the 
perceived domestic political pressure. Under the proposed agreement, there will be an independent 
dispute settlement body which can receive alleged non-compliance complaints and award coercive 
measures such as sanctions in the case of established breaches. As discussed in Section 2.4.3, the 
availability of dispute settlement bodies and coercive enforcement measures may encourage 
compliance in the sense that reluctant states would probably be convinced that the likelihood that a 
violation will be detected and sanctioned makes the expected costs of violation exceed those of 
compliance.  
Besides its hard law dispute settlement mechanisms, the proposed agreement will also utilise 
certain soft law preventative measure including self-reporting and policy review mainly related to 
efforts to inspect and evaluate state behaviour before violations actually occur.  
  Thirdly, the use of vague and discretional soft law in the long-term proposal may address the 
complex feature of procurement, and significantly reduce the high negotiating and implementing 
costs associated with the coverage rules and transparency rules of a procurement agreement.  
With regard to the issue of coverage, the proposed coverage rule will lie somewhere between the 
uniform approach of the EC ruling out any possibility of derogations (see Section 4.1.2), and that of 
most binding procurement regimes such as the GPA and the NAFTA which accords states absolute 
freedom in negotiating their coverage (see Section 3.2.2 and Section 4.3.2). The proposed agreement 
is intended to set out general coverage rules but states are allowed to negotiate country-specific 
derogations for certain existing procurement programmes while developing and least developed 
countries can also negotiate particular transitional measures. 
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The discretion states have in negotiating derogations and transitional measures can possibly help 
the proposed multilateral procurement agreement to achieve a broad coverage as well as to attract 
wide participation. States can participate in the multilateral procurement regime while maintaining 
their existing procurement programme to promote social or environmental goals. In the case of 
developing or least developed countries, it will be possible for them to negotiate transitional 
measures to gradually eliminate their discriminatory procurement practices.  
This represents a more flexible approach than that of the EC, which is arguably indispensable in 
view of the much more diversified membership of the proposed multilateral agreement. However, 
different from the approach of the GPA, the proposed agreement will also restrict states’ discretion 
by including general coverage rules for all member states, which largely avoids the complicated and 
time-consuming process of item-for-item bilateral negotiations between states and the problem of 
‘reciprocity’ under the GPA18and thus significantly lower negotiating costs. 
As regards the transparency rules, soft law in terms of vagueness and discretion has been 
proposed for the long-term multilateral procurement agreement taking into account the complex 
feature of public procurement as well as the diversity of states’ regulatory approach in procurement. 
It has been argued in Section 8.3.1.4 that the choice of vague soft law can avoid the difficulty in 
formulating detailed rules addressing complicated situations in procurement and therefore lowers the 
incidence of drafting errors and consequent redrafting.  
More importantly, compared with the relevant hard law employed in many binding agreements, 
the use of vague soft law makes it much easier for negotiating parties to agree on transparency 
procedural rules owing to its better ability to accommodate states’ divergent regulatory approaches 
in procurement (see Section 8.3.1.1). In this sense, the proposed multilateral agreement may involve 
less negotiating costs than many binding procurement agreements including the GPA. 
  Meanwhile, the use of soft law in terms of vagueness and discretion for the proposed agreement 
can also reduce its implementing costs. As elaborated in Section 8.3.1.2, vague soft law without a 
                                                        
18
 For the discussion on the GPA’s negotiating history on coverage, see  
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high level of delegation can significantly reduce implementing costs of a procurement agreement by 
reducing the need for states to revise the details of their existing legislation. In the presence of the 
designated body with strictly limited interpreting authority, states may only have to ensure that their 
national procurement legislation comply with the general principles in the proposed agreement.  
There will be no prescriptive requirements expressly contained in its legal provisions or 
potentially to be developed through judicial interpretations for them to adjust the details of their 
procurement rules. Therefore the costs of adapting domestic legislation and training procuring 
officials can largely be reduced, which will be particularly important for many developing county 
members with less-developed procurement legislation and limited resources available.  
Also, soft law with a high level of discretion in implementation in the proposed agreement can 
reduce its implementing costs by offering states a wider range of choices in implementing their 
obligations. As argued Section 9.3.1.1, the flexibility offered by soft law in terms of discretion can 
make it more likely for states to find a cost-effective way to transpose international procurement 
rules into national legislation.  
This argument is also true with regard to a future multilateral agreement. For instance, similar to 
most procurement agreements, the proposed multilateral agreement will require states to make 
available a domestic review body for aggrieved suppliers but leave them a broad discretion in 
implementing this requirement. States can therefore freely establish or designate their own challenge 
review bodies according to their own legal tradition and available resources so long as certain 
general requirements are met. Obviously, this approach will entail less implementing costs than the 
one prescribing a certain type of court or administrative body to be set up to take on this role. 
  Lastly, the proposed long-term multilateral agreement will probably also fit well with the 
fast-evolving feature of public procurement. It has been pointed out in Section 7.3.1.4 that 
difficulties have often been found in many binding procurement regimes to update their procedural 
and coverage rules to technological and economic developments. In Section 7.3.1.4, and Section 
8.3.1.4, soft law in terms of non-bindingness and in terms of vagueness have been identified 
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respectively as desirable options to make procurement rules more adaptive to changing 
circumstances.  
In the case of the proposed multilateral agreement, its binding form will make the issuance of 
legislative amendments significantly lag behind developments, while its limited delegation in 
interpreting power will affect the ability of the designated body to interpret the agreed rules in a way 
reflecting the change of circumstances. Nevertheless, as with a binding procurement agreement, the 
more ambiguous its procedural rules, the stronger capability it has in the face of rapidly changing 
environment. So the use of vague soft law in the proposed agreement can enhance its ability in 
adapting to changes, and thus significantly reduce the need for constant updating through lengthy 
and costly legislative amendments.   
 
11.3.4. The potential risks of the long-term proposal 
Although the proposed long-term agreement can well address the particular features of procurement, 
it involves potential risks, in particular, with respect to its use of soft law in terms of vagueness and 
discretion. As argued in Section 8.3.2.1 and Section 9.3.2.1, the use of vague soft law may increase 
the possibility of divergent interpretation of the agreed rules among participation states, while a high 
level of discretion can make it very difficult to determine whether a participating state is living up to 
its commitments and thus increasing the chance for opportunistic states to shirk from their 
obligations.  
As with the proposed agreement, the possible disadvantages of soft law identified in the previous 
analysis still apply: the vagueness of the rules may lead to legal uncertainty in terms of states’ 
obligations, and the discretion given to states for legitimate national goals can be abused to 
implement disguised protectionist procurement policies instead. 
However it is not necessarily true that the use of soft law with a low level of precision and a high 
level of discretion would inevitably jeopardize the fundamental principle of non-discrimination. 
Under the proposed agreement, these possible disadvantages of soft law may, to a certain extent, be 
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addressed by its detailed non-binding guidance on how to apply the rules as well as its effective 
enforcement system. Furthermore, the potential risks such as the implementation of disguised 
protectionist procurement policies may be associated with all procurement regimes even those with 
very detailed and stringent procedural rules in place because of the limits on what transparency rules 
can achieve as mentioned in Section 8.3.2.1. 
 
11.4 Possible links between the short-term and long-term proposals 
As we can see, the short-term and long-term proposals raised in this chapter are comprised of 
different soft and hard law elements. Furthermore, these two proposals are different in terms of the 
different aims they are trying to achieve: the short term proposal is intended to employ soft law to 
tackle the ‘illegitimate' concerns of many states and achieve a multilateral agreement by mitigating 
the political opposition from domestic vested interests, whilst the long term proposal uses the 
combination of both hard and soft law to address states’ legitimate concerns and the particular 
features of public procurement. Nevertheless the short-term and long-term proposals are interrelated 
in the sense that the former can develop into or contribute to the conclusion of the latter. 
The short-term proposal consists of all the four soft law elements in terms of bindingness, 
precision, discretion and delegation and the long-term proposal combines both hard law elements in 
terms of bindingness and delegation and soft law elements in terms of precision and discretion. It 
can be seen that the short-term proposal would be adapted to become the long-term proposal if its 
soft law elements of non-bindingness and a low level of delegation could later harden into 
bindingness and a moderate level of delegation.  
It has been argued in Section 2.3.1 that soft law can sometimes serve as ‘intermediate step’ 
towards the formation of hard law rules. As discussed in Section 11.2.4, the non-binding form of the 
proposed short-term multilateral agreement may have the potential to evolve into the binding one. 
Similarly, the low level of delegation in enforcement included in the short-term proposal may 
develop to be a higher level over time, which amounts to the moderate level of delegation in the 
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long-term proposal. As pointed out in Section 10.2, it is possible for a procurement agreement with a 
low level of delegation in enforcement to transform into the one with a higher level of delegation, as 
demonstrated by the development of the GPA enforcement procedures.  
The development from the short-term proposal to the long-term proposal can be regarded as a 
process of transforming a second-best multilateral procurement agreement compromised with 
current political reality, to a desirable one in consideration of the particular features of public 
procurement. However, the short-term proposal is not necessarily made as a first step in a process 
eventually leading to the long-term proposal at a certain point in the future. Even if the short-term 
proposal does not harden up to the long-term proposal, it still performs important legal functions 
given the current situation. So the short-term and long-term proposals are raised separately and for 
different purposes despite their possible links.
Chapter 12 Conclusion 
 
As explained at the outset, the research question of this thesis was to evaluate soft law as a method to 
regulate public procurement from a trade perspective, more specifically to outline the possible 
advantages and disadvantages that soft law could have in the area of procurement, and to identify factors 
specific to procurement that might be relevant for soft law’s influence in that particular area. In order to 
answer the research question, the thesis developed a four-fold framework to study ‘soft law’, reviewed 
the existing international procurement regimes, examined the possible advantages and disadvantages of 
soft law in terms of regulating procurement, and set out both a short-term and a long-term proposal for a 
multilateral procurement agreement taking into account the special features of procurement.  
Part I 
The first part provided for a definition of and a framework for ‘soft law’ with the aim to limit the scope 
of the subject matter for the purpose of the thesis. Moreover, it generally discussed the role soft law 
plays in contemporary international system as a whole. 
We saw that ‘Soft law’ was defined as rules of conduct that are formulated in instruments which lack 
certain core elements of hard law, but nevertheless not are devoid of all the legal effects of hard law, and 
that are aimed at and may have practical effects comparable to hard law. Largely based on Abbott et al’s 
legalization framework but with slight adaptations, a framework of types of soft law was also set up, 
which classifies soft law instruments according to a four-fold approach – bindingness, precision, 
discretion and delegation. In this sense, an international legal instrument can be considered soft along 
one or more of the above four dimensions. This approach was employed throughout the thesis. 
It was also pointed out that the role of soft law in international legal system mainly involves two 
functions. The first is that soft law may serve as a second-best to hard law where the latter cannot be 
achieved but the subject matter still demands international regulation. It was explained that soft law 
can be resorted to in order to break deadlocks and promote agreement during negotiations and to 
provide a certain degree of regulation in its implementation. Also, such soft law regulation can be 
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regarded as an ‘intermediate step’ towards the formation of hard law even though this is not 
necessarily the case.  
The second role soft law mainly plays is that in some cases it can be chosen as a better alternative 
to hard law even where the latter is attainable, and it may produce similar effects of hard law but 
avoid some of the costs of hard law. Soft law was argued to have certain independent advantages of 
its own. In comparison with hard law, it was explained that firstly, soft law can be used as a method 
to reduce negotiating costs; secondly, it may entail lower sovereignty costs for participating states; 
thirdly, it can offer better options to deal with changing circumstances; and lastly the soft law form 
may sometimes be chosen for technical reasons.  
Despite various advantages that soft law can better offer over hard law, possible disadvantages 
associated with soft law were mentioned and possible ways of addressing these disadvantages were 
also suggested. Most important of all, soft law may lack the function of hard law in strengthening 
the credibility of commitments and inducing compliance. Moreover, soft law may raise the 
transaction costs of subsequent interactions.  
In order to study the issue of states’ compliance with international rules, the factors which may 
possibly affect states’ choice to comply were identified including the calculation of benefits and 
costs of violation, lack of capability to comply and ambiguity of the rule, whilst measures employed 
by different international regimes to induce compliance were also discussed such as sanctions, 
dispute settlement mechanism, violation preventative measures, denial of benefits and capacity 
building. It was examined how different types of soft law affect states’ choice to comply in view of 
the above mentioned factors and measures influencing compliance.  
Although it is true that the legal consequences flowing from binding obligations may deter 
non-compliance by making the choice of non-compliance more costly, states are still reluctant to 
violate their soft law obligations for other reasons such as the maintenance of the stability of the 
international legal system and the fear of the bad name of violator. It was then argued that 
compliance with soft law might still be ensured by introducing a well-designed soft law monitoring 
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system including the establishment of an OECD-like peer review system and self-reporting and 
publication system. 
  Part II 
The second part of the thesis reviewed the current procurement regimes, either with or without a 
trade objective. These international and regional procurement instruments share similarities as well 
as differences, and they were examined and compared in terms of their objectives, general 
approaches, coverage, secondary policies and the soft law and hard law issues. 
  It provided an overview of procurement rules within the WTO framework. First of all, the GPA 
was reviewed. In terms of the soft law and hard law issues, it was found that the GPA is an 
international agreement of a binding nature, with a varying degree of precision among its provisions, 
with a fairly high degree of discretion accorded to all members and an even higher degree of 
discretion to developing countries members, and with a high level of delegation in enforcement.  
In this part, the failed attempt to negotiate the proposed WTO multilateral agreement on 
transparency in procurement was also examined to illustrate the current difficulty of negotiating any 
procurement agreement at the multilateral level. During negotiations, there were substantial 
disagreements concerning both the form and content of the proposed transparency agreement, most 
of which involves the choices over the four dimensions of soft/hard law, especially over its 
binding/non-binding nature and its challenge procedures. Beneath the apparent disagreements, the 
underlying difficulty was also revealed in reconciling the opposite position held by developed and 
developing countries: developed countries were keen to obtain a greater share of developing 
countries’ procurement market, while developing countries wanted to preserve their current 
procurement policies. 
It then examined the major procurement instruments with trade objectives at regional level: the 
EC procurement rules; the NAFTA Chapter 10; Chapter XVIII of the third draft of FTAA agreement; 
the COMESA directives; and the APEC NBPs.  
Among them, the EC procurement regime represents the hardest approach, which combines a 
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binding form, the highest level of precision, the lowest level of discretion, and the highest level of 
delegation. Most notably, the high level of authority delegated to the ECJ in interpreting the rules 
has further increased the precision of the rules as well as reduced states’ discretion in 
implementation. At the other end of the spectrum, both the COMESA directives and the APEC NBPs 
employ a pure soft law approach, which are of non-binding nature, having a very low level of 
precision and an extremely high level of discretion and no delegation at all to the third party to 
interpret the rules or to adjudication the relevant disputes. 
 Besides the above-mentioned international and regional procurement instruments, it also dealt 
with others also with trade objectives, namely, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement and the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement is a 
non-binding instrument in nature, which serves as a model to be followed voluntarily by national 
legislation. Its high level of precision responds to its original objective of harmonisation, whilst its 
high level of discretion makes it suitable to be adopted by states with different levels of economic 
development and diversified political and legal systems.  
It was also pointed out that the development of OECD instruments combating bribery seemed to 
support the argument made earlier that soft law instruments could be resorted to for difficult issues 
when the relevant hard law could not be achieved, but certain elements of such soft law might 
harden up when possible and desirable. 
Although the focus of this thesis was to study the value of soft law from a trade perspective, a 
number of other international instruments regulating procurement with non-trade objectives were 
also reviewed including the World Bank’s rules governing its aid-funded procurement and the 
OECD’s Recommendation on Untying Aid. It was argued that either the use of hard law in the World 
Bank’s rules or the choice of soft law for the OECD’s Recommendation is appropriate in light of the 
nature of subject matter regulated. 
  Part III 
After having examined the current procurement regimes, the third part of the thesis analysed the 
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possible advantages and disadvantages of the four dimensions of soft law in terms of regulating 
procurement with the aim of market liberalisation. It considered whether and how the advantages 
and disadvantages of soft law generally identified in Part I could apply in the particular area of 
procurement, drawing on the existing experiences of regulating procurement under international 
instruments that were discussed in Part III   
  This part studied the value of the four dimensions of soft law, i.e. non-bindingness, precision, 
discretion and delegation in the area of public procurement respectively. It was found that the 
function of soft law serving as a second best to hard law deserves special attention in this area. It 
was explained that public procurement is a sensitive subject area in the sense that many states are 
often unwilling to give up their regulatory freedom to use procurement for protectionism purposes. 
As illustrated by the failed experience to negotiate the proposed WTO transparency agreement 
examined in Part II, procurement has always been a controversial issue during international trade 
negotiations.  
In this regard, the first dimension of soft law or non-bindingness was argued as an effective device 
for breaking deadlock and fostering compromises in negotiating a procurement agreement and 
avoiding the costs of having no agreement at all. It is more likely that substantial disagreements 
among negotiating parties over specific aspects of a procurement agreement can be resolved if a 
non-binding agreement is agreed upon. More importantly, non-binding soft law can arguably 
reconcile different oppositions held by different negotiating parties, and mitigate political opposition 
from domestic vested interests.  
Like non-binding soft law, it was argued that soft law with a low level of precision, or with a high 
level of discretion, or with a low level of delegation could help to facilitate compromise and promote 
agreement during negotiations, and to provide a certain degree of regulation at the implementing 
stage, which may have the potential to harden up in the future. Nevertheless, even soft law 
procurement rules with no prospect of hardening up were argued to be better than no law at all.  
  Besides serving as a second best to hard law, soft law can be regarded as a better alternative to 
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hard law even where the latter is attainable. It was found that most independent advantages of soft 
law identified in Part I are relevant in the context of procurement such as its reduced negotiating 
costs, reduced implementing costs, reduced sovereignty costs and better adaptation to changes.  
Firstly, due to the complexity of its procedural rules and coverage rules and its generally sensitive 
nature, the adoption of a hard law procurement agreement normally entails significant negotiating 
costs, and therefore the advantage of soft law in reducing negotiating costs is particularly valuable in 
this context. As regards soft law in terms of bindingness, it was explained that the non-binding form 
of a procurement agreement can lower the negotiating costs by making it easier for detailed 
procedural rules to be adopted as well as avoiding the necessity of negotiating and drafting detailed 
procedural and coverage rules. 
Soft law in terms of precision or in terms of delegation can also significantly reduce negotiating 
costs of a procurement agreement. As we know, procedural rules governing tendering can be very 
complex and detailed. It was argued that soft law in terms of precision can reduce negotiating costs 
by avoiding the difficulty in formulating detailed rules, lowering the incidence of drafting errors and 
consequent redrafting, reducing the need for updating, and more importantly, by making it easier for 
states with different regulatory approaches in procurement to agree on procurement rules. Soft law in 
terms of delegation can produce similar effects by accommodating states’ divided views on the 
enforcement rules as well as by making it easier for states to agree on other procurement rules. 
Secondly, the implementation of an international procurement agreement would often entail 
amendments to the existing national government procurement regime and training of procurement 
officers to become acquainted with the international rules. This might prove a costly process if the 
agreement is binding in nature and sets out very detailed rules which are complex and difficult to 
apply in practice. 
Consequently, the choice of non-binding soft law was argued to be a more gradual and less costly 
way of opening up procurement markets as far as the implementing costs are concerned. Moreover, 
soft law in terms of precision and in terms of discretion may arguably reduce implementing costs of 
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a procurement agreement by offering states a wide range of choices in implementing the agreement 
as well as reducing the need for states to revise the details of their existing legislation. Also, soft law 
with no delegation to domestic review bodies can help states to avoid the costs of setting up and 
maintaining a national challenge system for aggrieved suppliers and thus partly reduce the 
implementing costs of procurement agreements. 
Thirdly, it was explained that legally binding procurement instruments often impose high 
sovereignty costs on participating states because of their more intrusive nature on states’ regulatory 
autonomy compared with many other areas of international trade law. As a result, when formulating 
a procurement instrument, its trade objective should be balanced with states’ legitimate objectives 
concerning national security, social equity, and environmental protection.  
Bearing in mind the intrusive nature of procurement law, it was argued that soft law in terms of 
bindingness, in terms of precision, in terms of discretion or in terms of delegation, might reduce 
sovereignty costs of a procurement agreement by preserving states’ regulatory autonomy to 
implement legitimate national goals though the effects of these four soft law dimensions depend on 
one another.  
It was explained that soft law in terms of precision sometimes entails lower sovereignty costs 
because the vague wording of rules may accord states more discretion in implementing their 
obligations rather than trying to accommodate divergent national circumstances within a detailed 
single text. However, it was also pointed out that the actual implication of vague soft law on 
sovereignty costs still very much depends on the level of delegation agreed for a particular 
procurement agreement. It would be possible for some vague rules to be developed to impose 
precise obligations through judicial interpretations if a high level of interpreting authority was 
delegated to a third party. This is considered important in procurement but can be intrusive. 
Meanwhile, as for a procurement regime involving a high level of delegation, the precision may not 
necessarily of itself imply higher sovereign costs but just greater clarity of treatment. 
  Lastly, it was pointed out that public procurement is a fast-changing area for international 
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regulation, and international procurement regimes need to constantly adapt to technological and 
economic developments in this area. The thesis then argued that the choice of soft law in terms of 
bindingness or in terms of precision makes it much easier for a procurement agreement to adapt to 
changing circumstance. A non-binding procurement agreement can be amended more quickly and 
easily than a binding one, and more significantly, the non-binding nature of the agreement itself 
provide states with flexibility in adapting to changes. Soft law in terms of precision was also argued 
be more suitable to adaptation to changes. As for a procurement agreement, the more ambiguous its 
procedural rules, the stronger capability it has in the face of a rapidly changing environment. 
  Besides the above possible advantages of soft law in terms of bindingness, precision, discretion, 
and delegation, the relevant disadvantages were also identified. Most important of all, the choice of 
soft law for a procurement agreement may possibly weaken the credibility of its rules, which can 
arguably be very problematic taking into account its perceived challenge of negative political 
influence and reciprocal nature of obligations. 
Regarding non-binding soft law, the legal consequences flowing from binding obligations can 
deter non-compliance and strengthen the credibility of member states’ commitments for both internal 
and external purposes, and the choice of non-binding soft law sacrifices such deterrence. The use of 
vague soft law in procurement rules may also affect the credibility of the rules by making it harder to 
determine whether a state is living up to its commitments and increasing the possibility of divergent 
interpretation of the rules among participating states.  
  Moreover, it was argued that soft law, giving a high level of states’ discretion in implementation, 
increases the chance for opportunistic states to shirk from their obligations, while soft law with a 
low level of delegation in enforcement may affect the credibility of the agreed rules by failing to 
provide an effective deterrent to non-compliance and to maintain legal consistency and 
predictability. 
However, the soft law rules’ possibly weakened credibility can arguably be addressed by 
incorporating a well-designed monitoring system. It was argued that carefully designed soft law 
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enforcement measures could induce states’ compliance even though they do not involve formal 
adjudication and coercive force. In this regard, certain soft law enforcement measures were raised 
including OECD-like peer review, self-reporting and the publication and dissemination of 
self-reported and peer-assessed information. Also, the involvement of private actors in enforcing the 
rules was mentioned as a way to makes it more difficult for states to shirk their obligations. 
Another possible disadvantage identified is the increased intergovernmental transactional costs, 
which is mainly associated with soft law in terms of precision and in terms of delegation. It was 
argued that soft law with a low level of precision or with no delegation may imply more 
transactional costs in interpreting and applying the agreed rules. This is because without 
authoritative judicial interpretation, vague soft law provides states with a wider scope for 
auto-interpretation, which may possibly lead to divergent interpretation and consequential 
inconsistent implementation among participating states. However, under a soft law system without a 
delegated third party to adjudicate disputes, the parties to a dispute might spend years in political 
negotiations in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution. It was also argued that such possibly 
high transactional costs can partly be reduced by issuing detailed guidance on how the vague rules 
should apply. 
  Part IV 
Based on the above conclusions, this part of the thesis set out both a short-term and long-term 
proposal for developing a multilateral agreement on government procurement by use of soft law.  
The short-term proposal is premised on the fact that no hard law multilateral procurement 
agreement with a wide participation of developing countries can currently be achieved. It was 
disclosed that many countries, especially developing countries, are unwilling to accept any hard law 
international procurement regulation and their major concerns were also identified. It was found that 
although developing countries could economically benefit from joining a multilateral procurement 
agreement, it would be politically difficult for most of them to reap such benefits. Compared with 
developed countries, developing countries tend to incur more political costs in participating in a 
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procurement agreement, while no compensating political support can be mobilized from export 
industries, owing to their limited supply capacity. 
Two possible ways were pointed out in order to break the political logjam holding back 
developing countries from liberalising their market: maximizing domestic political support from 
their export interest or minimizing the political opposition from their protected interests. More 
political support can be gained by linking procurement to other trade issues which interest 
developing countries. However, the short-term proposal only focused on the feasibility of using soft 
law to achieve a multilateral procurement agreement by reducing political resistance.  
In this regard, non-binding soft law was suggested as the most important means to assist in 
achieving the proposed short-term agreement by reconciling the different positions held by states, in 
particular, mitigating the strong political opposition from many developing countries. Moreover, the 
choice of soft law in terms of vagueness, in terms of discretion and in terms of delegation were also 
included in this short-term proposal with the aim to help foster compromises and promote agreement 
during negotiations and to make it easier to achieve the proposed multilateral agreement. 
From the perspective of international regulation, four main special features of public procurement 
were identified, i.e. intrusiveness, sensitivity, complexity and constant evolution. In view of the 
above special features of public procurement as well as the legitimate concerns of states, the 
long-term proposal for a future multilateral procurement agreement is raised, which is of a binding 
nature, with a low level of precision, a high level of discretion and a moderate level of delegation 
The following arguments were made to justify the desirability of the long-term proposal. Firstly, 
its use of soft law in terms of vagueness and discretion may mitigate the intrusiveness of 
international procurement rules by preserving states’ regulatory freedom to achieve legitimate 
national objectives while effectively outlawing states’ protectionist procurement practices.  
Secondly, despite the sensitive nature of procurement, the binding form of the proposed agreement 
as well as its enforcement system consisting of both a hard law dispute settlement mechanism and 
soft law preventive measures can resist the perceived strong political pressure from domestic vested 
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interests and thus ensure the credibility of the agreed rules. Thirdly, the choice of soft law in terms of 
vagueness and discretion in the agreement may tackle the complexity of procurement and 
significantly reduce its negotiating and implementing costs. Lastly, the use of vague soft law in the 
agreement can make it more capable of adapting to changes, which corresponds to the constant 
evolving feature of procurement.  
Having examined the feasibility of the short-term proposal to achieve a multilateral procurement 
agreement and the desirability of the long-term proposal to serve the particular features of public 
procurement, their possible limits or potential risks were also spelled out. States’ compliance with 
the proposed short-term agreement might be doubted even if it could be reached, while the proposed 
long-term agreement may possibly affect the legal certainty of the agreed rules and increase the 
chance of states implementing disguised protectionist procurement policies. 
At last, possible links between the short-term and long-term proposals were also pointed out. 
Although these two proposals are different in terms of the different aims they are trying to achieve, 
they are interrelated in the sense that the short-term proposal can, but may not necessarily, develop 
into or contribute to the conclusion of the long-term one. The possible development can be regarded 
as a process of transforming a second-best multilateral procurement agreement compromised with 
current political reality, to a desirable one in consideration of the particular features of procurement. 
Public procurement is an important aspect of international trade but still remain unaddressed by 
multilateral market-access rules. Trade in procurement has been and will continue being an 
important concern for future. The value of soft law in regulating procurement highlighted in this 
thesis as well as the proposals raised for a multilateral procurement agreement might provide a 
theoretical insight into possible ways of overcoming the difficulties in opening up procurement 
markets and thus achieving more efficient use of world resources. 
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